


Ex LIBRIS
UNIVERSITATIS
ALBERTAENSIS



The gift of
Dr. W.A.R. Kerr
1941



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2017 with funding from
University of Alberta Libraries

THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH
AND THE FUTURE

*Issued under the joint auspices of
The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
The Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
The Australian Institute of International Affairs,
The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs,
The South African Institute of International Affairs,
The Indian Institute of International Affairs*

The Institutes of International Affairs in the British Commonwealth are precluded by their rules from expressing, as Institutes, an opinion on any aspect of International or Imperial Affairs. Any opinions expressed in this book are, therefore, not those of the Institutes.

British Commonwealth Relations Conference

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND THE FUTURE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SECOND UNOFFICIAL CONFERENCE
ON BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
RELATIONS,
SYDNEY, 3rd-17th September, 1938

EDITED BY
H. V. HODSON

WITH A FOREWORD BY
THE HON.
SIR THOMAS BAVIN
K.C.M.G., K.C.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO

1939

✓

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMEN HOUSE, E.C. 4
London Edinburgh Glasgow New York
Toronto Melbourne Capetown Bombay
Calcutta Madras
HUMPHREY MILFORD
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY

Printed in Great Britain

FOREWORD

THIS book is designed to furnish an official report of the second Conference on British Commonwealth Relations, which was held at Lapstone, near Sydney, in September of 1938. The Conference was larger in numbers and, I think, perhaps more representative in character than the Toronto Conference of 1933. We, of the Australian Institute, were deeply gratified that our invitation to hold the Conference in Australia was accepted, and still more, that so many distinguished men should have joined the various delegations.

The holding of the Conference in Australia, or at all, was made possible only by the generous assistance we received from the Governments of the Commonwealth and of the State of New South Wales, and also from the Carnegie Corporation and the Rhodes Trustees. I wish, on behalf of the Australian Institute, and on behalf of all the members of the Conference, to express our high appreciation of this assistance.

There are those who doubt the value of such conferences as the one which has just closed. I hardly think this doubt would be shared by any one who took part in it, and had the experience that I was privileged to have, both of the formal discussions of the Conference and of the informal personal intercourse between delegates, which was by no means the least valuable and interesting feature of the proceedings. If the future organization of co-operative activity of the British Commonwealth of Nations is to be determined by carefully prepared objective deliberation, based upon a mutual understanding of the interests and aspirations of each component part, rather than by haphazard *ad hoc* decisions possibly adopted under the pressure of immediate exigencies, or by the time-honoured policy of merely letting things drift, it is not easy to think of any assembly better qualified to contribute to such deliberation than the gathering whose proceedings are recorded in this volume.

This is not to say, of course, that the Conference could not have been made more representative, nor that each of its members necessarily voiced any large body of opinion in their own countries. Taken as a whole, however, it may be said that each delegation represented a fair cross-section of opinion in the Dominion from which it came. In the result, it is no unreasonable boast to say that the discussions recorded in this volume represent a common fund of information about the currents of political thought, the special interests and aspirations of the Dominions, and the practicability of effective co-operation between them, which is not available elsewhere. The Conference itself, of course, had no official standing. It came to no conclusions, and its deliberations bound no one. But it could and, I think, did provide material which should be of the utmost value to the Commonwealth statesmen who have to deal with the problems considered at the Conference as problems of practical politics.

It would be a mistake, I think, to estimate the value of such a gathering as this by the degree of actual agreement achieved on questions of practical policy. If its members learn from the discussions the reasons why agreement on questions which, to them, are easy of solution, is unobtainable, if they are brought to understand why a practical course which to them is obvious and straightforward, is not acceptable to others, if, in short, they learn not only the extent of agreement which can be achieved, but the reasons for inability to agree, a useful purpose has been served. Looking at the Conference from this point of view, I do not think there is one member who did not leave the Conference feeling that he understood, far better than he had done before, actions and policies of other Dominions which previously had been unintelligible to him. There was not one, I believe, who did not realize the existence of factors which explained what he had previously regarded as anomalies or inconsistencies. In a word, there was, at the end of the Conference, much greater understanding and far less

misunderstanding of the widely diverse interests and aspirations of the communities which make up the Commonwealth than there was at the beginning.

In any such conference as this there is a very natural tendency to stress particular interests and points of difference. People who agree about everything do not need to hold conferences. If any reader of this book should think, as I am bound to say I sometimes did during the discussions, that undue emphasis was laid upon difficulties and differences, that sometimes the wood was lost sight of because of the trees, this should not be allowed to obscure the much more important fact that there emerged from the debates a very definite agreement that the British Commonwealth should continue as a co-operative organization, able and willing to use its collective strength and influence to support the cause of freedom, of justice, and of peace. All the delegates agreed, I think, that the British Commonwealth was not an end in itself, but a means to a greater end. That end was seen as a world order: a co-operative organization of the nations of the world which should use its collective thought to promote the happiness and prosperity of mankind. They agreed, I believe, that the existence and maintenance of the British Commonwealth was a step towards that end, and that differences in the domestic interests or conditions or outlooks of the various Dominions need not prevent a common effort towards it.

To me, the outstanding feature of the Conference was a reassertion, and a re-emphasizing of the fact that the real unity and strength of the British Commonwealth, the real basis for practical co-operation, does not lie in formal constitutional bonds, nor in the formal adoption of a uniform policy in trade or defence or in foreign affairs. It lies in the close similarity of our ideals of government, in our common love of liberty, in our common aspirations for peace, reason, and justice in our external relationships, and for a better social order in our domestic affairs.

These things should make practical co-operation not

only possible, but natural, and should enable the Commonwealth, not only to hold together, but to maintain the place which Mr. H. V. Hodson, the Conference Recorder, whose masterly survey of the discussions forms an important part of this book, has claimed for it, a place in the van of the march towards a better ordered world.

Sydney,
October, 1938.

T. R. BAVIN,
Chairman of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference.

PREFACE

THIS published record of the proceedings of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938, which met at the Lapstone Hill Hotel, near Sydney, N.S.W., from September 3rd to 17th, 1938, is the result of a decision taken by the Steering Committee of the Conference, approving the conclusions of an Editorial Committee which it had set up at an earlier stage.

The Editorial Committee consisted of the Recorder of the Conference, Mr. H. V. Hodson, and the Secretary of the Conference, Mr. Ivison S. Macadam, *ex officio*, the Recorders of the four Commissions, who happened to be drawn from four different national delegations, and one member from each delegation not otherwise represented. Each member of the Editorial Committee was made responsible for finding a substitute from his own delegation if he himself was unable to attend. The original membership of the Committee was as follows:

Mr. H. V. Hodson (<i>Chairman</i>).			
<i>Australia</i>	.	.	Professor K. H. Bailey
<i>Canada</i>	.	.	Professor K. W. Taylor
<i>India</i>	.	.	Mr. Amjad Ali
<i>Ireland</i>	.	.	Mr. James Meenan
<i>New Zealand</i>	.	.	Professor F. L. W. Wood
<i>South Africa</i>	.	.	Professor S. H. Frankel
<i>United Kingdom</i>	.	.	Sir Alfred Zimmern
Mr. Ivison S. Macadam			
Mr. Anthony Gray (<i>Minutes Secretary</i>)			

The Committee held two meetings at Lapstone in the course of the Conference, and one meeting in Sydney after the Conference ended. By a decision of the Steering Committee, it had been authorized to take all decisions necessary for the editing and production of the Proceedings after the rising of the Conference, and at its last meeting it empowered the Conference Recorder, as

Editor, to take on its behalf whatever further action was required.

The plan of the book follows that adopted for the Proceedings of the first unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Toronto.¹ It falls into two main portions, namely, an analysis of the Agenda and of the preliminary work that was done upon it before the Conference assembled, and an account of the Conference meetings themselves, in so far as it is possible to reveal their details. One of the conditions under which the Conference was convened was that complete confidence should be accorded to everything said at its meetings, other than those expressly stated to be open to the public. The Conference was subjected to a good deal of criticism in the Australian Press and elsewhere for insisting upon this rule. But one of its most important purposes would have been entirely destroyed if its members had not felt themselves free to speak their minds frankly, without risk that their remarks might be used against them in their political careers at home, more especially if cabled back in an incomplete form, or that statements on such issues as foreign policy or defence might have an injurious effect if they were transmitted to foreign countries. It would obviously have been possible to hold an entirely public conference on British Commonwealth relations, but it would have been a quite different conference from that which the organizers had in mind and which actually took place. The Reports of the Commission Recorders, which are printed *in extenso* in this book, contain many verbatim passages from statements made at the Conference, and every effort has been made to give as faithful and complete a picture of the deliberations as possible. In his capacity both as Conference Recorder and Editor of the Proceedings, the writer wishes to express his gratitude to the Commission Recorders, who wrote reports of immense value, though

¹ *British Commonwealth Relations: Proceedings of the First Unofficial Conference at Toronto, 11-21 September, 1933.* Edited by Arnold J. Toynbee. London: Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d.

working in harassing circumstances and under great pressure of time. He would like to add a particular word of thanks to Professor K. W. Taylor, who not only acted as Recorder of Commission II, but also gave up his time after the conclusion of the Conference to help in the editing of this book.

The latter is not a complete record in itself. For a full appreciation of the work of the Conference it is necessary to turn also to the books that were published by the different participating Institutes of International Affairs as part of their documentation for the Conference. A full list of these books, and of other preparatory papers which it was not possible to publish, is given in Appendix II.

September 26th, 1938.

H. V. HODSON.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	<i>page</i> vii
PREFACE	xi
I. INTRODUCTION	I
II. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE MEMBER NATIONS	13
By H. V. Hodson, Recorder of the Conference	
(1) Introduction	15
(2) The United Kingdom	16
(3) Canada	47
(4) Australia	63
(5) New Zealand	81
(6) Ireland	97
(7) Conclusion	104
III. THE OPENING SESSIONS	113
(1) The First Public Session	115
(2) The Inaugural Address by the Chairman of the Conference	121
IV. THE REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION RECORDERS	133
Commission I: A Consideration of the Interests of the Individual Nations of the Commonwealth (Recorder: Professor K. H. Bailey)	135
Commission II: External Policies in their Economic Aspect (Recorder: Professor K. W. Taylor)	167
Commission III: External Policies in their Political and Strategic Aspects (Recorder: Professor F. L. W. Wood)	189
Commission IV: The Future of the Commonwealth as a Co-operative Organization (Recorder: Professor Sir Alfred Zimmern)	218
V. A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE	243
By H. V. Hodson, Recorder of the Conference	
(1) Introduction	245
(2) The Common Purpose	247
(3) Ideals and Ideologies	250
(4) The Colonial Problem	252

(5) Freer Trade and Higher Standards	<i>page</i> 254
(6) A Dynamic Commonwealth	257
(7) A World Order	258
(8) United Kingdom Solidarity	262
(9) The Problem of Co-operation	264
(10) Diversity and Uniformity	269
(11) The Problem of Responsibility	274
(12) The Commonwealth of the Future	276
VI. THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE STEERING COMMITTEE ON THE WORK OF THE CONFER- ENCE	281
VII. THE CLOSING SESSION	291
APPENDICES	
I. THE CONFERENCE AGENDA	299
II. LIST OF STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE CONFERENCE	305
III. ANNOTATED LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE	310
INDEX	327

PART I.
INTRODUCTION

PART I.

INTRODUCTION

THIS book is an attempt to make some permanent record of the work of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938, which was held in Australia, at the Lapstone Hotel, near Sydney, from September 3rd to 17th, 1938. The Conference was a successor to the British Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Toronto in 1933, and the following description of the Toronto Conference, written by Professor Arnold J. Toynbee in his introduction to its Proceedings, applies equally to the Sydney Conference:

This Conference was unofficial in every respect: in the initiative by which it was evolved, in the organization through which it was carried out, and in the personnel of its membership. The delegates were all of them people who at the time were in private stations, though many of them had behind them, and probably also in front of them, a long and distinguished experience of public life, while others were students of public affairs or experts in some department of politics, law, or economics. They attended the Conference in a purely private capacity, bringing no mandates, passing no resolutions, representing many different varieties and shades of opinion in their respective countries, and agreeing to differ in their personal views; but these circumstances, which had their intended effect in producing a discussion which was friendly as well as frank, by no means condemned the results of this discussion to be without effect.

After five years' experience of the influence exerted by the work of the Toronto Conference, one can speak with the greater confidence of the value of such meetings. Their effect is felt through four main channels. First of all, those who actually attend the Conference carry away with them a deeper understanding of the problems of British Commonwealth relations, and of the difficulties

placed in the way of their solution by differences of interest and outlook among the member nations of the Commonwealth and among different sections of their public opinion. They make invaluable personal contacts, both with other members of the Conference itself and, if they are visitors, with citizens of the country in which it is held. Since the delegates are selected as representative of different walks of life, and as, therefore, influential in many different spheres, this direct effect in broadening their acquaintance with the peoples of the Commonwealth and their understanding of its problems is likely to have wide repercussions in public affairs.

The second channel of influence is that of the people of the country in which the Conference is held. Through their local Press they read more of the proceedings and learn more about the personalities of the Conference than can citizens of other parts of the Commonwealth. Many of them have the advantage of meeting some of the visiting delegates personally, or of hearing them upon the platforms of various political and social organizations. In this connexion, broadcasting has immensely enlarged the power of the spoken word, spreading it among a far wider audience than could possibly hear a lecture or after-dinner speech. Apart from the three broadcasts on the work of the Conference included by the British Broadcasting Corporation in its Empire short-wave programmes, a large number of visiting delegates to the Conference were invited to broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Commission or commercial stations in Australia, both during the Conference itself and after its proceedings were ended.

The third channel of influence lies in the relations between the delegates and the public in their home countries. Some of them are politicians, some university teachers or lecturers in other educational courses, some journalists and authors. Thus the ripple of knowledge and understanding spreads ever wider. Above all, the Institutes of International Affairs in the participating countries disseminate the work of the Conference and are

in turn strengthened by it. The Toronto Conference gave an invaluable stimulus to the formation of Institutes in India, New Zealand, and South Africa, and it is hoped that the Sydney Conference may likewise stimulate the formation of an Institute in Ireland. But perhaps the strongest impulse is felt by the Institute in the host country, a larger number of whose members and potential members are able to take part in the Conference or follow its work closely than in the other participating countries.

The fourth concentric ring of the ripple is formed by the still larger public who are able to share in the work of the Conference through reading this volume or the other published books to which the Conference gave birth. This public is larger, not in the sense that the sales of such works can expect to attain a circulation more numerous than that represented by the listeners to an all-Empire or national broadcast, or the readers of a great daily newspaper, but in the sense that the written word remains for generation after generation to study and reflect upon.

The origins of the Sydney Conference go back to a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Kyoto in 1929, when members of the groups attending from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand adopted the proposal of an Australian member that matters affecting the British Commonwealth should be discussed at a conference similar in character to those of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to be specially convened for that purpose. Out of this initiative eventually emerged the Conference held at Toronto in 1933. At its final session this Conference endorsed the proposal of its Steering Committee that 'it would be desirable to hold a second British Commonwealth Relations Conference, the decision as to the time and venue of such a Conference to be left to a Committee consisting of the Chairman of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and of the governing bodies of the Institutes in the other Dominions; the initiative as to the convening of such a Committee

to be taken by Chatham House'. As a result of correspondence between the Royal Institute and the Canadian Institute, there took place in the course of the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Yosemite in August 1936 an informal meeting of representatives of the groups attending from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, under the chairmanship of the Hon. Newton W. Rowell, who had been Chairman of the Toronto Conference. It was there resolved unanimously that a second unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference be held, and that it should consider political and economic rather than constitutional problems, the main subject of its discussions to be foreign policy. In accordance with the wish expressed by this meeting, an Arrangements and Agenda Committee for the projected conference was called together at Chatham House in June 1937. The Committee consisted of a representative of each of the Institutes of International Affairs in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India, with Viscount Samuel as Chairman; at four of its five meetings an observer was present from the Irish Free State. The Committee gratefully accepted an invitation from the Australian Institute of International Affairs to hold the Conference in Australia in 1938, and set in motion the administrative machinery which duly resulted in the assembly of the Conference in Sydney on September 3rd, 1938.

The most important duty of the Committee, however, was to draw up an Agenda for the forthcoming Conference. The detailed Agenda on which it agreed, and which was accepted without amendment by the Conference itself, is printed in Appendix I of this volume. The Committee on Arrangements and Agenda prefaced it with a 'Note on the General Approach' which was of so great importance that it is worth while repeating the bulk of it here:

During the period when the Dominions were developing into autonomous states it was natural to think of them as a group and

the central problem of the Commonwealth as that of adjusting the constitutional relations of the Dominions with Great Britain. It was also natural to discuss that problem in terms of the formal and historic unity of the Commonwealth, with the result that possibly undue emphasis came to be laid on the centrifugal character of recent developments. The problem now is to attain the maximum of mutually advantageous co-operation among a number of autonomous and equal nations. In this phase the Dominions can no longer be assumed to form a group with common problems. The problems of the several nations of the Commonwealth are in many ways distinct, and upon the respective interests of those nations will largely depend the nature and degree of co-operation desirable between them. A careful consideration of these interests is therefore felt to be the most constructive and realistic approach to the examination of the possibilities of co-operation.

In pursuance of this line of approach, the authors of the Agenda propounded a plan whereby each participant in the Conference should already have, when he joined it, an appreciation of the different national interests and popular outlooks of the countries composing the Commonwealth. It was proposed that each member Institute should prepare a paper setting out these matters for its own country. There was to be no attempt to gloss over difficulties or differences, either within the country itself or between it and its fellow members of the Commonwealth. The Institutes were specifically instructed to refer both to advantages and to disadvantages of the existing Commonwealth association, and to give an objective survey of different opinions, rather than to attempt any compromise statement. Although it did not prove possible to lay before members of the Conference full statements of this kind from India or South Africa, and while the statement of Irish interests was admittedly incomplete, the preparatory papers were undoubtedly of immense value in serving the central purpose of the Conference, to seek how to attain 'the maximum of mutually advantageous co-operation among a number of autonomous and equal nations', building on solid and durable foundations, rather than on theories or passing sentiment.

This section of the Agenda was not completed by the circulation of the written word. To probe and elaborate these expressions of national interests and policy, mainly by way of question and answer between the different delegations, was the first task of the Conference when its formal business was concluded, and formed the subject-matter of Commission I. (At its first administrative session the Conference agreed to work through four commissions of its whole membership, rather than to split into specialized sub-commissions or round-tables.) This stage of the process was especially important with regard to those countries that had not submitted full written documents. Besides helping to illumine national interests that were universally acknowledged, it did a great deal to bring out the nature and extent of the differences between various sections of national opinion, in so far as these were represented in the delegations themselves.

The next stage in the Agenda, as it was envisaged by those who drew it up more than a year before the Conference opened, was to consider the facts thus revealed under two main heads, the one economic and the other political and strategic. The view that foreign policy and defence must be considered as an indivisible whole in times of stress in international affairs was reaffirmed by the Conference itself. To the economic section of the Agenda, forming the subject-matter of Commission II, the Agenda Committee attached an important note, remarking that no technical discussion of the economic problem was contemplated, but that the emphasis would be on its character as a vital element in the whole complex of international relations. Economic policies, it was remarked, have a profound effect upon the risk of war, by increasing or relieving international tension, and conversely the possibility of war may suggest precautionary changes in economic policy. This note on the direction of emphasis was not neglected by the Conference in its actual discussions.

The consideration of 'external policies in their political

and strategic aspects', the task of Commission III, was foreseen to be the critical item in the Conference agenda. Three stages of discussion were contemplated. First, there would be a debate on the similarities and divergencies of interests and outlooks of the member nations, on the bases of co-operation in foreign policy and defence, and on the obstacles to it. The Conference, having informed itself of these facts, would next consider a more general and theoretical question: to what extent should Commonwealth co-operation be uniform and comprehensive, to what extent based on group or bilateral understandings within the Commonwealth? For it was thought likely that the first debate might show such differences in degree, if not in character, of common interest, that the Conference would have to face the question whether the pace of co-operation must be that of the slowest, or whether co-operation might not proceed at different gaits as between different pairs or groups of member nations. At the third stage, with this problem cleared up, the Conference would consider the practical possibilities of co-operation or agreed external policy in regard to special regions or special topics.

Finally, under the heading 'The Future of the Commonwealth as a Co-operative Organization', the Agenda Committee posed the following question:

Does there emerge from the discussions any fresh conception of the Commonwealth arising from a re-assessment of the historical and constitutional factors in the light of the present interests and national composition of the individual countries forming the Commonwealth?

The consideration of this question was referred to Commission IV, and the answer, or answers, to it that the Conference supplied are to be found in the reports of the Recorder of that Commission and of the Conference Recorder.

The selection of delegates to the Conference was left in the hands of the several Institutes of International Affairs; in Ireland, where no Institute existed, a delegation was formed through the efforts of Mr. Donal

O'Sullivan, who became its leader. The Institutes endeavoured to bring together groups as representative as possible of different schools of political thought and technical interest, and in the task they were not confined to their own membership. The South African delegation, for instance, though small, contained leading members of the three chief political parties in the Union, a professor of economics, an expert on race relations, and a former Administrator of the territory of South-West Africa. The United Kingdom delegation, as an example of a larger group, included two Members of Parliament (one Conservative and the other Labour), a Liberal peer, a prominent trade unionist, a big employer, two senior representatives of the defence services, an expert on colonial policy, a woman educationalist, a senior civil servant recently retired from the Foreign Office, and a number of other authorities on international and imperial affairs. Every member of the Conference, it should be repeated, attended in his private and personal capacity, not as a nominee or spokesman of any public or private organization. The Conference itself, like the participating Institutes, was precluded from expressing any corporate opinion on the subjects under discussion.

The moment at which the Conference met inevitably affected the course of its deliberations. As the delegates assembled in Australia, the problem of Czechoslovakia's relations with Germany was being driven more and more violently to the front of international concern. A few days before the Conference met, Sir John Simon made his important speech reaffirming Mr. Neville Chamberlain's earlier statement of Britain's interest in the affairs of Central Europe and of the likelihood that through her association with France she would be drawn into any war arising there. Throughout the first week of the Conference the international excitement grew more tense. On Monday, September 12th, Herr Hitler delivered his inflammatory speech against Czechoslovakia at the Nuremberg Congress. On the following day the Prime Minister of Australia issued a statement

affirming his Government's support for the efforts of the Government of the United Kingdom to uphold world peace. In view of the attitude of warning to Germany that the latter Government was then publicly adopting, this statement was generally assumed by members of the Conference to be a pledge to stand by the United Kingdom in the event of war over Czechoslovakia, which then seemed not unlikely. Pronouncements by leaders of the Opposition parties at Westminster also indicated that they would support the Government in firm action to defend law and order in Europe. On Thursday, September 15th, two days before the Conference ended, Mr. Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden, at a moment when European war seemed imminent. It was not until Sunday, September 18th, after the members of the Conference had scattered, that M. Daladier and M. Bonnet came to London and assented to the plan for the severance of the Sudeten districts from Czechoslovakia. The Conference was thus held at a moment of the gravest crisis, in which one of the few morsels of comfort was to be found in the apparently growing solidarity of the democratic peoples, especially those of the British Commonwealth, in face of a naked threat to international order and morality.

PART II.

THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF
THE MEMBER NATIONS

- (1) INTRODUCTION
- (2) UNITED KINGDOM
- (3) CANADA
- (4) AUSTRALIA
- (5) NEW ZEALAND
- (6) IRELAND
- (7) CONCLUSION

PART II.

THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE MEMBER NATIONS

(I) INTRODUCTION

THE documentation of the Conference was prepared in accordance with Part I of the Agenda, which is printed in Appendix I. Each participating Institute or national group was invited to prepare papers analysing the national interests, position, and outlook of the member nation of the Conference that it represented, and other matters relevant to the Agenda. A list of the preparatory studies submitted to the Conference is contained in Appendix II. A number of them have already been printed and published to the world at large, and the Conference Editorial Committee put on record its hope that the several Institutes would see their way to publishing more. The analysis that follows cannot do justice to so large and informative a collection of studies.

It proved impossible for the South African and Indian Institutes of International Affairs to prepare suitable documents in time for submission to the Conference before it met, and speakers from those two countries had thus all the more difficult tasks in presenting to the Conference a picture of their national circumstances in the sittings of Commission I. There is no doubt that the existence of the preparatory documents immensely helped the work of the Conference, not only in that Commission but throughout its sessions. Indeed, while those documents could stand by themselves as an invaluable contribution to the understanding of the affairs of the nations of the Commonwealth and their mutual relations, the Conference itself, without them, would have lost a great part of its value and significance.

(2) THE UNITED KINGDOM

(a) *A World Power*

One outstanding characteristic distinguished the account of the United Kingdom's national interests from those of the Dominions. She is a world Power, and her interests—with the diplomatic machinery necessary to maintain them and the defensive system necessary to secure them—are scattered over every continent. Between different continents and countries, indeed, they naturally differ both in intensity and in the relative weight of economic and politico-strategic factors. Nevertheless, the first characteristic of the United Kingdom outlook upon world affairs, as revealed in the preparatory papers, is the universal scope of its vision, through both economic and political spectacles.

As far as trade is concerned, a table showed that in 1937 over 60 per cent. of the United Kingdom's imports came from foreign countries, and that well over half her exports went to foreign countries. It showed, too, that only one country (the United States, with 11.11 per cent.) supplied more than 9 per cent. of her imports, and that no country took more than 8 per cent. of her exports. As for defence, the priority given to the Navy with its ships in every sea may speak for itself; but it should also be noted that nominally one-half and actually rather more of the British Regular Army is always serving outside the United Kingdom, either in the overseas Empire or in foreign countries where His Majesty has treaty rights of local defence.

The world-wide spread of the United Kingdom's political and defensive interests is obviously due in some measure directly to the fact that she is responsible for a vast and scattered colonial Empire, and considers herself liable to come instantly to the aid of any of her fellow-members of the Commonwealth who might be the object of aggression. Since, however, as the historical passages in the preparatory study showed, important parts of the colonial Empire were themselves acquired for strategic

reasons, that cannot be the whole story. In a word, the United Kingdom's economic and political position is that of a world Power, with all that that implies. If she were to neglect and sacrifice her outlying interests, her status in world affairs would be radically altered, and with it her ability to defend her remaining interests. Situated as she is in a position at once advantageous and exposed off the coast of Europe, she might not be able to maintain her effective independence if she lost her world-Power status. Certainly she would be bound to suffer persistent and perhaps violent encroachment on her economic interests abroad.

The latter are therefore not to be considered by themselves, but only as part of the United Kingdom's whole position in world affairs. They represent, however, the most important way in which internal forces (in this case, the working of the industrial, commercial, and financial machine) are reflected in external policies. Such a statement would not be true of some of the Dominions, where the need for bridging internal dissensions ranks above economic issues in this respect. But in the United Kingdom there are no such rifts. In the words of the principal preparatory paper:¹

Political assimilation is complete. There are no minority or language problems. In Scotland and Wales there are local nationalist movements, but these are neither politically disruptive nor strong.

Formerly, the United Kingdom had a critical internal problem of racial nationalism in the shape of the Irish Problem, but since 1921 this has been transferred to the external sphere.

One other form of internal cleavage may be mentioned. The often violent criticism levied by the Opposition against the Government's foreign policy of late years, especially when that policy seemed to favour the fascist

¹ 'The Essential Interests of the United Kingdom', circulated as confidential (to be published by the Oxford University Press early in 1939). All quotations in this section on the United Kingdom are drawn from it unless otherwise stated.

dictatorships, has suggested that class-divisions exert a critical influence upon the United Kingdom's external attitudes. The chief preparatory paper, however, described the permanent bases of British interests and British policy without mentioning this factor. It is legitimate to deduce that the Editorial Committee responsible for the paper, including as it did members of all the chief political groups, regarded class and party divisions as essentially subordinate to long-term national interests, moral and material, in the formation of British international policy.

(b) *The Conflict of Economic Interests*

The foremost characteristic of the United Kingdom's economic interests is their diversity. By reason of her dependence on oversea sources of supply of food and raw materials, her possession of great export industries that cannot be sacrificed without disaster, and her reliance upon 'invisible' items of income to balance her accounts, the United Kingdom stands to gain most, on the whole, by a relative freedom of world trade including her own. But in a world beset by economic nationalism, often of an extreme kind, her advantage in a more or less unilateral freedom of trade is not so certain. 'Nor', wrote the authors of the paper, 'is the problem only one of economic interest; political factors play a large part. This is particularly true of the policy of Imperial preference.'

In spite of powerful advocacy of protection, free trade both as a dogma and as a practical policy lasted until well after the War. But the prosperity previously built up on world markets was no longer secure. Even 'boom' times in Great Britain meant at least 1,000,000 unemployed. Tariffs were demanded to protect home industries (including agriculture) that were being injured by imports, to bargain for better trading terms with foreign countries, and—more especially after the international liquidity crisis of 1931—to set right a menacing debit balance of payments. The revenue consideration was also important, not less than £221 millions of national revenue being derived in 1937-8 from customs.

The enforced stock-taking of the national position in 1931 gave the measures then taken the appearance of an emergency character, which is deceptive. The essentials of the policy which has grown up in the last six and a half years seem likely to be permanent.

Against these interests making for tariff and quota protectionism (to which must be added a desire to reciprocate the Imperial preference already accorded by the Dominions) must be set other interests at least as important. First come the interests of the exporting industries, which stand to be injured by the retaliatory protectionism of other countries and by the latter's plain inability to buy if they cannot profitably sell. Next, there is the interest of the international investor, who likewise cannot be paid unless debtor countries can export a sufficient surplus above their imports.

The income from British long-term investments abroad represents one-twentieth of Britain's net income and pays for one-quarter of her total imports.

It is therefore a British interest that both the quantity and the quality of those investments should be maintained. Since 1931, however, visible and invisible credits and debits on current account have almost exactly cancelled each other out in the national balance of payments, leaving no surplus for transfer to capital account. New investments have been made, but they have been offset by the repayment of outstanding loans. This process causes a deterioration in the average quality of overseas investment, because it is the best loans that carry effective sinking funds. The absence of a credit balance on current account has led to official censorship of new issues for overseas borrowers, in the interests of exchange security. This control has always been exercised more favourably towards Empire than towards foreign borrowers. Of an ascertainable total of £3,240 millions of overseas investments at the end of 1936 (to which must be added perhaps £500 millions of 'direct investments') £1,981 millions were invested in the Empire and £1,259 millions in foreign countries. Well over one-half of the

Empire investments took the form of Government and municipal bonds, and less than 45 per cent. that of commercial and industrial securities; whereas little more than a quarter of the foreign investments were loans to Governments and municipalities.

British policy and interests in relation to currency and banking have also been profoundly affected by changes since 1930. In a period of instability, the object of exchange policy, conducted mainly through the machinery of the Exchange Equalization Account, is to smooth out the fluctuations that would result, in the absence of control, from temporary migrations of money, and to prevent external movements from causing unnecessary disturbance to the internal economy; while maintaining, in the words of the Three-Power Monetary Declaration, 'the greatest possible equilibrium in the system of international exchanges'. Internal financial policy, thus liberated, may be summed up in the phrase 'cheap money'.

The interests of Britain's short-term finance, like those of her long-term, lie in the greatest possible freedom of world trade. So does the interest of British shipping. 'Shipping services are one of the most important of our invisible exports', and a large volume of mercantile tonnage is of great defensive importance to the nation. There have been a number of measures of governmental assistance to the industry, including a small temporary subsidy to tramp shipping and aid in financing the construction of the S.S. *Queen Mary* and her sister-ship, but no general subsidy or other form of protection to liner tonnage has yet been given.

One particular aspect of the conflict of interests over trade policy is the question of home agriculture. The United Kingdom is by far the most important international market in the world for agricultural commodities. This fact is of vital importance to her suppliers, and therefore at second remove to her own international trading interests; but it also means that British agriculture is exposed to the full force of competition when world depression or world glut drives down the

prices of foodstuffs. Hence special measures of defence, especially of a kind designed to raise prices by restricting supply, have been successfully demanded.

This policy has been advocated on a great variety of grounds, economic and political. (i) Agriculture is still Britain's largest single industry . . . employing over 1,000,000 persons. Although predominantly industrial, Great Britain yet produces more food—mainly animal products—than any of the Dominions. . . . (ii) On social and health grounds, it is argued that the rural population is superior in health, vitality and social stability; also urbanization and congestion of population have their own problems. . . . (iii) . . . The question of the security of our food-supplies in time of war has been given increasing attention. . . . (iv) In some quarters it has been hoped that some of the unemployed workers would be absorbed by promoting agriculture; or at least that the decline of the agricultural population would be arrested. . . . (v) Last but not least, powerful political interests are injured by the decline of agriculture.

As regards the defence argument, the object of British agricultural policy has not been self-sufficiency, nor even to expand British agriculture in peace-time to the maximum output possible under war conditions, but rather to maintain a profitable and well-conducted industry.

Over against the interest in protecting agriculture may be set the need for keeping wage-costs low in order to compete in export markets, and the growing public awareness of the importance of sound nutrition to the economic health of the nation. Apart from the effects of the social services, especially unemployment pay, in supporting standards of life, nutrition policy has hitherto been confined to the provision of cheap or free milk to school-children and other special classes.

This clash of interests over agricultural policy is, of course, extremely important to the Dominions. More generally, there is a clash between interests associated with foreign and those associated with Empire trade. The relative importance of foreign and Empire trade has already been mentioned. How far the increase in the Empire share of the United Kingdom's imports and exports since 1932 is due to Ottawa and how much to

other forces, such as the creation of the sterling currency *bloc*, is not certain, but from the United Kingdom point of view the Ottawa Agreements have operated more favourably for the Dominions than for herself. The smallness of the reductions effected in their preferential tariffs has been a disappointment to British manufacturers. There has been special uneasiness about the closing of the colonial 'Open Door', on the ground that it is incompatible with the concept of trusteeship and gives rise to grave international reactions.

Ottawa has also restricted the opportunity for the United Kingdom to make freer-trade treaties with foreign countries. Since 1932 she has made a number of trade treaties with countries with which she has special commercial and/or political ties, but they are of limited scope. United Kingdom official policy upholds the principle of the most-favoured-nation clause (excepting always Imperial preference), as checking tariff warfare and making for the widest spread of freer-trade relations in the world at large; but exchange control in foreign countries has both enabled and necessitated the partial circumvention of the clause in practice, and the principle itself has been subjected to criticism on a number of grounds.

Another conflict of interests is presented by the question of ratifying International Labour Organization conventions. The United Kingdom is concerned in furthering the work of the I.L.O. because her standard of industrial conditions is higher than in many competitor countries. But her governments have been reluctant to ratify some of the more important conventions, partly because the conditions were held to be too rigid and it was feared that other countries would not adhere to them as faithfully as herself, but more generally because 'by the time the I.L.O. came into being, collective agreement had become the predominant method for regulating wages and hours'. Direct aid to the wage-earning class, in the shape of State-aided insurance, pensions, unemployment relief, housing subsidies, and so on, has gone much farther than

indirect aid in the shape of Government ownership or regulation of industry.

The development of social services has obviously had a direct and important effect on the flow of migration, since it has diminished the relative economic attractiveness of oversea countries. This is doubtless one of the causes of the fact that for nearly a decade past the United Kingdom has been on balance an immigrant country. Other causes include restriction of immigration into the Dominions and the United States, agricultural depression in Ireland, and political disturbance in Europe. The total net immigration between 1930 and 1936 was 410,000. A more fundamental and obdurate cause of this phenomenon, however, is the slowing-down of the increase of population. The net reproduction rate for Great Britain is about 0.75, which means that in default of immigration the population must inevitably decline before long, on a gradually steepening curve, unless there is some radical change in social habits. The proportion of old people in the population will rise, with important effects upon the whole economy. This development may have an important effect upon British attitudes towards emigration and towards Commonwealth affairs generally.

(c) *General Interests in Foreign Policy*

In the words of the Defence White Paper of 1935:

The establishment of peace on a permanent footing is the principal aim of British foreign policy. The first and strongest defence of the peoples, territories, cities, overseas trade, and communications of the British Empire is provided by the maintenance of peace.

The United Kingdom has no territorial or economic ambitions that she would seek to promote by war, and even a local war in which she was engaged would entail difficulties and dangers out of all proportion to the original cause of the conflict. A war in any part of the world, even if she herself was not involved, would threaten her interests. Moreover, 'there is in the United

Kingdom to-day a profound love of peace for its own sake'.

In the short run, Britain's policy is the avoidance of European conflict; in the long run, her policy continues to aim at recreating the conditions for a world order where force is no longer the arbiter between states, and where the British Commonwealth of Nations can continue the peaceable development of that tradition of freedom and co-operation which is its outstanding contribution to civilization.

The United Kingdom's position has been rendered more difficult by the disappearance of the conditions, characteristic of the nineteenth century, in which the *Pax Britannica* held sway. The League was in a way an alternative to the *Pax Britannica* system.

The original idea of the League . . . was that of a combination of Powers which would be so strong against any possible 'aggressor' or disturber of the peace as to make forcible resistance hopeless, and sanctions decisive. This would have provided security for all against war, and for each against aggression.

This hypothesis was shattered from the first by the abstention of the United States, and to-day it is completely destroyed. The United Kingdom from the first repudiated the French conception of a war-making League with an international general staff, and although she was instrumental in having the sanctions clauses inserted, she stressed the function of the League as an organ of peaceful international co-operation.

There have been two great tests of the authority of the League and of British policy towards it. The first was the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The Manchurian problem was complex, and 'it is debatable whether Japanese grievances were not such as to make the dispute unsuitable for settlement by automatic sanctions'. In any case, no effective action to restrain aggression in that part of the world was possible without the active support of the United States, who, in fact, co-operated with the League but 'did not consider that coercion in any form should be applied'.

In any case it was all but certain that had economic sanctions been applied Japan would have resisted to the point of war, and in that case the task of defeating her must have been undertaken by Great Britain almost, if not quite, single-handed.

In the circumstances, the United Kingdom and the other League Powers, with the United States, relied on moral pressure, including the doctrine of non-recognition, 'but this also, contrary to Mr. Stimson's expectations, was found in practice to be completely ineffective'.

The Abyssinian affair was the second great test of collective security, and a fairer one, because the aggression was flagrantly unprovoked and because the League Powers by themselves could have exerted decisive force in the area concerned. The first plank in the British Government's policy was the promotion of a peaceful settlement, and as an earnest of disinterested goodwill it offered a strip of British colonial territory to Abyssinia in order to facilitate concessions on her part. The Hoare-Laval plan, though it was assigned more sinister implications, could be represented as a continuation of this conciliatory policy. Sanctions were applied with the full assent and co-operation of the United Kingdom, given, however, under two undisguised conditions. The first of these was that the United Kingdom would act only as a member of the League and not independently; this in effect meant going the pace set by France, who was apprehensive of the rising German danger and most reluctant to provoke the hostility of Italy or to risk firing the fuse of a European war. The second condition (actually implied in the first) was that military sanctions, or other measures that might lead to war, were ruled out.

The coercion of Italy, if it had been undertaken, must have fallen to France and Great Britain, but neither felt justified in staking their whole military and naval forces on preventing the conquest of Abyssinia.

The rearmament phase in world politics, which began with the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference in 1933, was greatly accelerated by the preparations for the Abyssinian War, by the war itself,

by the reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 (in part a by-product of the Abyssinia affair), and by the manifest failure of League sanctions to act as a preventive of war. The Disarmament Conference presented the United Kingdom with two broad issues, closely connected—equality for Germany and security for France. British policy was opposed to further Continental guarantees beyond Locarno and the Covenant, and was therefore uneasy about taking a 'pro-German' line on the other issue. The new phase found the United Kingdom seriously disarmed in relation to potential enemies, despite the apparent strength of her traditional main arm, the Navy. In particular, little had been done to meet the rapidly growing air menace. British rearmament has not been an attempt to maintain a lead, but an attempt to overtake others.

The most serious development of the post-Abyssinia period in European politics was the construction of the Rome-Berlin Axis and the spread (chiefly by Rome-Berlin propaganda) of the concept of ideological war. Free institutions are the very atmosphere that British citizens breathe, and, themselves nurtured under the rule of law, they 'cherish the idea of a reign of law among the nations', whereas the totalitarian countries 'regard military power as the measure of international justice'. The conflict between these two ideologies is therefore bound to lead to difficulties. But 'it is the conclusion of the British and most other European Governments that no international policy can or ought to be built on this "ideological" foundation'.

During the period of weakness of the League, and of the prevalence of totalitarian ideas of national sovereignty, British policy has concentrated on two points: armament for defence, including diplomatic armament by making and keeping friends with common interests, and conciliation as a means of preventing limited conflicts from leading to world war. This negatively defensive policy, however, is forced on her by circumstances and reflects neither her long-term interests nor the long-term objectives

of her policy, which are bound up with the positive construction of a world-peace system.

(d) *Interests in Europe*

Although the interests of the United Kingdom are world-wide, there is a certain order of priority among them. This was reflected in Mr. Eden's famous Leamington speech of November 20th, 1936, defining the circumstances in which British arms would be used. The substance of his statement was reaffirmed by Mr. Chamberlain in his speech of March 24th, 1938.

Britain's interests and commitments in Europe are determined primarily by her geographical situation, which exposes her to attack from any European Power that can either establish itself on the opposite shore of the English Channel, or obtain the military hegemony of the Continent, or challenge British sea-power on equal terms. While, therefore,

the magnitude of the United Kingdom's responsibilities throughout the world makes it necessary for her to limit her intervention in European affairs to the minimum consistent with her safety and independence,

her exposed position has led her to adopt three fixed principles in her relations with Europe:

- (i) She cannot allow any Power to challenge her naval supremacy in the North Sea and the English Channel.
- (ii) She cannot allow the Low Countries to pass into the hands of any Great Power.
- (iii) She cannot allow any Great Power to achieve such a hegemony on the continent of Europe as would threaten Britain.

To these direct causes of intervention in Europe must be added the need, exemplified in history, to decide in Europe conflicts of extra-European origin.

The above three principles

have been felt instinctively to be bound up with the independence of the United Kingdom and the maintenance of her position as a

Great Power. They did not cease to be valid in 1919. When Britain entered the League she sought to attain these ends by more general and more effective means; she resolved to merge her own security in a general régime of security. The failure of the League has brought these principles once more into the clear light of day. They are immutable because the United Kingdom's geographical position is immutable.

The United Kingdom cannot forget that her most densely populated and vulnerable region lies closest to the European continent. It is of vital importance that advanced bases for hostile aircraft should not be established in Belgium; conversely, air-power has given Great Britain a new potential method of intervention in Continental politics.

In the last resort, she has been able to intervene directly with force in European power politics only in terms of sea-power. . . . She cannot go to war in Central and Eastern Europe; she can only spread an existing war there to Western Europe.

The peace system of 1919 (including the League Covenant) was intended permanently to secure Britain's European interests; it failed, because it was neither acceptable to the beaten foe nor backed by overwhelming force. This failure gave rise to a conflict of interests which still continues. On the one hand, British self-defence required the mobilization of power behind the Western frontiers and behind the principle of law in Europe. On the other hand, the French policy of repressing Germany by direct action and by ringing her round with alliances alarmed British governments and public opinion. Locarno and the entry of Germany into the League were an attempt to escape from this dilemma.

Germany's withdrawal from the League was followed by the rapid expansion of her air-power, which, by offering a direct threat to Great Britain, threw her back on her strategic link with France. 'Whatever the cause, Britain could not allow France to be conquered.' German rearmament evoked United Kingdom approval for France's pursuit of an Eastern security pact and for the

entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League. French and British interests in the Mediterranean and the Near East are complementary rather than conflicting; hence, given the alliance of the two countries for defensive purposes in the North-West, they are bound to be closely associated in those other regions also.

The independence of the Low Countries 'has been a principle of English foreign policy since the beginning of modern power politics'. For geographical reasons, the Netherlands is the less liable to attack, and the problem chiefly concerns Belgium, who regards a British guarantee as a vital element in her security. After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, Belgium adopted a policy of armed neutrality backed by unilateral guarantees. These she obtained both from Great Britain and France and also from Germany, but with differences in expression reflecting their different attitudes towards collective security in Europe. For Great Britain, as a map shows, the question of rights of passage through, use of, or flight over Belgian territory in the event of a 'collective war' is of vital importance.

These guarantees to France and Belgium (reciprocated by France) are necessitated by the geographical situation of the United Kingdom, and do not assume the inevitability of a clash between Germany and the British Empire. The general trend of British post-war policy, at least up to the announcement of German air rearmament, was sympathetic towards Germany and suspicious towards France. The menace of German rearmament drove the United Kingdom into the anti-German 'Stresa Front' with France and Italy, but she soon showed in a practical way her recognition of Germany's right to rearm in the absence of universal disarmament by signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, an action that shocked and disappointed France. The agreement provides

that the relation of German naval tonnage to the aggregate tonnage of the British Commonwealth should be in the proportion 35 : 100, but that Germany should have the right to equal submarine tonnage with the Commonwealth, though undertaking not to

exceed 45 per cent. without notice. Moreover, Germany agreed to renounce the use of unrestricted submarine warfare.

While Britain's reaction to German policy also included a big effort of rearmament in the air, she continued to pursue the mediatory role which she had assumed ever since the Ruhr and Locarno. She took up Germany's proposal of 1936 for a Western security pact, but that effort came to an end with the German refusal to answer the British 'questionnaire' of May 6th. Underlying this *impasse* was the conflict between the Franco-British idea of a general settlement and the German idea of a Western pact distinct from the separate pacts that she would make with her Eastern neighbours.

The strengthening of Great Britain's association with France unavoidably linked British interests with Eastern Europe, and particularly with Czechoslovakia, in spite of the refusal to extend definite commitments east of the Rhine. The United Kingdom Government explicitly recognized that, were France to become involved in a war of Central European origin,

it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries, besides those which were parties to the original dispute, would almost immediately become involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries like Great Britain and France, with long associations of friendship, with interests closely interwoven, devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty, and determined to uphold them.¹

Since the last war the two main objects of British policy in Central and Eastern Europe have been to preserve the independence of Austria and to encourage the organization of regional security. Italy was necessarily the most important of the three Great Powers who were concerned to maintain Austria's independence, since she alone of them could bring force to bear directly. By joining the Rome-Berlin Axis and weakening herself through extra-European adventures, Italy virtually abandoned the

¹ Mr. Chamberlain, in the House of Commons on March 24th, 1938, quoted in the preparatory paper.

defence of Austria. When Germany invaded Austria, Great Britain and France could protest, but could not act without instantly provoking a general European war.

Viewed politically and strategically, United Kingdom relations with Soviet Russia have been subordinate to the problem of Eastern European security, which is itself subordinate, for her, to the problem of Anglo-French security. If the U.S.S.R. allied herself with Germany—a not impossible contingency—the danger to Great Britain might be very great. Russia could also bring help to a common cause in the Far East. Public opinion, however, is far from unanimous about relations with Russia, and some people, it was reported, would like to see the Franco-Soviet Pact denounced.

United Kingdom relations with Scandinavia have been governed by three main considerations. Firstly, the Scandinavian countries were ardent members of the League, and were regarded as protected by collective security. Since the latter is no longer possible, they have inclined towards a policy of armed neutrality. Secondly, the United Kingdom renounced the exercise of naval power in the Baltic by signing the Anglo-German Naval Pact. Thirdly, she has with the Scandinavian countries a very close economic connexion, which has important strategic implications both for herself and for her potential enemies.

(e) *Interests in the Mediterranean, Near and Middle East, and Africa*

The United Kingdom was said, in the preparatory paper, to have two major interests in the Mediterranean area: the need to exert naval power upon Central Europe in pursuit of the objectives described above, and the need to protect the maritime routes to Mediterranean shores and through the Suez Canal. The first interest is historically and logically prior to the second, since it was only because she had possessed herself of power in the Mediterranean that Great Britain was able to establish herself as guardian of the Suez Canal route.

The opening of the Suez Canal emphasized that it was in the countries east of Suez that Britain's primary interests lay. The Mediterranean has been described at various times as a 'jugular vein', a 'vital route', a 'short cut' and, finally and perhaps most authoritatively, as a 'main arterial road' for the British Empire.

The development of this vital British interest in the Near East led to the extension of political power to Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf, and in a lesser degree to Persia and Afghanistan; and the dictates of strategy have thereby involved Britain in unforeseen political implications of the widest importance.

The commercial importance of the Suez route to the United Kingdom and other countries of the Empire is a relative matter. By comparison with the Cape route, it saves 4,300 miles to Bombay from Plymouth, 3,300 miles to Singapore and the Far East, and only 1,100 miles to Sydney—which is actually almost the same distance from London via Panama as via Suez. As for the economic importance of the products reaching the United Kingdom through the Mediterranean or from its shores,

there is none . . . that can be justly described as 'vital' to Great Britain's economic requirements. A switch over to alternative routes would undeniably create dislocation for some four to six weeks, but would not of itself mean starvation either for the people or for the industries of the United Kingdom.

Controversy has arisen about the proper naval strategy for Britain to adopt in the Mediterranean in the event of war with a first-class Power in that sea. This is partly a technical issue; regarded in a political light, there is no question of any sacrifice of Britain's Mediterranean position in peace-time, and even in war-time the matter cannot be settled merely by reference to the trade route, since Britain's position in the Near and Middle East, India, and the whole Moslem world is intimately involved.

The extension of Great Britain's power and influence in the Near and Middle East has been subordinate to her interests in the Mediterranean and particularly in the canal route. An important consequence, however, has

been to give her the defensive control of both the north-west entrances into the Indian Ocean, her most exclusive maritime preserve. Control of the Persian Gulf is thus ancillary to control of the canal and Red Sea and of strong points in the Mediterranean. It is also, to-day, vital for the preservation of air communications with India, Singapore, and Australasia.

Britain's power in the Mediterranean depends essentially on the bases she possesses there. The position of these bases has been profoundly affected by the development of the air arm, by the diplomatic rift between Britain and Italy during and after the Abyssinian War, and by the war in Spain. British policy towards the Spanish War—conducted outside the machinery of the League for the realistic reason that Germany's and Italy's co-operation was essential, and both of them had repudiated Geneva—has been primarily governed, not by any anxiety for direct British interests, but by a wider consideration, namely, the desire to prevent the conflict from spreading into a general European war. Non-intervention was originally a French policy; M. Blum indeed expressed a conviction that the non-intervention initiative saved Europe from war in August 1936.

Attacks on British and other shipping in the Mediterranean, by aircraft and by unidentified submarines and surface vessels, led to the summoning of the Nyon Conference, which resolved on direct action against such 'piracy'. The abandonment of non-intervention was demanded by sections of British public opinion when attacks on British ships in Spanish ports multiplied, but it was generally agreed that the merits and demerits of the policy turned upon wider issues. From the beginning of the Civil War, the British Government repeatedly declared their interest in the integrity and independence of Spanish territory. The danger that an Insurgent victory might produce a Spanish government hostile to Britain and harm British commercial interests in Spain never presented itself very vividly to the British Government, for they always believed that in the long run the

Spanish people (whichever side won the war) would not tolerate a large body of foreigners in Spain, and would appreciate the disinterestedness of the Great Powers that had not intervened.

The outcome of the war in Spain, in respect of the foreign influences upon her future government and the alliances it may make, is nevertheless of great strategic importance to the British Empire, more especially in regard to the security of Gibraltar as a naval base and anchorage for shipping.

The strategic value of Malta has been seriously affected by the development of air-power and by political factors. It is within bombing range of five Italian aero-naval bases and one French base, and there is the added danger of submarine attack outside the harbour. Its defences, however, have been improved since 1935. No alternative base is immediately available; Haifa is under mandate and thus cannot be fortified; Cyprus presents opportunities for defensive development, but this has been arrested under the 'standstill' section of the Anglo-Italian Agreement; and Alexandria is in a foreign country. In any case, none of these potential bases could be a substitute for Malta.

The defence of Egypt is vital to British interests in the Mediterranean, in the Near and Middle East, and in the Suez Canal, which runs through Egyptian territory.

It has, therefore, been a cardinal point in British policy never to allow any foreign Power to control Egypt, or to interfere with her strategical arrangements in that area. Equally important has been the maintenance of a stable régime in Egypt itself, and of good relations with that country.

British interests are at present secured under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which includes a perpetual alliance between the two countries. In the event of war or 'apprehended international emergency' the King of Egypt will furnish his ally with 'all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes, and means of communication'. The military terms of the Treaty, which provide for the retention of

British forces in the canal zone until Egypt shall be able to undertake its defence herself, reflect the changes in Egypt's defence problem effected by air-power and by the massing of Italian strength in Libya and Abyssinia. British control over the Sudan, which is renewed in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, also becomes all the more important in view of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia.

Anglo-Italian relations in the Mediterranean are governed, in the long run, by the fact that whereas that sea is a 'vital route' for Great Britain, it is even more vital for Italy. Each of the two countries has power to do considerable damage to the other, but both have a common interest, which is shared by France, in maintaining free traffic in the Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal.

The Maffey Report established that Italy's action against Abyssinia involved no direct threat to British imperial interests. While applying sanctions in co-operation with other League members, the United Kingdom Government held, in regard to the Suez Canal, that it was bound by the Convention of 1888, which specifically forbade blockade of the canal or interference with its free use in time of war as in time of peace. This principle has been reaffirmed in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 1938. The Agreement 'touches upon most of the issues in the Mediterranean or the Near East which have for the last three years had so unfortunate an effect upon Anglo-Italian relations'. It 'was designed to remove all causes of disagreement, so as to provide the possibility for wider co-operation in the future'. It was remarked in the preparatory paper that 'the beneficial results of the Agreement on the Mediterranean situation in general have been very noticeable and have given fresh strength to British diplomacy in Europe'. Italy has now given her delayed adherence to the Montreux Convention governing the passage of the straits between the Aegean and the Black Sea. Good relations with Turkey, which were reinforced by the conclusion of the Convention, are of great strategic importance to the United Kingdom.

The latter's interests in the Near East and the Arab world are even more important, since they are vital both to her position in the Eastern Mediterranean and to her ability to guard the entry to the Indian Ocean. After generations of a forward policy in the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf, 'to-day she is established as the greatest Power in the Middle East, and her diplomacy is defensive'. The acceptability of the *status quo* to her is reflected in the Anglo-Italian Agreement, in which each party agrees in effect to respect the other's territories and spheres of interest and not to extend its own at the expense of independent countries. The importance of Britain's oil interests in the Middle East has often been exaggerated; although the Haifa pipe-line runs through territory under British control, the producing company is not British but international, and Great Britain has never relied upon the 'Iraq fields for more than 4 per cent. of her supply. Her greatest Middle Eastern oil interests are in Iran, where she has probably least political influence. The strategic and economic importance of the Eastern air routes and their ground facilities, on the other hand, is growing rapidly.

In relation to the Arab countries, the United Kingdom exercises different degrees of influence or control. Apart from Palestine, those countries include a mandated territory now exercising a measure of independence under British tutelage (Transjordan), an ex-mandated territory having a perpetual treaty of alliance with His Majesty ('Iraq), a British colony (Aden), a number of British protectorates (the Aden protectorate and the principalities of the Persian Gulf), and two fully independent Arab states (Saudi Arabia and the Yemen). To these may be added another strategically important Middle Eastern state, Afghanistan, with which British relations are now friendly, and in which her primary interest is the maintenance of strong and orderly government. Perhaps the most vital consideration in British policy in the Middle East at the present time, outside Palestine, is the need for consolidating good relations with Saudi Arabia,

which is much the most powerful of the Arab states and which occupies a strategic position of considerable importance.

The problem of relations with Ibn Saud, and with the Arab nationalist movement, is closely linked with the problem of Palestine, for it is over this that the Arabs have most clearly shown their solidarity. The Palestine trouble originated in the promises given to Jews and Arabs during the War. These promises have been interpreted by the two communities in such a way as to cause a head-on clash between their respective ambitions. In 1936 disorder caused a virtual suspension of the mandatory's long-term task of reconciling Jewish and Arab interests within the mandate, in favour of the short-term task of keeping order. In 1937 the British Government accepted the Peel Commission's proposal of partition as the most hopeful way of escape from the *impasse*.¹ The immediate British interest in Palestine is the maintenance of order, followed by a pacific settlement. Underlying it are strategic interests, centring on the position of Haifa and the retention of defensive reserves, economic and transport interests, and religious interests, which are bound up with British relations with world Jewry and with the whole Arab community.

Little need be said of the United Kingdom's material interests, political and strategic, in Africa other than Egypt, since they are of their nature subordinate to interests in Europe and the Mediterranean. The defence of the Cape route to the East, of the colonies and protectorates themselves, and of the air communications to the different parts of Africa, are to be regarded in this light. Subsidiary British interests which were mentioned in the preparatory paper included the prevention of militarization of the natives in Italian East Africa, and the security of Portuguese African ports and territory against any potential enemy Power.

¹ The Report of the Woodhead Commission (Cmd. 5854) and the White Paper of November 1938 (Cmd. 5893) have been published since this was written.

(f) *Interests in the Far East*

The preparatory paper contained the following summary of British interests in the Far East:

Great Britain is interested in the Far East territorially, in respect of Hong Kong, Malaya, Borneo, and the South Sea Islands (now becoming important in connexion with air routes), and commercially and financially in respect of her trade with, and investments in, China, Japan, and her Far Eastern dependencies. Great Britain is further interested in the Far East in so far as developments in that area affect the defence of India, Australia, and New Zealand, and in so far as events in the Pacific area affect the general situation and have repercussions upon the balance of power in the world at large and, indirectly, in the European continent.

Both the commercial and the political and strategic interests rest largely on Britain's position in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Her prestige in the Far East is said to depend in a great degree on the possession of Hong Kong and adjacent territory on the mainland. The International Settlement at Shanghai is the hub of the greatest commercial and financial centre in China, and its Municipal Council and administration are overwhelmingly British in character and higher personnel. The British Government has also assumed from time to time the chief responsibility for protecting the Settlement in time of disorder. British investments in China were estimated at £250 millions in 1931. In 1936 trade with China represented 1·5 per cent. of total British exports and 0·45 of total British imports. The corresponding figures for Japan were: exports 0·9 per cent., imports 1·2 per cent. There is also a very important British shipping interest in the Chinese trade. A further expanding British interest in the Far East lies in the actual and potential value of the British dependencies and of the dependencies of friendly Powers (the Netherlands and France) as air bases.

The maintenance of British Far Eastern interests has depended since the War on the working of the political and strategic system erected by the Washington Conference, which replaced the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The

Washington Conference system had two main principles: the independence of China and the Open Door in that country, and the regulation of naval strength in such a way that none of the three great naval Powers could directly threaten or interfere with any of the others in the latter's own areas of the Pacific zone. The effect was to make Japan strategically master of Far Eastern waters, since she could concentrate her strength there, whereas other countries, including Soviet Russia, had divided responsibilities.

The degree of British participation in Far Eastern events must necessarily be determined primarily by the state of things prevailing in Western Europe at any given time. No threat to British Far Eastern interests, however grave, can ever deflect British statesmanship from what must inevitably be its major concern, namely the security of the British Isles, and of the sea communications upon which Great Britain depends for her supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials.

Up to the time of the Manchurian invasion, British policy satisfactorily relied on Japanese co-operation in the peaceful maintenance of the Washington system. Meanwhile, under British leadership, substantial progress was made with the liquidation of the régime of special privileges imposed on China by the 'unequal treaties'.

The primary aims of British policy towards China were described in the preparatory paper as follows:

- (1) A united, prosperous and friendly China. . . .
- (2) Generally peaceful and stable conditions in the Far East, for which the first essential is harmonious relations between China and Japan.
- (3) International co-operation (including that of China herself) in the rehabilitation and development of China.
- (4) The Open Door and equality of opportunity for the nationals of all countries. . . .

This statement supports the contention that there has always been a fundamental similarity of aim between British and American policy in the Far East. There could be no better proof of the weakness of Western diplomacy without active American support than was

afforded by the invasion of Manchuria and the attack on China in 1937. Over Manchuria, the United States, according to the preparatory paper,

did not consider that coercion in any form should be applied, and the League Powers principally interested in the Far East shared the view that this was not a case in which sanctions either could or should be applied.

In 1937 the state of Europe 'rendered it impossible for either the League collectively or any League Power effectively to intervene'.

In a speech in the House of Commons on November 1st, Mr. Eden said that nothing effective could be done in the Far East without the United States, and that in order to secure her co-operation he would, if necessary, go from Melbourne to Alaska; His Majesty's Government would neither rush ahead of the United States nor lag behind.

In the event, however, the Powers at Brussels found themselves as powerless to act as the League itself, and the Conference ended in complete failure. With regard to Japan's southward ambitions, so long as she is locked in a fierce struggle with China, she can hardly embark on a fresh aggression.

But if Japan should ever succeed in establishing domination over China, then further aggression southward would become not merely a possibility but a virtual certainty, for the prize would be one of great value.

(g) *Interests in the Americas*

Great Britain's desire for close and cordial relations with the United States is based, as the preparatory paper observed, on the strongest motives of both sentiment and interest. Their economic relations are particularly close: the United Kingdom is second among the suppliers of the United States import market, and first among the markets for her exports; the United States exports more than any other country to Great Britain, but she takes only fourth place as a market for British exports.

As far as political relations are concerned, the most important potential sphere of Anglo-American co-operation is the Far East. Here, however, American isolationism is a serious handicap to active collaboration. There is shown to be a basic dilemma in the relative positions of the United States and Great Britain in world affairs; for, whereas a League policy is politically impossible for the United States, her public opinion is most favourable towards Great Britain when the latter is herself adopting a full League policy. Nevertheless, despite the persistence of American isolationism, the form of its practical expression of recent years has been on the whole favourable to British world policy. The Neutrality Act, by implicitly abrogating the doctrine of the freedom of the seas, removes one of the great obstacles to Britain's use of naval blockade. Moreover, the 'cash and carry' principle of the Neutrality Act works in favour of those Powers which have the financial means and the mercantile fleets necessary to buy goods in America and ship them home in their own bottoms.

Thanks to the shelter of the Monroe Doctrine and to the expanded naval power of a friendly United States, the strategic importance of the West Indies has diminished for Great Britain. The Panama Canal is of appreciable but limited economic and strategic importance to the British Empire. Bermuda and Newfoundland have always been important for naval defence reasons, and their strategic value is likely to be greatly increased as trans-Atlantic aviation progresses.

In Latin America, granted the efficacy of the protective Monroe Doctrine, Britain's interests are entirely economic. In this respect, Argentina is by far the most important of the ten republics. Britain's adverse balance of trade with the principal South American countries is to a great extent covered by the income on her investments there, which were estimated at a total of £775 millions in 1930, representing over one-fifth of total British overseas investment. Of this some £450 millions was in Argentina alone.

(h) *Defence Interests and Policy*

The bases of United Kingdom defence policy—that is to say, Imperial defence policy as seen from and implemented by the United Kingdom—may be summarized as (a) the command of the seas, (b) the local defence of the United Kingdom and of other parts of the Empire and certain foreign countries for which the United Kingdom assumes immediate responsibility, (c) the reinforcement of hard-pressed points from reserves of land, air, and naval forces, and (d) possible intervention in European land warfare.

Necessary naval strength, according to the preparatory paper, is determined by two factors—on the one hand, by the volume and distribution of British trade and the length of strategic communications, and, on the other, by the naval force possessed by potential enemies. It is the latter, relative factor which brings battle fleets into existence. The peace distribution of the Royal Navy is based on the principle that in every sea is maintained a cruiser squadron, whose duty on the outbreak of war would be to defend British sea-borne trade in its area from sporadic attack. In addition, two battle fleets are kept in being—the Home and the Mediterranean Fleets—which

form a central reserve whose sphere of operations on the outbreak of war cannot be precisely indicated beforehand, since it would depend upon the identity of the enemy and the general international situation.

The purpose of command of the seas (which cannot, of course, be universal) is threefold: to enable Great Britain to be supplied with food and raw materials, without which her people and industries would starve; to keep open communications for the transport of men and munitions to overseas theatres of war, including British Dominions or colonies; and to impose blockade on a Continental enemy. The first two of these three objectives, and to some extent the third also, have to be shared, to-day, by the Air Force. Ports and merchant convoys

are vulnerable to air attack, and the strategic importance of air routes is increasing. The Air Force, however, cannot absolve the Navy of its main tasks. Great Britain must be kept from starving and the lines of Imperial communication kept open.

Unless Great Britain and every one of the Dominions and of the colonies is capable of looking after its own defence—an impossible hypothesis—the problem of Imperial defence resolves itself into one of ensuring the possibility of mutual assistance, which in turn becomes, primarily, a problem of communications by sea and by air.

The Atlantic Ocean is the most important of all maritime areas for the United Kingdom, since she lies on its fringe and across it are transported most of her most vital imports. The Mediterranean

affords, by way of the Suez Canal, the shortest line for sending reinforcements to the East, and its safeguarding has always been a cardinal factor in all considerations of strategy which affected the safety of India, Australia, and New Zealand as well as of British interests in the Far East.

The eastern exit of the Mediterranean is the north-western entrance of the Indian Ocean, which is 'almost a British lake'—a fact of cardinal importance for Imperial defence.

Almost every important port is British and more than a quarter of the mercantile marine of the Empire is in its harbours or on its seaways at any given time. British control has been based on two main axioms—namely, that no Great Power should establish a defended port within the area and that Britain should command the gateways from other seas.

The command of such gateways, and of ocean power generally, depends absolutely on the existence of fortified bases. The main oversea fortified bases under the control of the United Kingdom are Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Trincomalee, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Stress was laid in the preparatory paper on the special importance of the Singapore base. 'Unquestionably the most

important requisite' of Pacific defence 'is the maintenance of an adequately defended and appropriately organized naval and air base at Singapore.'

The keeping of the seas is, in a sense, part of the local defence of the United Kingdom itself, since the latter would otherwise perish. But there is also a grave local defence problem in a more limited sense. One aspect of it is the strategic unity of the British Isles. 'The control of Ireland by a hostile Power would be a danger as grave as the control of Belgium by a hostile Power.' The rights of naval defence in Irish ports established by the 1921 Treaty were regarded as of little value if they aroused Irish hostility, which 'would have crippled Britain in a European war'. The conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of April 1938, under which the defence of the ports is transferred to Ireland herself, was thus a matter of strategic prudence.

The most urgent aspect of the United Kingdom's local defence problem is that of air defence.

Until Britain feels that she has overcome the threat to her heart or at least reduced it to manageable proportions, she may find it more difficult than in the past to send out forces to protect the outlying portions of the Empire—which are themselves in some cases more liable to attack since the advent of air-power.

The main air effort of this country is concentrated on the defence of the British Isles. . . . Out of the total strength of 139 squadrons on the R.A.F. establishment early in 1938, 112 squadrons (21 on an auxiliary basis) are included in the so-called Metropolitan Air Force which exists for the defence of this country.

The Army, like the Air Force, gives priority to home defence, within which category anti-aircraft and coast defence rank first. The calls on the Regular Army for service abroad, however, are so heavy, according to the preparatory paper, that without a large expansion it could not also shoulder the greatly increased burden of home defence which the air menace has laid on the country. Consequently, coastal and anti-aircraft defence has passed almost exclusively to the Territorial Army. The total man-power of the Regular Army, when the

paper was written, was about 227,000, of whom 90,000 were normally stationed abroad, including some 55,000 stationed in India. The strategic reserve is organized from the remainder, stationed in the British Isles. It is theoretically capable of producing an expeditionary force of five regular divisions which can, some months after war breaks out, be reinforced by twelve divisions of the Territorial Army.

It is clear that the United Kingdom's power to sustain the third basic principle of her defence policy, the reinforcement of hard-pressed points, depends, first, on the command of the intervening seas, secondly on the withstanding of local attack, and thirdly on the apportionment of limited available forces among a number of possible theatres of action. The two latter, if not the first, of these considerations, apply to air strength as well as land strength.

In a general war, it is unlikely that any given area will be able to find it possible to spare squadrons in the early stages to reinforce its neighbours, and certainly such assistance cannot be relied upon from the main depot of air strength in Great Britain. . . . A Continental war would make the largest of calls on the 'Metropolitan' squadrons, and few, if any, could be spared to reinforce distant threatened territories.

As for the possibility of assistance to a Continental ally, the United Kingdom's available expeditionary force is too small for her to have much, if anything, to spare after meeting the needs of Palestine, Egypt, and possible danger-points in the Empire, in the event of a general war, at least until an army could be built from the Territorials and fresh volunteers.

The 55,000 British soldiers and 140,000 regular Indian soldiers serving in India are sometimes mentioned as including a potential reserve for an expeditionary force. But

the army in India (which includes the British element) is for the defence of India alone. Its employment outside India, while it is constitutionally still possible, is likely to become less frequent as time goes on. Indian public opinion is strong on this point.

The primary function of India's defence forces is the discharge of India's domestic military liability, which comprises local naval defence; security from invasion and the maintenance of the equilibrium on the north-western and north-eastern frontiers; and the maintenance of law and order in India itself in support of the civil power.¹

In brief, India's position in respect of defence corresponds with increasing closeness to that of the self-governing Dominions, which are in independent control of their own defence forces and are primarily responsible for their own local defence. The advance towards defensive independence is not complete, but it is being accelerated, first, by the immense burden of defence expenditure on the Indian Budget, combined with the fact that a British soldier costs nearly three times as much as an Indian soldier, and, secondly, by the advance of military mechanization, which widens the difference between the defensive needs of India and those of the United Kingdom.

The defensive independence of the Dominions is fully recognized in the United Kingdom. The preparatory paper remarked, however, that 'local defence is not always the best defence', and that the safety of a Dominion might be decided, not locally, but on battle grounds or on the seas many thousands of miles away. The concept of Imperial defence in United Kingdom eyes is one of 'mutual assistance'. The United Kingdom, like the Dominions, must build her defensive preparations from local defence outwards. Her local defence, however, is of supreme importance for the whole Commonwealth.

Unless the defence of the islands themselves against attack, whether sea or air borne, can be adequately provided for, there will be no possibility of Great Britain's succouring the overseas portions of the Empire in time of war.

Her destruction would leave every part of the Commonwealth (with the possible exception of Canada) at the mercy of her conquerors and their allies.

Her immense defence expenditure, amounting to one-third of her national budget, therefore in a very special

¹ Quoted from the supplementary paper on Indian Defence Problems.

sense serves the vital interests of the whole Commonwealth.

(3) CANADA

(a) *The Unity of Canada*

The boldest strand in the whole complex pattern of Canadian interests, as depicted in the Canadian preparatory papers, especially in the main study by Professor F. R. Scott, is the need asserted for maintaining the national unity of Canada. Professor Scott quotes a series of doctrines governing Canadian foreign policy as it has been expressed by Mr. Mackenzie King, who himself approved this summary of his attitude. The first of those doctrines is as follows:

The guiding principle in the formulation of Canada's foreign policy should be the maintenance of the unity of Canada as a nation.¹

Clearly the most important threat to Canadian unity in relation to foreign policy and defence comes from the division between the French-speaking and English-speaking sections of the population. While the English-speaking section is in a substantial majority, 'no national policy can long be followed which does not receive considerable support from Quebec'. Both the chief parties in federal politics seek support from all the major groups of the population.

The result is that Liberals and Conservatives differ very little in their opinions upon crucial questions, since they are both made up of the same varied elements; employers and labourers, townsmen and farmers, French and English, Catholics and Protestants.

There are also important sectional lines arising from geographical causes.

It was geography, as well as race, which made Canada a federal rather than a unitary state. No Dominion Cabinet can be formed

¹ Quotations in this section on Canada, unless otherwise stated, are from Professor Scott's book, *Canada To-day*, which was written as a preparatory paper for the Conference. (See Appendix II.)

except on a federal basis, giving representation to each of the main divisions of the country.

(b) *Economic Interests and Policies*

To some extent the geographical and economic lines of division coincide with the racial and historical lines, but in some respects they cut sharply across them.

Geography gives Quebec and Ontario similar economic opportunities and interests which offset to some extent their racial and religious differences. Both provinces are the centres of protectionist thought, for in both live the manufacturers who benefit most from the tariff. The Prairie Provinces, predominantly suppliers of a single commodity which must be sold on a world market, are naturally inclined to free trade so as to be able to buy cheaply their agricultural machinery and domestic supplies; their dependence upon the eastern capital, which controls railways and banks, makes them lean to political radicalism and new experiments, particularly in times of depression.

A paper on Canadian tariff policy cited five basic factors in the moulding of that policy. First, in an expanding pioneer country there is likely to be a pronounced fiscal dependence on the customs tariff. Secondly, Canada has invested an immense capital in railway development, one result of which was greatly to cheapen the entry of imported goods, and hence to provoke a demand for tariff protection. The third factor is the pronounced sectionalism of Canada. Fourthly, from time to time there have arisen movements in Canada designed to promote national unity as against so-called Americanization. Finally, the political ties between Canada and other parts of the British Commonwealth have been important. The advocacy of British preference has usually been a means of advocating lower tariffs. Partly as a result of all these conflicts of interest,

there is nothing isolationist in Canadian economic policy, however her foreign policy may show a trend in this direction.

Canadian manufactures are not being developed with a view to making Canada self-sufficient; their growth is entirely a matter of

unplanned expansion determined by considerations of profitable investment.

A further important economico-geographical factor is 'the inescapable burden of heavy transportation costs'. The need for spreading the immense over-heads that have been incurred is one of the major influences towards a positive immigration policy in Canada. The opposite influences, however, are to-day very strong.

Canada, in the present condition of her domestic and foreign markets, appears already overcrowded. If agriculture merely holds its own and other rural employment is not forthcoming, a rural surplus of 800,000 is quite possible by 1941. To absorb the present natural increase in urban Canada, the estimated rural-urban migration, and the number of unemployed in 1931, would require a 45 to 50 per cent. increase in urban employment over the next decade. There is little likelihood of this occurring. Canada would be more than able to supply her own population requirements for five or ten years to come if the rate of economic expansion obtaining during the period 1911-31 were restored, and even if the boom conditions of 1901-11 were repeated she would not need to draw more than a few thousand a year from abroad to reach the limit of her absorptive capacity.

The author of another preparatory paper suggested 'an estimated possible figure for immigration into Canada of around 50,000 yearly', and he wrote:

The upper limit of any probable population in Canada at the end of this century has been placed by those who have made a really careful study of the problem at 20 million people.

A Study Group in Victoria, B.C., after emphasizing the importance of relative standards of living to this question, reached the conclusion 'that, were there no restrictions, British Columbia could and would support a very considerably increased population of Asiatic origin'. Another commentator suggested that more emphasis should be laid upon the need for a greater measure of social security in Canada.

Canadian public policy in economic affairs has been hitherto essentially non-socialistic.

The idea that the first duty of the state is to see that the economy provides a basic standard of decent living for every citizen is not a political idea which either of Canada's major parties has yet espoused.

The French-Canadian Nationalist movement was economically reformist in the sense that it drew a good deal of power from the resentment of French-Canadians at being hewers of wood and drawers of water for 'big business', which is almost exclusively in English-Canadian hands.

But socialism at the moment stands condemned by the clergy of Quebec. Consequently, the nationalist movement is in an *impasse*. . . . The increasing urbanization and hence industrialization of the French-Canadian people, and the exploitation of their workers by corporations which they do not control, are producing fertile soil for a more radical movement among the masses than has yet appeared.

(c) *Unity and Foreign Policy*

No racial *Gleichschaltung* of the Canadian people is in sight. People of foreign origin who have entered into Canada (forming nearly 20 per cent. of the population in 1931) are indeed being assimilated with their English-Canadian neighbours. At the same time, the French-Canadians increase much more rapidly than the rest, and in default of immigration it is estimated that by 1971 the French-Canadian element is likely to outnumber that of British descent. Professor Scott remarks, however, that it is dangerous to argue too much from this prediction. The French Canadians will still be concentrated very largely in a single province.

Further, persons of British descent usually occupy the most influential positions in politics, religion and education, outside Quebec, and in finance and industry throughout the country.

The trend towards monopoly, which Professor Scott describes as a fact of great importance in contemporary Canada, will tend to increase the influence of the English-speaking elements in so far as that influence rests on

financial and economic power. At the same time, this trend enhances French-Canadian sentiments of revolt, and therefore re-emphasizes the most important line of division in the country.

This division, with the many others that characterize Canada's public life, necessarily has a profound effect on her external policies.

These factors explain why the possibility of another world war, in which Canada might be expected to take part on the side of Great Britain, contains so great a danger for Canadian national unity. The French Canadian feels no obligation or desire to take part in any European wars. His fear that because he is part of the Dominion he will inevitably be dragged into all such wars makes him view his political connexion with English Canadians with the greatest suspicion, and makes him feel that the English Canadian is not a true Canadian at all.

The student of Canadian affairs who understands the mixed nature of the Canadian population, the world-wide distribution of Canadian foreign trade, and the conflicting pulls of British sentiment and North American geography, will not be surprised to find that Canadian foreign policy lacks a clear and positive direction. . . . The internal political situation is such that instead of hammering out a policy at party caucuses or conventions and then putting it before the public for their acceptance or rejection, Canadian politicians have preferred to let the event, at the last moment, determine the policy.

A consequence of this fear in the political leaders is that the Canadian public is largely ignorant of, and confused about, questions of foreign policy.

Professor Scott remarks that only in so far as Canada obtains full control over her own foreign policy can she become a united country internally, and that a right to remain neutral in wars involving other parts of the Commonwealth is a prerequisite of this.

It appears reasonable to assume that a considerable majority of the people of Canada believe either that the Dominion has or that it should have the right to remain neutral whenever it so desires. . . . There would not be so strong a support as this for a definite *policy* of neutrality, which would tie the hands of the Government in

advance, although . . . isolationist sentiment has grown greatly in strength during the past seven years.

Even those Canadians who wish Canada to have the right to neutrality when Great Britain or any other part of the Commonwealth is at war, do not wish to secede from the Commonwealth. . . . Even many of the French-Canadian Nationalists have said that they do not desire to quit the Commonwealth altogether; their independent republic would remain a Dominion under the Crown.

This statement was borne out in a supplementary paper giving a French-Canadian view of Canada's foreign policy. Its author, however, claimed the right to secede if necessary.

In the event of war involving Great Britain, in which our vital interests would not appear to be endangered, there would be for Canada—complete neutrality being impossible in the present conditions—no other alternative but to withdraw her free allegiance to the Crown, a right which has been recognized by the Statute of Westminster; unless, of course, Canada prefers to repeat the performances of 1899 and 1914.

Professor Scott also refers to 'an extremer form of nationalist fervour which from time to time has arisen in Quebec'. He makes the following general comment on the attitude of French Canada towards the Commonwealth:

The French-Canadian looks upon both the Commonwealth connexion and confederation in much the same way; they are both political ties with the English which are part of his historic destiny. He cannot avoid them; he does not, at the moment, wish to break them, but they do not command his warm allegiance. Both represent a *mariage de convenance*.

Professor Scott cites the opinion of Mr. Lapointe, the Minister of Justice, that Canada is automatically committed to a state at least of passive belligerency. He refers to Mr. Mackenzie King's 'ambiguities' on the point, but it seems from the latter's exchange with Mr. Bennett, recorded on p. 3,455 of the volume of Canadian Hansard of May 24th, 1938, which was submitted as a preparatory paper, that he accepts the position as stated by Mr. Lapointe.

Moreover, the arrangements for Canadian defence, though strictly independent in form, are in practice built into the pattern of Imperial defence. Professor Scott refers to 'military preparations which lend themselves to some form of participation in the next war in which the Commonwealth is engaged'. He remarks that

to prepare for an expeditionary force to Europe, the emphasis must be placed on mobile and mechanized units, trained and equipped for immediate integration with the British Army. . . . This type of army, on a modest scale, is contemplated and is in fact being organized in Canada.

In view of the existence even of a disguised or partial commitment to Great Britain (which, it is clear from these papers, would be likely to become a real psychological commitment in the minds of a very large number of Canadians as soon as war actually broke out), Canada has a close and vital interest in the course of British foreign policy. Since her own foreign policy must needs be one of 'no commitments', and even of isolationism in so far as that is compatible with her peculiar structure and external relations, she might be expected to approve, if not demand, a similar policy on the part of Great Britain. The latter has not the same capacity for isolationism, and in her case a comparable policy must be one of 'appeasement' as contrasted with a rigid adherence to collective security.

This attitude was in fact adopted by Mr. Mackenzie King, according to his speech in the Canadian House of Commons of May 24th. He then remarked that

the Canadian Government believes that the only feasible and constructive basis of League activity under present conditions is to develop all its possibilities of conciliation, all its possibilities of co-operation in agreed tasks, all its possibilities of shaping and focussing world opinion.

And he continued:

At the present juncture of world affairs it is not possible to make the League an international war office, an instrument of force, military or economic.

It is clear, however, that his implied approval of British policy as conducted by Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax is not by any means universal in Canada. Thus Professor Scott writes:

The policy of the British Government since 1931 has steadily estranged those Canadians who believe it prefers power politics of the pre-League type to the principles established by the Covenant.

Many in the other [non-isolationist] half [of Canada] will turn isolationist if British policy continues during the next few years to be what it has been since 1931.

The division of opinion between those Canadians who share the feelings expressed in the above quotation and those who regard the present emergency as calling for an even stronger allegiance to the British Commonwealth is said to be increasing the strain on Canadian national unity.

Many who formerly supported a League policy for Canada have reverted to the imperialist position either because they believe a strong Commonwealth is the best alternative to a League, or because they think that the Commonwealth may be the foundation on which the collective system can be rebuilt in the future.

Despite its vanishing chances of realization, remarks Professor Scott, the idea of a revived League of Nations still has many adherents in Canada. These believe

that nothing has failed at Geneva except the statesmanship of the Great Powers, amongst which they would include Great Britain as a chief offender. . . . Many people, formerly of this collectivist opinion, their faith in a revived League being dead, have turned to a temporary isolationism rather than to imperialism as the present best policy for Canada.

(d) *Canada and the League of Nations*

The two main alternatives to the present British policy, for those in Canada who disapprove of it, are a policy of collective security under the League of Nations and a policy of opposition to fascism. These may be roughly

identical in effect, but they have different implications for Canada. As regards the League, it is clear that Canada herself has always been opposed to a rigid and automatic system of collective security. In the House of Commons debate of May 24th, Mr. Mackenzie King repeated his own remarks uttered at Geneva in 1936:

There is a general unwillingness of peoples to incur obligations which they realize they may not be able in time of crisis to fulfil, obligations to use force and to use it at any place, any time, in circumstances unforeseen, and in disputes over whose origin or whose development they have had little or no control.

Professor Scott remarks that Canada's willingness to participate in the application of sanctions over Abyssinia indicated that when loyalty to the Commonwealth and to the League were combined, the majority of the Canadian people were willing to undertake very considerable commitments in world affairs. But he continues:

At the same time the more cautious attitude, the North American suspicion of all European politics, is always present in the country.

The North American attitude is strongly reinforced by French-Canadian opinion. According to the French-Canadian author of a preparatory paper,

The League of Nations as it now exists is not highly prized in the Province of Quebec. . . . The League seems more anxious to safeguard what is called 'democracy' against fascism than to promote peace.

He voiced the French-Canadian suspicion that the League is run by freemasonry and communism. Russia, he remarked,

now occupies a leading position at Geneva, the modern wolf in sheep's clothing, extolling disarmament for others and urging universal peace, while the Third International promotes internal revolution in *bourgeois* and capitalist countries.

(e) *Fascism and Anti-Fascism*

The anti-fascist crusade is equally unattractive to a large body of Canadians:

Religion exerts a very large influence upon Canada's domestic and external affairs. . . . The French Roman Catholic element in Canada was sympathetic to Italy in the Abyssinian War and Catholic opinion generally has supported Franco in Spain.

It is, of course, possible to recognize a danger to Western civilization, and particularly to the British Commonwealth, from the forces at present grouped in the Anti-Comintern Pact, without accepting the ideological thesis or assuming that fascist and democratic states are bound to be hostile to each other. This view of a world strategic situation threatening the Western Powers, including both the British Commonwealth and the United States, did not, however, find clear expression in the Canadian preparatory papers.

(f) *Canadian Defence*

After remarking that Canada would be better defended by a strong League of Nations, or even by a strong alliance between England, France, and Russia, than she ever can be by the British Commonwealth alone, Professor Scott commits himself to the view that

as regards the problem of defence in the future, it would appear that neither Commonwealth aid nor the Monroe Doctrine is immediately essential, though both are important.

He bases this view, first on the geographical isolation of Canada and the difficulty of successful invasion, and secondly on the unlikelihood of any country wanting to invade Canada in foreseeable circumstances.

The utmost that need be expected at the moment are 'minor attacks by combined sea land and air forces, to destroy something of strategic or commercial value, or to secure an advanced base of operations, and this applies to coasts, to focal sea areas and to the preservation of Canadian neutrality', and also 'sporadic hit and run raids by light cruisers or submarines to destroy our main ports and focal sea areas'.

The above inner quotations are from Mr. Ian Mackenzie, Minister of National Defence.

Professor Scott and Canadian official policy, of

course, acknowledge that the power of the United States and of Great Britain give additional security over and above that of Canada's own local efforts. A rather different view of the implications of America's nearness to Canada and her defence policy was taken by the author of a preparatory paper on Canadian defence policy.

In a war between Great Britain and Japan in which the United States is neutral, the Monroe Doctrine offers no protection against such hit-and-run raids.

If the United States becomes involved in war, and finds (or thinks its finds) that its security is menaced by the possibility of enemy submarine bases being established in British Columbia, or of an enemy striking through Canadian territory, it will certainly make pressing demands on Canada to be allowed to occupy that territory and police her coasts. These demands will be made whether the Dominion is a party to the war or not, and (in the latter case especially) most Canadians would, I suspect, find them highly objectionable. The only way that such demands can be prevented, or (with any justice) refused, is by Canada's making, before the crisis, such preparations as will render her in a real sense a partner, though necessarily a junior one, in the defence of North America.

(g) Canada and the United States.

Another preparatory paper made explicit the suspicion of United States policy towards the rights and integrity of Canada which is implicit in the above quotation.

There is no sound basis for supposing that where the national interests of the United States may be deemed to run counter to any position taken by Canada the American Government will play its own hand any less shrewdly when dealing directly with Canadian authority than was its wont when the negotiation of Canada's case was still in Britain's hands. . . . Canada, then, has continued need of a genuine Commonwealth connexion, sufficiently vital to cause opinion in the United States to take it for granted as an essential accompaniment of Canadian nationality.

Professor Scott declares that, but for her membership of the Commonwealth, Canada would probably have joined the Pan-American Union. On this issue of possible membership of the Pan-American Union, Canadian opinion is divided. A round-table of the Fourth Annual

Conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs showed, informally, a two to one majority in favour of Canada's participation in the Union. However, of those who favoured membership in the Union, none did so as an alternative to withdrawal from the British Commonwealth or the League of Nations, or as a means of intensifying the tendency towards isolation that seems increasing in Canada.¹

It was argued that the Latin American states that were also members of the League did not regard that as incompatible with membership of the Union. The opponents of membership were afraid of the issue becoming a party matter in Canada, while some felt that the Dominion's political centre of gravity would shift to Washington. One member believed that the Roman Catholic hierarchy looked with suspicion upon further association with the United States, as tending to strengthen the spirit of Americanism which had been the greatest danger to the control of its people in Quebec.

The preparatory papers reported a general recognition in Canada of the vital necessity to the Dominion of maintaining cordial relations with their neighbour. This was said to be coupled with a very considerable suspicion, even dislike, of the United States and of the constant Americanization of Canada.

The anti-American feeling has declined in recent years, however, and the decline is an indication that Canadians have matured to the point when they no longer fear the loss of their identity on the American continent.

When a Canadian talks of Canada as an American nation, he does not mean that he wants to become a citizen of the United States, or hopes Canada will enter the American Union; he means that he recognizes now, and is not afraid to face the fact, that his destiny and chief interests lie in North America.

(h) *Canada and the British Navy.*

As for the role of the British Navy in the defence of Canada, its major importance is not in relation to local defence of the Dominion but in relation to her trade

¹ Quoted from Professor Soward's paper. (*See Appendix II.*)

and oversea interests, as well as the whole power complex of which the British Commonwealth is part. Professor Scott questions whether it is as valuable as some people believe.

Canada's foreign trade is essential to the economic welfare of the country, given the continuation of Canada's present economic policy. But this trade is not essential in the sense that without it Canadians would starve to death. . . . A sort of *de facto* 'cash and carry' principle prevails; Canada sells her produce to European importers in Canada, and they collect it in their own ships at Canadian ports. It is their trade, rather than Canada's on the high seas. They are more vitally concerned to import it than is Canada to export it.

He also cites the remark of a Canadian defence expert to the effect that

if Canada dropped out of the Empire to-morrow Great Britain could not reduce her armed strength by one warship, aircraft, or man.

This view, however, did not pass without criticism. A commentator on Professor Scott's draft wrote:

It is nonsense to talk of the trade not being Canadian trade because it is carried from our shores in ships of foreign registry or owned by foreign purchasers. An enemy nation which secured control of the oceans could get all the supplies it needed from other countries and our trade would come to an end.

It is natural and right that our defence policy should be directed first of all to our own defence and, since such defence will cost all that we can at present afford to spend, our Government is taking the right course in making such defence its sole present aim. But as our people come to realize the world situation more clearly they will insist on our being prepared to do our part, if it becomes necessary. That can only be done by co-operation first with Great Britain, then with the other parts of the Empire and the United States, and ultimately in a League of the Free Nations for the defence of our common liberties and interests.

The author of a preparatory paper on Canada's defence policies described the Navy as 'still the weakest spot in the Dominion's defensive organization'.

(i) *Actual Defence Preparations*

Professor Scott gives the following brief summary of Canada's defence forces:

Canada has a permanent active militia of 4,000 men, a non-permanent militia with a peace establishment of 100,000, but an actual strength of about 45,000 and a paper reserve militia. The naval forces consist of four destroyers, with two on order (four to be placed on the Pacific and two on the Atlantic coasts), and a number of mine-sweepers; total personnel (March 1938) 119 officers and 1,462 ratings, with a volunteer reserve of 77 officers and 1,344 ratings. The Air Force consists of an authorized permanent personnel of 1,730 and a non-permanent force of 1,064; 102 aircraft are being secured, and landing fields have been constructed across the country to permit of rapid concentration.

A more elaborate account was contained in the preparatory paper just referred to. The militia was described as in process of reorganization and partial mechanization. Providing the force with modern weapons was proving not only an expensive, but also a protracted business, since the British factories with which orders had been placed were already working to capacity for the Imperial forces. 'In the new scheme of national defence the militia does not play the leading role.' Great importance in the rearmament programme was said to be attached to the fixed coastal defences, especially in the Esquimalt-Victoria area on the Pacific coast. Aerodrome development was also in progress on both coasts.

With regard to the Navy, stress was laid on the fact that four of the six destroyers were to be stationed on the Pacific.

Across that ocean (fortunately a very broad one) lies another aggressive military nation which of late has grown increasingly unfriendly to the British Empire; and between it and British Columbia there are only a couple of British cruiser-squadrons. There are no British capital ships east of Suez, nor are there likely to be before 1940. Moreover, even leaving the United States quite out of the picture, it is unlikely that Britain will ever again be able to exercise naval hegemony in both Atlantic and Pacific. Her naval

power must be concentrated where her primary interests lie—in Europe.¹

Concerning the Air Force, with its 102 new planes in 1937 and its 75 new planes in 1938 (the establishment of the permanent force having been raised to 2,070 of all ranks and that of the non-permanent force to 1,450), the same author wrote:

These figures make it abundantly clear that the present Government's theory of national defence assigns a very large role indeed to the air arm.

This fact is clearly of great importance in relation to Canada's possible role in British Commonwealth defence.

One of the most valuable contributions Canada could make would be a force of up-to-date combat planes manned by trained pilots—exactly the type of force, incidentally, that we have suggested is most applicable to her own local defence; while another would be the mobilization of Canadian industry for the production of munitions, not gradually and by degrees, but on the largest scale and at the very outset of hostilities.²

Very considerable progress has been made to render Canada self-sufficient in the lighter forms of armament, including the new Bren automatic gun. Canada is already becoming an exporter of certain forms of military equipment to Great Britain; Professor Scott expresses a certain uneasiness about the political implications of this.

There has been no parliamentary decision that Canada is to turn her resources to the manufacture of British armaments, though this is very definitely increasing Canada's commitments in Europe.

It is clear that at many points Canada's defence policy contemplates Imperial co-operation in the event of war.

Canada is under contractual agreement with Great Britain to permit the use of Halifax and Esquimalt harbours by the British fleet, and has always co-ordinated her training and equipment with British practices. There is thus a difference between local defence requirements and present defence policy, a difference

¹ Quoted from Professor Stacey's paper on 'New Trends in Canadian Defence Policy'.

² Stacey, *op. cit.*

representing Canada's recognition of the possibility of having to take part in an overseas war.

At the same time, the emphasis has always been laid by Government spokesmen on the local and independent character of Canadian defence preparations.

The new military policy is (apart from all other considerations) the one that is safest politically: for it is the one on which the largest number of Canadians can agree. It pleases many of those with a tendency towards 'isolationism' because it is primarily a policy of home defence. It pleases those with a tendency towards 'Imperialism' because it fulfils, at least partially, Canada's first and most fundamental obligation in the general system of Imperial defence—the obligation to make sufficient provision for her own local defence to ensure that in a crisis she will not have to beg the Mother Country for troops, ships, or equipment that may be worse needed elsewhere.¹

(j) *Canada and the Empire*

In view of what has already been said, it is not surprising that Canada was shown to be generally negative in her attitude towards British Commonwealth relations.

Canada has consistently opposed the creation of any central Commonwealth organization which would possess executive power or which might give the impression that a new system of control was being established in London. There is no likelihood that this attitude will change.

In reference to the present practice of loose consultation and co-ordination of foreign policy between the Dominion and the United Kingdom, Professor Scott writes:

Canada is not likely to promote any change in this situation, and the Canadian Government in practice interprets the relevant resolutions of the Imperial Conferences to mean that its failure to express dissent from a United Kingdom policy of which it has knowledge must not be interpreted as meaning assent to that policy or a willingness to support it.

Professor Scott gives a good deal of attention to the value of the economic and other non-political aspects of the Commonwealth connexion.

¹ Stacey, *op. cit.*

Each Dominion government is endeavouring to solve its local problems, many of which are affected by conditions in some other part of the Commonwealth. Wherever this is so, co-operation becomes valuable. Co-operation with other foreign states may be equally valuable; the Commonwealth promotes co-operation because the will to mutual aid is stronger.

Economic co-operation remains a valuable principle of Commonwealth action if it is for the purpose of raising the general standard of living in Commonwealth countries (and not merely for the purpose of raising prices through production control) and if, in addition, it creates no obstacles to wider forms of world economic co-operation.

Among the important adverse effects of membership in the Commonwealth for Canada, Professor Scott claims that the intention of the British North America Act has been distorted by the interpretations laid upon it by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, with the result that Dominion power of action in the economic field is extremely limited. He notes in particular the limitations laid on the Dominion's treaty-making power by the decisions in the cases relating to I.L.O. conventions. It is fair to add, however, writes Professor Scott, that most Canadians have accepted the Privy Council decisions without much criticism until recently, and that if anything is to be done now the responsibility rests upon Canada. Finally, there is recognition of the manner in which Canada's world status has been enhanced by her Commonwealth membership:

In the international world, Canada as a British Dominion can speak with an authority she would hardly possess were she an independent country of 11,000,000 people. Canada has shared to some extent in the prestige and the power of the whole Commonwealth.

(4) AUSTRALIA

(a) *National Unity*

Australia's interests and policy, as portrayed in the preparatory papers, presented a contrast with those of Canada, partly for obvious geographical reasons, but also because her population is completely homogeneous in race

by the standards of the New World. It is often asserted that Australia is 98 per cent. British, but more illuminating is the fact that only some 10 per cent. of the population come from foreign parents or grandparents. No large or organized body of opinion is opposed to the British connexion. There is always, however, a certain anti-British or anti-Imperial minority to be reckoned with.

There flows into discussion of an Australian foreign policy a small current of definitely anti-British sentiment, or sentiment that views all association with Britain as a hindrance in the way of the full development of an Australian nation, with a distinctive, self-satisfying culture.¹

Racial homogeneity has reinforced a strong sense of federal unity. This feeling has helped powerfully in the construction of unitary national institutions over and above those directly provided for by the Constitution. Most remarkable is the machinery of the Loan Council, under which the credit of states and Commonwealth is pooled and no government can borrow without the assent of other governments. A further important by-product of the same feeling is the faith placed in independent expert tribunals, like the Arbitration Court and the Tariff Board, and including even bodies like the Commonwealth Grants Commission, which decides upon the financial relations between Commonwealth and states.

(b) *Economic Development*

The rapidity of Australia's progress and her geographical isolation from Old-World quarrels, combined with her racial homogeneity, have caused her to concentrate her thought and energies largely on problems of internal development. Such clear-cut external policies as have developed are in the main reflections of internal forces. This applies, for instance, to the White Australia policy, which according to a preparatory paper, was

¹ Quoted from a paper on 'Australian Foreign Policy—Formation and Expression of Australian Opinion', by E. A. Ferguson and others.

adopted as a result of labour troubles aroused by the competition of low-paid Oriental labour.

The White Australia policy is justified, in the eyes of Australians, by economic and racial necessity. . . . A standard of living, high enough to attract European workers, cannot be maintained if Asiatics are allowed to settle in large numbers.

Its necessity is a deduction from our experience, and its serious modification would not be entertained except as a result of the direct application of force.¹

It is recognized, writes Mr. Harris, that the policy may arouse anti-Australian prejudice in India and thus handicap Australia's trade there. But 'there is a good deal of evidence that where the White Australia policy is understood in India it is approved'.

Another internal factor having important external reactions is the economic positivism prevalent in Australian thought—another direct contrast with Canadian conditions. Thus Mr. Harris writes of

the implicit assumption of a great majority of Australians, that the nation controls its own economic destiny and that the Government, as the most potent instrument of the State, can and should direct the organized strength of the nation to desirable ends.

Professor Copland, in a preparatory paper, recorded with approval the Banking Commission's view that the objective of central banking should be

the reduction of fluctuations in general economic activity in Australia, thereby maintaining such stability of internal conditions as is consistent with the change which is necessary if economic progress is to take place.

The Commission accepted the argument that considerations of internal activity must generally have priority over those of external stability.

It was clear from the Australian preparatory papers

¹ Unless the source of quotations in this section on Australia is otherwise indicated, they are drawn from Mr. H. L. Harris's book, *Australia's National Interests and National Policy*, which has been published. (See Appendix II.)

that the idea of development, of an economic destiny which Australia has still to fulfil, permeates Australian thought in all branches of public life.

The natural order of development has been accelerated and parts of the economic structure rendered less stable by attempts to realize national aspirations through economic policy. These aspirations or ideals are those of White Australia, the high living standard, and greater self-sufficiency, or at least 'a balanced economy'.

(It may be noted that this statement inverts the position of the White Australia policy as it has been described above in Mr. Harris's own words.) Mr. Harris quotes Mr. R. G. Menzies's assertion:

Our own all-round industrial development is the essential condition not only of our growth, but also of our existence.

A supplementary paper stressed this factor still more.

. . . not only has there been a relative decrease in the percentage of breadwinners engaged in primary production, but the absolute numbers of primary producers are now almost stationary.

Manufacturing, therefore, is the most important single branch of the Australian economy both from the point of view of employment provided and of value of production.¹

(c) *The Tariff and Ottawa*

The effort to accelerate economic development has expressed itself in a policy of protectionism which is deeply rooted in Australian thought.

It has, however, become apparent during the past decade that 'over-pressure to diversify production in the national economy is a real menace to its expansion', and that if development is to be 'all-round' in the sense of sound and well-balanced, the economic costs of too early or too rapid diversification must be avoided. . . . The necessities of our internal structure require that we should foster the export industries.

¹ These quotations are drawn from a paper on 'The Development of Australian Industry', by H. Burton.

It is held particularly necessary for Australia to foster those primary industries which employ a relatively large number of people per unit of land. This is behind the movement towards 'closer settlement' which is prominent in contemporary Australian affairs.

The United Kingdom cannot go on indefinitely absorbing more and more of our exports. And yet if our economic structure is to expand on its primary producing side and additional population is to be settled on the land, markets must be found for just those commodities which are likely to become increasingly difficult to market there. . . . The probability of a declining population in the United Kingdom means, after allowance has been made for an improvement in the standard of living, that markets for them must be sought elsewhere. A similar conclusion is reached when we consider the future of our exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures. Their largest external market is at present New Zealand, but New Zealand is steadily following the same course as ourselves and will not always be willing to take our iron and steel, earthenware, glassware, &c. Empire markets are of enormous importance, both for their size and for what they absorb, but eventually our policy cannot be determined solely by reference to them. Empire trade is very important, but Empire trade is not enough.

This theme of the dependence of Australia's economic future on foreign markets was also referred to in a number of the supplementary papers, as the following sample extracts show:

Australians recognize in a general way that there is much to be gained for Empire countries both through increases of their own direct trade with foreign countries and indirectly through a general rise in living standards as the result of international commerce.¹

With the general recovery in world trade it has become clear that, for both the United Kingdom and Australia, Imperial trade is not enough. The Ottawa agreements should be regarded as a temporary measure for unusual circumstances rather than as a permanent pattern for our trade structure.²

Australia's interest is essentially in the freer trade, which will

¹ From a paper on 'Australia's Foreign Trade Treaties', by the Hon. C. A. S. Hawker.

² From a paper on 'Australia's Interests in the Pacific Basin', by a Study Group in Canberra.

tend to establish international harmony, rather than in the further expansion of closed markets which will maintain—and probably increase—international friction.¹

On the other hand, Mr. Harris remarks that a high degree of mutual dependence has developed between the economic systems of the United Kingdom and Australia, and that Australian dependence upon the British market for the sale of some of the commodities whose production she has specially stimulated is virtually complete. He adds that a closer study of this mutual dependence should bring fuller understanding and closer sympathies. Another contributor, Mr. C. A. S. Hawker, wrote that Great Britain was the only market in sight which offered any real outlet for the products of closer settlement areas. That, he remarked, is what gives the British preferences such importance to Australia. He added, however, that the Ottawa preferences, by their effect on foreign countries, had secondary reactions adverse for Australia. The recognition of the need for foreign markets is reinforced, as an influence towards tariff moderation, by internal considerations of the costs imposed by an excessive protective tariff. Hitherto, however, the moderating tendency has been largely confined to the preferential tariff.²

Mr. Hawker recounted Australia's illuminating experience in direct trade treaty relations with foreign countries. In earlier periods she was generally content with the most-favoured-nation position secured by British treaties, but during the depression she experienced the determined retaliation of foreign countries against her own tariff and against the exclusive aspects of the Ottawa policy. In spite of Australia's advantages from the Ottawa Agreement, and of her own trade disagreements with the United States, Australian public opinion was said to be favourable towards the conclusion of the Anglo-American trade pact.

¹ From a paper on 'Australia's Relations to other Pacific Countries', by Professor A. C. V. Melbourne.

² See a paper on 'The Australian Tariff', by W. S. Kelly.

Opinion about the importance of Eastern markets to Australia varies. Thus the following two quotations may be compared:

We must seek markets, where markets are available. In the East, standards are rising, if only slowly, and industrialization is increasing. In Western Europe the population will soon attain stability and then begin to decline. Rising standards may or may not offset the loss of numbers.¹

There is a great deal of loose talk about the size of the population in Oriental countries, and the geographical advantage which Australia has in reaching their markets. In practice, what even the wealthy minority in these countries are ready to buy from primary producing countries are just those bulk cereals and crude materials such as wheat and wool, for which a world market exists and which require the minimum man-power to produce.²

A number of objections—not always compatible with one another—have been raised in Australia against the Ottawa Agreements. Thus it is complained that Ottawa has resulted in an increase in the general tariff, with consequent retaliation and ill-will on the part of foreign countries and a handicap to the negotiation of trade treaties with them. It is also alleged, by a different group of Australian interests, that the lowering of the preferential tariff has injured Australian secondary industry. It is also frequently complained in Australia that the result of the general clauses of the Ottawa Agreement, under which Australia undertook to accept the Tariff Board's advice in the working of a formula for maximum preferential duties, has taken the control of the tariff from the Australian Parliament. A demand has consequently arisen for the elimination of this kind of undertaking from any future agreement.

(d) *Migration*

One by-product of the idea of development is the extravagant views that are sometimes held in Australia with regard to the population-carrying capacity of the country. All the larger estimates of maximum or optimum

¹ Harris, op. cit., p. 126

² Hawker, op. cit.

population of Australia include a big total in the tropical parts of the country. According to Mr. Harris, however:

A comparison of natural conditions in tropical Australia with those in other tropical lands supports the conclusion that, except . . . for the narrow Pacific coastal strip, the Australian tropics will never support a population of any magnitude of our own, or any other race.

Nevertheless, he remarks later that as openings in the temperate regions diminish, the north will become relatively more attractive than it is at present. Between 1921 and 1933, whereas the population of the Commonwealth as a whole increased by about 21 per cent., the population of tropical Australia increased by about 31 per cent.

As another contributor remarked, 'the important question is, not how many men will a given area feed, but how much will it earn'.¹ Already, the limitation of world markets has made increased primary production hazardous if not permanently unprofitable. In the circumstances, wrote the same author, no considerable increase in the rural population is likely to take place in the near future.

Mr. Harris points out that even the doubling of the present population is not likely to be realized if present tendencies persist. The net reproduction rate for the period 1932-4 was 0.96. And although it has since risen slightly above unity, an ultimate decline in the population can be predicted with assurance. One estimate showed that in default of immigration Australia will have a maximum population of less than 8 millions in the decade 1973-83. The maximum economic absorptive capacity of Australia for immigrants at the present time was put at 40,000 to 50,000 per annum. It was suggested that future immigration must be different in character from the former influx.

¹ See a paper on 'The Population-Carrying Capacity of Australia', by J. Andrews.

It should aim at introducing various types of skilled labour in large enough quantities to enable the development on an economic scale of secondary industry and of various types of tertiary production.¹

Borrowing abroad is described as likely to increase Australia's absorptive capacity and accelerate the development of secondary industry. Oversea borrowing, however, tends to make Australia more dependent on external conditions and increases the amplitude of the trade cycle. The disadvantages of increased borrowing would be less if it took the form of equity investment in Australian industries. In the meantime,

if the country is to have immigrants on any appreciable scale it must adopt a definite policy to that end.²

Why, then, should Australia adopt a definite immigration policy? The first argument that is put forward is the strategic one, namely, that Australia's 'empty spaces' are a temptation to aggression, which her small population would be unable to withstand. On the whole, the authors of the preparatory papers put a low value on this argument.

The density of China's population seems to be no protection. And would not a potential aggressor cast an even greedier eye on spaces that had been tilled and cultivated than on those that were merely empty? The more serious argument, but the one naturally more distasteful to politicians, is that larger armies can be raised from a larger population. But is capacity for defence a mere function of numerical strength?³

It is also claimed that 'all the land that is capable of being profitably used is already occupied in some form or other', and that in earlier periods 'Asiatics showed no inclination to come unsought'.

It follows that arguments in favour of immigration must rest chiefly on economic grounds. Here the demand

¹ See a paper on 'Migration', by R. B. Madgwick; also Andrews, *op. cit.*

² See a paper on 'The Future of the Australian Population', by A. Smithies.

³ Smithies, *op. cit.*

for a higher population in order to spread overheads or increase productivity comes face to face with the trade union view that large-scale immigration menaces Australian standards of living.

(e) *Australia and Great Britain*

It is now possible to turn to Australia's external political attitudes, but before doing so one may note the following important general comment:

It is impossible to explain the external policy of any nation, or to predict the attitude it is likely to adopt in any given set of circumstances, without taking into account the imponderables which constitute what may be called the emotional background of the national life. . . .

It may become apparent in the future that at this particular juncture Australian interests and sentiments are in conflict, that the national mind, pulled different ways, is unable to steady itself sufficiently to make clear and positive decisions. The dilatoriness and hesitancy which seem to characterize Australia just now may be the result of a sound instinct to avoid or defer decisions until facts work themselves out and the imperatives of our situation are a little clearer.

Clearly, the most potent intangible factor determining Australian attitudes is British sentiment and the most potent tangible factor is geographical situation.

We are Europeans in the Pacific and our sympathies are those natural to a liberal democracy of the European and especially British type.

It is almost certain that any major war in which Britain was involved would be represented correctly or incorrectly, but convincingly, to the majority of Australians, as one involving the fate of the whole Empire.

Any discussion of the neutrality issue, which looms so large for certain other Dominions, is regarded as academic and unrealistic. This belief in necessary and permanent attachment to Great Britain also helps to explain Australia's dilatoriness in endorsing the Statute of Westminster, which is also 'due partly to an innate empiricism, an instinct to allow facts to work themselves

out as far as they will, and partly to the inertia of a community intensely preoccupied with local affairs'. However, a warning is given against building recklessly on British sentiment in Australia.

In spite of the strong traditional and sentimental attachment to Britain, it does not follow that Australians would support British policy in all conceivable circumstances. . . . Any attempt to use British prestige or power for the open exploitation of a weaker race would receive little support in Australia.

The British sentiment is based largely on race and history, but also to some extent on material factors. Dependence on oversea markets is always an important factor in Australia's external policy.

At present these markets are overwhelmingly in Great Britain and Western Europe, but the trade with Pacific countries is substantial and increasing.

Australia's geographical situation gives her at one and the same time a sense of isolation from the quarrels of the older continents and one of exposure to aggression originating there. This combination makes her anxious at all times that Great Britain, to whom she feels herself so strongly attached, should keep out of international complications.

In general, the principles enunciated by responsible Ministers in England during the past few years are such as command very general approval in Australia. . . . The commitments acknowledged in Mr. Eden's Leamington speech, too, are recognized by those who have studied them, as reasonable and indeed more or less inevitable—for Britain. The general hope is that Britain will not become embroiled in Europe again, or involve herself any further than she must in European affairs. In any case, public opinion in Australia is on the whole set against any positive commitments for Australia.

Another writer gave his opinion that 'of the possible alternatives, a foreign policy which tends to reduce world tension and encourage appeasement is the only policy for the Empire'.

Incidentally, it may be noted that on the whole the

defence of the Mediterranean is not regarded as a direct vital interest for Australia. It was described in one paper as 'useful but not essential'.

(f) *Australia and the League*

It may be deduced from the above that Australia has never whole-heartedly accepted the doctrine of collective security. Her emphasis has been on the pacific functions of the League.

Because Australians are lovers of peace they look with favour upon anything that can ensure it provided that it makes no demands entailing sacrifice.¹

The Manchuria affair of 1931-2 aroused little real interest in Australia. The Abyssinian War excited much more concern because it obliged Australia to take a definite decision on sanctions, and it is noteworthy that the Labour Party opposed sanctions on this occasion as likely to involve Australia in war. For a certain section of Left Wing opinion the League is as suspect as the Empire, since both are regarded as the instruments of capitalism. A large body of organized industrial labour, however, supports the League and collective security in principle. Australia has been foremost in advocating the reform of the League on regional lines, though her regional proposals for the Pacific zone were propounded at an inopportune moment, just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. The Australian Government, as the preparatory papers recalled, made further important proposals for reform of the Covenant.

The decline of the authority of the League was said to have tightened the Imperial connexion, but also to have encouraged the establishment of more direct relations between Australia and her neighbours in the Pacific. One paper declared that the consequence had been

(a) a further weakening of confidence in the League system as a safeguard of Australia's security, (b) recognition that an Australian

¹ Quoted from a paper on 'What the League of Nations Means to Australia', by F. Aarons.

foreign policy must concern itself with national security, and (c) a reinforcement of isolationist sentiment.¹

(g) *Geographical Factors*

Australia's position in the southern Pacific naturally has a profound effect on her outlook on world affairs.

Australia is a lonely outpost of Western civilization in a profoundly alien sea. Too far from Britain for easy succour, Australia is perilously near the new storm centres of the world. Distance and isolation once spelt security, they now in our darker moods seem to leave us a too easy victim for the first predatory Power.

Australia is still in the transition stage. Primarily her policy is linked, like her economy, to the British Commonwealth from which she has sprung. But there is an increasing feeling that she has, whether she wants it or not, a part to play in the Pacific, and that she should consciously shape a policy to meet the problems of her own region.²

Australia's interest in the Pacific area differs greatly from the interest of the United Kingdom. Australia is in the Pacific area for all time, but the United Kingdom might withdraw completely from the Far East and still be an influence in world affairs.³

Before dealing with Australia's relations with the Far East, however, it may be well to quote a paragraph illustrating her attitude towards the United States.

The vast majority of us could not conceive a situation in which we should be hostile towards the United States. We are glad to think there is a powerful Anglo-Saxon nation on the other side of the Pacific, and there is a widespread conviction that in spite of, or should it be because of, their business acuteness, on the whole, the Americans stand firmly for peace and right and justice.

As far as trade is concerned, there have been difficulties between the two countries, culminating in Australia's 'trade diversion' policy, which she has now abandoned. There is now, however, considerable mutual goodwill.

In regard to the Far East, the references above to migration questions have shown that different opinions

¹ Ferguson, *et al.*, op. cit.

² From the Canberra Study Group Report, op. cit.

³ Melbourne, op. cit.

are held in Australia concerning any cause for fearing Japanese aggression. Different currents of Australian feeling have also displayed themselves in relation to the Manchuria and North China incidents. On the whole, Australian opinion tends to be tolerant of Japanese incursions on the Asiatic mainland. In 1931-2,

popular sentiment might be fairly summarized as welcoming Japan's preoccupation in this region.¹

In 1937 . . . the first reaction to Japanese hostilities in China was one of humanitarian denunciation of Japan's military aggression. It was soon followed by a realistic appreciation that international action, either by economic or by other means, to restrain Japan would demand large sacrifices from Australia, and might also expose this country to grave risk.²

This tolerant attitude towards Japan's action is no doubt promoted by Australian fear that if Japan were not otherwise preoccupied she might turn her attention southward.

There is a general feeling that until some outlet for Japanese commerce or population or both can be secured there will be no permanent security in the Pacific.³

Australian opinion was favourable towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and was always uneasy about the Washington Conference system.

Australia has direct economic reasons for desiring a settlement in the Pacific. In 1936 over 15 per cent. of her imports came from Japan, China, the Netherlands East Indies, and the British Pacific islands, while 8½ per cent. of her exports went to that group.

The fact that Australia is a colonial Power gives her an additional interest in the countries to the north of her. A point with regard to the New Hebrides may be noted:

From the missionary, commercial, and defence points of view . . . there is a case for the transfer of the British side of the administration to Australia.⁴

¹ Ferguson, *et al.*, op. cit. ² Op. cit.

³ Canberra Study Group Report, op. cit.

⁴ Canberra Study Group Report, op. cit.

As regards Germany's colonial ambitions:

So far there has not been formed in Australia a strong opinion one way or another regarding the German claim for restoration of colonies. Proposals to satisfy the claim in Africa would probably have support in Australia, or at least would not provoke strong opposition, but retrocession of the mandated territory of New Guinea, if that issue were raised, would probably reveal determined dissent.

Defensive reasons are the first of those given for this attitude.

A further important interest of Australia in the Pacific is in transport and communications, particularly shipping. This interest has been severely injured by subsidized competition, the Union Line services between San Francisco and Australia having been extinguished by the competition of the subsidized Matson Line. Partly as a result of Japan's Governmental policy, Japanese ships were stated to carry already 75 per cent. of the trade between Australia and Japan.

(h) *Australian Foreign Policy*

It is necessary to ask whether, in the circumstances that have been described, an Australian foreign policy can be said to exist.

The present state of Australian opinion concerning international relations suggests that there is little reality in the discussion of a wholly independent foreign policy for Australia. The Australian people still view their relations with foreign States through the protective screen of their intimate association with the United Kingdom. . . .

It is still assumed as an axiom that Australia could not be involved in war while the United Kingdom stood apart as a non-belligerent. This has an important bearing upon the question of an Australian foreign policy.¹

The feeling of association with Great Britain has led to the conclusion that it is Australia's duty to help shape British foreign policy. This feeling, according to the

¹ Ferguson, *et al.*, op. cit.

preparatory papers, has been enhanced since the decline of the authority of the League. The Prime Minister himself has declared it to be of paramount importance that the British Commonwealth of Nations should show a united front.

There were said, however, to be in Australia rival views of the Dominion's interests in foreign policy. Some hold that the chief objective should be the securing of a *modus vivendi* with her Pacific neighbours.

A third view minimizes the danger to be apprehended by Australia from any foreign Power and sees as the best way of ensuring Australia's immunity from any form of aggression or attempt to interfere with her domestic policies the proclamation of her utter disinterestedness in the affairs and policies of any other nation, British or foreign.

A semi-isolationist view has been adopted fairly recently by the Labour Party, in contradiction to its former adherence to collective security under the League: this change has been partly due to the effect of Roman Catholic influences, which regarded the League as directed against Italy—a Catholic country—and against General Franco in Spain. 'One of every five Australians is a Roman Catholic'. There is, however, a streak of anti-fascism in the Australian outlook, especially in Labour and pacifist circles.

(i) *Defence*

There is a distinct, but not a one-to-one, connexion between isolationism in foreign policy and localism in defence. Australian defence policy figured prominently in the general election of 1937. Both sides of the technical controversy, however, apparently accepted Imperial co-operation in principle. According to Mr. Lyons, 'Australia, subject to the sovereign control of its own policy, and without prior commitment, stands for co-operation in defence between the members of the British Commonwealth'. Mr. Curtin's policy, on the other hand, is described by Mr. Harris as 'Imperial co-operation by making Australia so secure that no enemy could weaken

the Empire and strengthen her own position by seizing Australia'. Both sides of the controversy, it seems, also accepted the principle of local defence, at any rate as a starting point. The argument turned on the ways and means of conducting local defence, and particularly on the question how far local defence has to be projected beyond territorial waters.

The Government policy is one of 'balance' between the different forces. Thus defence expenditure in 1936-7 was as follows: Navy £3.3 millions; Army £3.2 millions; Air Force £1.5 millions; civil aviation £0.5 millions; munitions £0.6 millions, making a total of £9.2 millions. According to the present programme, the Royal Australian Navy will consist of two 10,000-ton cruisers and two smaller cruisers, one flotilla leader and four destroyers, and other vessels. The Air Force has a personnel of over 2,000 men, with 96 effective first-line planes. An additional 60 planes are due to be delivered before the end of 1938. The peace-time organization of the Army is a permanent force nucleus of 2,300 men and a voluntary enlisted militia of 35,000.

Efforts made to mechanize equipment have been partially frustrated by the inability of British armament firms to supply essential equipment which could not be procured locally, but plans have now been developed for the local production of much of this equipment, and good progress is expected.

With a proper incentive, it is possible for Australia within a few years to become the major source of Empire supplies for the Indo-Pacific sphere. While Singapore may be the major base, the major civil support for that base, both for man-power and munitions of war, may have to be Australia, not merely in the interests of the Empire, but of Australia.¹

One serious weakness on the economic side of Australia's defence is her lack of oil, which she is attempting to remedy in part by the exploitation of shale.

The controversial issue arises over the Navy. The defenders of the 'balanced' policy base their argument on the following points. Firstly, Australia must help to

¹ Quoted from a paper on 'The Defence of Australia', by P. F. Irvine.

defend her overseas trade, which is necessary, if not for bare living, at least for the tolerable maintenance of her economic structure. Secondly, for Australia's own national reasons, it is a vital interest that the independence of British territories in the Pacific should be preserved. Thirdly, it is held that, in view of Australia's great distance from any potential enemy, even a small harassing force could greatly handicap an invader of much greater size, since he would have to keep open long lines of communication. Fourthly, the defenders of the policy acknowledge the strength and importance of British naval defences based on Singapore, and believe that Australia should in her own interests contribute to them.

On the other hand, the opponents of Australia's naval policy argue on the following lines in favour of concentrating on local defence in the narrower sense, particularly on the provision of a substantial air force. Firstly, they claim that the naval policy depends for its efficacy on the existence of a large British fleet based on Singapore, and that in the world situation of to-day this cannot be counted on. Secondly, some of the critics assert that the Singapore base is of little defensive value, distant as it is from supporting bases. Thirdly, Mr. Curtin is quoted as saying: 'If a nation has a fleet that cannot conquer, it would be better off without one.' Finally, the critics argue that Australia cannot afford a reasonable measure both of local and of naval defence, and that she must concentrate her resources where they are most needed.

While this argument proceeds, it can hardly be said that Australia as a whole has a national view of defence policy and of the proper means of co-operating in Imperial defence. The following quotation may therefore serve as a sufficient summary:

What objective evidence there is, suggests that definite and positive commitments will not be entertained, that the feeling that Australia is bound to co-operate with other members of the Empire, at least to the extent of standardizing equipment and training so

that she can co-operate, is strong; but that attempts at a single peace-time control, unless perhaps it were Australian control, would not only fail, but do positive harm. Finally, what has been said in effect must be repeated—public opinion under the stress of war or threat of war is largely controlled by instinctive urges.

(5) NEW ZEALAND

(a) *Sentiment for the Commonwealth*

The main New Zealand preparatory paper, *Contemporary New Zealand*,¹ is the work of several hands, and that alone would account for certain conflicts of opinion that are apparent in it. But there also seemed to be unresolved conflicts within the typical New Zealand outlook, as it was there presented. To an outsider, this suggested that New Zealand opinion was not altogether united, and that it was difficult to strike an average between opposite extremes; that thought in the Dominion about international affairs was perhaps passing through a phase of transition and doubt, in which elements hitherto latent were coming to the surface.

The main conflict—and this was not merely to be inferred, but was frankly revealed in the survey itself—appeared to be that between a powerful sentiment of loyalty to the British Crown and of solidarity with other British peoples, on the one hand, and on the other, a disbelief, held at least by a sceptical minority, in the material value of the British connexion and even a positive belief in its dangers for New Zealand.

The force of British sentiment is plainly expressed in many different passages. For instance, the author of the first chapter in the survey says of New Zealand:

It is a British Dominion, its nationality is British, and in that fact we see a value absolute in itself. . . . We are British, and proud of it; and, feeling a common nationality, we feel the necessity of a common political system.

¹ This work, from which all quotations in this section on New Zealand have been drawn unless otherwise indicated, has been published. (*See* Appendix II.)

New Zealanders as a whole are said to be 'still acutely conscious of their Imperial connexion and anxious at all costs to maintain and secure it. They are still romantically English'. There are geographical and economic as well as historical reasons for this. Indeed, one contributor declares that New Zealand 'psychologically has remained a colony because economically it has remained a colony'. But one must also look to the racial ancestry of New Zealand's population. Of the European population no less than 96·5 per cent. are of British stock. Europeans form over 94 per cent. of the population, and Maoris and half-caste Maoris account for a further 5 per cent., leaving less than one-half of 1 per cent. of Chinese and other Oriental races.

(b) *Attitude on Constitutional Questions*

The strength of British sentiment, and the psychological acceptance of a colonial relationship with Great Britain, have led to a distrust of the recent process of constitutional devolution within the Commonwealth. In earlier days New Zealand was anxious to gain control of its own defence and native policy, which had been reserved from responsible government.

But, once it had got essential control of its own internal affairs, it was not really interested in constitutional evolution; or, rather, its interest was that of a rigid disapproval. It is a 'Dominion' in spite of itself.

While New Zealand looked upon federation with the Australian colonies with distrust, she was foremost in advocating a wider Empire federation. After the War, the development of Dominion status was regarded by her leaders with positive apprehension, lest it should prove a step towards the disintegration of the Empire. The Statute of Westminster, in particular, was felt by those then in command of New Zealand affairs to be a dangerous measure, and its major provisions were not passed into New Zealand law. This view was not shared by the Labour Party, then in opposition. But the Labour Government which came into office in 1935 did not alter the

system, unique to New Zealand, whereby the Governor-General was the agent of the United Kingdom Government and the channel through which correspondence between the United Kingdom and New Zealand Governments passed.

The Labour Prime Minister himself, at the last Imperial Conference, upheld the New Zealand tradition when he declared that

New Zealand attaches no particular importance to the theoretical basis of our association as members of the British Commonwealth.

The New Zealand delegation also opposed any move to alter the present law and convention regarding nationality, whereby New Zealand—like Australia—accepts the common status of British subjecthood and has created no separate nationality of its own. There is no popular desire for any change in the system of appeals to the Privy Council. New Zealand has no legations or consular representatives in foreign countries, and her relations with such countries are conducted through the United Kingdom Government and its diplomatic representatives. New Zealand, however, recently followed Australia's example in appointing a liaison officer with the British Foreign Office.

New Zealand has been content to concentrate almost wholly on her own local problems. Consequently, her external interests, except in so far as they relate to trade, immigration and the administration of her island dependencies, have not been considered of sufficient volume or importance to justify the creation of special departmental machinery similar to the External Affairs Departments of the other Dominions.

Certain circles, however, for some time past, and recently a wider public, have begun to doubt whether this dependent attitude of New Zealand is to her advantage or consistent with her proper status in the world. Even before the Labour Government came into power, New Zealand's participation in discussions of foreign policy had not been 'altogether marked by that mild

acquiescence of which it has generally been suspected'. An attitude of dissent has obviously grown more pronounced since the advent of the Labour Government. There is now evidence, it is reported,

of a growing appreciation of the need for fuller assumption of responsibility and a realization that New Zealand's interests, though closely related, are not necessarily identical with those of the United Kingdom.

Apart from the change of government, a number of explanations are offered for this altered attitude. The rapid development of communications has brought about new and more widespread contacts. The trade policy of the United Kingdom has encouraged New Zealand to try to diversify her own economy and to seek markets elsewhere. Other contributory reasons are also suggested.

(c) *Disadvantages of the Commonwealth Connexion*

Some of those responsible for the survey feel, indeed, that in purely material terms the British connexion might be positively injurious to New Zealand.

Envisaging a future (as in 1938 one is compelled to envisage it), not of ordered international government, but of war that is in the first place international and in the second place social, the disadvantages we derive from the Commonwealth association are overwhelming.

New Zealand's Commonwealth membership is alleged to render her more likely to be attacked than if she stood alone. Nevertheless, Commonwealth membership is acknowledged to imply much more than strategic considerations.

(d) *Trade and Tariffs*

On the economic side, it is asserted that New Zealand gains no particular advantage from the preferential trade system as between herself and other Dominions.

New Zealand buys much more from Canada and Australia, India, South Africa, and Ceylon than she sells to them, and in the particular circumstances it is doubtful whether the system of

Empire preferences has benefited New Zealand—apart, of course, from the English market.

Whereas previously her preferential tariff was automatically extended to all British countries, the present practice is to make separate trade agreements with the different countries of the Empire; no such agreements, however, have yet been made with India, Ireland, Newfoundland, and certain colonial territories.

With the United Kingdom, which takes about 80 per cent. of New Zealand's exports, an essentially complementary basis of trade has developed.

One peculiar advantage for New Zealand of being in the British Empire is that England more than any other country imports food-stuffs, and so offers the best market for New Zealand's dairy produce and meat. If New Zealand had not been within the Empire her food products would probably have received the same treatment in recent years as those of Denmark and the Argentine.

Nevertheless, the advantage to New Zealand is not seen as an unqualified one. In the first place, it is claimed that New Zealand offers at least an equal return for the preferences she receives in the British market.

A market can only deal with a market. If New Zealand needs England, England, no longer the workshop of the world, needs New Zealand—whether Dominion or not.

In the second place, it is argued that, while the preferential system has been of substantial advantage to the Dominion's primary production, it has injured her actual or potential secondary industries. The continuance of this state of affairs owes something to the political make-up of the country. 'Farmers have always controlled or held the balance of power in all New Zealand Governments.'

Attention is drawn to certain subordinate disadvantages of the Ottawa Agreements. The consumer has suffered by having to take an inferior article from the United Kingdom or else pay a high duty on goods imported from foreign countries. Of late years the

feeling has grown that Great Britain takes the preferential market in New Zealand for granted, and does not go out of her way to satisfy New Zealand wishes in trade matters. It is claimed that New Zealand gave a generous interpretation to the general clauses of the Ottawa Agreement, with the result that 'of the 103 changes subsequently made in the already low tariff, 100 consisted of reductions or abolitions of duties'. On the other hand, it is alleged that the United Kingdom has sought to escape her obligations, undertaken at Ottawa, with regard to the market for Dominion meat. Her policy in this matter has fluctuated, and the resultant uncertainty has damaged New Zealand trade.

The application of quotas and the threat of import levies have impressed upon New Zealanders the necessity both of diversifying their own economy and of seeking new markets elsewhere.

The Labour Government, though committed to the stimulation of secondary industry, is still only moderately protectionist. The Prime Minister, Mr. Savage, has declared that if British policy prevents the sale of New Zealand's export surplus in the United Kingdom at economic prices, and in sufficient quantities to enable the Dominion to continue to progress, then New Zealand must either seek foreign markets for her primary products or else develop manufacturing industries to replace a great many existing imports from the United Kingdom. He added, however:

We have no desire to set up uneconomic industries behind the shelter of a high tariff wall. Rather we would attempt to organize industry on a rationalized plan.

(e) Social Policy and Governmental Control

As the survey points out, 'the provision of services is becoming an increasingly important branch of the economic organisation of a modern community'; and New Zealand policy is going through a phase of rapid and far-reaching extension of public services. Services, of course, are necessarily produced within the com-

munity itself; they may to some extent replace imports in the distribution of New Zealand's purchasing power.

In a new country the state had naturally to be largely responsible for large-scale economic development—railways, electric power, irrigation, and so on. 'On the whole state enterprise has been successful even when judged in terms of profit in the commercial sense of the term.'

In addition successive governments have followed in more or less degree a policy of intervention in or regulation of private enterprise. . . . A typical example of the opportunist use of the powers of the State and the readiness with which those powers are invoked in New Zealand is to be found in the control of export marketing.

The tendency towards state control, and towards equalizing the distribution of the national income, has had the consistent support of the people as a whole. The tendency has been stimulated by New Zealand's very severe experience of unemployment during the world depression.

The policy of the Labour Government included the enforcement of a forty-hour week without reduction of earnings, and the establishment of a comprehensive system of pensions and medical service open to all citizens. Not only have the control boards for different export industries been brought under public control, but the Government has also embarked on a complete system of guaranteed prices and Government marketing for New Zealand's most important group of exports, dairy produce.

The purpose of the system is not only to defend the incomes of one section of the people, but also to contribute to a general plan of minimizing the effect of world price movements on New Zealand's internal conditions.

The fact that one-third of the national income is derived from the sale of a narrow range of exports very susceptible to fluctuations in price renders the economic structure of New Zealand highly vulnerable to world price movements.

Her financial and economic policy, however, is now directed towards insulating both her banking system and

her major industries from these adverse external forces. Part of this endeavour consists in reducing New Zealand's dependence on the English market for long-term finance. In March, 1935, the total of New Zealand Government debt domiciled in England was £163,200,000 sterling. This figure, however, has since been reduced by £5,500,000,

and there is a strong determination on the part of the Labour Government to continue this policy of gradually reducing the overseas debt, which becomes an increased burden when export prices fall.

The Labour Government's proposals for a trade agreement with the United Kingdom allowed New Zealand to retain an export surplus sufficient to pay, not only shipping charges, debt services, and other invisible items, but also the cost of an annual redemption of her sterling loans.

The New Zealand Government's ideas on reciprocal and bilateral trade are . . . part of a philosophy of planning internal production—production for which New Zealand is most suited—and also planning exports in order to import those things which New Zealand needs and cannot produce or can produce only at great expense.

It has so far proved impossible to reach a satisfactory agreement with the United Kingdom on the lines proposed.

(f) *Migration and Population*

A further reason for the Labour Government's intention to promote secondary industries has been its desire to encourage emigration once its own unemployment problem has been solved. Mr. Savage is responsible for the following statement:

So long as we remain a purely agricultural country, the number of immigrants that we can absorb is definitely limited. If, however, we achieve a more balanced economy and produce more of our own manufactured goods we should be in a position not only to absorb that considerable proportion of our people who at present are

unable to find normal avenues of employment, but also to maintain a much greater population.

A number of carpenters have already been imported in order to assist in the Government's housing scheme, and it is suggested that the conditions are now much more favourable than in the past for a revival of assisted emigration.

The net reproduction rate in 1936 was only 0.967, and if present trends continue the New Zealand population, without emigration, will actually begin to decline within the span of existing lives. The agricultural industry seems incapable of absorbing any large increase of the numbers now engaged in it. Indeed, the number of farm workers has actually declined.

In contrast, the factory industries offer wide possibilities for increased employment in the substitution of New Zealand factory products for imports.

(g) *Air Routes and Shipping*

Apart from trade, on two vitally important economic matters requiring Commonwealth co-operation, New Zealand's experience has been unsatisfactory. The Dominion will probably be the terminus and junction of two of the greatest international air routes in the world; that from Great Britain to Australasia, and that across the Pacific from North America to the South Seas. As regards both the necessary intra-Commonwealth co-operation for the organization of the first of those routes, and the necessary international co-operation for the organization of the second, there have been disappointing controversies, misunderstandings, and delays. Delay and lack of co-operation have been equally serious in regard to the other matter referred to, namely, the competition between British shipping lines (registered in New Zealand) and subsidized American shipping on the trans-Pacific routes. The problem has been under consideration by the Commonwealth Governments concerned for several years, and, when agreement on a measure of

financial assistance seemed at last to have been reached, shipbuilding costs had risen so far that further delay in the actual construction of new ships appeared inevitable.

That two such relatively simple problems as the maintenance of British shipping in the Pacific and the inauguration of an Empire air service should prove so difficult of solution, does not bear eloquent testimony to the strength of the Commonwealth idea.

(h) *Regional Security or Insecurity*

The geographico-strategic reasons for scepticism about the Commonwealth's value to New Zealand are based on the view that New Zealand is too far removed from centres of potentially aggressive power to fear direct attack, and that she is more likely to be involved in war as a result of her connexion with the Commonwealth than as a result of her own national disagreements with foreign countries.

New Zealand's strategic position in relation to trade is a comparatively simple one. She is 1,200 miles from the nearest mainland in one direction of trade, 5,000 in the other and 5,000 miles from the nearest likely enemy. Her commerce becomes oceanic the moment it leaves New Zealand ports. . . . Admittedly the trade does pass through one focal point *en route* to Europe and at the end merges into the densest shipping stream in the world; but by that time it has passed out of New Zealand's strategic orbit and must be regarded as a problem for the Empire as a whole, and for Great Britain in particular. New Zealand's overseas trade is naturally of cardinal importance to her; but relative to the world's trade it does not loom so large.

The survey reports an increasing appreciation of the fact that New Zealand's future interests will tend to lie more and more in the Pacific basin.

There is, however, a general disposition to regard the Far East as a somewhat remote compartment of the world. Consequently New Zealanders are prone to adopt towards Far Eastern affairs as, indeed, towards foreign affairs generally, the detached attitude of a spectator country rather than the more conscious concern of an interested party.

Although Japanese imperialism is felt to be a potential menace, there does not appear to be any widespread fear of Japanese aggression against the Dominion itself.

If it is granted that New Zealand's measures of home defence are sufficient to repel anything less than a combined naval and military expedition of some size, then to the doubtful value of the objective must be added the difficulty of attaining it. The mere distance from its base at which such an expedition would be compelled to operate would seem to ensure that it would not be sent at all. When, in addition, these thousands of miles of sea are within the sphere of operation of potentially hostile naval forces, the prospect of such an invasion ever being attempted seems hardly worth considering.

Since Japan embarked on the invasion of Manchuria and then of China, there has developed, nevertheless, an attitude of hostility and distrust which has helped to occasion an all-round increase of New Zealand's defence forces.

New Zealand's historic policy in the Pacific has been to oppose, and if possible to prevent, the establishment of foreign Powers in islands capable of providing bases from which they could attack New Zealand or harass her trade. After the war of 1914-18, when New Zealand accepted the mandate for Western Samoa, her representatives were disappointed that there were to be no actual annexations. Her most important Pacific dependencies are the Cook Islands, whose economic importance is slight, but is greatly exceeded by their strategic importance, as they are within 1,600 miles of Wellington. During the last two years the development of air services across the Pacific has drawn attention to the strategic importance, as potential air bases, of a number of small islands and atolls, which had been previously neglected because of their isolation and unproductiveness.

As a supplementary paper there was submitted a report published by the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs on the question of Western Samoa, formerly a German colony. The return of Western Samoa is said to be primarily a political problem, not one

of economic loss or gain, from New Zealand's point of view. The present position, in which all islands south of the Equator are in the hands either of the British Empire or of its probable allies or friends, would be destroyed. The island is said to be suitable for a seaplane base, but otherwise to have no special strategic merits. It is thought that New Zealand would be able to recapture it almost immediately as she did in 1914, if war broke out between the British Empire and Germany. From the strategic point of view, the real danger is said to be an alliance between Japan and Germany in peace-time, with a view to war in the Pacific.

Considerable importance is attached by the authors of the survey to good relations with the United States.

Though the foreign policy of the United States differs fundamentally from that of both Australia and New Zealand, the view is widely held that the security of both Dominions along with that of Canada is indissolubly linked with the United States of America.

The strategic arguments on which the Dominion's defence policy is based assume that the United States is to be regarded as a potential menace to Japan if the latter should embark on aggressive ambitions in the South Pacific. It is thought that Japan would consequently regard the game as not worth the candle.

The conclusion is, therefore, that New Zealand, Commonwealth considerations apart, would not be likely to be engaged in a war with or to be attacked by any other nation.

(i) *Foreign Policy*

The third set of reasons for a sceptical attitude towards the Commonwealth connexion in New Zealand is based on differences over foreign policy. The popular assumption, that the immediate interests of the Empire were identical with the League, was shaken, according to this survey, when people in New Zealand observed 'the vague ineffectiveness of British behaviour over Manchuria and Abyssinia and Spain'.

At the Imperial Conference of 1937, the New Zealand Prime Minister expressed the view that grievous mistakes

had in the past been made in the foreign policy of the Commonwealth. The cause of peace could best be served, he held, if there could be published to the world the lines which a united British Commonwealth intended to follow in the future. Firstly, a concerted international effort should be made to rectify and remove the economic causes of war. Secondly, 'until it had been possible to remove economic injustices it was essential that the collective peace system established at Geneva should be made effective'.

The survey suggests that, since the new developments in British foreign policy associated with the resignation of Mr. Eden, the divergence between the British and New Zealand views has tended to be accentuated. It is alleged that Britain 'had taken the lead in weakening the League on almost every occasion upon which it was weakened from Locarno to Spanish "non-intervention" '.

In July 1936 the New Zealand Government opposed the removal of sanctions against Italy, advocating rather their intensification. It urged that the question of the reform of the Covenant should be immediately and frankly considered. In May 1938 it strongly opposed at Geneva the British proposal that individual nations be authorized to decide, as they thought fit, the question of recognizing the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. In December 1936, and again in May 1937, its representative opposed the British and French view that the Spanish War was not a matter which came within the scope of the League Covenant. In May 1938 New Zealand supported the Spanish representative's demand that his Government should be allowed to buy war material wherever it could. With regard to Japan's invasion of China, the New Zealand Government similarly took the view that there had been a breach of the Covenant demanding positive League action.

(j) *The League of Nations*

This policy of strict collective security under the League of Nations was not New Zealand's line before the

advent of the Labour Government. The previous attitude is summed up in the preparatory survey as one of determination to prevent the League from rivalling the Empire in the affections of the members of the British Commonwealth. New Zealand was also extremely backward in support for the International Labour Organization, having ratified none of its conventions.

Lack of interest, and the belief that the New Zealand laws more than adequately covered the minimum standards laid down by the International Labour Office, were the principal reasons for this strange non-compliance with the provisions of Article CCCCIV of the Versailles Treaty.

The Labour Government has made a start with ratifying conventions, beginning with those which are, in effect, already applied in New Zealand.

Its policy of universal and automatic collective security was expressed in its memorandum on the reform of the League Covenant, which is quoted in full in the survey. The following outstanding paragraphs may be cited from it here:

- (5) We are prepared to accept, in principle, the provisions proposed for the Geneva Protocol of 1924 as one method of strengthening the Covenant as it exists.
- (7) We believe that the sanctions contemplated by the present Covenant will be ineffective in the future as they have been in the past—
 - (i) Unless they are made immediate and automatic:
 - (ii) Unless economic sanctions take the form of the complete boycott contemplated by Article XVI:
 - (iii) Unless any sanctions that may be applied are supported by the certainty that the Members of the League applying the sanctions are able and, if necessary, prepared to use force against force.
- (9) We are prepared to agree to the institution of an international force under the control of the League or to the allocation to the League of a definite proportion of the armed forces of its Members to the extent, if desired, of the whole of those forces—land, sea, and air.

The memorandum went on to propose that all members of the League, and any non-members that chose to do so, should hold national plebiscites on the question of automatic and immediate participation in economic and military sanctions. It supported the establishment of a tribunal to ventilate and rectify international grievances, the reconsideration of the Peace Treaties, and the separation of the Covenant from them.

While the New Zealand Government did not base this policy on ideological or class arguments, the opinion is expressed in the course of the survey that New Zealand's interests are identified with democracy, and within democracies with 'the struggling left-wing parties of the world'.

(k) *Defensive Commitments*

The collective security policy plainly requires a measure of force behind it. 'The Abyssinian episode awoke in the public mind a fairly general realization that force of arms was the ultimate sanction of the League Covenant.' The collective security policy itself is said to be indicated for New Zealand by her own strategic needs.

It is felt that in the world as it is to-day, there can be no security except collective security. Especially is this felt to be so in the case of a small and therefore relatively defenceless country such as New Zealand, in an international order built on competitive armaments and power politics.

This statement does not seem to be altogether compatible with the argument, mentioned above, that New Zealand's strategic position is one of safety in isolation and that commitment to the British Commonwealth—let alone to the other members of the League of Nations—increases rather than diminishes her liability to attack.

New Zealand opinion is said to recognize that the Dominion's policy cannot be one of no commitments to the Commonwealth itself. Indeed, in questioning and sometimes opposing British foreign policy, New Zealand is influenced by the popular belief that she could not

escape the consequences of any European entanglements in which England became involved.

She cannot remain a member of the Commonwealth and choose neutrality when the Commonwealth is involved in war; the practical difficulties of such a position are overwhelming.

While, therefore, New Zealand, in common with other Dominions, reserves complete freedom of action in the event of any British non-League commitment resulting in war, the extent to which this reservation is likely to apply in practice is very questionable.

(1) *The Defence Forces*

The New Zealand division of the Royal Navy consists of two cruisers and some smaller vessels. The squadron is maintained, and to a large extent manned, by New Zealand, but it remains part of the Royal Navy. There is said to be a tendency towards revising this position in the direction of the Australian plan of an independent naval force. It is generally felt that New Zealand's first line of defence is naval defence centred on the Singapore base, to the cost of which she has contributed.

The land forces consist of a voluntarily enlisted citizen army. The Government's policy

is not to build up a large force, but one of high efficiency from which leaders can be obtained if the need arises, and of sufficient strength to provide coastal defence. . . . It cannot be said, however, that a war-time policy really exists at all. . . . There is an undoubted general sentiment against a definite commitment in peace, and to a lesser degree, a sentiment against ever again dispatching a force overseas; but if an Empire war occurred and if it were clear that such a force were needed, it seems certain that an attempt would be made to provide it.

The Air Force, after a reorganization plan has been completed, will consist of two squadrons of long-range, modern aircraft manned by permanent personnel, together with territorial squadrons intended for coastal defence. The two main squadrons are regarded as a striking force and as a definite contribution to Imperial defence. In this practical way, despite her disagreements

with the United Kingdom over foreign policy, New Zealand acknowledges the continuance of her traditional belief in the unity of the Commonwealth's really vital interests.

(6) IRELAND

(a) *Partition and Irish Nationalism*

The omission from the preparatory studies of any detailed account of the Irish attitude towards international relations was, in an immediate sense, the result of the absence of any Institute of International Affairs in Ireland. But it also seems to have had a more profound cause in the fact that—

For reasons partly geographical and partly, no doubt, to be accounted for by history, no great public interest is manifested in Ireland's external relations (including those with other members of the Commonwealth)—except, of course, in the secular problem of her relations with Great Britain.

A reader of the studies can hardly fail to be impressed by the frequent recurrence of one theme; that is the question of the partition of Ireland.

There is no body of opinion in the Treaty area—whether Nationalist, Labour, Independent or *ci-devant* Unionist—that is not wholeheartedly in favour of a united Ireland.

At this very moment conscious and deliberate British policy is maintaining in Ireland a strident challenge to one of the most powerful Irish instincts, the instinct for national unity. . . . Sooner or later that challenge will be met.

Dominion status was much more than Home Rule, but it fell short in form of either Griffith's Kingdom or the 1916 Republic. The greatest weakness of the settlement was, however, not its form, but the fact that it recognized partition.

On Ulster no compromise is conceivable to the Irish Nationalist. . . . Time is on our side and discussion is largely useless. This problem should not alone prevent a settlement of other outstanding problems, though it is certainly true that, while it remains unsolved, full friendship and co-operation between the two countries will be difficult of attainment.

Partition, among present political issues, is the most striking by-product of the bitter history of Ireland. The studies contained a very great deal of history, some of it going deep into the past.

The Irish position is, to a quite unusual degree, history-conditioned; so much so, indeed, that it would be idle to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of Commonwealth membership to her except in a historical perspective.

One contributor claimed that the essential nature of Irish nationalism is cultural rather than political. He compared it, though with reservations concerning both quality and quantity, with 'the great non-political cultures of the Orient, such as those of India and especially of China'. He recalled its debt both to English ideas and to Englishmen.

It is very remarkable that ever since the end of the eighteenth century the most successful Irish political leaders have been men of English race.

(b) *Ireland and the Commonwealth*

According to another writer in the preparatory paper:

The dispute between England and Ireland has been, from the Irish point of view, the result of at least three powerful motive groups; the internal class struggle, the religious struggle, and nationalism.

The mixture of economic and cultural motives with political motives has inevitably caused some uncertainty regarding the ultimate purpose of the Nationalist effort. After the French Revolution, we were told, nationalism took two forms, which ever since have competed one with the other, the desire to establish an Irish state virtually independent of England, but entirely on the English model and owing allegiance to the Crown, and the more revolutionary policy of establishing an Irish republic modelled on that of France. . . . Indecision as between these two aims has been the great mark of Irish politics from that day to this.

At first Dominion status was accepted with some enthusiasm by the great majority, but it was accepted not as something positive,

but as the temporary *de jure* expression of actual freedom. The inevitable policy of Irish statesmen has been, so far as possible, to bring theory into harmony with the Irish view of the facts. In this respect, Mr. de Valera's recent legislation, for all its apparently revolutionary character, has been simply a continuance of work done by his opponents, Kevin O'Higgins and Mr. McGilligan.

Even for those who accept Dominion status as the objective, this must be taken in the sense of equality of different states within the Commonwealth, and cannot imply comparability between Ireland and the oversea Dominions.

English political and social institutions have no meaning for the Irishman and call forth no loyalty from him.

It is therefore a matter of common honesty and wise realism for Irish Nationalists to insist on a radically different status for their country from that of the self-governing Dominions. If loyalty to the Crown is a real force, binding together the other self-governing parts of the Empire, it is presumably because those Dominions recognize a common origin from a common Motherland, of which they may be justly proud. The Crown is to them a rallying point, a symbol of their community life, as it is still in England. In Ireland there can be no question of any such symbolic role. What is possible, and all that is possible, is the use of the Crown in external affairs, as a sign of our association with the British Commonwealth. But the association must be from outside, analogous rather to the relationship of Egypt and the Sudan than that of India, to mention two other communities where native loyalties have prevented in the past, and still prevent, the development of loyalty to the English Crown. To an Irishman, it seems strange that the Commonwealth should have any objection to such an obvious solution of the problem. It would, indeed, appear to open the door to a rearrangement of the complicated relationships binding the solid kernel of the British Commonwealth to an outer fringe of states, which show varying degrees of strategic and economic dependence on the Empire.

(c) *Economic Relations*

There appeared from the preparatory paper to be two powerful material bases for Ireland's association with the Commonwealth, more especially with Great Britain. The first is economic and the second strategic. In 1936

no less than 81.4 per cent. of Irish exports went to Great Britain, and 51.9 per cent. of her imports came from that country. An even more striking fact is that as regards exports the position was not radically changed in comparison with 1932, when the proportion going to Great Britain was 84.7 per cent.; the 'economic war' and the efforts of Mr. de Valera's Government to find alternative markets for Irish produce had thus little effect in diminishing Ireland's dependence on the British market.

The so-called economic war, indeed, had not an economic but a political origin—a causality not unknown in the previous history of Anglo-Irish relations. The interaction of politics and economics has, however, passed through several different phases. In the early phase the revolt of the depressed peasant classes was identified with political nationalism. This alliance of class warfare with political divisions ended with the Treaty of 1921, when

Labour found itself face to face with a native capitalism much less influenced by the infiltration of progressive views than its counterpart in England. Since then, while still paying lip-service to the Nationalist cause, the Irish Labour movement has been mainly preoccupied with the class war inside Ireland.

During Mr. Cosgrave's administration Ireland adopted moderate protectionism, but based its economic policy primarily on the interests of the farmers. A new phase came with the entering of Mr. de Valera into power, when industrial protectionism on a considerable scale was adopted, partly for its own sake and partly in retaliation against British measures. It seems likely that still another phase has been opened with the entry into force of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of April 1938, whereby the policy of the past six years has to a large extent been abandoned.

Whatever may be argued of its industrial and agricultural effects, Mr. de Valera's economic policy failed most strikingly to perform one of its objectives, which many Irishmen regarded as fundamental—namely, to stem the

flow of emigration and to keep Irish people in Ireland. By comparison with other European agricultural countries Ireland is lightly populated. On a similar comparison, her people enjoy a high standard of living. The extremely late age of marriage that is prevalent acts as a check upon the birth-rate, but Ireland has nevertheless a surplus by natural growth which might be regarded as allowing scope for emigration. Uncontrolled emigration, however, has led to a persistent decline in the total population. In 1936 it is estimated that 24,000 Irish people permanently emigrated into Great Britain, and 32,000 in 1937, not counting 3,000 seasonal migratory labourers. An important part of the injury that this entails for Ireland is the worsening age distribution of the population. The preparatory studies leave the impression that differences in standards of living will continue to exert their influence, and that administrative action repelling this influence might be bitterly resented. The task for the Irish Nationalist, therefore, is described as to raise the relative standard of living in Ireland, and the conclusion of the April agreement seems to imply a recognition that this objective can be best achieved through close and preferential trade relations with the United Kingdom.

(d) *The Strategic Connexion*

Ireland's strategical position is essentially one of sheltering behind the barrier of Great Britain. While this enables her to avoid any definite commitments to other countries, it makes it difficult if not impossible for her to contemplate any hostile action against her neighbour, and indeed makes it almost certain that she would be involved as an ally in the latter's wars. These strategic considerations were set out in a paper on Irish defence problems, from which the following quotations are selected:

It may be safely assumed that Ireland could not *remain* neutral in any major war in which Great Britain was involved. Even if we assume that neutrality was declared to begin with by the Irish Government, and make the very considerable further assumption

that both Great Britain *and* the other belligerents were prepared to recognize such neutrality, the inevitable course of hostilities would result in Ireland's being drawn into the vortex. Let us see why.

It is certain that—exactly as happened in the war of 1914-18—England would greatly increase her purchases of food and certain other commodities in Ireland. . . . It would, consequently, be a serious military advantage for England's adversary, whoever he is, to cut off the Irish supplies to England.

It is when we come to consider the advance in aviation that we realize that Ireland's former isolation is indeed a thing of the past. No degree of internal apathy can ever undo what has been accomplished regarding the country's status in this respect. Ireland is now easily accessible by the aircraft of every first-class Power with the possible, but not certain, exception of Japan.

Dublin—in the circumstances under review—is an obvious target for air attack. It is, in fact, the one target in Ireland really worth while—being the bottle-neck through which Irish supplies would be poured into England, and the centre whence everything in Ireland is distributed.

The author considered, not that any attempt would be made to use Ireland as a base for actual military invasion of Great Britain, but that a European enemy might well try to establish temporary aero-naval bases from which he could harass British shipping and territory.

In view of what has just been said of the hostile aims, the role of Ireland is obviously easy to diagnose. That role will be to *frustrate* the adversary—in other words, to prevent him from securing such utilization of Irish terrain and situation as would enable him to sever England's western communications, or to launch attacks against western England, or both. The Irish armed strength should in that case be organized and developed along corresponding lines.

It was argued that the recent Anglo-Irish Agreement, under which the landward defences of the ports reserved for British use under the Treaty of 1921 have been transferred to Ireland, represented a first step in the direction indicated, but that further efforts were necessary, particularly in regard to the defence of the east coast.

(e) *The Church and the Commonwealth*

A further important factor in Ireland's relations with the Commonwealth is the position of the Catholic Church. The overwhelming Catholic majority in Ireland distinguishes her from all other Commonwealth countries. The Church in Ireland, however, is distinctly Irish as well as Catholic. While it is naturally anti-communist—a fact which has led the Irish Labour Party into complications over the Spanish War and relations with Russia—it is essentially democratic in outlook.

It has grown up with democracy; it understands it, and gets on with it. Fascist movements have no chance of success among Irish Catholics. Again, as a Church, it has learnt the lesson from bitter experience that politics and religion are best kept apart. . . . The Church is therefore eminently suited to fulfil that function in the British Empire which its past history, especially during the last hundred years, so clearly indicates. It has carried throughout the English dominions its characteristic type of eminently practical, democratic Catholicism.

Nevertheless, when the same writer reached the following conclusion—

That when the question of status is once solved, Ireland has closer affiliations with the Commonwealth and has more to gain from an association with it than with any other nation or group of nations,

he seemed to imply that the question of status had not yet been fully solved. One of his fellow contributors wrote of the status asserted by Mr. de Valera in his recent constitutional legislation:

It is quite unthinkable that any Irish government will ever accept a lesser status. On the contrary, the tendency will continue to be one of working towards the position of internationally recognized political independence, while preserving the economic bonds whose value and necessity to both countries is gradually emerging into a clearer light.

He also remarked that the complete objectives of Irish nationalism were as yet unrealized and that its strength

remained at least as great as before. This fact is clearly of profound importance to the whole Commonwealth; for Irish nationalism, in the same writer's view, has contributed perhaps more than any factor to the formation of the present British Commonwealth of Nations, and it is unlikely that its influence will disappear in the future.

(7) CONCLUSION

By their different contents and methods of approach, the papers submitted by the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and by the Dominions, on the other, plainly show forth the difference, in outlook upon international affairs, between a Great Power and small Powers. This difference affects both the range and the character of their interests. In a sense, every nation's interests nowadays are world-wide, but for a small Power its interests beyond a certain special field of vision (determined by geographical or historical forces) are faint and blurred and essentially subordinate to its relations with one or more Great Powers. Thus Canadians will write of Canada's interest in Europe, but not of her interest in Czechoslovakia or Memel; or of her interests in the Far East, but not of her interests in Hong Kong or Shanghai. The interests of a Great Power like the United Kingdom, on the contrary, even in distant parts of the world, are much more specific and momentous, and are essentially direct. The directness applies with still greater force to the means that the country has of protecting its interests. A Great Power must consider their protection in terms of its own power first and foremost, and secondly of the power of its potential friends and allies. But a small Power is bound to consider the defence of its interests—even very often of its national integrity and independence—primarily in terms of the assistance obtainable from Great Powers or substantial groups of fellow small Powers. Thus, for instance, however great Canada's interests in Shanghai were, she could not hope to protect them herself, but would rely for their defence on the strength and prestige

of Great Powers like Great Britain or the United States, and on the identity of their interests with hers.

This difference in the character of national interests must obviously affect the character and even the possibility of any common machinery among a group of Powers for dealing with interests shared in common. To the extent, for instance, that the Dominions—or some of them—accept the Great-Power interests of the United Kingdom as their own, because of their intimate and unbreakable links with her past and with her destiny, it is possible to build Commonwealth institutions of a certain, more or less centralized type. But to the extent that the Dominions reject that point of view, and demand that common institutions of any real strength be confined to zones of overlap between national interests in the narrower sense, an entirely different type of organization is necessary.

The zones of overlap between the national interests of small Powers and Great Powers, speaking generally, are of two kinds. The first is the zone of general principles of international policy—the maintenance of peace, as a common interest, by such means as local or universal collective security, or the equilibration of a balance of power, or neutrality, or conciliation and ‘appeasement’. The second is the zone of particular interests shared regionally—for example, the common interests of the United Kingdom, of India and of the Pacific Dominions in the security of the south-western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The breadth and strength of institutions to be built on this class of common interests must depend on how far afield, for the smaller of the partners, these particular interests may be regarded as extending. Does, for instance, the interest of Australia in the security of the Indian Ocean make the latter’s north-west entrance an area of defensive concern for her?

As for the other class of common interests—the general principles—it is quite clear from every one of the preparatory papers that the supreme interest of all the countries of the Commonwealth is world peace. It is

certainly the supreme interest of the United Kingdom, with her world-wide liabilities, her contentment with the *status quo*, her vulnerability to air attack if she should become involved in a European war. It is no less certainly a supreme interest for the Dominions, with their desire for nothing more than to be allowed to work out in peace their own destiny, which they conceive in ambitious terms. Differences appear, however, when it comes to translating the general objective into particular policies. A common interest in peace does not by itself determine how great a price should be paid for peace.

It seems clear from the preparatory papers that no country of the Commonwealth looked upon the League as a means for organizing an inevitable war in such a way that, so to speak, the 'big battalions would be on the side of God'. They regarded it as a means of preventing war, not of making war to the best advantage. The crisis of the League over Abyssinia confronted them with a hard practical issue, in which, in fact, they all upheld their obligations under the Covenant to the point agreed upon by their fellow members of the League. But the breakdown of sanctions found them divided, not only over the immediate issues of the withdrawal of sanctions, the recognition of Abyssinia, and so on, but also over their concept of the future place and character of collective security.

These differences have commonly expressed themselves in the shape of criticism of United Kingdom policy. That is no doubt the chief point, one could conclude from those papers, on which a greater mutual understanding is necessary. Yet the differences divide perhaps even more plainly the several Dominions from one another. In the light of what the papers tell us of Canadian interests and opinions, for instance, there is scarcely a clause of the memorandum of New Zealand's official policy towards the future of the League that would be possible for Canada. The acceptance of precise and automatic military obligations in advance is foreign to the majority outlook in Canada, and in Australia, too, where there is a

strong isolationist wing of Labour which also finds sympathizers in the opposite political camp. The negative Canadian attitude at present towards automatic and universal collective security is no doubt largely due to her various racial and other internal divisions, as well as to a sense of North Americanism, of identity of interest with the United States rather than the countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

It is apparent from the preparatory papers that a nation's internal structure—especially the racial homogeneity or division of its people—is almost if not quite as influential as its geographical situation in determining its outlook on vital international issues, and almost certainly more influential than its trade or financial interests abroad. Religious differences—sometimes but not always associated with racial differences, and rarely identical with them—tend to grow more important in this same respect, now that wars are supposed to be fought for ideologies rather than material objectives of national policy. Roman Catholicism in Canada appears to be almost as important as French-Canadian nationalism in moulding the Dominion's policy and capacity for action in any matter concerning Spain or Russia or even Italy; the substantial Catholic minority in Australia makes itself felt over foreign policy, more especially in Labour circles; the Labour Party in Ireland meets with confusion over similar matters through the threat of divided loyalty. The different degrees in which racial and other internal divisions are present in the various Dominions suggest that, in important details, a single common foreign policy for all the Commonwealth nations may be extremely difficult to attain.

Another instance of the inadvisability of regarding all the Dominions as one kind of creature is given by the sharp contrast in outlook on social policy between a country like New Zealand and one like Canada, neither of whose major political parties, we were told, accepts the notion that it is the state's duty to see that every citizen is provided with a standard of decent living, whereas the

same idea is a commonplace of politics in Australia and New Zealand. Canada's attitude is partly determined by her incapacity, through constitutional difficulties, to carry out certain branches of social legislation with any degree of ease. The connexion between constitutional problems and external policies, if rather more subtle, is nevertheless strong. Canada, for instance, is under a serious handicap in making international engagements in certain fields on account of the obstacles placed by her federal constitution in the way of implementing them. Since it is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that has placed this interpretation on her constitution, the same factor directly affects her attitude towards the Commonwealth connexion.

A third important group of internal forces affecting external attitudes is the economic group. An outstanding example mentioned in the preparatory papers is the White Australia policy, which was originally a policy to meet an industrial labour problem, and is still closely identified with questions of the national standard of living rather than with any racial or political prejudice. On the other hand, economic divisions may sometimes act like racial divisions in giving different sections of the community different interests or outlooks in foreign policy, and therefore tending to make national foreign policy indecisive. It seems possible to detect, for instance, from the preparatory papers, a difference of outlooks in Australia on Far Eastern affairs between those who sell wool to Japan and those who compete with Japanese manufactured products.

The last of the internal factors it is necessary to mention is class divisions. The doctrine of the class war does not appear to be part of the apparatus of thought in any British country, even in those which have or have had Socialist Governments; nor was the doctrine of the ideological war between communism and fascism shown in the preparatory papers to be incorporated by any nation of the Commonwealth in its outlook on world affairs, as an inevitable lining-up of forces in which it

must choose one side or the other. But class interests are obviously important in internal party politics, and it is not entirely by accident that different parties have adopted different shades of foreign policy in the world situation of to-day.

Important as were the differences of opinion described in the preparatory papers on foreign affairs, it is difficult to classify them under regional heads, excepting always the New Zealand Government's policy of proposing intervention in China and Spain, following its wish to continue sanctions against Italy. In regard to the United States, the papers expressed a universal belief in the essential need for the closest and most friendly possible relations. The United Kingdom paper assumed for its statement of defence problems that the United States would always be at least benevolently neutral. Australian opinion was described as believing that the interests of Australia and of the United States are in the long run identical and that American opinion will recognize them to be so.

There was significantly little discussion in the Dominion papers of the details of European affairs or of the Dominions' strategical relation to that continent. Indeed, public opinion in each of the three oversea Dominions from which papers were available was said to be reluctant to plan for the dispatch of forces to Europe, and in foreign policy this feeling is reflected in a similar hesitation to accept commitments in Europe. Ireland, on the other hand, appears to recognize herself as a European country, strategically and politically bound up with the Continent in almost the same measure as her neighbour. The United Kingdom paper examined the European problem in very considerable detail. Europe provides the United Kingdom with her local security problem, on which it is her imperative need and duty to concentrate. The defence portion of the preparatory paper suggested that this was a very grave danger-point for the United Kingdom and, therefore, for other members of the Commonwealth to the extent to which their future was bound up with hers. At the same time

the preparatory paper did not leave the impression that any contribution to a joint defence system which any Dominion might choose to make could most advantageously be made, in the first instance at least, in the form of European reinforcement.

For the solution of the problem of co-operative Commonwealth defence, the papers suggested special attention to the Near Eastern and Far Eastern theatres, and within those theatres to the possibilities of material rather than man-power contribution. Each of the nations of the Commonwealth has a problem of local defence which is its own primary concern and on which each of them was shown to be concentrating, sometimes on a rather strict and sometimes on a more liberal interpretation of what constitutes local defence. Certain of those local problems overlap. For instance, New Zealand's has a good deal in common with Australia's, and Ireland's is really part of the problem of the British Isles as a whole. But, beyond that, there is a common problem, a problem of communication and mutual reinforcement, which still pivots on sea-power, but which now includes air-power. And, of course, both air forces and navies require shore bases.

It is in this light that the expression of the United Kingdom's vital interests in the Near Eastern and Far Eastern zones is to be interpreted. It was either stated or implied that particular local interests such as oil in 'Iraq or investments in China are quite secondary and are not to be regarded as potential causes of war or as determining influences upon foreign policy and defence. Far more important than any such interest—on a different plane of importance altogether—is the vital interest of not only one but the greater number of the Commonwealth countries in preserving the Indian Ocean and neighbouring waters as an undisputed preserve of British power. The preparatory papers did not show that the force of this factor is as plainly or effectually recognized in the Dominions concerned as in the United Kingdom. That seems to be due, not to a difference of vital interests,

as they are acknowledged by public opinion in each country, but rather to a different approach to the general problems of external policy, whether it be economic, political, or defensive policy. The contrast, again, is that between a world Power and a small Power. The preparatory papers helped to bring out the vitally important fact that the Commonwealth contains countries vastly disparate, not only in numbers, military power, and spread of national interest, but also in outlook on international affairs.

PART III.
THE OPENING SESSIONS

PART III.

THE OPENING SESSIONS

(I) THE FIRST PUBLIC SESSION

THE opening session of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938, was held in the Great Hall of the University of Sydney on Saturday, September 3rd, 1938. Sir Thomas Bavin, Chairman of the Conference, presided.

After thanking the Vice-Chancellor and Senate of the University for placing the Great Hall at the disposal of the Conference, the Chairman invited the Rt. Hon. J. A. Lyons, Prime Minister of Australia, to welcome the visiting delegates on behalf of the people of Australia.

In the course of his address, the Prime Minister said that whatever differences there might be among the delegates on some questions—and the delegations had been chosen deliberately to represent differing political and economic points of view—there would be unanimity on one proposition: that freedom of discussion was an essential element in a democratic system of government. The problem of the British Commonwealth was to reconcile the national and regional interests of each member of the Commonwealth with those interests which all had in common.

While the Imperial Conference of 1937 had recognized that differences in political creeds need not be obstacles to friendly relations between countries, the British Commonwealth was based on democracy and really believed in democracy. Mr. Lyons continued:

I think it would not have been possible for the British Commonwealth to have retained the allegiance of so great a diversity of peoples unless those basic democratic rights to which I have alluded had been freely conceded, and unless full scope had been allowed to their various national aspirations and national cultures.

The British Commonwealth has not sought to impose a standardized system on its peoples, but has brought into being a rich and varied society which to-day contains nearly a quarter of the world's inhabitants.

The British Commonwealth, he went on to say, was the most powerful influence in the world for peace, and a principal concern of its members was how best to achieve that unity of aim and purpose which would maximize its influence towards the establishment of an orderly international life. He welcomed the recent declaration of policy by Mr. Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State, and felt that the peoples of the Commonwealth were in full agreement with the aims and ideals there expressed.

Referring to the extremely grave anxiety that must be felt over the immediate international crisis, he believed that the masses of the people of all nations fervently longed for peace, but such desires seemed of small avail when the clash of interests permitted an intense nationalism to take control. The Prime Minister then announced that his Government had decided to ask the Churches of Australia to set aside a special day of prayer for intercession and divine guidance, not only in the problems of the British Commonwealth, but in those of the entire world.¹

In closing, the Prime Minister congratulated the Conference on its selection of Sir Thomas Bavin as Chairman. He was a great Australian who represented the best in Australian public life.

The Hon. B. S. B. Stevens, Premier of New South Wales, welcomed the delegates on behalf of the Government of his State. He emphasized the importance of study and discussion in developing a healthy interest in public affairs.

Sir Thomas Bavin then extended a welcome to the

¹ After consultation with the principal religious denominations, the Government set aside Sunday, September 11th, 1938, as a special day of prayer.

delegates on behalf of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. The delegates to the Conference represented the most varying shades of political thought in each country. The purpose of the Conference was to consider to what extent, in what direction, and by what method the communities which were somewhat loosely linked together as the British Commonwealth of Nations could work together, not merely for the protection and advancement of their own private interests, but for the protection of what was the greatest interest of them all—the cause of peace, justice, and freedom in the world of men.

The Most Hon. the Marquess of Lothian, leader of the United Kingdom group, in responding on behalf of the visiting delegates, said that the first British Commonwealth Relations Conference in Toronto in 1933 had agreed that support of the League of Nations should be the basis of the foreign policy of the Commonwealth as a whole. But to-day the League as a system of foreign policy and security was in almost complete abeyance. Four of the seven Great Powers were out of the League and an increasing number of smaller Powers were withdrawing from their commitments under Article XVI. Yet, for all the frustration which had overtaken it, the League enshrined an imperishable ideal. The hopes of millions of people in every continent would continue to centre about a system of world unity which would substitute the reign of law for the anarchy of force. For the present, however, it had to be admitted that the League no longer provided a sufficient basis for a common foreign policy.

In the immediate future the problem was to find security, freedom, and a way back towards a tolerable international order. The basis for such a policy could be found in two things; first, the maintenance of the British Empire as a bastion of liberty and peace in the world, and close collaboration with the United States, whose history and interests were so closely linked with those of

Great Britain; and second, in Europe and in the Far East, to eschew theories or ideological views, and, with the strength which flowed from rearmament, to do everything possible, even at the price of abuse and of some humiliation, to try to solve disputes peacefully, and above all to prevent them from developing into a world war. The supreme purpose of British policy must always be to prevent world war; for a world war meant the destruction of freedom, democracy, and law, and possibly even of civilization itself.

The diplomacy of the moment was a dangerous game of thrust and parry, bluff and pressure, in which a fool, a knave, or an accident could set in motion forces that might pass out of control. The difficult, dangerous, but inescapable task of the British Government was to solve the three great local crises without a general war, by pressing strongly for changes which were just or overdue and resisting attempts to bring about revision by violence. In this primary task of preventing world war he, personally, hoped that the Dominions would give to the British Foreign Secretary all possible support.

Major P. G. V. van der Byl, leader of the South African group, joined Lord Lothian in thanking the Governments and the people of Australia for their very great kindness and their most cordial hospitality to the visiting delegates. Probably no conference, ever assembled in the British Empire, represented so fully all shades of opinion in the member countries. The South African delegation was small, but its membership reflected the wide divergences of views in politics, in economics, and in race relations which existed in South Africa. In the world to-day, 'with crisis following crisis like wild duck at sunset', there could be nothing more useful than a complete and frank exchange of views. The members of the Conference must look facts in the face and state frankly where they stood and what the reactions in their countries were likely to be if one of those crises got out of control.

Every Dominion had a decided and a growing public opinion no longer based on sentiment, but based on considerations of economic and national safety. Each delegate should inform the Conference frankly how public opinion in his country was moving. It was particularly important that the view of influential minorities should be placed before the Conference, together with some assessment of their probable weight when important political decisions had to be taken¹. It was a great fallacy, which unfortunately was too prevalent in the Empire, to think that because a party, or a group believed that the interests of its country must be the basis of its policy, it was therefore anti-British or anti-Empire. Those in South Africa who wished to restore the former close constitutional ties to Great Britain did so because they believed that their country could best be served in that way. Similarly, those at the other extreme who believed in a republican form of government, and who wanted to break entirely the link with the Empire, were equally genuine and sincere. Personally, he believed in the present free association of nations called the British Commonwealth, and felt that to withdraw from it would endanger South African security. But the issue of these divergences would be settled in South Africa. Public opinion within each Dominion would decide that Dominion's course. Legal and constitutional ties could never make a nation take up arms. It was impossible to compel a nation to be an ally, but it was possible to force it to be an enemy.

The concluding speech in response to the addresses of welcome was delivered by the Hon. Pandit H. N. Kunzru, leader of the Indian group. The great value of the Conference, he said, lay in the fact that it brought together people who represented different races and cultures, as well as different economic interests. The

¹ Major van der Byl went on to develop at greater length the position of the several parties or groups of opinion in South Africa. A note on this subject is contained in an appendix to the report of the Recorder of Commission I. *See* p. 165.

adjustment of all these conflicts required something more powerful and more lasting than force, which Western nations seemed to regard as a sign of greatness and glory. An ancient sage of India had said that the basis of right action was to be found in the saying, 'Thy neighbour is thyself'. The interests of the peoples around us were as important as those of our own nation. This was an essential extension of the meaning of democracy, and by that fundamental principle we all stood. The British Commonwealth of Nations must convince the world of the value of democratic ideals. India was not yet a full member of the British Commonwealth. But if the spirit which inspired this Conference could also inspire the politicians of the Commonwealth, India would soon achieve a complete and equal status, and the enlarged Commonwealth would prove an enduring bridge uniting East and West.

The Agenda of the Conference, said Pandit Kunzru, showed that it was not content with the conventional recognition of the value of the British Commonwealth of Nations, but was prepared to admit that this association might entail serious disadvantages in certain circumstances. This open-mindedness encouraged the hope that the Conference would lead to better understanding among its members. The Dominions, with their recently acquired full nationhood, had a strong sense of the value of freedom and equality, and they could, if they realized their responsibilities, be the spearhead of the movement for freedom within the Empire and all over the world.

The first business on the agenda of the Conference was the proposal of the following message to His Majesty the King, which was adopted by acclamation:

The members of the second unofficial Conference on British Commonwealth Relations now meeting in Sydney in His Majesty's Commonwealth of Australia, and drawn from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Ireland, the Indian Empire, and Newfoundland, beg His Majesty

graciously to accept an expression of their loyalty and devotion. The members of the Conference trust that through study and understanding of the special interests and problems of the individual countries of the Commonwealth, they may contribute to the development of that friendly co-operation between them which can so greatly influence the maintenance of world peace, and that their frank discussions may once again prove of service in the development of that body of informed and enlightened public opinion which is the essential basis for the conduct of British Commonwealth and foreign relations in the great democracies, which by their allegiance to His Majesty are united in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

T. R. BAVIN,
Chairman.

To this message the following reply was received:

Please convey to the members of the second unofficial conference on British Commonwealth Relations my sincere thanks for their loyal message. I fully appreciate the value of such opportunities for full and frank discussion of the many problems affecting the various parts of the British Commonwealth, and send my best wishes for the success of the Conference.

GEORGE R.I.

(2) THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SEPTEMBER 4TH, 1938

It falls to my lot, as a result of a compliment which I deeply appreciate, to say a few words at the opening of this Conference. I need not repeat the welcome you have already received, a welcome which I am sure will be emphasized publicly and privately, wherever you may go in Australia. I only wish to say that the Australian Institute regarded your acceptance of our invitation to hold this Conference in Australia as a very high honour. Most of you had to travel a long way to reach us. We hope that the results of the Conference, not merely in the interest of the discussions, not merely in the contribution which we hope and expect those discussions to make to the problems that are to be considered, but in the personal relationships that will be established, and the fuller

understanding of each other's local interests and conditions, will justify the time and trouble it has cost you to get here, and that you will carry away with you when you go, not only pleasant memories of the place and its people, but friendships and associations that will add to that network of intangible bonds which gives to the British Commonwealth a very real unity.

The very length of your journey, the time occupied in getting here, must have served for some of you as a practical illustration of one at least of the difficulties that beset any effort to establish real and continuous co-operation between the different members of the British Commonwealth. If your sense of those difficulties has been emphasized by the distance you have had to travel, I hope your experience since you have been here has furnished a practical evidence of the essential similarity between our national characters, our ideals and methods, our general outlook on life, and your own, that will make you feel that the difficulties raised by distance are more than cancelled, and that whatever view we may take as to the formal or material bonds that should exist between us, there is a very real spiritual unity in the British Commonwealth that can and shall be used to strengthen the cause of peace and justice in the world, and to contribute to the ordered government of mankind.

Our task at this Conference, as I understand it, is to examine the realities of the existing relationships of the constituent parts of the British Commonwealth, and to explore, in the light of the varying interests and conditions of each Dominion, the extent to which, and the directions in which, voluntary co-operation in world affairs can be promoted.

This, of course, is no new problem. It has been agitating the minds of statesmen and publicists of the Empire for at least half a century, and many factors in the problem are much clearer to-day than they have ever been before. The imposing ideal of Imperial Federation which for many years held the field as the most logical form of Empire organization has receded into

the background. The unfettered self-governing rights of the Dominions, fully conceded in respect of their domestic concerns, were extended to cover their external interests, and their complete independence in this field, implicit in their membership of the League of Nations, was made fully explicit in the Balfour Declaration of 1926.

The polished phrases of that statement of political and constitutional theory were embodied in juridical form in the Statute of Westminster, which left little, if any, formal organization in the Empire, and subjected even the personality of the sovereign to a somewhat metaphysical process of constitutional dissection, which I confess I do not at present fully understand, but which will perhaps become clearer as a result of our discussions. The wheel had gone full circle, the centrifugal forces had full sway, the process was completed. The self-governing Dominions became, in form as well as in fact, independent units, subject in their foreign as well as their domestic policies to none except voluntarily imposed restrictions.

It is not within my purpose here to inquire how far these developments are good or bad, helpful or damaging. That is a matter of opinion on which much has been, and probably will continue to be, said. It may be that it was an inevitable development, and in any case, it is an accomplished fact. Nor is it within my purpose to inquire how far these developments are either understood, or accepted, by the rest of the world, particularly by that part of it which places a somewhat higher value on logical processes that we Britishers do, although that may possibly become an important question in some of the discussions that will occupy the time of this Conference.

We ourselves understand it, and—whether we like it or not—accept it, and whatever hopes or expectations we may entertain as to future developments, the acceptance of this fundamental fact of the complete independence of the self-governing Dominions, both in determining what are their own national interests and in selecting the

methods of asserting and advancing those interests, must be the basis of our consideration of the future of British Commonwealth Relations.

Does this dissolution of formal ties, this repudiation of all external restrictions on the foreign policy of the individual Dominions, mean the disappearance of what used to be known as the British Empire as a single force in world policy? Does it mean that there is no longer, or that we wish there should be no longer, any reality which corresponds to the name of the British Commonwealth of Nations?

Your presence here to-day, your readiness to travel many thousands of miles to attend a Conference on British Commonwealth Relations, seems to me, in itself, to furnish your answer to these questions. You would hardly, I imagine, have thought it worth your while to come here unless you had thought that the maintenance of the unity of the British Commonwealth, in some form and for some purposes, was worth while, both in the interests of the world generally, and in the interests of that part of the British Commonwealth to which you belong.

In the temper, and under the conditions which exist to-day, the kind of unity to which we are to apply ourselves—the only kind to which we *can* apply ourselves—is the basis and extent of free and voluntary co-operation between the different units of the Commonwealth. The problem now is, in the apt words of the Committee which made the arrangements for this Conference, ‘to attain the maximum of mutually advantageous co-operation among a number of autonomous and equal nations’, and thus to maintain what, in spite of all the constitutional developments to which I have referred, has never really been lost—the collective strength and solidarity of the British Commonwealth, and the ability to use it and direct it, as a single force in defending and strengthening, not only the material interests of each part, but the cause of justice and public right in the world at large.

Although the phrase which I quoted a moment ago from the Agenda Committee about equal and autonomous

nations expresses the truth about our purposes, it is not, I think, the whole truth. It would be a mistake—one which would rob our deliberations of a great deal of their value, and would prevent any conclusions at which we may arrive from being (to use the current jargon) 'realistic'—if we approached our problems merely as those of possible co-operation between 'equal and autonomous nations'.

Such a phrase would, of course, apply to any international conference. We meet, however, on a different footing. We may, as between ourselves, have the status of 'equal and autonomous nations'. But we are nations with a long common history; a great inheritance of common instincts, traditions, and ideals; with a recent memory of a great common sacrifice. Master we may be to-day in our own house. But we cannot, and, I am sure, do not wish to ignore the fact, which has much more than a merely sentimental significance, that for long years we were 'sons in our father's house'. In fact, we *are* 'equal and autonomous' to-day, and the problems we have to consider present themselves in the form I have described, very largely because we are chips of the old block, because of the fact that one of the strongest among our inherited traditions was the tradition of self-government. Apart from that, we have a whole network of common bonds, of language, of history, of similar political and social institutions and ideals, which tend to make co-operation between us, not an artificial graft on a foreign stock, but the natural and healthy growth of the parent tree.

In other words, it is the normal and natural thing that we *should* work together in the world for common ends, and the onus of proof should be on those who say that such co-operation is either impossible or undesirable. In saying this, I do not ignore the special circumstances in the history or aspirations of some of the Dominions, which may diminish the force of these inherited traditions. But these do not, I think, destroy the general validity of the considerations to which I have just referred.

The classical statement of the doctrine of the complete

equality and autonomy, in both domestic and foreign affairs, of the constituent nations of the British Commonwealth, is found, of course, in the Balfour Declaration of 1926. It may not be out of place to remind you of what appears sometimes to be forgotten, that this statement did not stop with the oft-quoted declaration, that the Dominions 'are autonomous communities within the British Empire equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs. . . .'

It continues, in words which have, I think, greater importance and relevance for our present purposes than the ones I have quoted. The assertion of equality and autonomy it rightly describes as a merely negative statement of Commonwealth relationships. 'A foreigner'—it proceeds to say—'endeavouring to understand the true character of the British Empire by the aid of this formula alone, would be tempted to think that it was devised rather to make mutual interference impossible than to make mutual co-operation easy. Such a criticism, however, completely ignores the historical situation.' And then, after describing the development towards autonomy, it proceeds: 'But no account, however accurate, of the *negative* relations in which Great Britain and the Dominions stand to each other can do more than express a portion of the truth. The British Empire is not founded on negations. It depends essentially, if not formally, upon positive ideals. Free institutions are its life blood. Free co-operation is its instrument . . . and though every Dominion is now and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, *no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.*'

The declaration assumes, it will be observed, that we have 'common causes'. Not much has been done, since then, by way of defining what they are, or how they can be advanced, or how we can avoid imperilling them. It is the business of this Conference, as I understand it, to try to determine what these common causes are, to ascertain how they may be advanced, and to see that they are not

imperilled. We approach this task, or seek to approach it, equipped in the only way that affords any reasonable hope of grappling with it successfully, with a sympathetic understanding of the separate interests and policies, and aspirations of each Dominion.

We have been at pains to secure in advance the fullest statement of these, from all points of view, in the preliminary papers that have been distributed. In these, supplemented as they will be by our informal discussions, we have a wealth of non-partisan objective information and opinion that should go far to remove the most serious obstacle to effective co-operation—the inability or failure to understand each other's point of view.

Our problems are, of course, very closely related to those which faced the Toronto Conference in 1933. Although its official purpose was primarily the discussion of the *machinery* of co-operation between the members of the British Commonwealth, in fact a good deal of its time was occupied in the consideration of questions of policy, especially foreign policy. There is, however, one fundamental difference between the world conditions which existed at the time of that Conference and those which exist to-day, a difference which has a profound bearing on the questions we are to discuss. Much of the discussion there turned on the question of the relationship between the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations, and one has only to read the report of these discussions to see that underlying most of the opinions expressed, especially on questions as to co-operation in foreign policy, or on defence, was the assumption that the League of Nations Covenant would continue to be a real and effective factor in world organization. Obviously, on that assumption, many of the problems which arise as to co-operation between states which were League members, were solved in advance. We were already committed to co-operation over a large field, and the obligations which followed from those commitments were reasonably well defined.

It was relatively easy to work together within the

framework of the Covenant, and if we differed, even on important matters of world policy, well, no harm was done. The responsibility fell, in the last resort, on the League. As to defence, when we had each equipped ourselves to fulfil our obligations under the League Covenant in the very unlikely event of our being called upon to resort to armed force, no further question arose. The difficult, perhaps crucial, problem of neutrality, in its bearing on Commonwealth relationships, became, on the assumption I have referred to, 'academic'.

Even at that time, of course, the League machine creaked somewhat ominously. But the prevailing feeling about it seems to have been fairly expressed by one of the Canadian preparatory papers in these words:

The League has its obvious defects and limitations, but it is at least the partial realization of an ideal, and the possibility is that, despite setbacks and failures such as we are now witnessing, as the size of the world goes on decreasing, the power of the League will increase, and will eventually become large enough to establish the reign of law.

Such was the background against which the problems of Empire co-operation were discussed in 1933. Such, unhappily, is *not* the background against which our problems are posed to-day. It may be—speaking for myself I hope it *will* be—that one day, the optimistic forecast that I have quoted will be realized, and the rule of justice and reason, as embodied in some form of world organization, will resume its sway over the minds of men.

But we are dealing with the world as it is to-day: a world which makes guns instead of butter, a world in which the voice of reason and good faith seems to be submerged by the din of military preparations, a world from which the idea of collective security and collective progress by means of collective human effort has, temporarily at any rate, vanished.

We in the Empire can no longer depend, either for our being or our well-being, on the practical efficiency of the League. Our responsibilities are no longer merely those of a single member of a world organization: the problem

of co-operation between us is no longer merely the problem of working together, within the framework of the League, to improve its structure, and to contribute to its efficient working. It has become a problem of individual action and individual responsibility.

I think, therefore, that it is roughly true to say that to-day one relatively easy and safe road of approach to the question of Empire co-operation, which was open, or at any rate was regarded as open, at the time of the Toronto Conference, is no longer open to us. Its closure may be only temporary, but policy must be determined by existing facts, and not by pious hopes and aspirations.

If this is so, then the conditions under which we are addressing ourselves to our agenda paper to-day are quite different from those in which the problems of Empire co-operation have ever been discussed at any gathering of this kind before.

In pre-League days the formal supremacy of the British Government, especially in matters of external policy, was still a substantial reality. The foreign policy of the British Empire was substantially the foreign policy of the British Government. In matters of defence no one had any doubt, either of the ability or of the readiness, of the British Navy to come to our aid, and, while we had our own defence policies, they hardly took into account the contingency that in emergencies that were not only possible, but likely, we might have to rely solely on our own efforts to preserve our existence. The question of co-operation between independent units did not arise, because at that time there *were* no independent units so far as foreign policy was concerned.

In post-League days—until after the Toronto Conference—the problems of co-operation, as I have just pointed out, were largely solved for us. To-day we have emerged, by our own wish, from the shelter of the British Government, and our foreign policy, our defence policy, is our own responsibility, and a responsibility that must be borne without reliance on the security that was furnished by the League Covenant. All of what I might describe

as the automatic or ready-made factors in the problem of co-operation are gone, and the question is one of the individual responsibility of each Dominion.

These considerations, of course, may increase the difficulty of common action in various fields, but they do not diminish its necessity, unless, of course, we are satisfied to continue as we are. But before we express our satisfaction with the policy of continuing 'as we are', it is as well to ask what that means.

The position to-day, so far as effective Commonwealth co-operation is concerned, can be shortly stated. The only field in which there is anything that can be described as a common Empire policy is that of trade. As to this, there appears to be a growing feeling that economic exclusiveness is a somewhat inadequate, and possibly dangerous, foundation upon which to build the structure of Commonwealth unity. This, however, is one of the matters to be discussed, and it would be out of place for me to express an opinion on it here.

In the field of defence, there is no comprehensive plan into which the policies of each Dominion fit as parts of a whole. It may be that our discussions will reveal that such a plan is not feasible nor desirable, especially if it involves anything in the nature of centralized control. Be that as it may, it seems worth our while to examine whether, without sacrificing anything of our individual freedom, it is possible to approximate, far more nearly than we do at present, to a common plan which would recognize the special strategical position, the special needs and capacities of each unit, and at the same time contribute to the greatest possible strength of the whole.

In the field of foreign affairs, there is, of course, nothing that can be accurately described as a common policy for the British Commonwealth. We had in the resolution adopted by the last Imperial Conference an admirable statement of certain general principles upon which all the governments agreed. Agreement on abstract propositions, however, while it may furnish a basis for policy, can hardly in itself be described as a

policy, especially when it is prefaced by an express statement that it involves no commitments. I am inclined to think that our discussions will have more reality if we frankly face the fact that a policy of co-operation must involve commitments, whatever may be the consequences of such a view.

This again, however, is ground that will no doubt be covered in the course of our discussions, and I will trespass no farther on it. All I want to do, in referring to these three fields of possible co-operation, is to emphasize that to decide in favour of continuing 'as we are' is to decide in substance against any real policy of co-operation, and in favour of a policy which leaves the British Commonwealth, for most practical purposes, a mere geographical expression.

I do not think, however, that it is possible to continue as we are. I believe that unless some positive effort is made to achieve a common policy in those fields where a common policy is possible and beneficial, we must inevitably drift farther and farther apart until even the nominal unity which exists to-day is dissolved. And I am speaking, of course, on the hypothesis that none of us desire that.

The case for active voluntary collaboration, for purposes which we think worth while, has I think, sometimes been damaged by its identification with the advocacy of different forms of Empire organization, of more or less rigid constitutional agencies, exercising some form of central control, or, in the loosest form, committing the Dominions represented in them to some degree of responsibility in advance.

We all have our own opinions as to the need for, or the utility of, such agencies, and as to the form they should take. Whatever those opinions may be, I venture to think that we may all agree that the question of the machinery of co-operation is different from, and subordinate to, the question of adopting a common policy. In fact, when the question whether there are common causes for which we desire to co-operate has been

answered, the question of machinery will, to a large extent, solve itself.

The practical political wisdom which, without undue boastfulness, I may claim for the different communities of the Empire is, I think, equal to the task of evolving whatever organization may be found necessary or desirable for the effective carrying-out of the purposes on which we have agreed.

I suppose none of us would quarrel with the proposition that any policy of co-operative effort on the part of the communities of the Commonwealth, if it is to have any reality or permanence, must rest, in the last resort, upon our interests. But I would suggest, as my final word, that we guard against taking too narrow a view of what our real interests are.

We are all concerned, and rightly concerned, about our own material prosperity, about our freedom to work out our own national destiny, about avoiding undefined commitments. All these separate and individual interests, however, are subordinate to, and dependent upon, a large common interest—our interest in the preservation of peace in a war-threatened world, our interest in the upholding of international honour and good faith in a world which treats it as a thing of naught, our interest in the maintenance of the ideals of justice, and of civil and religious freedom, of democratic government, in a world which derides them as the outworn relics of a decadent civilization.

Our common interest in these ideals, while it does not provide us with a common policy, gives us a foundation upon which we can build. If in our deliberations we can hammer out the basis and the methods of a united effort on the part of the communities that are represented in this hall to-day, to reinforce those ideals, and to bring them back into a distracted world, as real and attainable objects of human effort, we shall serve not only the interests of the Dominions to which we belong, not only the interests of the British Commonwealth, but the highest interests of mankind.

PART IV.

THE REPORTS OF THE
COMMISSION RECORDERS

PART IV

THE REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION RECORDERS

COMMISSION I

A CONSIDERATION OF THE INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL NATIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

REPORT BY PROFESSOR K. H. BAILEY,
COMMISSION RECORDER

(Adopted by the Conference)

Commission I was set up by the Conference Organizing Committee to consider Part I of the Agenda, 'A Consideration of the Interests of the Individual Nations of the Commonwealth'. Each Commonwealth member group, through a person chosen for that purpose, presented a brief verbal statement. This statement was followed by discussion, mainly in the form of question and answer, with the purpose of further elucidating the peculiar interests and problems of the member country under review. The Commission held four sessions: the first, on Australia and Ireland; the second, on Canada and New Zealand; the third, on India and South Africa; and the fourth, on the United Kingdom. (For a detailed statement of the Agenda of Commission I see Appendix I.)

THE task of Commission I was explained in the 'Note on the General Approach' to the Conference Agenda as follows:

The Dominions can no longer be assumed to form a group with common problems. The problems of the several nations of the Commonwealth are in many ways distinct, and upon the respective interests of those nations will largely depend the nature and degree of co-operation desirable between them. A careful consideration of these interests is therefore felt to be the most constructive and realistic approach to the examination of the possibilities of co-operation.

From one point of view, 'interest' and 'policy' might appear to be contrasted notions, an 'interest' being an objective and a 'policy' an instrument thereof. The Agenda, however, did not draw this distinction, and included the policies of the several nations in the subject-matter to be discussed by the Commission. 'Interests', too, were treated in the Agenda as including, not merely material concerns, but sentiments also. As the discussions turned out, most attention was, in fact, concentrated upon the state of opinion in the several countries and upon their external policies, rather than upon their 'interests' in a strict sense. No attempt was made to confine discussion to an organized succession of topics, or even to the list of topics set out for illustrative purposes in the Agenda.

The representative character of the Conference was strengthened, as compared with that of the Toronto Conference, by the addition of a group from Ireland. The special nature of Ireland's essential interests accounted for some of the keenest discussions of the Commission.

Throughout the sessions the existence and general nature of Dominion status, save in India, was taken for granted. Apart from one or two questions to elicit information, the only substantial discussions on constitutional matters arose, as had been planned by the Preparatory Committee, as incidental to the consideration of particular interests of the countries concerned. The foreign policy of Canada, for example, gave rise to an examination of the right of neutrality, the discussion of India's participation in Imperial defence drew attention to the present limitations upon the constitutional status of India, and active discussion arose upon the partition of Ireland.

The matters most commonly discussed were defence, including the relation of local defence to defence of the Commonwealth as a whole; foreign policy, including the relation of the Dominions to the policy of the United Kingdom, and the role of the Commonwealth as a group in world affairs; trade among the members of the

Commonwealth and its relation to world trade, especially apropos of the Ottawa Agreements; the future of the 'C' class Mandates; and migration, including in particular the position of Indians in other parts of the Commonwealth. In addition, there were special matters raised in connexion with some of the countries. The discussions will be summarized under these heads. In no two cases, however, did discussion follow exactly the same lines, and it would be artificial to impose any strict uniformity in making a record.

At the outset, it may be observed that the discussions in the Commission confirmed the tentative analysis of the preparatory papers made at the opening of the Conference by the Recorder. They emphasized the fact that the Dominions could not usefully be regarded 'as one kind of creature'; that external policy in all the member countries depended closely upon internal conditions; that a conviction was growing in strength that the interest of each of the member countries lay in securing a greater degree of freedom in world trade. The proceedings of the Commission illustrated, over and over again, the difference between the world-Power approach of the United Kingdom and the small-Power approach of the Dominions to the major problems of world affairs, and, also, the widely different approach to policy of those who thought of world affairs primarily in terms of nationality, and those who thought primarily in terms of class. These points are illustrated in detail below.

(a) AUSTRALIA

The opening Australian speaker drew attention to the two factors on which was based the traditional and still predominant Australian conception of the country's place in the British Commonwealth. The two factors were a population almost wholly of British extraction and tradition, and the vulnerability of the country by reason of its isolation, its small population, and its huge coastline. Citizens of 'the least self-conscious of the Dominions', Australians—

as a rule do not feel it due to their dignity and self-respect to emphasize their separateness, and have always been willing to set up machinery for co-operation with the British Government. . . . There is no feeling that willingness to co-operate is a badge of inferiority. We have no sense of being overawed or overreached, and feel confident that we can hold our own.

The speaker did not put forward this view as that of all Australians, but as the attitude which was, in fact, reflected in Australian policies to-day. He added that

while I believe that Australia is prepared for co-operation with other members of the Commonwealth, I think that she is not prepared to consider any form of organic union or closer constitutional ties. No representative man in Australia would sponsor such a proposition. Any fight for closer ties would really prejudice the cause of co-operation.

(i) *Defence*

The speaker explained that the essentials of the Australian defence problem were still a matter of some controversy. Possibly, isolation might be a factor of safety; invaders, moreover, 'are not attracted by deserts'. At present, however, the defence plan was based on co-operation with the British Navy as a first line of defence. This assumed that the United Kingdom would be able to transfer substantial naval forces to the Pacific area if required. Those who did not feel sure of this urged that a greater proportion of the defence budget should be spent upon the air force, and upon mechanized land forces, in order to protect the settled areas, especially against raids. The evidence appeared to be that even if Australia's external trade were cut off she could supply most of her needs for a substantial period.

The Australian naval forces, it was explained, were organized for service either in Australian waters or overseas, as required. The air force was in the same position, though service overseas was not at present contemplated. The militia could not, as the law stood, be sent overseas.

(ii) *Foreign Policy*

In opening the discussion, it had been said that Australia felt that her own destiny depended upon a solution of the world's major conflicts, and admitted some obligation to do what she could towards their solution. This was a natural corollary of Australia's sense of ultimate dependence on the United Kingdom.

A New Zealand delegate asked whether the association of Australia with the Commonwealth might not be felt to draw her into dangers which, if she stood alone, she might hope to escape. In reply, one of the younger Australian delegates declared that there was a growing body of opinion in favour of a policy of aloofness, like that outlined recently by the Prime Minister of Canada. He went on to say, however, that the prevalent opinion was that

our interests are bound up with the might of the British Navy. . . . We are beginning to feel that an 'Australia first' policy has to be adopted; but that an 'Australia first' policy clearly involves some form of co-operation, in the minds of most people at least.

It had been said in the opening address that co-operation with the United Kingdom in foreign policy, or even in defence, would obtain more support in Australia if it were inspired by a great cause. A Canadian delegate asked whether, and how, people in Australia think of the relation between the Commonwealth and the wider organization that would be necessary to maintain a general rule of law; . . . whether they regard the Commonwealth chiefly as a means to the general end or as an end in itself.

The answer, implicit in what had been already said, was that, though Australia had a strong Imperial tradition, there was an inchoate and growing uneasiness about any policy which could not be shown to be directed to the re-establishment and reinforcement of world order. In other words, people were coming to think of the Commonwealth rather as a means than as an end, though in any crisis the effect of mere Imperial sentiment would no doubt be great.

This question, however, elicited an explicit answer of a quite different kind. An Australian delegate urged that to discuss such matters in terms of 'Australia' as an entity was simply to beg all the vital questions. Everything would depend on the group whose opinion was dominant. The political section of the Labour Party was, at present, isolationist in tendency. The industrial wing of the party, however, especially in New South Wales, advocated collective security and would strengthen the League of Nations. Fundamentally, they did not see the present difficulties as a conflict between nations, but as a struggle against fascism. Because of their antagonism to fascism, and their anxiety to support Russia and France, they supported the League. But their attitude towards either Commonwealth or League depended from time to time upon the alignment of Commonwealth or League in the struggle against fascism.

(iii) *Commonwealth and World Trade*

Asked about Australia's attitude to the system embodied in the Ottawa Agreements, several Australian delegates emphasized the rapidly changing view in Australia, caused by a realization that the United Kingdom market for her produce was approaching, if not already at, saturation point. There were definite prospects ahead of expanded production in these very products, and the finding of new markets in foreign countries would necessitate greater freedom in making agreements on the basis of mutual concessions. It was realized that

Ottawa came at a time when it was badly needed. It was a measure of self-defence . . . against world-wide deflation.

On the other hand, it was stated that at the Empire Producers' Conference in Sydney in March-April 1938, the limits of the United Kingdom market were made abundantly clear and a resolution adopted expressing the willingness of Empire producers to modify Imperial preferences with a view to increasing trade in foreign markets.

(iv) *The Future of Mandated Territories*

A good deal of attention was given to the question whether Australia would consider the retrocession to Germany of her mandated territory in New Guinea. Opinion in the territory itself was very strongly opposed to such a course, both because of the extensive development which had been undertaken in the territory under Australian control, and also on strategical grounds, the islands affording numerous bases for ships and for aircraft which would menace the settled areas of the Australian mainland. The Australian Government, moreover, had declared itself against retrocession, and was no doubt supported by an overwhelming body of public opinion. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the question had never been explicitly put to either Parliament or people. Some delegates thought that the people's answer could not be taken for granted, and that it would depend largely on the diplomatic position at the time, and upon the way in which the question arose. If the retrocession of the territory were proposed as part of a general settlement with Germany, offering good prospects of general appeasement, some delegates thought that the country might possibly be willing. The delegate already quoted, however, who belonged to the industrial labour group, was emphatic that that group did not believe that fascism could ever be appeased by such concessions.

(v) *Migration*

On the question of migration, Australian opinion was now pessimistic. Brobdingnagian estimates of her absorptive capacity had given way to the calculations of the geographer and the statistician. Attention was now being concentrated rather on the rates of growth without dislocation. Since the rate of national increase was declining, there was room for substantial migration, but it would be necessary for the migrants to be capable of taking their place in secondary or tertiary industry, and to be socially assimilable—i.e. they should be able to

'accept Australian conditions, live at somewhat the same standard, intermarry with people in Australia, and not form local enclaves'.

This definition of assimilability provoked a discussion on the desirability of child migration; on the position of refugees from Germany and Austria; and on the position of Indians as migrants. The child-migrant schemes were warmly commended by several delegates. There seemed to be reasonable prospects for the admittance in regulated numbers of European refugees. In reply to questions from the Indian group, Australian delegates emphasized, in familiar fashion, the importance of the economic grounds for the 'White Australia' policy. Asked whether economic difficulties could not be removed by means of minimum wage legislation and the like, they indicated that, in their opinion, such difficulties could not wholly be met in that way. They urged, too, the social difficulties that distressed so many other countries:

If [said one delegate] there are violent objections to intermarriage, whether they come from the migrant or from the people in the home country, it leads to the formation of enclaves, pockets, and minorities which would, I believe, make the development of democratic institutions impossible. But whether I believe it or not, that is what I think the Australian people think about it.

In answer to a further question, it was stated that Australian public opinion had not hitherto considered the 'White Australia' policy in relation to the co-operation of India in Commonwealth defence and other Commonwealth interests.

(b) IRELAND

The opening speaker from Ireland emphasized the new position created by the recent constitutional changes in Ireland itself, and by the Agreement of April 28th, 1938, which ended the economic war between Ireland and the United Kingdom:

With the exception of partition [he said] Ireland is now a satisfied Power. That is a very, very great thing to be able to say.

(i) *The Place of Ireland in the Commonwealth*

The speaker referred to the new Constitution which came into operation on December 29th, 1937. It replaced by an elected President the King or his representative in the internal government of the State. By joint operation of the Constitution and of an Irish law the King was authorized to act on behalf of the State in certain matters of external affairs, by reason of the fact that he acted for like purposes on behalf of the United Kingdom and the Dominions. Ireland was thus constitutionally associated with the United Kingdom and the Dominions. It was not the same constitutional link as that which united the other members of the group. But:

Any doubts as to whether we were members of the Commonwealth were removed for most of us by the Declaration issued on December 29th, 1937, which read as follows: 'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom (together with the Governments of Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand) are prepared to treat the new Constitution as not effecting a fundamental alteration in the position of the Irish Free State . . . as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.' . . . The British Commonwealth is capable of containing many different kinds of democracy, and he is either a fool or a coward who is afraid of new ideas, provided the structure itself remains undamaged.

Asked, later in the discussion, whether it was not the case that Ireland had 'destroyed every link between herself and the rest of the Empire', the speaker admitted that Ireland was now substantially in the position of a republic, and that juridically the position was obscure, abnormal, and perhaps unsatisfactory. He referred, however, to Article I of the Treaty of 1921, which the Agreement of April 1938 recognized by implication as still in operation, and under which Ireland was expressly stated to be a member of the British Commonwealth. He thought, moreover, that probably

Ireland will, for economic, defence, and other reasons, perhaps psychological, gradually drift back. By that I do not mean that there will be any formal amendment of the Constitution. . . . But, apart

from that, I feel that spiritually and psychologically it is on the turn.

(ii) *Defence*

Under the Irish Constitution war could not be declared, nor could the State participate in any war (save in the case of actual invasion) without the assent of Dáil Eireann. But it was pointed out that one of the prime objects of an enemy of the United Kingdom would be to close the door of her larder in Ireland. Accordingly, it was inevitable that Ireland must be involved, from the outset, in any major war in which the United Kingdom was engaged.

Reference was made to the transfer to Ireland, by the Agreement of April 1938, of responsibility for maintaining the three harbours occupied by British forces ever since the Treaty of 1921, and also to Mr. de Valera's pledge that Ireland would, in no circumstances whatever, be allowed to be made a jumping-off place for an enemy of the United Kingdom.

All this meant, in effect, that the defence interest of Ireland was linked with that of the United Kingdom, even more closely and indubitably than that of Australia was felt to be.

(iii) *Commonwealth Trade and World Trade*

Despite the growth of secondary industry since the Treaty of 1921, agriculture was the main industry of the country, and it was pointed out that it depended overwhelmingly upon the United Kingdom market. The search for alternative markets had proved vain, and in 1936, with economic war still taking place, 81 per cent. of Irish exports had gone to Great Britain. An agreement along the lines of Ottawa was one of those concluded in April 1938. Primary producers in Ireland, it seemed, had not shared the anxieties which appeared to be afflicting the primary producers in Australia as to the operation of the Ottawa Agreements.

(iv) *Migration*

In this regard, indeed, the position of Ireland *vis-à-vis* the United Kingdom was precisely the opposite to that of the Dominions. She was a country of emigration, principally to the United Kingdom. Figures were given showing that the number was rising, reaching 32,000 in 1937, and that most of the migrants were of marriageable age. The Irish delegates anticipated the continuance of this movement, and deplored it as denuding the country of great numbers of citizens at the most valuable stage of their lives. They attributed it to the drift from the land of the younger sons and daughters attracted by the cities and by the prospects of higher wages and more certain employment.

(v) *Partition*

The partition between the twenty-six counties of the South and the six of the North which remain within the United Kingdom might seem to raise questions between Ireland and the United Kingdom alone. An Irish delegate urged, however, that:

It is a fatal error . . . to think of Ireland only as a small island in the Atlantic. It is not; it is the greatest spiritual Empire in the world.

The question of reunion, it was suggested, was contained under four headings—the political, the economic, the racial, and the religious.

On the political side, Irish delegates urged 'the intense nationalist desire, of an almost mystical kind, for the union of Ireland', and the danger to the Commonwealth as a whole of leaving Irishmen in every one of the member nations still with a deep grievance. From the United Kingdom came the reply that the Government of Ireland had done 'every single thing that was most irritating to a large number of people in Northern Ireland', particularly in regard to their loyalty to the Crown; that the great majority of people in the North were opposed to union; and that no practical method had been suggested for

overcoming these objections. To this the Irish reply was that the loyalty of the North was not really to the United Kingdom, as had been shown in 1914, and that if the Government of the United Kingdom would say that it did not want partition, unity would be secured, with the assent of the North, in twenty-five years.

On the economic side, interests even in the South were seen to pull both ways. It was pointed out that the trade unions were organized on an all-Ireland basis, ignoring partition, and were solidly in favour of Union. Some employing interests, however, had grown up under the shelter of the Eire tariff, and would not wish to face Belfast competition. One Irish delegate was confident that the tide of nationalism would sweep the 'tariff-mongers' away, but another remarked that 'the tide comes in again every twelve hours'. It was pointed out, too, that Belfast would probably not relish the imposition of a tariff between her industries and Great Britain.

It was in the midst of the discussion of partition, with its significance for British Commonwealth relations as a whole, that the allotted time ran out.

(c) CANADA

The opening speaker from Canada emphasized three fundamental factors in Canada's position: her geographical situation on the North American continent adjoining the most potentially powerful nation in the world; her racial divisions, only one-half of the population now tracing descent directly from the United Kingdom and Ireland; and her dependence upon foreign trade, especially her market in the United States. He went on, basing himself on these three factors, to make some general observations about Canada's place in the Commonwealth, and about the Commonwealth association itself, which may usefully be quoted in full:

There is an opinion on the part of some in Canada, and of some of you, no doubt, that Canada is generally trying to follow the policy of getting the best of two worlds; in other words, refusing to

make commitments as far as the Commonwealth is concerned, yet trying to get what trade she can from Commonwealth agreements. Before accepting that idea, I hope you will intelligently consider, to your own satisfaction, the contrary view, namely, that Canada of all the nations of the Commonwealth is the one which really stands to gain the least, and runs the risk of suffering most, from a Commonwealth association; because I think most of us, if not all of us, would agree that, in the event of war breaking out in the relatively near future, Canada would probably be involved, and she would probably be involved because of her Commonwealth association, certainly at a time closer to the outbreak of war than would be the case if her policy were governed solely by the broader interests of a North American democratic State.

I hope, in your questions, that you are not searching for ways and means for enabling all our countries to act as one, because I do not think anything could be more destructive of results, and because the denying interests or attitude of one or more of our countries should not bar the others from co-operating to their mutual advantage. In Canada, as in most of our countries, the elements which find sentiment a sufficient basis for Commonwealth co-operation react on those who do not by tending to produce an unenlightened national selfishness. And a narrow, unenlightened, selfish national outlook tends to intensify in others the bond of sentiment as the essential basis of lasting co-operation. The dual problem underlying the matter of Commonwealth co-operation in each of our countries is to enlighten national selfishness where it exists, and to obtain in all our countries the general acceptance of enlightened national selfishness as the essential basis of lasting co-operation. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that in the questions that are to be asked of the Canadian group you will be searching for such facts as will enable you to form a judgement as to what an enlightened interest for Canada will probably mean in relation to its policies in future.

(i) *Defence*

This matter was not fully discussed. To a question concerning Canada's attitude towards Japanese expansion in the Pacific, a Canadian delegate replied that in the near future, at any rate, they needed to fear only hit-and-run raids, against which defence measures were being undertaken. It was also stated that the Agreement of 1911 with the United Kingdom for the use by the British Navy in

peace and war of the harbours of Halifax and Esquimalt was still in force.

The opening speaker drew attention to the difference of opinion in Canada between those who thought that the country's security was essentially a problem of Commonwealth co-operation, and those who thought it depended rather on her geographical situation in relation to the United States. He went on to say that 'there is at least a greater realization on the part of Canadians than there is on the part of Americans that North American security is in itself tremendously interested in a strong British naval power'. These points, however, were not taken up in the subsequent discussion.

(ii) *Foreign Policy (including the Question of Neutrality)*

The Canadian approach to foreign policy was seen to be very deeply conditioned by her geographical position, her racial condition, and her need of the United States market. 'So far as the security of Canadian soil is concerned', said the opening speaker, 'the Canadian situation is entirely different from the problem of any other part of the Commonwealth'. If her contiguity with the United States predisposed her to avoid international commitments, this tendency was greatly increased by the need for adopting a policy which maintained national unity. It was stated, for example, that, in any case, French-Canadian opinion would, on religious grounds, be strongly opposed to a war against Italy, and, on ideological grounds, to an alliance with Russia.

It was stated that both the major political parties were indecisive in their views on foreign policy, but that the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation advocated 'a recognized international neutrality, and that immediately'.

Upon this, an Irish delegate asked:

Does that mean that the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation stands for an international recognition of Canada's right to remain neutral in a war in which Great Britain is involved? Or does it mean that she stands for isolationism and a refusal to take part in any war to be fought in Europe?

The reply was as follows:

The last Party Convention, held only a month ago, made that very clear. They distinguished between the right to neutrality and a permanent policy of neutrality or isolation. They rejected the latter and accepted the former. What they look for is a properly constituted League of Nations to which Canada could make full contribution, or else, if we are going to live in a world where national sovereignties are the international units, then Canada should have the same right as Great Britain to be neutral or go into a war as her interests determine.

In reply to other critical questions, it was stated that there was no substantial body of opinion in Canada which had worked out all the consequences of a right to neutrality; that the matter had not been a vital issue in contemporary Canadian life or politics and that, in its technical aspects, it was still confined very largely to academic circles. Indeed, to the delegate who asked 'Why don't you go ahead and do it? What is stopping you?' the reply was that:

There is such a strong body of Canadian opinion with Imperialist sentiment, as contrasted with those who would be strongly in favour of neutrality, that no intelligent politician would be prepared to introduce neutrality legislation at the present time.

The question arose here, as in the case of Australia, how far support in Canada for United Kingdom policy would be increased if it were in accord with the principles of the League of Nations. The answer was the same:

If Great Britain acts through the League of Nations, she can expect considerably more support in Canada than if she merely appears to Canadians to be operating a balance of power in a power-politics world.

(iii) *Commonwealth Trade and World Trade*

Asked whether Canadian opinion had been evolving like Australian in regard to the Ottawa Agreements, a Canadian delegate replied that the Agreements were not regarded as conferring any major advantage in trade, but

that no body of Canadian opinion would favour abandoning them. On the other hand:

There is a widely held view that the British market, in the case of our staple products, as in the case of Australian staple exports, does not provide an adequate market for our surplus production.

(iv) *The Position of Indians in British Columbia*

To an Indian inquiry it was replied that only about 900 Indians remain in British Columbia; that their immigration is prohibited and their numbers are decreasing. In common with all other non-Europeans in British Columbia, they were not permitted the franchise. This anomaly was explained on historical grounds, and was stated with regret.

(d) NEW ZEALAND

The opening speaker from New Zealand emphasized the changes that had taken place since the Toronto Conference as to New Zealand's attitude towards Commonwealth and world affairs. He said:

Before referring to any change that may have occurred, I want to draw your attention to an important point on which the preparatory paper shows that no change has occurred. While there has been, since 1935, a great change in our domestic policy with the advent of a Labour Government, and a much more critical attitude towards British policy, the present Administration is as fully alive as its predecessors to the enormous value of our association with the British Commonwealth and its preservation. Its present Ministers have fully, freely, and fervently expressed their belief that this association should be made closer and more effective. . . .

Secondly, although this is so, it is true also that New Zealand's traditional attitude is undergoing a change in certain quarters, both in political circles and in other sections of the community. There is beginning to emerge . . . a demand for recognition that New Zealand interests, though closely related, are not necessarily identical with those of the United Kingdom. . . . Hitherto, broadly speaking, her leaders have always been conscious that a real development in status has taken place, but they have regarded it with apprehension lest it should prove a step in the disintegration of the

Empire. Hence, at other Conferences New Zealand delegates have endeavoured to retard other Dominions in their attempts to secure further development in Dominion status. However . . . there is emerging a feeling that we have been too long under tutelage, that our romantic attachment to Britain is preventing the emergence of an individual national outlook and culture, that we have idealized our relation to, and admiration for, Britain to an extent that has made us subject to criticism for not evolving a more distinctive outlook of our own. The difference in the opinion that now exists, as compared with previously, between New Zealand and the other Dominions, as to the wisdom of a rapid development towards independent nationalism, now exists within the borders of New Zealand itself, as well as elsewhere.

(i) *Defence*

The delegation was asked, in particular, about the general scheme of New Zealand's provision for defence. The reply was that development was taking place along two main lines. The whole plan was based on co-operation with the British Navy as a first line of defence. Contrary to the expectations of some, the advent of the Labour Government had not involved any diminution of New Zealand's naval forces. Local defence was being provided by fortress troops at vital points on the coast, assisted by aircraft. In addition, however, plans were being executed for building up an air force which would be capable of service outside New Zealand, and which would be the Dominion's special contribution to Commonwealth defence.

The most recent official pronouncement was made by the Minister of Finance in his Budget speech (July 20th, 1938) that rearmament was an urgent necessity, and the Government would be failing in its duty to the citizens of New Zealand and to the British Commonwealth if it did not take its share of the expenditure necessary for defence.

(ii) *Foreign Policy*

A Canadian delegate, envisaging the possibility of several Labour governments in the Commonwealth,

asked whether the implementing of the New Zealand Government's own policy inclined them to a greater or less degree of co-operation with other members of the Commonwealth. The reply was that, while there was a general tendency to reconcile the Commonwealth connexion with a world policy, some sections of the Labour movement felt strongly about the class struggle and did not feel confident about identifying New Zealand with present Commonwealth policy.

(iii) *Migration*

New Zealand delegates informed the Commission that the problem of increasing the population was not, for the majority, a live issue at the moment. Where the matter did arise in public discussion, two schools of thought were apparent; one maintaining that the development of secondary industries should precede further immigration, the other that a larger population in the Dominion was necessary before new secondary industries could be established. As in Australia, markets for increased primary produce were hard to find; the rate of natural increase was declining, and inquiry into the possibility of extending the development of secondary and tertiary industry was only just beginning. There was evidence of a definite desire to maintain the existing racial homogeneity, but no clear indication of the countries from which migrants would be sought.

(iv) *The Future of Western Samoa*

The position in regard to the mandated territory of Western Samoa was discussed, but not conclusively. No clear pronouncement had been made by the Government, and public opinion, the matter not having been emphatically raised, simply assumed a continuance of the present position. It was pointed out, however, that there were, in the case of Samoa, two special factors to be considered. The first was that Germany having occupied the territory for only fourteen years before its capture, New Zealand had now been in control longer than any other Power.

The second was that there existed a vigorous national movement among the natives, and they could certainly not be ignored in any settlement concerning the territory.

(e) INDIA

The opening speaker from India reminded the Commission that the experience of the Commonwealth had shown that full co-operation had not been forthcoming from any part until it had been assured of its full national status. He said:

That situation exists in India to-day. . . . If India is to be in the same position as England or the Dominions, if her association with the British Commonwealth is to be as free as that of the self-governed parts, it is obvious that she must be placed on a footing of complete equality with them.

So far as concerned the Dominions, it was with regard to immigration that the speaker claimed the right of equality for Indians. Referring to the Imperial Conference resolution of 1923, he said:

Now, we recognize the legal rights of the Dominions to decide whom they will admit into their territories. That legal and constitutional right has been admitted over and over again by the representatives of India at the Imperial Conference; but the exercise of a legal right may in certain circumstances be regarded by those whom it affects as a grievous political and moral wrong, and India feels that the exclusion of her children from the Dominions is a national affront to her, and a moral wrong of the first order.

He went on to explain that he did not by any means claim the right of unregulated entry or unrestricted competition. The principle he contended for was this:

It is open to every Dominion which is in need of greater population to decide how many people it will admit in a year; what their qualifications should be; what are the laws under which they should work; but when these conditions have been decided, and a regular plan has been formed, there should be no ban on the entry of Indians. India ought to be among the countries whose nationals are regarded as eligible immigrants.

He claimed that unless changes along these lines were speedily made, military co-operation in Commonwealth defence could not properly either be asked of, or given by, Indians. Another Indian delegate put it, in words used at Toronto, 'If you wish to bind men to you, you must leave them free'.

So far as concerned the United Kingdom, the claim to equality of status connoted substantial changes. The new Constitution had given rise to so much dissatisfaction that unless it was altered to permit the formation of a national government at the centre, with the powers indicated below, there would be serious trouble in India. Again, the extent of India's trade with the outside world (more than half of her exports in 1936-7) required that India should be free to determine her own commercial and monetary policy, instead of being subject to the overriding authority of the representative of the United Kingdom Government.

In foreign policy, it was unsatisfactory that the people of India should take no share. India was deeply interested in the outside world—especially in Afghanistan and other Moslem states on her border, in countries such as Palestine, and in the Far East. India was opposed to Japan's policy in China. But should Anglo-American co-operation be used to weaken Japan, feeling in India would flare up, because that would be regarded as an extension of the 'white dominion' policy to the whole world.

The speaker also urged that equality of status required important changes in the sphere of defence. These are mentioned below.

(i) *Indian Migration to the Dominions*

Further discussion took place on the position of Indian migrants to the Dominions, with special reference to South Africa. It was pointed out that there were in the Union some $7\frac{1}{2}$ million non-Europeans and only 2 million Europeans. The question was asked whether it was a reasonable thing to regard as a 'moral wrong and a national affront' the refusal of the Union to allow a still greater disproportion,

by admitting further Indian migrants. Admittedly, the existing Indian population had come to South Africa by invitation of the Europeans. But what should be the position for the future? The Indian speaker repeated the principle he had already enunciated—entry of Indians on the same terms as other nations, within qualifications fixed without discrimination. Indians were at present in a worse position than the Japanese, who did not belong to the Empire, with regard to entry into the Union. A gentleman's agreement, like that existing in South Africa with Japan, he could not, of course, regard as satisfactory. But it would be an improvement upon the existing direct ban.

A delegate from the United Kingdom sought to put the whole question of Indian migration into a broader perspective. He said:

I want to ask Dr. Kunzru and his colleagues whether they are conscious of the historical situation in which this question first grew up, and that we are moving into a new historical situation. Historically, the question grew up as one of white capital and coloured labour; and historically the New Zealand democracy, shall I say, and the Australian Labour Party, were fighting the same battle as reformers in India were fighting. The Indians were opposing the shocking abuses that went on through the system of indentured labour; and the New Zealand and Australian people were, in exactly the same way, opposing those who were inflicting those abuses. It was a question of transporting tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands of underpaid people, and exploiting them outside India. . . . Now, we are passing into a new historical movement; the essential thing is the movement of India towards self-government and, *pari passu* with that, the raising of Indian standards of living by the responsible Indian leaders in politics and industry, who alone can do it. . . . It is happening now, and it will happen more quickly in the future. In proportion as it happens, the whole situation is transformed. The realization of that transformation will, I am certain, enter the minds of the democracies, of the Labour Parties in particular, of New Zealand and Australia. But I would ask Dr. Kunzru and his colleagues whether they realize the inevitable time-lag, and . . . whether they are prepared to be patient and sympathetic, bearing those things in mind.

Following this up, an Australian delegate said there had been an abortive attempt some years ago, by a Labour group in Sydney, to work out some sort of Commonwealth Labour policy which would defend existing standards and yet satisfy the Indian demand for recognition. He wondered whether the same kind of thing was being attempted on the Indian side.

(ii) *Defence*

In opening the discussion it had been said that two changes should be made in the Indian defence organization. First, Indian soldiers should be substituted for British in the ranks of the Indian Army. There was ample martial material in India, which should be used. Secondly, the scheme laid down by the British Government for the training of Indian officers was too slow. Generally, the man-power and martial capacity of India should be developed, in the interests of India and her full participation in the defence of the Commonwealth.

A United Kingdom delegate made a plea for patience at the slow pace of Indianization of the army officers, which he thought was inevitable. It took twenty-five years for a man to rise to the command of a regiment, and the scheme had been in operation only seventeen years; the experiment could not yet be regarded as having proved itself. In reply, one of the Indian delegates urged that the recruitment for training was too small, that the scheme should be made to cover the whole army and not one-fifth only as at present, and that the experience of Afghanistan and Nepal showed that Indians had real capacity for command. They were certainly not inferior to the people of Afghanistan or Nepal.

(iii) *The Indian Constitution*

A United Kingdom delegate agreed that if India were to play a full and loyal part in the Commonwealth it could only do so as and when it reached full Dominion status. He agreed that Dominion status implied two fundamental things: authority to draw up its own

constitution, and responsibility for its own local defence. What was felt in the United Kingdom, however, was the immensity of the problem of organizing India itself for these purposes, with its huge area and population, its diverse races and religions, and its Native States.

(f) SOUTH AFRICA

The opening speaker from South Africa sketched the strategical and economic position of the Union, with special reference to some recent developments.¹

The strategical position of South Africa was of importance to the whole Commonwealth, especially if the Mediterranean route were ever closed. The Union was at present building a new harbour at Table Bay, in which all types of modern ships could be berthed and repaired.

The speaker outlined recent policy towards the natives. He referred to the fact that the natives of the Cape were allowed to elect three white representatives to the Union Parliament and two to the Provincial Council. The natives of other parts were allowed to elect four white men as senators, in addition to four senators appointed by the Government as having special knowledge of native affairs. There was also a Native Representative Council, to which all bills dealing with native affairs must be submitted, though for consultative purposes only, and without formal veto. Further, by the Native Land and Trust Act, the Government had set up a trust to buy over 15 million acres at a cost of over £10,000,000 in order to create new native reserves.

He mentioned that the present enhanced price of gold had led to a great expansion of industry. Low-grade ore producing as little as $3\frac{1}{2}$ dwt. to the ton could profitably be crushed. Fifteen new mines would soon be operating. Indeed, the only factor that might limit this expansion would be the possible limit of available native labour.

¹ An additional note on the attitudes of different groups in South Africa towards Commonwealth relations is contained in an Appendix to this Report. See below, pp. 165-6.

Reliance upon gold production was, however, risky, in view of present currency trends. 'If gold were demonetized', said the speaker, 'South Africa would have to go back to the ox-wagon.'

If any delegates felt critical of South Africa's recent wool agreement with Germany, it should be kept in mind that South Africa's wool was mostly of a fineness worked in France and Germany, and that Germany had purchased last year more than Britain and France together. South Africa had therefore a serious market problem which had prompted the agreement.

The speaker pointed out that, alone in the Commonwealth, the Union had paid its War Debt in full, declining to take advantage of the Hoover Moratorium.

(i) *The Protectorates*

The opening speaker put forward South Africa's claim for a speedy decision by the United Kingdom as to the transfer of the Protectorates to the Union, and said:

... The majority in South Africa feel that England should now make up her mind, one way or another, whether she will hand these over to us or whether she will keep them. If Britain says, 'You can have them', we have the machinery to administer and develop these countries. South Africa could get on with their development for the natives, and such development would include dealing with soil erosion, the prevention of stock diseases, pests, and overstocking. If, on the other hand, Britain says 'No', we will have to consider drawing a ring fence around these places, and eliminating any free access into our country, because we cannot allow native primary products to come in from these native territories to swell our already great surpluses. We have no control over these things. Again, we cannot allow the free crossing of our borders when we have such dangerous diseases as foot-and-mouth and so on, with no power to deal with the infection at its source. Another point is the question of the locust.

Other speakers pointed out that over and against the Union's interest in good and convenient administration lay the United Kingdom's pledge that no change should be made without consulting the natives themselves, the

indication that the natives were averse to the transfer, the anxiety always felt in native questions overseas by certain sections of British opinion, and the United Kingdom's desire that any transfer should take place gradually and by stages. It was stated that there was a pressing need for administrative co-operation between the two Governments to work out some scheme of transfer.

A delegate from the United Kingdom pointed out that at present nearly half of South Africa was outside the control of the Union, and that half of the natives of the Protectorates obtained their living from work in the Union. The fundamental issue for the Union Government to settle was the relationship of black and white in South Africa. The delegate asked whether South African self-government could be said to be complete so long as the Protectorates remained in British control. The South African delegates who spoke were divided in opinion in answering this question.

(ii) *The Future of South-West Africa*

South African opinion, unlike that in Australia and New Zealand, appeared from the course of the discussion to be definitely settled against retrocession of this territory under any circumstances. The factors mentioned were mainly strategical and economic—the danger of a potential enemy within a few hours of the main nerve-centres of the country, and the expense already incurred in development. It was pointed out that this territory is the only case in which the mandated territory is actually on the border of the mandatory state. Further, it was pointed out that there was a large indigenous population which would be strongly averse to any retrocession. The Union was sympathetic to Germany's demands, but would definitely not consider any bargaining with its own territory in the interests of European appeasement.

(iii) *The Position of Indians in South Africa*

A South African delegate stated that there were now some 220,000 Indians in the Union, a great majority of

them living under deplorable conditions, worsted in competition with native and poor white alike. A minority among the Europeans was striving to improve their lot. But they felt that their efforts would be made much more difficult if India were to press for the admission of more Indians.

(iv) *Defence and Foreign Policy*

Neither of these points was fully discussed. It was stated, however, by a South African delegate that there were two sharply defined schools of thought on the question whether South Africa could stand alone without the Commonwealth connexion. From this point of view South African opinion seemed to be more closely akin to Canadian than to Australian opinion, but perhaps to have moved farther away from isolation during the immediate past.

(g) NEWFOUNDLAND

In a short discussion on Newfoundland the constitutional changes which had taken place there in recent years were explained, and the status of the island was defined as 'a colony with suspended Dominion status', or 'a Dominion on leave of absence'.

The Commission was informed that there was no racial or population problem in Newfoundland; 99·4 per cent. of the people were of British extraction, 98·5 per cent. actually born in the island. The birth-rate was steadily increasing, and the natural increase had more than sustained the population, despite the absence of appreciable immigration for many years, and despite a steady emigration to the United States and Canada.

The majority of the people of the island realized the necessity for the continuance of Commission Government until financial stability was achieved. This would depend on an improvement in public finance, which in turn depended on an improvement in the international trading position of the island. The great bulk of Newfoundland's external trade was done with the United

Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, in that order. The maintenance of friendly relations, both political and economic, between the United Kingdom and the United States was thus very important to Newfoundland. The staple exports were fish, newsprint, and minerals. The fishing industry was financed almost wholly by Newfoundland capital, and fishery products were exported mainly to the Mediterranean countries, the West Indies, and Brazil. Thus the island was so dependent on external trade that it could readily be understood that Newfoundland supported a policy of appeasement.

In reply to a question by a United Kingdom delegate whether, geographically, it would not have been appropriate for Canada rather than the United Kingdom to have acted as 'big brother' in 1933, the factors which had kept Newfoundland aloof from joining the Canadian federation were noted, but emphasis was also given to Newfoundland's close financial and commercial relations with Canada. The question of assistance from Canada had been fully considered by the Amulree Commission, but in the long run the present solution had seemed the most satisfactory.

(h) THE UNITED KINGDOM

The opening speaker from the United Kingdom drew attention to the fact that the only acute differences in Great Britain were not racial or religious, but political—mainly the issue broadly described as the conflict between capital and labour. The political differences which he analysed most closely were in relation to the conduct of foreign policy and defence. In this sphere, he pointed out the striking change in the position of Great Britain, through becoming, for the first time in two centuries, vulnerable to direct attack—i.e. from the air. This involved her both in the risk of grave destruction and in an entirely new burden of defence. Her rearmament programme, however, now had the support of all parties. In respect of foreign policy, he traced the attacks made on the policy of the Government by its Labour and Liberal

critics, and sketched the Government's reply. He concluded thus:

... I want to say, in conclusion, that Great Britain, as a result of the policy independently pursued by the United States in the Pacific, still controls the high seas. That means, in practice, that on the ocean something like a League policy still exists. That is to say, the policy for which naval power is used does respect the independence of other nations, promotes self-government, and seeks a settlement of international disputes by pacific and not by warlike means. I do not pretend that this is due to any peculiar virtue on the part of the English people—we are often accused of being hypocrites—but one reason is that we are experienced and we are sated. What would be the position of all of us supposing that naval situation ended and that those elements of sea-power, for instance Gibraltar, Simonstown, the Falkland Islands, and Singapore, which really make it possible for British or Commonwealth sea-power to be exerted all over the world—supposing that disappeared and those places fell into the hands of someone else, and the only nations into whose hands they would be likely to fall are the aggressive militarist nations.

(i) *Foreign Policy*

It was upon foreign policy that the keenest discussion took place, the critics coming from all the Dominions. There reappeared the anxieties which had been disclosed in considering the policy of the several Dominions in world affairs. On the one hand, there was a feeling that a policy of peace at almost any price was not so much policy as a substitute for one; that it gave no guarantee that the road led to a secure world peace with justice; that men, especially men at a great distance, could feel no enthusiasm for a policy not steadfastly linked to principle, not consciously fashioning a world organization and the rule of law. The answer to this was that the League of Nations had ceased, by reason of inherent defects of organization and by reason of successive defections from its membership, to provide a system by means of which the members could make each other collectively secure. In such a world, all that could be done was to keep intact such areas of order as could be preserved. But, came the

question, was the United Kingdom, amid the skelter of concessions and retreats, keeping in full view always the building of a fresh world order as the next step? A United Kingdom delegate connected with the Labour movement answered in the affirmative, and with a challenge:

The British people—and I speak for my own people with whom I am closely associated—fear at this moment attack from the Continent and they believe we have got to make ourselves safer. Once it is in the minds of the British people that security is established . . . the electorate will go back and fight hard towards a world order, and in that we shall be glad to go back feeling that you are with us in the job.

The same delegate also put the opening speaker's concluding point in a slightly different form:

I think . . . that any break-up of the British Empire would lead to a scramble, and having got one-third of the world under some sort of co-operation it is easier to build up from that into a world order than it is to go back. That is the view, and I think, as one who has now for over thirty years been advocating the United States of Europe, that the only hope of solution of world problems is to allow the integration of Europe.

The methods by which a world order might again be established fell perhaps within the sphere of later commissions. One other anxiety, however, about the present drift of policy should be recorded. It was the fear, met with at an earlier stage, that the policy of the United Kingdom had in recent incidents been based on unwillingness to see a real defeat imposed on an undemocratic Government, whether in Italy or Japan or Germany, or to see Republican Spain triumph. This fear sprang, as before, from the approach to world affairs, through class and not through nation.

This discussion led also to some consideration of the 'interests' of the United Kingdom, in the strict sense of the term. The opening speaker had made a statement of capital importance, in view specially of the discussions of neutrality as applied to some of the Dominions. Recalling

the fact that in politics as in trade the United Kingdom is a world Power, he said:

She is a world Power because she still undertakes full responsibility for the defence of every part of the British Commonwealth, because any war anywhere is likely to threaten some part of the British Commonwealth of Nations and is therefore likely to be of concern to Great Britain. The problem of neutrality therefore does not arise as far as Great Britain is concerned.

No doubt most people in the Dominions, with the possible exception of Canada, relied on the continuance of this United Kingdom interest. But it should be considered along with the request of another United Kingdom delegate that Dominion delegates should ponder whether he could reasonably ask his comrades to fight wars for Dominion defence at the ends of the earth.

In general terms, it was cogently put, with illustrations, that fundamentally the concern of the United Kingdom in the world at large was not in territory and investments and concessions, but in securing a decently-run world, with law and order prevailing—not because the United Kingdom was specially altruistic, but because in such a world these material ‘interests’ could look after themselves. In even wider terms, it was suggested that ‘the world interest which the United Kingdom is out to protect is self-government’. Such generalizations involved a danger of self-deception as well as inspiration. The test of their bedrock sincerity came when the country was prepared to carry through some sacrifice of ‘interests’ in the strict sense in order to maintain those wider and more general concerns.

(ii) *Migration*

The opening speaker had outlined the complicated situation at the United Kingdom end, correlative to the hesitations and doubts which the Commission had seen in the Dominions. A declining birth-rate, combined with increased social services at home, had removed the possibility of mass migration. The unemployed were not

wanted overseas, and 'the organized worker will not submit to inequality and to being treated as a cheap labourer'. In such circumstances, the choice of immigrants, as another United Kingdom delegate contended, became a matter of training, of selection by some permanent consultative body.

(iii) *Commonwealth Trade and World Trade*

Here again, in the opening statement, the speaker had given the United Kingdom end of the processes already considered in discussing the several Dominions. The approach by way of the interests of individual Dominions obscured, but could not alter, the fact that British Commonwealth relations were much more radial relations between Dominion and United Kingdom than circumferential relations between Dominion and Dominion.

The Ottawa Agreements were stated not to be popular among the manufacturers in the United Kingdom, who felt that Britain had had the thin end of the stick. In Britain, however, as in the Dominions, there was a growing expert opinion that the Agreements were in themselves an obstacle to world recovery and appeasement; as impoverishing Europe by transferring purchasing power to the Dominions; as complicating the operation of the 'most-favoured-nation' system; as having hindered the negotiations with the United States; and finally as applying the preferential system to the Colonies.

NOTE.—*The Conference agreed that the following note on South African attitudes towards Commonwealth relations, based on speeches to the Conference, should be attached to this Report.*

Public opinion in the Union is divided between two opposite minority views and an intermediate position held by a majority of the people. One minority desires a republican form of government and wants to break every constitutional link with the Commonwealth. The other minority holds that this break has in fact been already achieved by the Status and Seals Acts, and wants to undo it by restoring the constitutional relationship to the

British Crown, which it considers these Acts to have destroyed. The majority of the white population does not attach much importance to constitutional niceties, but is content to maintain South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth on the basis of accepting the King of Great Britain as also the King of South Africa. The majority is not guided by sentiment so much as by the conviction that, especially in these critical days, the national interests of South Africa, and not least her interest in her own safety, demand her closest co-operation with Great Britain and the other members of the Commonwealth, and that the defeat of Great Britain in a world war would be 'disastrous not only to South Africa, but to the well-being, safety, freedom, and peace of the world'. It should be made clear that the republican minority must not be regarded as being actuated by 'anti-British' or 'anti-Empire' sentiment merely because it honestly and sincerely thinks that it is contrary to the best interests of South Africa to be, through membership of the Commonwealth, automatically committed to participation in any war in which Great Britain may become involved through her entanglement in Europe, or her far-flung interests in other parts of the world, in which South Africa is not directly concerned.

COMMISSION II

EXTERNAL POLICIES IN THEIR ECONOMIC ASPECT

REPORT BY PROFESSOR K. W. TAYLOR,
COMMISSION RECORDER

(Adopted by the Conference)

Commission II was set up by the Conference Organizing Committee to consider Part II, Section A, of the Agenda, 'External Policies in their Economic Aspect'. The particular topics to which the Agenda directed attention were Trade, Migration, and Currency and Finance. The Commission was not expected to study these problems in their technical aspect, but was asked to relate them to two main questions: (a) Did the interests of the several members of the Commonwealth in economic matters point towards a more exclusive or less exclusive policy than in the past, in relation to their fellow members? (b) Did the interests of the Commonwealth nations, regarded as a group, point towards a more exclusive or less exclusive policy than in the past in the relations of the group to the rest of the world? The Commission held three sessions: the first, on Trade Relations; the second, on Migration and on Currency and Finance; and the third, on the Objectives and Methods of Future Co-operation. (For a detailed statement of the Agenda of Commission II, see Appendix I.)

(a) OBJECTIVES OF COMMONWEALTH ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

THE objectives of economic co-operation within the Commonwealth, as they emerged from the discussions in Commission II, may be grouped under three general heads:

(i) *Defence*

It was pointed out that from the point of view of individual members of the Commonwealth, an economic policy designed to facilitate defence required the promotion of a substantial degree of self-sufficiency and the

development of those channels of trade that would be least liable to interruption in time of war. From the Commonwealth point of view, some degree of economic decentralization could be designed to promote defence. As a United Kingdom delegate put it:

The development of the steel trade in Australia and other countries so as to be able to supply munitions in time of war, would be of the greatest possible assistance to us for the supply of various forces in the Eastern Hemisphere. . . . That would have the hearty support of the defence authorities in England. It would save an immense amount of transport.

Such a policy, it was pointed out, either implied a definite commitment in advance by all members of the Commonwealth to co-operate in war, or it involved the grave risk of the member nation on which the defence plan relied as a source of necessary supplies failing to make these available in a crisis. There was a danger, however, in over-emphasizing Empire trade as a contribution to defence. An Australian delegate remarked:

The primary-producing Dominions must be prepared to recognize the necessity of the United Kingdom buying some of its dairy products in Denmark, as otherwise Denmark must go completely into the fascist orbit. . . . The same thing applies to some extent to meat from the Argentine. It is a shorter sea route. But, again, the recognition of that fact should not preclude a rationalization of the trade with a preference which may not bring so much benefit to the Argentine as it does to the Dominions, but which may bring to both a price benefit.

To this a Canadian added:

We almost seem to be reaching a conclusion that the Ottawa Agreements, far from strengthening the Empire, are a positive danger to it in time of war.

It was clear that, in the present world situation, defence motives could not be entirely absent from Commonwealth trade policies, but it was not suggested that such a motive provided a constructive basis for permanent Commonwealth economic co-operation.

(ii) *Ideological Objectives*

To some sections of the population of the Commonwealth the maintenance or strengthening of Empire and Commonwealth ties was an end in itself. A New Zealand delegate, prefacing his remarks with the statement that his colleagues would probably disagree with him, put this point in the following way:

I understood the idea behind Ottawa was to try to strengthen the internal structure of the Empire economically *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. . . . It has been complained that the result was to create vested interests. I think if you regard the stability of the Empire as more important than free trade or higher standards of living, that was all to the good; because the vested interests that were created were an Empire influence, and if we wanted to strengthen the Empire, that was a satisfactory result. . . . If we abandoned preference and the Ottawa Agreements, New Zealand would gradually pass into the orbit of America, first in trade, then in finance, with all the consequences that would naturally flow. . . . Gradually we would become an appanage of the United States instead of the Commonwealth.

(iii) *Economic Objectives*

The main economic objectives of Commonwealth co-operation were variously defined as comprising expanding trade, higher standards of living, and reasonable freedom of movement for peoples and for capital. Members from practically every group represented, rejected as impossible the pursuit of policies directed towards complete self-sufficiency, either for the individual nation or for the Empire as a whole: but, on the other hand, there was no agreement on the existence of any economic basis of unity within the Commonwealth itself. Useful co-operation, it was observed, required an understanding and a harmonization of the social philosophies and objectives of each member of the Commonwealth. A general tendency was noted in all Commonwealth countries towards more balanced economies, towards internal stability, and towards the raising or the maintenance of internal standards of living. At times these internal objectives were in conflict with the external objectives of

freer trade within the Commonwealth, and of freer trade in the world as a whole, and it was repeatedly emphasized that, in the long run, the achievement of higher internal standards of living in Commonwealth countries would be greatly assisted by raising standards in the world generally.

Commonwealth co-operation, it was urged, should proceed towards freer and expanding world trade. A South African put his views in the following words:

The question has been asked whether the idea of Imperial economic policy is a solution, and what it consists of. I think it consists chiefly of the free spirit of enterprise. The Empire has been built up under a régime of free trade, but also one of free enterprise and free opportunities. . . . It is that freedom which is the essence of self-government. . . . I believe standards of living will be raised mainly by the opportunity that will be given for the full development of particular areas according to their natural resources.

An Irish member of the Conference suggested as an objective the union of the Commonwealth in a 'free trade *bloc*':

I believe that the nearer we get back to free trade, the nearer we will get to the solution of our problems. I want an economic *bloc* that will be open to every one to come into, if they want to. I will explain the sort of *bloc* I want. I suggest the British Commonwealth of Nations should set an example to the world by forming a *bloc* of trade in the world that would lay down the principle of getting back to free trade, indicating that they recognize at the same time the danger of low standards of living in such countries as India and Japan.

The exchange of views, however, made it clear that the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India were all committed to policies of protection.

A New Zealand member put it as follows:

The general impression I have gained from the discussions is that there is a genuine belief in the ultimate desirability of freer trade . . . and that this particular urge for a more liberal structure of economy co-exists with a real movement towards greater self-sufficiency in each of the component parts of the Commonwealth.

There is a conflict between the aspiration towards greater freedom and co-operation, and the fact of greater economic self-sufficiency. I suggest that the effect of greater self-sufficiency is the most important single, concrete, practical matter under this part of the Agenda, and that the possibility of Commonwealth co-operation must start from a recognition of that fact.

It was also pointed out that free trade belonged to the period of free individualistic competition, and was inconsistent with the almost universal trend towards the social control of economic conditions, particularly in relation to labour.

In summing up his views of the problem and his impressions of the debate, an Australian said:

May I suggest that the trend of the discussion has left me in no doubt that . . . we all feel that the objective as far as trade is concerned is for freer trade within the Commonwealth . . . but not at the expense of the objective of freer trade with the world as a whole.

And he felt that the two objectives could be made fully consistent.

(b) CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE PROBLEMS

(i) *Trade Relations*

The Commission started its discussions with a consideration of the results of the Ottawa Agreements. Ottawa was described as a defensive policy adopted in the depth of an extremely serious world depression. Its objective, in part, was the re-establishment of reasonable prices for those primary products on which the Dominions were so largely dependent, and which were important items in the United Kingdom's own agricultural policy. It was the defensive and emergency character of the Agreements that made their achievement comparatively easy.

Opinions on the effects of Ottawa were divided. Many examples were given of benefits to particular industries. The live-stock producer in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand had benefited substantially, partly as a result of

the Ottawa Agreements and partly as a result of the United Kingdom's own agricultural policy. Canadian lumber and apples were also mentioned as items which had benefited materially from the Ottawa Agreements. On the other hand, it was stated that Ottawa had proved definitely disadvantageous to the Australian wool-producer. Manufacturers in the Dominions were inclined to be nervous of Ottawa and to feel that it limited the opportunities of development, and British manufacturers were definitely disappointed with its results. Moreover, while Ottawa, combined with the British agricultural policy, had, by increased prices, benefited the Dominion producer, it had also, in the words of a United Kingdom delegate, 'wiped bacon off the British working-man's breakfast table'.

A New Zealand delegate held the view that the quantitative regulation of meat exports to the United Kingdom had benefited both countries, but that tariffs had benefited neither the United Kingdom nor the Dominion producer.

A South African view of Ottawa, as given by one of its members, was that discussion of whether this or that industry had benefited was of little significance. Ottawa, he felt, had not contributed to the reduction of tariff barriers in the world; its good intentions had been swamped by the pressure of vested interests.

Indian views, as expressed by two members, were definitely opposed to the system of Ottawa, on both political and economic grounds. One member said:

So far as Imperial preference is concerned, it involves, as we can all understand, political factors as to whether we will form a military *bloc*. Now, that feeling does not exist in India. India, for political reasons alone, would not be prepared to accept the principle of Imperial preference; and on economic grounds, too, it would not be prepared to renew the Ottawa Agreements, as has been made clear during the last four years. . . . India is going in for industrialization and it is plain that this means the adoption of a policy of protection. . . . India will not accept any policy which means the lowering of her protective tariffs.

He added that members of the Commonwealth should be prepared to make sacrifices to promote the development of other parts of the Empire. For example, India wanted to develop an Indian mercantile marine and a committee appointed by the Government of India in 1923 had recommended its development, but restrictions incorporated in the Government of India Act, in the interests of British shipping companies, had made this impossible.

Another Indian speaker said:

With regard to Ottawa, although it was in operation, none of the Dominions came forward to buy our cotton. Some cotton was sold to England, but we had to fall back on Japan to buy the bulk of our cotton. . . . Ottawa has obliged us to buy certain things from Empire countries, although they are not just as good and as cheap as we could find from the other markets of the world.

Certain other points mentioned in discussion may be noted. Ottawa had seriously handicapped some members of the Commonwealth in arriving at satisfactory trade agreements with foreign countries. For all the members of the Commonwealth, with the possible exception of Ireland and New Zealand, the volume and the nature of their trade with foreign countries made it essential that they should be on friendly terms with these countries. Speakers from both the United Kingdom and Australia mentioned the difficulties that Ottawa had placed in the way of such commercial negotiations. A New Zealand delegate pointed out that the Ottawa Agreements were a hindrance to protecting industry other than by the tariff method. Several speakers referred to the fact that the competitive manœuvres of the vested interests created or strengthened by Ottawa had not added to the sum total of inter-Commonwealth goodwill.

Ottawa, it was pointed out, had had external political, as well as economic, repercussions. While a critical examination of the results of Ottawa showed little evidence of the establishment of an economic *bloc*, the drama of Ottawa had undoubtedly convinced much of the outside world that an exclusive economic *bloc* was in the

making. This was especially true of the extension of substantial preferences in the dependent Empire, which several speakers regarded as inconsistent with the principle of colonial trusteeship. The ill-will and retaliation thus engendered had definitely worsened international tension. The serious handicaps placed on the trade of some of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries could only tend to force them into the orbit of German economic and political influence. A United Kingdom member observed that, for political reasons, the United Kingdom had been directing purchases towards Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and other countries, and pointed out that any considerable movement of this sort was in conflict with the Ottawa Agreements. A peaceful and a prosperous Europe was a fundamental national interest of the United Kingdom, but Ottawa had so tied her hands that she had little that she could offer in a policy of appeasement.

In a concluding criticism an Australian delegate summarized his views in the following manner:

The experience of Ottawa is now long enough to suggest that it has revealed that there is no reality in Imperial economic unity. Ottawa is becoming nothing more than a series of bilateral economic bargains in which apparently one or other party to the bargain thinks it has the better or the worse of the deal. The United Kingdom delegate thinks his spokesmen were outbidden and some of the Canadians think they made a pretty good deal. What of it? It merely suggests that the bargains at Ottawa were separate bilateral agreements with the advantages and disadvantages incidental to that kind of agreement. Has that not clearly revealed that there is no fundamental economic reality in this talk of Empire economic unity?

In the discussions of possible modifications of the whole system of preferential tariffs typified by the Ottawa Agreements, several suggestions were advanced.

A United Kingdom member put a suggestion in the following terms:

In the United Kingdom, we are very near Europe and conscious that, however successful we are in the Empire, we cannot live and be peaceful and prosperous unless Europe is working as well. It

must be got going somehow. At the present moment, economically, we have nothing to offer Europe, largely due to Ottawa. There are great forces in Europe who would, if an opportunity was presented, begin an agitation to come into some kind of world order. I wonder what the Dominions would say supposing Great Britain established a kind of economic Ottawa to apply to countries who would come into a system of collective security and maintenance of peace, to come within an entirely new orbit. I think it would be of advantage to the Dominions, because the British market is limited, and the way to attain the standard of living Australia and New Zealand want to raise, is through the millions in Europe.

A New Zealand delegate spoke as follows:

The position is that we have economic nationalism trying to function within a somewhat limping system of Imperial preferences, and a system of Imperial preferences trying to operate within a much more limping system of world trade. That gives rise necessarily within every component part of the Commonwealth, as well as within every other nation in the world, to a mass of conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies. . . . Are there any practicable methods by which we can cut across these conflicts and bring about a more liberalizing state of trade relationships? Frankly, I do not believe that, in themselves, attempts to bargain within the Empire on a more liberal basis will get us very far. . . . I believe that the most important thing in setting in motion this more liberalizing tendency is likely to be the evolution of social policies within each individual country.

It was pointed out by a number of speakers that, if abandonment or drastic alteration of preferences were to be undertaken, either the changes must be made gradually or some measures of compensation extended to the primary producers affected.

An Irish delegate expressed the view that the imposition of a protective tariff was an invitation by the Government to business men to invest capital in a given industry; and when a government undertook to remove or lower such duties consideration should be given to the interests of these investors; serious practical difficulties and questions of good faith arose when tariffs were drastically revised.

An Australian speaker suggested that the serious difficulties in the international field which followed Ottawa were due to excessive margins of preference. The Dominions, he thought, would have to be content with very moderate preferences, or the whole system might break down.

During the debate on trade relations, the practical conflict between freer trade and the protection of internal standards of living became obvious. It had been suggested by one speaker that the policy of a 'free-trade *bloc*', to be initiated by the United Kingdom and the Dominions, and freely open to adherence by other countries, should be applied to industries where 'conditions of work and rates of pay will be fixed by some external and impartial authority'; he wanted 'free trade and regulated conditions'. This led to the suggestion by a United Kingdom speaker that the International Labour Organization might be of value in this connexion. It had been hoped that the I.L.O. would be an instrument for levelling up standards of living in various countries, but it had had to meet the opposition of vested interests, and the attitude of the British Government had not been helpful. Another speaker emphasized the conflict between the proposed free-trade *bloc*, based on equated standards of living, and the Australian and New Zealand interest in raising standards of living in the great potential consuming areas of the world; it was hardly a contribution to the raising of standards of life in low-standard countries to refuse to buy or to discriminate against their goods; expanding trade was one of the most important factors in improving the standards of living.

A good deal of attention was given to a new line of approach to trade policy that had been developed since Ottawa, namely, the problem of nutrition and the raising of standards of living. Expanding trade and prosperity in the great raw-material producing countries depended on the maintenance and improvement of standards of living throughout the world. Largely at the instance of Australia, this problem had been taken up by the League

of Nations and was being carefully studied by the International Labour Office.

(ii) *Migration*

Two questions were raised in connexion with migration—the prospects for migration within the Commonwealth and the desirability of immigration from outside the Commonwealth.

In opening the general discussion, an Australian speaker said that the flow of migration depended in part on the absorptive capacity of the receiving country, which in turn depended on the rate of expansion of its economy in relation to its technical efficiency and its standard of living. It also depended on the available sources of migration, which were related to population pressure and the existence of international differences in standards of living. He believed that there was a large absorptive capacity for additional population in the Commonwealth, though it varied widely between different countries. But the standards of living in Great Britain and the Dominions were now fairly equal, so the conditions for a flow of people on economic grounds now or in the future were absent.

Another Australian delegate pointed out that the net reproduction rates in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand were below unity. A United Kingdom delegate added that England, during the past eight years, had been, on balance, a substantial immigrant-receiving country, and there was little likelihood of substantial emigration from England in the future. An Irish member observed that Ireland was the only remaining source of white emigration in the Commonwealth and said the white races were killing themselves off by not having sufficient children.

A Canadian member of the Conference towards the end of the discussion, said that his view that there was virtually no possibility of further inter-Commonwealth migration in any substantial volume had been confirmed; and another Canadian in supporting this conclusion said:

I want to press the point made earlier by asking two questions: first, whether there is any important body of migrants available within the Commonwealth, apart from India which is a special problem and must be considered by itself; and second, whether the Dominions at the present time want or can use any considerable body of migrants. . . . I think the real question is that of opportunity. As far as agriculture is concerned, our own tendency is to require fewer workers than in the past; and unless we are contemplating a different kind of society from that in which we have lived, it strikes me as being questionable (*a*) whether we have within the Commonwealth any large amount of material available for migration and (*b*) whether within the Commonwealth there is any very large place for that body of migrants.

The New Zealand attitude towards migration was put as follows:

A very excellent phrase was used just now by the United Kingdom delegate when he referred to 'migration by retail'. That is the essence of New Zealand's present policy. . . . We are concentrating at the present moment on importing specific types of labour for specific jobs of work as the occasion arises and as the need is there.

There was some discussion of ways and means of selecting and training skilled workers in Great Britain for migration to those Dominions where programmes of encouraging secondary and tertiary industry were proceeding. It was pointed out that it takes many years to train skilled workers, and trade-union practices limit apprenticeship to the estimated number required in the trade. If the Dominions wanted this type of skilled worker it would not be difficult to arrange the additional apprenticeship in accordance with such needs. This would require a long-range plan and a continuous organization in the Dominions to keep the British trade unions and the Government informed of the prospective requirements. A United Kingdom delegate thought that the consideration of this plan should include a discussion of 'the financial arrangements that ought to be incurred by all of us in training this new capital asset'.

A New Zealand delegate, in commenting on these suggestions, said:

The New Zealand economy will not permit of any large introduction of farmers until we organize a plan to ascertain how our secondary and tertiary industries can be developed. For that, some scheme must be arranged by which we can get hold of trained migrants, and this can only be done by an organized committee.

The position of Indians as migrants received a considerable amount of attention. It was pointed out that India was the only member of the Commonwealth in which high population pressure and abnormally low standards of living combined to provide a strong economic motive for emigration. All the Dominions, in effect, prohibit Indian immigration, and migration to colonial areas is closely controlled. The reasons for the legal restriction on migration to the Dominions were given as economic and sociological. Indian speakers were unable to accept the objection to mixed marriages, and an Australian speaker added his view in the following words:

I entirely repudiate the idea that inter-marriage between radically different races is an evil. I believe the evil comes from the attitude of the rest of the community towards the progeny of such marriages. I suggest that the duty of individual Australians is to try to break down, in the community, that irrational feeling of prejudice against other races.

The economic argument against Indian migration was put in the following terms by the same speaker (in its context this statement referred to low-standard countries generally, European as well as Asiatic):

From the economic point of view, if the migrant from a country of low standards is taken into the receiving economy at the same standard as the ordinary worker, he is very rarely able to give value for the money he gets, and therefore such migration would be negligible; and it is not likely to take place if that condition is insisted upon. If he is taken in at his own standard, he tends to break down the standards of the receiving country. He is an

obstacle to all schemes of economic control and he generally tends to break down the normal development of that economy. If that type of economy is best fitted to the country, very little good is served by such a migration.

The reply of the Indian delegate to this was:

There is no suggestion on the part of India that an unlimited migration of Indians should be allowed to any Dominion irrespective of the economic possibilities there. All that is suggested is this: you say what is the number of persons you require from us; to begin with, if you are not certain with regard to the suitability of people coming to a country, fix a quota for them and leave it to them to prove their suitability, their industrious and law-abiding character. As regards the co-operation of people of more than one race, the example of India shows that is no bar to a common national feeling.

The issue of Indian migration to Kenya was also raised. A South African member understood that Indian migration to Kenya was creating difficulties with the Arab sections of the population. The Indian speaker believed that Arab-Indian relations in Kenya were good, but there was antagonism in Kenya between Europeans and natives. A United Kingdom speaker said that British policy towards Kenya was that the interests of the natives were paramount; that policy had been concurred in by the Indian population of Kenya, but it had never received the sincere concurrence of the Europeans.

A brief discussion took place on the possibilities of European settlement in Tanganyika. One South African speaker felt that white settlement was entirely possible and ought to be undertaken for strategic reasons. In reply, an Indian member said that unorganized migration into Tanganyika would almost certainly reproduce the undesirable results that had occurred in Kenya. A second South African speaker, however, felt that permanent white settlement in the equatorial areas was impossible. In this connexion, an Australian speaker stated that the vital statistics relating to tropical Queensland indicated that permanent white settlement was quite possible.

In the discussion of the possibilities of immigration

from outside countries, it was pointed out that substantial immigration was unlikely to come from Northern European countries for the same reasons as in the case of Great Britain—low reproductive rates and relatively high standards of living. Several speakers referred to the possibilities of refugee migration from Germany. It was pointed out that there was little room in the Dominions for the professional men who were available in considerable numbers, but that there was some opportunity for skilled workers, and such were, in fact, being absorbed at the present time.

A brief discussion of the possibilities of Central, Southern, and Eastern European migration centred largely on the question of assimilability. It was pointed out that the degree to which such migrants became 'good Australians' or 'Canadians' varied considerably and somewhat unpredictably. The experience of some Dominions and regions was not the same as others. The political and social problems of unassimilated minorities were noted by an Australian delegate, who pointed out that enclaves of unassimilated minorities with their competitive social cultures tended to undermine the effective operation of democratic self-government.

(iii) *Currency and Finance*

The most important change noted in relation to currency and finance in Commonwealth affairs during the past decade was the cessation of large-scale international lending by the United Kingdom. A speaker from the United Kingdom put it as follows:

Since 1931 the balance of payments of the United Kingdom has left virtually no margin whatever for net new investment abroad. . . . In some years there has been a net debit balance. . . . If this condition continues it implies an end, not necessarily to the dynamic period of Empire economic development, but to the period when the dynamic force came from the United Kingdom.

The continuance of such a condition would also involve a fundamental change in the trading position of the United Kingdom.

The discussion brought out the fact that Dominions still needed capital, but in future it would not be so much for increasing their facilities for the production and marketing of primary products as for carrying out their programmes of expansion in the field of secondary industries. South Africa, it was stated, required very substantial sums of new capital for mining developments, but Australia and New Zealand, in particular, required capital primarily for industrial purposes. Ireland was a financially mature country, and Canada, on balance, had not been a substantial importer of capital since 1925.

The discussion also indicated that in the light of the experience of 1930 all the Dominions have been moulding their policies towards greater financial independence, and a shift from fixed interest to equity securities was likely to be a marked feature of future imports of industrial capital. The experience of 1930 had demonstrated the dangers of heavy external fixed-interest borrowings, and had emphasized the importance of developing as high a degree as possible of structural and financial flexibility.

As several speakers pointed out, the average annual demand for new capital imports in the Dominions was likely to be moderate, but the opportunities for the socially and economically profitable investment of capital in India and in the colonies was very great.

India required very large supplies of new capital for both industrial and social purposes. There was in India a vast store of private treasure. Could these vast hoards of treasure be fully diverted into productive channels through the development of an internal capital market, imports of capital on a large scale might not be necessary. An Indian delegate said that, apart from the economic objection to adding to the already large external debt of India, there were political objections to external borrowing:

There are objections to foreign borrowing now on political grounds. There are two reasons for this. One is that when the Round Table Conference took place it was found that those who invested their money in India asked for political control over her destinies. Now, howsoever desirous we might be of improving

India economically, we could not possibly place economic development above indigenous control. We would like to have both, but if we cannot, we would rather wait and have slower material improvement than place India in the hands of other people. The other reason is that foreign loans, all loans raised in England till the Federal Government is established, will be exempt from Indian income-tax. Now that is regarded as particularly unfair by Indians and consequently there is not likely to be much borrowing, so far as the people of India are concerned, outside India.

The Colonial Empire, like India, provided an enormous field for the socially and economically productive employment of capital. In the undeveloped colonial areas there was no possibility of local supplies of capital. If they were to be developed it must be by external investment. But every speaker on this point emphasized that the development of such dependent areas required unusually careful social control if the interests of the native peoples were to be safeguarded.

The Dominions, India, and the colonies all required capital, and the sum total required over a period of years would be large. If the United Kingdom could not supply it, the one large source of supply of new capital appeared to be the United States. Various suggestions were made for securing the financial co-operation of the United States in the development of the Empire's resources. One speaker felt that a prerequisite of such co-operation would be a satisfactory settlement of the Anglo-American Debt, and others believed that neither American nor other foreign co-operation could be expected unless the 'open door', in the most complete sense of that term, were restored. On the other hand, the terms on which such foreign co-operation might be secured would have to include the fullest safeguards for the interests of the native peoples.

Several speakers also noted that, given the present nature of the world's capital markets, economic experimentation in a country was a serious obstacle to external investment therein. Moves towards a regulated or planned economy, emphasis on internal price stability and

external exchange flexibility, discouraged new foreign investment. The reconciliation of internal planning and stability of external relationships might not be impossible, but its difficulties were very obvious. In all countries the tendency was increasingly apparent to regard currency, credit, and investment as essentially matters of Government policy, and as a result international capital movements were increasingly subject to Government activity and affected by political considerations.

This discussion led to a suggestion of some kind of a Commonwealth Investment or Development Board. The value of consultation and co-operation in capital movements with a view to the best employment of limited resources, the regularization of economic expansion, and the elimination of sporadic booms was recognized. But members who spoke to this question generally felt that co-operation merely on a Commonwealth basis was too narrow. As an Australian delegate put it:

There are points in the discussion of Commonwealth relations at which you find yourself brought up against not a Commonwealth problem, but an international one. I suggest that on the whole the discussion reveals what it revealed yesterday, that these are not Commonwealth interests really . . . but that they are really a matter for consideration from a world-wide point of view. The situation adverted to by the previous speaker really relates to the old change from a system of Europe supplying the outer world, to a system of relatively independent units. The trouble is that there are areas which are not yet capable of severing themselves from that dependence on European capital, whereas other areas have substantially severed themselves. We are faced with the problem of unequal transitions. . . . If we are to get over this problem of unequal transition, we must tackle the problem of readjusting the flow of capital . . . and we shall not be able to do it on an Empire basis.

(C) METHODS OF CO-OPERATION

In the light of the objectives of either individual or collective Commonwealth policy, and in the light of past history and probable trends, the Commission turned to a consideration of the most suitable methods of co-operation.

In the first place, the relative merits of bilateral and

multilateral arrangements were examined. The discussion indicated that in the case of trade agreements, bilateral negotiations were much more likely to succeed, and the most-favoured-nation principle, if fairly applied, could be relied upon to generalize the effects and thus achieve much the same result as through multilateral agreements. Because the relations of each Dominion with the United Kingdom were more important than its relations with any other Dominion, there would tend to be certain common principles running through all Commonwealth trade agreements.

The adoption of a general protective tariff and of Imperial preference by the United Kingdom in 1931, and the increased importance and extent of the network of preferences after the Ottawa Conference, had raised very sharply the question of the principle of the most-favoured-nation clause. A Canadian member said:

I feel certain that it is not going to be very many years before serious objection is taken by foreign countries to the continuation of the fiction that Imperial preference is a colonial arrangement and therefore is exempt from the ordinary application of the most-favoured-nation clause.

A United Kingdom delegate put it even more strongly:

I do very strongly agree that it is impossible for us, who claim that the foundation of our policy is a scrupulous regard for international obligations, to go on pretending that this Imperial preference under the Ottawa Agreement does not infringe the most-favoured-nation clause in our agreements with the other countries.

Another United Kingdom delegate thought that it was the extension of preferences into the dependent Empire that had raised most objections. An Australian said he felt that it was the greatly increased preferences that had aroused the hostility:

I think that if the preferences are not too severe, the value of Empire markets is so tremendous that there will not be a great inclination to press the point too severely; and on the other hand, we should not be too pernicky about departures from it by quotas, import boards, &c., when we come to have negotiations with foreign countries.

Only if the preferences were on a very modest scale, and only if the Commonwealth clearly indicated an absence of economic exclusiveness and a willingness to co-operate internationally, could foreign nations be expected to concur in this inconsistency. Failing this, it was possible that before long the United Kingdom and the Dominions might be required to choose between the present preferential system and most-favoured-nation relations with foreign countries.

The possibilities of using the developing machinery of tariff and quota boards as an instrument of co-operation were also examined. A tariff board was necessarily clothed with at least some of the attributes of a planning authority. In drafting its recommendations it had to exercise a selection of industries and resources to be encouraged. To function efficiently, it must continuously review existing industries in its own countries. By interchange of information, by prior notice of new departures in policy, and by willingness to receive representations from other countries, tariff and quota boards might develop incidentally into channels of useful inter-Commonwealth and international co-operation.

There was agreement among those who took part in the discussion that tariff boards were useful institutions, even if they did not realise all 'the noble aspirations' of their creators.

Quotas and quota boards, on the other hand, produced more divided opinions. An Australian delegate said:

... In my view a quota is worse than a duty because it is a half-way house to a prohibitive duty. It is much more a restrictive and defensive measure than a constructive agency, and much more restrictive of trade in general. But it may be necessary to have it at times to secure regulation of primary production in a closing world economy, or to secure protection against destructive competition from new products, produced chiefly in low standard of living countries. I do not profess to like either of these things; but in the world in which we live most countries have had to take them in one form or other. I regard them not as measures of long-term policy but as short-term measures. If we have to use them, we

only use them to stem the tide of the inevitable changes that are taking place in the world, as it has been used in checking or blocking Japanese competition. But the idea of permanent quotas for Japanese produce is one of the most damaging ideas the Commonwealth could entertain in trade matters.

A United Kingdom delegate described the quota system as it operated in the iron and steel industry in Great Britain. On the whole it had worked fairly well. Australian speakers felt the meat quota had worked well for both Empire and foreign exporters and at the same time the consumer had been fairly treated. A New Zealand delegate put his point of view as follows:

Quotas can be of three kinds; quotas which aim at lowering the supply to the consuming country; quotas which aim at maintaining the supply at its approximate present level; and quotas which aim at a planned and progressive increase in supply to the consuming country. From New Zealand's point of view, it is the last of these three which appeals. What we aim at is a reasonably planned progressive increase in supply, which will protect, in the consuming country, the agrarian interests as well as the consumer interests, and, in the exporting country, give a reasonable opportunity for increasing production and preventing what is the big danger of quotas, the stratification of industries at their present level.

An Irish delegate, speaking in the interests of the consumer, was more concise:

Quotas, sir, are the invention of the Devil.

Finally, there was suggested the formation of a Commonwealth Economic Council to study the problems of the Commonwealth, and to recommend to the individual Governments of the Commonwealth useful lines of co-operation. The proposal commanded a considerable amount of support, but other speakers recalled that similar proposals in the past had struck on the rock of Dominion Autonomy.

In the discussion of this suggestion, the political embarrassment of the United Kingdom in its relations with Europe as a result of its commitments under the Ottawa Agreements, was again emphasized. The

Commonwealth was urged to drop its exclusiveness, or rather to make it possible to offer the advantages of economic co-operation to all nations of proved goodwill. This would mean the surrender of exclusive preferences in the British market, but it was urged that the advantages to the United Kingdom and to the Dominions of a peaceful and prosperous Europe would far exceed the value of their present exclusive preferences. It was admitted that it would be difficult, but probably not impossible, to secure the concurrence of the Dominion producers in this view.

It was pointed out that a suggestion to foreign countries to join in economic co-operation with the Commonwealth would be viewed with a good deal of suspicion in many quarters, and that international co-operation could be invited with greater probability of acceptance, either by members of the Commonwealth rallying to some common centre outside the Commonwealth, or by Great Britain being freed from the entanglements of Ottawa to pursue a policy of economic and political appeasement. Of these alternatives, the latter seemed more practicable and it appeared that the most useful contribution along this line would be for the Dominions to be willing to modify their present inter-Commonwealth co-operation in the interests of a somewhat wider international co-operation.

In summing up, the Recorder suggested that the general tenor of the discussions of Commission II indicated that there was no fundamental economic basis of Imperial unity; that attempts at collective or multilateral co-operation on a wide front were unlikely to succeed; that there was a very considerable field for most fruitful bilateral co-operation; and that there was a not inconsiderable area in which co-operation between three or more members might be found to be practicable and valuable. On the other hand, it was clear that the nations of the Commonwealth could have common objectives, and they could encourage other nations to join with them in the pursuit of these common ends.

COMMISSION III

EXTERNAL POLICIES IN THEIR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ASPECTS

REPORT BY PROFESSOR F. L. W. WOOD,
COMMISSION RECORDER

(Adopted by the Conference)

Commission III was set up by the Conference Organizing Committee to consider Part II, Section B, of the Agenda, 'External Policies in their Political and Strategic Aspects'. The Commission was asked to direct its attention to three general questions: (a) To what extent should Commonwealth co-operation be uniform and comprehensive, to what extent based on group or bilateral understandings within the Commonwealth? (b) What were the possibilities of co-operation or agreed external policy in regard to certain special regions or special topics? (c) Did the foregoing discussions suggest any necessary changes in legal position, constitutional convention, or administrative practice? The Commission held six sessions: the first, on a Review of National Outlooks and Policies; the second, on Defence; the third and fourth, on the Character of Co-operation in Foreign Policy and Defence; the fifth and sixth, on a more detailed examination of certain special topics. (For a detailed statement of the Agenda of Commission III see Appendix I.)

(a) NATIONAL OUTLOOKS AND POLICIES

(i) *The Far East*

ON this region the Irish delegation was silent, and it was said that 'the Far East does not interest South Africa except in that general way in which every country is interested in another'. An Indian delegate said 'that it was the initial policy of indulgence in England towards Japan that emboldened Japan subsequently to attack China'. But his main concern was lest the existing situation might induce Great Britain to station part of her general strategic reserves in India, which might seriously prejudice the development of his country's political status. Canada's material interest in the Far Eastern crisis was

stated to be small; but it was added that Canadian opinion was 'overwhelmingly in support of China, far more so than in the case of Abyssinia', and that if the Commonwealth co-operated with the U.S.A. to help the Chinese, Canada would play her part.

The main discussion, however, centred round the policy in the Far East of Great Britain and of Australia. British policy had been defined in a previous Commission as the defence of international order and decency, not the direct protection of material interests; for in a decent world material interests were safe. During the present Commission the delegate responsible for this definition expanded it in two significant directions. On the one hand, he judged it inconceivable in present circumstances that Britain would go to war in defence of particular interests overseas; otherwise she would have fought to protect her interests in China. On the other hand, he emphasized that in the British view a settlement in the Far East should not aim 'to repress, punish, or keep Japan down in any way', which might reduce her to chaos, but to give her 'the fullest chance of pursuing her economic interests in common with other nations in the Far East'. A United Kingdom delegate said at this point that the Commission had heard the view of the Foreign Office experts who desired to raise standards in the East, which meant that Japanese textiles must be bought. But he pointed out that the British Government also received expert advice from the Board of Trade, which urged tariffs on textiles in the interests of Lancashire. The Government had, in fact, followed the Board of Trade.

The question of raising standards was a link with the points of view expressed by delegates from Australia and New Zealand. They mainly expressed general agreement with the present content of British policy; but, as one delegate pointed out, their point of view was different, for they lived in the Pacific, while Britain only had 'interests' there. Speakers from both the Australian and New Zealand delegations urged that the vital interest of their countries in the Far East was that Eastern standards

of life should be improved, while the Far East's need of raw materials which the Dominions could supply gave an obvious basis for economic co-operation.

The question was raised whether the 'long-term' interest of raising standards did not conflict with the immediate object of stopping Japanese expansion southwards. Speakers from the United Kingdom were emphatic that this was not so. The improvements of standards of life in the East was bound up with the problem of Chinese rehabilitation and independence, which Japan was at present determined to prevent. Therefore, the long-term and the short-term policies of the Commonwealth countries coincided in the checking of Japanese political expansion. The argument was not pushed beyond this point.

(ii) *India*

Discussion on the general Indian defence problem was brief. The Indian delegation raised the question of the North-West frontier, where, it was said, the defence problem had been governed by the fear of attack by Russia. An Indian delegate said that such an attack now seemed out of the question, and invited the United Kingdom delegates to say whether this was so. The question of the mechanization of the Indian Army was also raised, and the view expressed that such mechanization would be justifiable, not by India's own defence problem, but in view of the possibility that British entanglements might lead to Indian troops being used against a European enemy. It followed that mechanization should be paid for by Great Britain. Members of the delegation deprecated any increase in Indian defence expenditure, but said that if more money were to be spent it should be devoted to the Indian air force. This, it was suggested, would be especially important in defence of the vulnerable, but largely ignored, eastern frontier, near which passed important air routes. In answer to a question, a delegate, while not approving any further extension of 'control' in North-West frontier districts,

said that withdrawal from districts such as Waziristan might be thought a sign of weakness and so cause trouble. He said that India had interests, strategic or cultural, in Chinese Turkestan and Siam which might be affected by the spread of Japanese influence.

A New Zealand delegate said that his country's political interest in India lay in the grant of Dominion status at the earliest possible moment.

(iii) *South Africa*

'The interests of South Africa', said a delegate from that country, 'are viewed from two different points. One school of thought holds that the interests of South Africa being what they are, its destiny is inextricably linked up with its being a partner in the Empire. The other school holds that its interests being what they are, it can fulfil its functions and realize its ideals as a complete sovereign independent state, standing alone.' It appeared from the discussion that there were the widest divergences of opinions on the general strategic problem. One delegate thought of South African interests as penetrating the continent, and even linking with the Mediterranean through liaison with the Royal Air Force in Egypt. He spoke of Nazi propaganda (among those of German race) not only in the South-West Territory but within the Union itself, and expressed the fear that any footing gained by Germany in Africa would be treated as 'a jumping-off place to complete the policy of *Mein Kampf*'. He was therefore suspicious not only of renewed German colonization, but also of commercial concessions in Portuguese colonies, while he regarded the strategic danger of a possible German air force in Tanganyika as being so acute for South Africa as to rule out entirely the possibility of returning that territory.

This attitude towards Germany was repudiated by another South African delegate, who said that a large section of South African opinion was not anti-German. 'We do not believe that by treating Germany as an outcast and saying she should not come within six thousand miles

of our borders we could get a brighter world.' This delegate said he would not object to German commercial agreements with the Portuguese, and that South Africa would play her part in a general scheme of appeasement which involved return of colonies to Germany. During the discussion delegates quoted statements of the Minister of Defence to the effect that 'a threat to the integrity of Portuguese East Africa would be of paramount importance to South Africa'. Other suggestions were quoted that territories in the Cameroons and Togoland might be handed over to Germany.

One South African delegate pointed out that colonial readjustment might involve the interests not only of South Africa but of British territories such as Southern and Northern Rhodesia; 'The question is one for a general settlement'. 'But', he said, 'I believe we must put a stop to the idea that African territories are there to be bandied about to appease quarrels in Europe.' They should be developed, he said, 'not only for the white man, but for the benefit of the African people'; Great Britain, he said, had announced that policy, 'and the Portuguese and the French were coming into line'.

With respect to the colonial problem, the policy of the British Labour movement was stated to be the placing of colonies under international supervision.

(iv) *The Mediterranean and the Near East*

A member from the United Kingdom suggested that the problems of the Far East, India, and Africa were all closely connected. 'It is in the vital interests of all the British countries bordering on the Indian Ocean that that area of the world should be reserved virtually as a field of British power', because, in those circumstances, self-government can develop within that area, 'a point of vital importance to India and to the African colonies'. Further, the irruption of any hostile Power into this area would vastly complicate the Empire's strategic problem. The problems of 'the Singapore front', the integrity of India, the problem of Africa and of the Near and Middle

East, could all be considered in the light of this danger. The Commission was therefore invited to consider the Near and Middle East as 'a real barricade between Europe' and the Indian Ocean area, but as a barricade which 'has internal weaknesses from the strategic point of view'. The resulting discussion dealt with three principal matters.

The Possibility of Britain's 'Abandoning the Mediterranean'. It was pointed out that the 'abandonment' of the Mediterranean was a strategic question depending on the circumstances of the moment. For example, British armed forces practically 'abandoned' the Mediterranean in 1913, and entrusted protection of British interests to the French. The Commission was assured, however, that though British traffic through the Mediterranean might be interrupted in the event of war, this interruption was likely to be temporary only. Further, it was stated that all necessary steps had been taken for the diversion of traffic round the Cape during this period: such steps included improved facilities and fortifications at Simonstown, and the building of strategic roads.

Palestine and the Question of Partition. It was stated that the partition plan would have no material effect on the strategic situation. The plan itself was criticized on other grounds by certain delegates, but the question of alternative plans was not taken up.

Spain. Sharply contrasted points of view on the Spanish Civil War were expressed by Irish delegates. Ireland, said one delegate, had no love for Franco; but if it were forced to choose, it would prefer Burgos (which 'at least admits the existence of God') to Barcelona (where fights 'the basest form of Russian Communism'). A fellow Irish delegate, while repudiating communism, denied that the facts showed that Franco had any title to support 'as a new champion of Christianity'—the question, he said, was not one of Christianity, but of power and prestige. A third speaker from Ireland said it was 'quite fantastic' to suppose 'that because Ireland is

90 per cent. Catholic it should adopt a different attitude towards a Catholic country which is a public wrongdoer than it would towards any other country'.

The question of Spain was also taken up by a Canadian delegate. He asked whether there was any connexion between the suggested 'abandonment' of the Mediterranean and the British Government's apparent indifference to a possible 'fascist' victory in Spain. He further described how British policy puzzled both wings of Canadian political opinion. Those who believed that the Commonwealth stood for democracy asked why more had not been done to help Republican Spain, while those who thought in terms of Imperial strategy were disturbed at the possible effect on the Mediterranean strategic situation of a victory by Franco.

In reply, a United Kingdom delegate denied any change in British opinion about the importance of the Mediterranean:

The vital importance of the Mediterranean is not transit [he said] but that you are enabled, by holding Suez at one end and Gibraltar at the other, to prevent the European Powers breaking across essential communications with the Atlantic on the one side and the Indian Ocean on the other. On that point there has been no slackening of opinion whatever in Great Britain.

The topic of Spain was not further pursued: but at a later stage Australian delegates remarked that their country's opinion would have been very seriously divided if Great Britain had followed a policy of intervention in Spain.

(b) THE BASES AND CHARACTER OF COMMONWEALTH CO-OPERATION

(i) *Participation in War*

The Commission was working in the shadow of a European crisis, which inevitably tended to direct delegates' thoughts towards the ultimate problem of war, and of the participation therein of the countries of the Commonwealth. This question was approached from

two main angles: Dominion participation in wars in which Great Britain might be involved; and British responsibility for general Imperial defence and for risks which might be incurred owing to special Dominion interests and policies.

Speakers from the United Kingdom delegation impressed upon the Commission that, in practice, the execution of any foreign policy devolved upon Great Britain:

Great Britain was expected to take on Japan in connexion with Manchukuo; Great Britain was expected to take on Italy with regard to the Abyssinian affair. And now there are those who seem to think that she should bear the responsibility with respect to Czechoslovakia. In the event of war [he continued] even if the Dominions wished to help, it would be something like two years before they could do anything effective. . . . The question we are going to ask is: what are other people going to put into the bag? That is the reality of the position. . . . It is all a question of power, and unfortunately power consists of aeroplanes, battleships, and men under arms. And it is always Great Britain who has to do the job. Therefore, if you are going to have any discussion on foreign policy, I urge you to consider the means by which that foreign policy is to be made effective.

On another occasion, the same delegate explained how in his view British sea-power was the vital factor in the situation. Sea-power, he said, 'gives security to all parts of the Commonwealth, because, while it remains, no Powers can reach any of them'. But he added that the continued maintenance of that sea-power was a problem; for in Great Britain opinion was becoming increasingly conscious of the burden involved and was wondering how long that burden would be carried by Great Britain alone.

Another United Kingdom delegate raised the same point, from the point of view of the British Labour Party. South Africa, he said, claimed the right to decide whether or not she should fight in a British quarrel; did South Africa recognize the same freedom for Great Britain in the event of South Africa getting into a quarrel? The British working-class movement, he said,

wanted to know whether they were involved in such quarrels, whether the Dominions expected to be defended, automatically, by Great Britain: 'there is a tendency to think that there is a tremendous liability on the British masses to defend causes everywhere in the world, and we are wondering whether the price is not too much'.

Dominion answers to these points took three main forms:

First. A discussion by delegates from South Africa and Canada as to whether public opinion in their countries did in fact expect automatic help from Great Britain. In both delegations there was a clear difference of opinion. Some delegates said that these two countries would in fact recognize (in principle at least) that Great Britain was not bound to help them in wars arising out of their own particular interests. Other delegates said that both in South Africa and Canada public opinion did expect help from Great Britain, 'the universal policeman'; and a Canadian delegate said that Canada had accepted the Imperial Conference report that a Dominion's defence plans aimed simply at holding out till help arrived.

Second. It was felt by many speakers that Great Britain did in fact bear the main burden of Commonwealth defence, and that this was a real problem in Commonwealth co-operation. But it was urged that, if Great Britain bore the main burden, she also had the most resources, and that her defence measures were undertaken for her own benefit as much as for that of the Dominions. It was even suggested that British defence expenditure would not be greatly reduced if it were admitted that she had no obligation whatever to defend the Dominions.

Third. The main answer was the practical one. As a United Kingdom delegate pointed out, the main danger of war at present facing the Commonwealth is of European origin, and therefore likely to affect Great Britain directly, not any Dominion. The question of British participation in a Dominion-caused war is thus not likely to arise at

present. As to Dominion participation in a war of European origin, there was singular unanimity among those who spoke from Dominion delegations. While the Dominions (particularly Canada, South Africa and Ireland) reserved the right of complete independence in judgement, there was almost complete agreement that, on any issue likely at present to involve war, that independent judgement would be for participation, subject to certain reservations such as probable 'passivity' among French-Canadians. The grounds given for this probable consensus of Dominion opinion differed widely in each case; and much of this matter had been discussed in Commission I. But it was said by many delegates that 'enlightened self-interest' would be decisive, even without other motives: that is, that a Dominion's own particular interest in any Commonwealth war at present conceivable, would dictate support of Great Britain. This view was expressed emphatically by a South African delegate.

This practical judgement as to Dominion participation was based, it should be emphasized, on the existing 'crisis situation'. No such consensus of opinion could be expected from the more general problem of the bases and nature of Commonwealth co-operation.

(ii) *Some Bases of Long-Term Co-operation*

From the outset there appeared a determination among certain members of all delegations to make one point clear: that co-operation with any given foreign policy would not, in the long run, be unconditional. It would depend on the recognition by public opinion throughout the Commonwealth that that policy conformed to common ideals and common interests. Even New Zealand, it was said, which in some circumstances (if not always) would have to stand by Great Britain whatever British policy were adopted, would give grudging support unless satisfied that British policy tended towards 'the establishment of a world order on a democratic basis'. There accordingly arose a demand from members of the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand delegations

for a definition of United Kingdom foreign policy.

One United Kingdom delegate, in reply, defined that policy as:

to prevent the outbreak of world war; to maintain world peace by hook or by crook in the hope and in the belief that if world peace can be maintained long enough the dictatorships will break down from within.

Another definition offered was this:

The ultimate objects of Great Britain's foreign policy are: firstly, the attainment somehow or other of a new world order to replace the one which we thought had been effectively established by the Covenant, but which has failed; secondly, to maintain upon the ocean-ways of the world that degree of world order which at present exists, and which is vital to the continued existence of the Commonwealth on its present basis.

In further answer to questions, attempts were made to define ultimate objectives in such a way as to give a moral basis to Commonwealth effort. Delegates spoke of self-government, liberty, and so forth. This line of inquiry was thus summed up by a United Kingdom delegate:

I want to ask, why England herself continues to co-operate? Why she has been able to go for two centuries without civil war? The answer is: the existence of a common interest. That is not merely a material thing, it is something which is inseparable from common principles, from a common ideology which is embedded in our institutions. The basic thing in England's institutions is the rule of law, and government by consent of the governed, and an ideal of justice. These are things which cannot stand still. Liberty not only has to be preserved, it has to expand, and in our day it expands with improving methods of social control.

In practice, 'if our policy convinces Englishmen that it is based on these principles, Englishmen will co-operate; and if it convinces our associates in the same way, they will co-operate'. The same thing, he added, would apply to any policy initiated in the future by a Dominion.

Several Dominion delegates emphasized the distinction between ultimate aims and the means adopted for their achievement, and the feeling was expressed in some quarters that recent British policy was obscure and

perhaps calculated to defeat its own ultimate objectives. Two United Kingdom delegates referred to similar doubts existing in an important section of British opinion. 'We do not know in Great Britain any more than they do in Canada what British policy is.'

This state of uncertainty was represented by some delegates as a definite obstacle to Imperial co-operation. On the other hand, an Australian speaker, who had been in doubt about British policy, said he was entirely satisfied by the answer given by United Kingdom delegates, and a speaker from Ireland expressed his warm support of present British policy. So long as Great Britain stood for individual liberty and democracy, she should be assured of Dominion support—but no longer. He pointed out to the Conference how dismal would be the change if Great Britain ceased to be a Great Power, and her present position in the world were occupied by a dictatorship Power.

An Indian delegate later raised some questions as to the real meaning of a policy which was professedly based on the maintenance of peace. That might simply mean preservation by imperialist Powers of the present situation, which is advantageous to them. 'This is a point of view which appeals specially to those countries which are politically "down". Unless they are able to achieve their constitutional liberties the word "peace" will seem unreal to them.' 'Again', he said, 'any policy in which we are all asked to co-operate must be such as will be in the interests of both the European and the non-European nations.' A policy merely designed to preserve European dominance would naturally alienate the sympathies of India—and of all Asiatic nations, for that matter. Therefore, a policy to promote peace must not be based on religion or on colour, but on some more positive principle such as 'patriotism defined as enlightened self-interest'.

(iii) *The Problem of Diversity*

In the discussions of this problem Canada appeared to play a central and particular part. As one delegate pointed

out, much of the discussion was based, explicitly or otherwise, on the assumed desirability of 'an agreed common foreign policy', while, for Canada, this desirability could no longer be assumed. For one thing, there was the overriding fear that any war might produce such serious internal strains as to threaten Canada's very existence as a national entity. Further, there was the natural influence exerted by the United States of America over Canadian attitudes. Canadian delegates asked for an understanding of Canada's peculiar position.

Some of these problems—for example, that of neutrality—were fully discussed in the preparatory papers and in the first Commission. In Commission III an attempt was made to carry the matter farther along a slightly different line. A Canadian speaker claimed that it was vital to recognize the broad line of development towards Dominion autonomy, and he deplored suggestions which had been made and which seemed to contemplate a reversal of this process; for example, the suggestion 'that commitments for defence are essential to the proper making of defence plans'. It might be argued, he said, that such commitments were desirable, but it was false to suppose them possible. The only possible line was to recognize the existing situation; an attempt to put the clock back 'will have disintegrating rather than consolidating effects so far as Commonwealth development is concerned. . . . I stress again that the only way in which a united policy can emerge will be by each nation, in a spirit of enlightened self-interest, finding in its own interest a policy which really conforms with the policies of the others of the group. However,' he went on, 'the ideas which would form the basis of co-operation are present in the different countries in quite varying degrees.' Both the security needs and the sentimental reactions were different.

In each of the countries [he said] there is no doubt unanimity as to the determination to defend the territorial integrity of that country. What about opinion when it comes to defending at all costs the territorial integrity of the whole Empire? In all our countries we have an element who take that view just as strongly

as they would in connexion with their own national territory. On the other hand, in all the countries, including Great Britain, there are schools of thought of varying strength who do not take that view, but who say that in the matter of the development of a world order, while we seem to have a common ground regarding it as an ultimate object, we seem to have no common basis for proceeding towards that object, that is, as far as any organization is concerned, because there are differing degrees of willingness in the different countries to follow the lead of Great Britain in carrying out foreign policy. So I think the lesson we must draw is that there will be less and less uniformity in relationship, and that it is extremely important that this increasing diversity be developed in an atmosphere of understanding and with a real recognition not only in an intellectual way, but actually in the hearts of all our peoples everywhere, of the propriety of enlightened national self-interest being the basis of our co-operation.

In the ensuing discussion another Canadian delegate emphasized that 'enlightened self-interest' should not be confused with material selfishness, and explained that the main point was the absolute necessity for recognizing the change in Dominion status, which meant that the interests of each autonomous part must be the basis of its foreign policy.

It must be accepted in the rest of the Commonwealth that if Canada believes she will destroy herself as a nation by going into a war, she will have to stop out. If we make that choice in Canada, you have to recognize that it is not because we do not want co-operation but simply because our essential interest requires us to behave in that way. The Empire is so diverse that there are varying degrees of this kind of interest, and a maximum degree of co-operation can be attained only if this be recognized.

Another Canadian member said that he could visualize a situation in which Canada might be allied with the United States in a war in which other members of the Commonwealth were not vitally interested, and Canada would feel no sense of betrayal if they stayed out.

An Australian delegate took up this problem of status:

Must co-operation in foreign policy be uniform and comprehensive if we are to retain a Commonwealth? Or is it possible for some people to do one thing and other members to do another thing

and still retain the Commonwealth? Is it possible, for example, still to call it a Commonwealth unless it has a collective security organization for each and all of the members? My own personal answer to that question is that it is possible to call it a Commonwealth even though it may not be an automatic collective security organization.

He did not think it necessary to rule Canada out of the Commonwealth on the sole ground that, in certain circumstances, it would be impossible for her to wage war. 'But', he added, 'the circumstances of other members of the Empire are radically different from those of Canada.' A South African delegate also urged the necessity for leaving 'room for our diversity in the Commonwealth and for solidarity in our flexibility'.

There was a distinct tendency in the Commission to emphasize 'enlightened self-interest' as a suggested basis for co-operation. The phrase was variously interpreted: by a Canadian delegate as meaning an obligation of mutual assistance in time of war; and by a United Kingdom delegate as meaning primarily material interests. A delegate from Australia criticized it as being too negative and selfish; a principle which would lead the Commonwealth up a blind alley. He believed that positive principles of co-operation could be found in the ideals of the Labour movement; a view which involved social change within member states as a factor in Commonwealth co-operation. Most speakers, however, found 'enlightened self-interest' a useful principle of co-operation. Further, many delegates found that this principle disclosed already a common interest: the continued existence of Great Britain as a Great Power. Some added a further objective based also on the same principle: co-operation in building a world order. It was, however, pointed out that, except in times of crisis, common agreement on the need to preserve Great Britain's status as a Great Power did not necessarily provide a rule of conduct in practical problems of foreign policy: for example, on the question of recognizing Italian rule in Abyssinia.

(iv) The Technique of Co-operation

At an early stage in the Commission's work a South African delegate raised the meaning of the word 'co-operate'. Did it mean 'only that Britain lays down the policy and we decide whether we can support that policy'? This, he added, seemed to him the only possible form of co-operation: but, in his view, 'that would not be co-operation—it would be a case of being satellites'. This interpretation of Commonwealth co-operation was to a certain extent confirmed by the fact (pointed out by a New Zealand delegate) that Canada at the present time seemed to be actively rejecting the conception of 'consultation' in favour of the mere reception of information on which Canada would offer no comment, so as to be free of obligation. The discussion was, however, given an important turn by a United Kingdom delegate. In day-to-day decisions on foreign policy, he said:

The British Government cannot surrender its will to any Dominion Government, however anxious that Government may be to co-operate and help . . . but that does not exclude the desirability of the closest possible co-operation if it takes the form of consultation and advice. Any policy that the British Government adopts has much the best chance of being effective if it has the support of the mass of the people of Great Britain (for example, the working-class movement).

The failure of the British Government to win the support of that movement was, in his view, the explanation of Dominion distrust of British policy. At a later stage, the same speaker said that in time of trouble it would be vital that British policy should be such as to command support from the public opinion not only of Great Britain but also of the Dominions. As a means to that end, he suggested a definite development in consultation, including the expression of Dominion opinion on British policy, and in the diffusion of information among the Dominions. In particular, he commended the Australian practice of appointing a 'liaison officer' in London, with access to Foreign Office documents and with the function of reporting not only on current

information, but also on atmosphere and background.

The conception which thus emerged from the discussion was that of 'co-operation without liability', as it was termed by an Irish delegate who strongly supported it. Ultimate responsibility would remain solely with the United Kingdom, yet, through consultation, Dominion Governments might exercise enough influence on British policy to render it acceptable to public opinion in their countries. Thus, in practice, Commonwealth solidarity would be safeguarded without sacrifice of principle.

This suggestion was extensively discussed, with special reference to the usefulness of a 'liaison officer' as a supplement to existing instruments of consultation. Comment was generally favourable, particularly on the ground that the fullest exchange of information was urgently desirable. A South African delegate said that he thought

this widening of information to kill ignorance . . . the most vital thing in the whole programme. It would do away with all the suspicion about no consultation between Great Britain and the Dominions; it would do away with this old Crown Colonies idea—with the idea that we must keep ourselves ignorant. The younger people of the Dominions will not any longer tolerate this state of ignorance about what is happening on the other side of the world.

On the other hand, the fear was expressed by certain Canadian delegates that an extension in means of consultation might imply agreement about objects of consultation or commitments as to future action. Another Canadian objection to a 'liaison officer' was that existing sources of information had proved entirely adequate. Finally, a South African delegate said plainly that no such scheme could reasonably be called 'co-operation' or even 'consultation' in foreign policy; for these would imply liability. In any case, he said, it was inconceivable that Great Britain should act against her own interest at the behest of a Dominion:

So I have come to the conclusion that this attempt to formulate a common policy for the Commonwealth is doomed to failure, and the longer we try to co-operate in foreign policy in that way, the

more we will get into difficulties and the greater will be the likelihood of the Commonwealth falling to pieces.

It should be added, however, that another South African delegate welcomed the suggestion of better machinery for consultation, on the ground that it would reveal to members of the Commonwealth how close together they really were.

One issue underlying the discussion appeared to be this: would consultation in itself tend to develop (or reveal) a common purpose—or should it be regarded as useful only in so far as a common purpose had previously been accepted?

At the conclusion, an Indian delegate inquired whether the discussion on the dissemination of information on foreign affairs was understood to concern India. The Chairman ruled that, as far as the Conference was concerned, the discussion applied to every country there represented—including, of course, India.

A second line of approach was discussed at some length on the initiative of a United Kingdom delegate who had been pressing for a definition of the Dominions' place within the Commonwealth, of the degree to which they wanted help from the United Kingdom, and to which they would accept responsibility in Commonwealth matters. His suggestion was that of a Commonwealth assembly, meeting, say, once or twice each year. Different suggestions were put forward as to the composition of such an assembly; that it might be 'unofficial', along the lines of the present Conference; or representative of different interests, like the I.L.O. Conference; or composed of Parliamentarians of every party. It was suggested that such an assembly should be unofficial and consultative, making no decisions, meeting normally in public, but with secret sessions if this seemed desirable. It would not necessarily meet in London.

Several speakers held that such an assembly would have a valuable effect in educating Commonwealth public opinion, but the proposal was criticized from various angles. A South African delegate saw in it an attempt to

revive the corpse of Imperial federation; to this it was replied that the proposal did not imply federation, but a free and consultative body. It was suggested, too, that Cabinet Ministers could not speak freely in the presence of political opponents; to which the answer was offered by members of the United Kingdom delegation that British Cabinet Ministers were more willing than Dominion Ministers to expound their policies to responsible groups; that the Leader of the Opposition in various parts of the Commonwealth was already consulted about problems of foreign policy; and, finally, that there was an attempt in the United Kingdom at present to build up continuity in foreign and trade policies, so as to prevent violent oscillations arising from changes in government. A South African critic said that the proposal presented a dilemma. A secret conference would be suspected by public opinion, while a conference meeting in public would tend to become a forum for political wrangles. A further point was that the educative work which it was intended that the assembly should carry out should be left to unofficial agencies. Finally, a Canadian member dissented from the whole conception. It seemed to him that those supporting it 'have been thinking in terms of the centre and not in terms of the opinions in the individual countries. I can think of no plan which would run such great risks of arousing opinions in at least some of the Dominions and of making them sharply divided'.

(v) *Imperial Defence*

In the phrase of the United Kingdom delegate introducing the subject:

We can, of course, only discuss Commonwealth defence on the assumption of a whole-hearted will to co-operate. Defence is far too insistent and vital a business to admit of partial or conditional co-operation.

He then outlined the changes which, in his view, had taken place in the British view of the problem since the War. The first big change was the abandonment—at

least at the beginning of a war—of the idea of an expeditionary force.

It is essential [he said] when talking of Commonwealth co-operation, to realize that Great Britain no longer thinks in terms of what might be called a cannon-fodder plunge into a European conflict, and that the members of the Commonwealth should no longer think in terms of contributions of masses of marching men rushed to a European theatre.

From the British point of view, the Air Force had replaced the Army as the instrument of British land intervention on the Continent. The development of air warfare had admittedly made Great Britain 'for the first time in her history liable to bombardment in a devastating form'. On the other hand, air action on the Continent had definite advantages over military action.

Air action is selective; it can choose any objective within its range and can switch even at the last moment from one objective to another. Air action is punitive and destructive; it is not acquisitive. It does not involve the occupation and holding of ground—both most expensive processes—but it *can* prevent the occupation of an area by an enemy if it has command of the air over that area. And finally, air action is based on manufacturing power and on machine power handled by a small expert personnel and not on the manpower of masses.

'A great navy', it was said, 'was still our greatest need', and it was claimed that the British Navy was still fully adequate to its task. From the point of view of the Pacific, 'Singapore was an admirable base', and a comparatively small force stationed there could guarantee Australia against any invasion on a large scale.

As for the part to be played by the Dominions in the general scheme, a United Kingdom delegate outlined a plan of decentralization. Starting from the accepted principle that a Dominion should be responsible for its own home defence, he suggested that each should work outwards and take such share in a wider regional responsibility as might be considered a natural extension of home defence requirements. This involved an extension

of strategic study over the whole area in which the Dominion was situated, with a view to possible active defence measures in that area. This was put forward as a scheme for future development, to be followed in so far as the Dominions might be able and willing to co-operate on such a scale.

These suggestions raised some discussion, partly on the grounds that the proposed extensions of Dominion influence might impose on them burdens quite out of proportion to their resources. A South African delegate raised the objection that this might mean that the Dominions would be automatically involved in a war in which Britain became involved. Indian delegates pointed out two difficulties from their point of view. Firstly, it was said that dissatisfaction with their constitutional status had created discontent in India which would hinder co-operation with Britain in war-time—just as had happened in the past in Ireland. Secondly, the fear was expressed that the proposed extension of India's sphere to 'Iraq might impose additional expenditure (which was denied by a United Kingdom delegate) and lead to her enforcing against Arabs a policy of which she disapproved.

Information supplementary to that contained in the preparatory papers was given on certain points. For example, an Australian member defined the contribution which his country might ultimately make to the common defence: this included complete responsibility for local defence, and the supply of war material to neighbouring Commonwealth countries. Some attention was also given to the desirability or otherwise of Canada relying upon American sources of armaments. A United Kingdom delegate reported a recent visit to the Dutch East Indies, where there was a population of 70 million whose standards were high, as Oriental standards go. The Dutch, he said, realized that their security was bound up with that of the Commonwealth; 'I believe that there, both for the United Kingdom and Australia, we have a field for trade and for the closest co-operation in every kind of way'.

(vi) *The League of Nations and Commonwealth Idealism*

It was repeatedly stated in the Commission's discussions that the Commonwealth needed a moral purpose—something outside itself—and various attempts were made to define such a purpose. One point which repeatedly recurred was the need to welcome association with non-Commonwealth countries. As a practical example, discussion turned again to a matter raised in previous Commissions: the 'liberalizing of Ottawa' (or, as one delegate preferred to phrase it, the destruction of Ottawa) in the interests of a wider field of economic co-operation. It was suggested that such a 'liberalizing' should be associated with agreement on standards of life and on the renunciation of war. Most delegates seemed disposed to agree as to the general desirability of such a broad development (though there was strong criticism of the linking up of political with economic objectives), and the concrete suggestions were made that maximum preferential rates of duty be substituted for minimum margins of preference, and that in certain circumstances the substitution of quotas for tariffs might be a useful development.

Another concrete suggestion put forward by an Irish speaker was that the Commonwealth should give a definite lead by agreeing to submit all disputes between member states to the International Court at The Hague. As a preliminary, the Court should be reorganized and its prestige restored. Action along this line would help to build up the tradition that *all* international disputes should be judicially settled, when in case of crisis it would give an immense moral advantage to those who accepted, as against those who rejected, the Court's jurisdiction. The suggestion was modified by later speeches to one that justiciable disputes between members of the Commonwealth should, at the instance of either of the parties, be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. This would involve the abandonment of the reservations by which the United Kingdom and all the Dominions

except Ireland had excluded intra-Commonwealth disputes in signing the optional clause. The plan, it was added, would in no way restrict the right of members of the Commonwealth, by agreement among themselves, to submit disputes to a body of their own choosing. The discussion of this project was not conclusive. There were some energetic protests against the idea of handing over 'family disputes' to an 'alien Court'. Some speakers from Canada approved of the proposal, but other Canadian delegates opposed it, referring to the recommendation at Toronto in 1933 that the Commonwealth tribunal contemplated by the Imperial Conference of 1930 should be transformed from an *ad hoc* into a permanent tribunal. They urged that no adequate reason had been given for abandoning the proposal for a Commonwealth tribunal. Some speakers seemed willing that all 'justiciable' disputes should be referred to The Hague Court—though the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable disputes was attacked by one delegate as obsolete—and a speaker from Australia went so far as to urge that such points of domestic policy as 'White Australia' should come within the Court's jurisdiction.

Discussion on The Hague Court thus tended to return to the broader question of 'a world order'. Throughout the Commission's work, the need for working towards such an order was repeatedly affirmed as a necessary background to Commonwealth co-operation. One Australian speaker, indeed, denied that such an order was possible or desirable in our present civilization. He favoured regional groupings. But the general discussion took the ultimate objective for granted, and concerned itself with methods of working towards it.

The main discussion on the subject was introduced by a vigorous plea for a strengthening of the present League structure. If the League is to be effective, it must be based on the following principles: the surrender of national sovereignty, the pooling of security, economic co-operation, and the development of machinery for peaceful change. It was recognized that the lead in

rebuilding such a League must begin with a few only of the present members, headed by the United Kingdom and France, who were already co-operating in practice for purposes of mutual defence. The advantages of collective security would be open to all who were willing to accept these basic principles. The offer of peaceful change of treaties through Article XIX would prevent the League appearing aggressive. No state should be excluded on grounds of race, religion, or political ideas. This kind of League, claimed its sponsor, 'is the extension into the international sphere of everything we have been taught to believe was valuable in our historic past'.

The discussion thus opened showed differences of opinion along familiar lines. Praise was given to the League's technical services and to the I.L.O., which, it was emphasized, needed every possible support from members of the Commonwealth. A speaker stressed the practical impossibility of surrender of national sovereignty in the near future. The fear was expressed that a rebuilt League might be regarded as a further step in the 'encirclement' of Germany: at least if unaccompanied by a really effective policy of appeasement. Arguments were produced in favour of the rival conceptions of a 'coercive' and a 'moral force' League. The view was expressed by New Zealand delegates that removal of internal social problems would be a real contribution. A Canadian speaker said that:

American public opinion is crystallizing more and more in the direction of supporting the League. Only last week we had news that the American Government had sent its representative to sit with the League of Nations Council, not merely as an observer, but as a participant. But the United States will only support the League of Nations when Great Britain is prepared to back the League effectively. It seems a curious paradox, but the more powerfully Great Britain backs the League, the more does American opinion swing towards supporting the League. In my opinion, the closest co-operation between Great Britain and the United States in the last seven years came between September and December 1935, before the Hoare-Laval proposals.

This question of the relations of the Commonwealth with the United States, and possible American co-operation in building a world order, was not pursued further in Commission III.

A New Zealand delegate urged that the Commonwealth had a unique opportunity for leadership at the present juncture. All the main problems facing a revived League were reflected within the Commonwealth; relations between East and West, the colonial problem, relations with the U.S.A., and economic co-operation. By facing these problems internally, the Commonwealth could contribute vitally to a more general solution. In the upshot, however, there was a tendency among many speakers to see the whole problem in terms of 'power politics'.

(c) INDIAN MIGRATION

A member presented to the Commission the following digest of the arguments previously used in the Conference bearing on the problem of Indian migration.

Indian delegates had made their position clear along the following lines:

- (i) India accepts the constitutional position, as laid down in resolutions of the Imperial Conference, that it is a right of each self-governing part of the Commonwealth to make its own immigration conditions, and that India claims this constitutional right for herself (*vide* Resolution of 1918).
- (ii) But Indians believe that the Dominions, in exercising their constitutional right in a discriminatory fashion against Indians, are inflicting a moral wrong.
- (iii) Indians accept in full the legal and moral right of the Dominions to protect their own standards of living. The position that Indians take is this: that each Dominion may decide for itself, in accordance with its economic requirements and social standards, how many immigrants it will admit in a given period. Having decided this, they should not exclude Indians as ineligible, but admit a quota, provided that financial and educational conditions are complied with.
- (iv) Attention was drawn to the resolution of the Imperial Conference with regard to the admission of temporary

visitors, such as business men, students, and others. The opinion was expressed that this resolution had not been fully implemented. It ought to be both implemented and liberalized.

There was discussion on some of these points by delegates from South Africa, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The discussion dealt with two aspects of the situation: the entry of new immigrants and the position of those already there.

A South African pointed out that to press for additional immigration at the present moment would defeat the efforts of those who were trying to improve the economic social, educational, and political position of Indians already in the Union, and in general to improve relations between the European and Indian sections of the population.

A South African delegate made the suggestion that the South African Government might consider a proposal for admitting as permanent residents, some qualified teachers of religion and representatives of Indian thought, to keep the Indian community in South Africa in touch with the sources of its culture.

No Canadian delegate discussed the immigration of Indians into that Dominion. It was, however, pointed out that the laws of British Columbia, where the great majority of Indians were located, deprived those Indians of the provincial and Dominion franchise. This situation was regretted by the speaker.

A United Kingdom delegate pointed out that in the past Indian immigration had been presented to these communities as part of the problem of 'white capital and coloured labour', i.e. of exploitation. The democracies of Australia and New Zealand had been unconscious allies of the rising democracy of India, which was fighting indentured labour. There was certain to be a time-lag before the new position, as stated by the Indian delegates, could be understood in Australia and New Zealand; and during this time-lag some patience would be called for.

Among the Australian and New Zealand delegates there was some division of opinion. Some said that even if the objections on grounds of economic standards were removed, there still remained other objections—namely, the difficulty of assimilation, and the difficulty of working democratic institutions when assimilation had not taken place. In addition, there was the force of racial feeling, which was one of the historic reasons for the exclusion policy. Other delegates submitted that there was no scientific basis for this feeling, but that it was a prejudice which could be mitigated by education. The leader of the Australian delegation expressed the opinion that the responsibility of combating this prejudice rested upon enlightened citizens in Australia and New Zealand.

A delegate in touch with the Australian Labour movement stated that if the views stated by the Indian delegates were representative, there seemed no reason why agreement should not be reached.

The member presenting this digest recalled in conclusion an oft-reiterated statement from the Indian delegation to the effect that progress in solving this problem was indispensable in order to elicit from India the will to co-operate fully in the Commonwealth.

The concluding discussion bore mainly on two topics: the White Australia policy and the problem of miscegenation.

White Australia. An Australian delegate urged the recognition of the principle of racial equality and, as a contribution towards solving a vexed problem, the admission of a limited number of Indians to Australia under a quota system. But he acknowledged the strength of opinion (and prejudice) in his country on the matter. Another Australian said that it was imperative that the whole problem should be raised simply and clearly by the people concerned. If the Indians were prepared to respect Australian standards of life, and if the issue of race equality could be solved for them by admission of a number of Indians from time to time, then something

might be done. But the only body which could raise the matter successfully would be the industrial labour movement. Australian discussion of the matter had been so much bound up with the idea of exploitation that 'if it were raised by anyone else at all, the suggestion of exploitation would be raised. This is a problem for the Australian Labour movement, and if agreement could be reached between the Indian trade-union movement and the Australian trade-union movement on this issue, it could be solved in a comparatively short time'.

Miscegenation. A United Kingdom delegate urged the importance of scientific study on the question of race intermixture as a vital matter in migration policy. In dealing with this matter, a nation might either attempt to prevent any intermixture at all; or allow 'pockets' which might well lead to the kind of political and social difficulties that were discussed in Commissions I and II; or it could adopt a policy of gradual assimilation of new elements. If the last alternative were adopted, this made imperative the scientific study of what races would, in fact, blend satisfactorily with its existing population. Such an inquiry should free itself from the suggestion that there was anything derogatory to any race in asking, in a scientific spirit, whether the mixture between that race and another was biologically satisfactory. In particular, it was necessary to separate biological and social problems, and to face the problem of whether feeling against half-castes had a biological basis, or whether (for example) it arose particularly in cases of union between partners at totally different cultural levels, as defence against deterioration by those at the higher level. Was it true, the speaker asked, that intermixture had proceeded so far in certain places (e.g. Java) that there were no social or other distinctions based on race? And had this process produced a type inferior to the pure Dutch? In present world conditions this problem was becoming of urgent and increasing importance, partly owing to the development of backward races, the falling birth-rate

among the white races, and improved means of world communication.

Subsequent speakers referred to research on race-fusion which had been carried out in the Pacific Islands and Honolulu, but it was said that biological evidence was inconclusive. A South African delegate doubted whether it would ever be possible, on purely biological grounds, to give a clear judgement on the general question of race-mixture. He said that the difficulty was sociological rather than biological. It arose 'very largely from the social stigma and social disabilities to which half-breeds are everywhere subject. I feel that wherever that feeling prevails, however satisfactory may be the relationship between man and woman, it is a crime against the children'. The same speaker added that, according to his observation, white objection to miscegenation (at least in South Africa) was a phenomenon incidental to the maintenance of *group-identity*, as was shown by the fact that the objection persisted even when the mixed-breed offspring was granted to be equal, and even superior, in quality to the parents of different racial stocks.

The discussion was closed by an Indian delegate, who again directed the Commission's attention to discrimination against his countrymen in various parts of the Commonwealth. In spite of the resolution passed at the Imperial Conference of 1918, Indian students, tourists, and business men visiting South Africa, Canada, and New Zealand were liable to be subjected to a harassing examination. In South Africa, Japanese were admitted on consular recommendation: Canada admitted a yearly maximum of 150 for permanent settlement. But in neither case was a similar privilege granted to Indians. Finally, he pointed out that many of the Commonwealth's racial problems were originally caused by migration of Europeans (for instance to South Africa), not of non-European people. 'Surely, in these circumstances, it is too late in the day to raise these questions only when Indians ask for their rights as citizens of a common Empire.'

COMMISSION IV

THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AS A CO-OPERATIVE ORGANIZATION

REPORT BY PROFESSOR SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN,
COMMISSION RECORDER
(Adopted by the Conference)

Commission IV was set up by the Conference Organizing Committee to consider Part III of the Agenda, 'The Future of the Commonwealth as a Co-operative Organization'. The general question to which the Commission's attention was directed was: Did there emerge from the discussions any fresh conception of the Commonwealth arising from a re-assessment of the historical and constitutional factors in the light of the present interests and national composition of the individual countries forming the Commonwealth? The Commission held three sessions: the first, on the Problem of a World Order; the second, on the Future of the Commonwealth in relation to Asia and to the United States; and the third, on the Future of the British Commonwealth of Nations. (For a detailed statement of the Agenda of Commission IV see Appendix I.)

(a) THE PROBLEM OF A WORLD ORDER

THE opening statement in Commission IV was made by a member of the United Kingdom group as follows:

In August 1914 the German Government consulted their law officers as to whether the British declaration of war involved the self-governing Dominions in belligerency. The law officers replied that it did involve the Dominions in belligerency with Germany. Every Power, belligerent or neutral, adopted that view and so did the Dominions. To-day that position remains unchanged, and must remain unchanged, until a Dominion Government itself notifies foreign Powers that a declaration of war by or against England does not involve its citizens, territory or ships in a state of belligerency. That notification would put that Dominion on the same status as Belgium and France, and thereby sever it from the British Commonwealth. It would divest all the citizens of that Dominion of their present status in international law as British

citizens. The Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster morally and practically entitle any Dominion Government to make such a notification to foreign Powers, but none of them has done so.

We are told by all statesmen in the British Commonwealth that since 1926 each Dominion Government now controls the policy which leads to peace or war. But as they would be involved in belligerency by a declaration of war by or against the British Government, they must all share in controlling the policy. The official theory is that the foreign policy which may involve all of us in war is controlled by the governments of Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, in co-operation. I ask the Conference to examine this theory, and especially those delegates who come from countries which, unlike Great Britain, have practical experience of the working of federal institutions.

Professor Scott, in his book submitted by Canada, explains that the Privy Council has ruled that the Federal Government and Parliament cannot implement Canadian treaties dealing with industrial conditions, except in co-operation with the governments and legislatures of all the provinces. This, he argues with unanswerable force, means that Ottawa can only negotiate such treaties in co-operation with the nine provincial governments, which is impossible. He does not pause to argue that this is impossible, because he, and all his readers who have lived under federal institutions, know that any attempt to negotiate a treaty where ten Governments in Canada are parties to the negotiation, is, and must be abortive. How, then, can any one with federal experience argue that the policy required to preserve the peace of the world can in fact be conducted in co-operation between six governments answerable to six legislatures and electorates, separated by all the width of the world? Mr. Menzies, who has federal experience, stated the truth when he said:

'We may, as indeed some of our predecessors did, claim that we are equal in all things in point of foreign policy, but the fact will remain that the great issues of peace and war will be much more determined by the gentleman who sits in a room looking across the Horse Guards Parade than it will be by my colleagues in Canberra or one of our colleagues in Ottawa or Pretoria. The nations of the world will not be prepared to sit down for a few weeks or months while the members of the Commonwealth have an intimate chat as to what they are to do.'¹

¹ Speech at the Eighth Annual Dinner of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, June 21st, 1938.

The peace of the Commonwealth has so far been preserved because the British Government has since 1926 from hour to hour and day to day made decisions which it could not have made had it waited to secure the assent of five Dominion Governments to the steps proposed. Such an attempt would have meant paralysis, would have ended in no foreign policy at all, and would quickly have plunged the world into war.

My conclusion is that the official and universally accepted doctrine that the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster have, in fact as well as in law, given Dominion governments, legislatures and electorates control of the issues of peace and war, is a dangerous illusion. My further conclusion is that no Dominion government and legislature can become so responsible, until of its own act it so informs the foreign Powers concerned. You will note that I limit this statement to the governments and legislatures. The electorates could acquire full responsibility while retaining a common status, by transferring the responsibility for peace and war from the British Government to a new and federal organ of government, equally and directly responsible to electorates in the Dominions and in Britain, and not necessarily seated in London, but in no other way. If this, as every one says, is unthinkable, I believe that Dominion electorates cannot stop short of assuming the same responsibility for peace and war as now rests on the shoulders of voters in England, and must sooner or later decide to notify foreign Powers that they are not committed to war by declarations of war by or against the British Government. I think that the Dominions must, will and also should take that course, if the federal way of attaining responsible government inside the Commonwealth is ruled out.

One word as to what I mean by responsibility for peace and war. I have no doubt that if the British Commonwealth is attacked, all the Dominions will rush to arms as in 1914. But a prior responsibility to making war is a continuous responsibility in peace for averting war. Let me illustrate this. In the last fortnight Attlee and Sinclair announced their readiness to support Chamberlain in warning Hitler that if he attacked Czechoslovakia, England would fight. They did this because Labour and Liberal voters behind them believe that such a warning is the best way to avert a world war. The *Sydney Morning Herald* urged that Dominion governments should follow suit, and had they done so they would have definitely lessened the risk of world war. Why have they not done what the Labour and Liberal parties, bitterly opposed in other

respects to the Chamberlain Government, have done? My own answer is that Dominion electorates have not been disciplined by responsibility for maintaining the peace of the world, disciplined, that is, to subordinating all local and national considerations to the task of maintaining world peace.

He said he had put a thesis in ten minutes which really required an hour, and in so short a time it might sound irritating and combative. He thought that the motto of the Conference should be, as enunciated by an Australian member, that when it came to the point that a question could not be discussed, that was the time that everything demanded that it should be discussed.

This conception of the Commonwealth as the nucleus of a system of world government was discussed from various angles, both in the session of that morning and at the two subsequent meetings of the Commission.

The discussion ranged round two distinct issues—the short-distance issue as to the working of the present system of co-operation between the Governments of the Commonwealth, and the long-distance issue, which may be described as a question of political philosophy, as to the kind of world order which should be envisaged as a goal of political endeavour. On the short-distance issue, satisfaction was expressed by several members that the position had been stated in such clear-cut terms. No one, however, was prepared to accept the federal solution outlined by the speaker from the United Kingdom group. The unanimity of the Conference on this point justified his description of it as ‘unthinkable’ as a practical proposition at the present time. On the other hand, various speakers embraced the other horn of the dilemma, including five of the six Canadian speakers who took part in the discussion.

The first of these, sweeping aside the legal aspects of the subject, defined the issue that had been raised as:

Either to return to the idea of federation in which there is some semblance of responsible government for the vital issues of war and peace, or to do as [the opening speaker] suggests, go on to the

other logical development of assuming individual responsibility as autonomous nations for these vital issues. It is high time [he continued] that this Conference and the representatives of the various members of the Commonwealth faced up to that issue.

Personally, he said, because of his experience in a federation, he was attracted by that idea and ideal, but the logic of events seemed to be in a contrary direction, and he considered that they should be prepared to explore the consequences of that logic in terms of future organization and action.

A second Canadian speaker, in endorsing this standpoint, stated that the Dominions were still in the colonial stage as regards the vital issues of peace and war. What, he asked, did the Canadian Government know about the rights and wrongs of the Czechoslovakian question? 'It knows nothing about the issue,' he continued, 'and yet it has been said that it will fight on the side of Britain.' They were, therefore, colonies in the fullest and truest sense of the term and, so long as they remained colonies, they would not only fail to develop their nationality but also betray their obligations to the family of which they formed part, the obligation, to assist in the settlement of disputes by a contribution of their own judgement and their own effort. What, he asked, were they going to do about it? They should accept the logic of events and assume the full responsibility of nationhood. That would involve a constitutional change, the right of neutrality. But he could conceive a Commonwealth, the members of which possessed these rights and could still be called a Commonwealth. Their mutual relations could be placed on a treaty basis and they could remain in a personal union under the Crown. The alternative to this was not federation, but disintegration.

In a later intervention, the same speaker made it clear that he had no feeling that the policy to which he had given expression was being resisted, or would be resisted, in Great Britain.

A third Canadian member, in thanking the United Kingdom delegate for his clear-cut statement, said that

he would be prepared to go farther than he in respect to the present constitutional position. He considered that his conclusions were all contained in the Balfour Report of 1926, which was, after all, the basis of the present position. He went on to say that there was an impression in the Dominions that the Statute of Westminster was given grudgingly. Nothing could be farther from the truth, as he was able to say from personal knowledge.

A fourth Canadian member remarked that, in listening to the opening speaker, with his insistence that the logical alternatives were anarchy and federation, he could not help recalling the similar insistence of Lord John Russell a hundred years ago when confronted with the recommendations of the Durham Report. He believed that history would repeat itself and that, if there were no hesitation in conceding to the Dominions the right of personal union and the right of neutrality, they would find a firmer basis for co-operation. If the appeal for co-operation were made in terms of world order, there would be no trouble in securing from the Dominions, apart from small racial groups within them, the common action that was required.

A fifth Canadian speaker said that, while legislation was necessary up to a point, what was really required was 'a fresh conception of the Commonwealth'. Such a conception was as much needed in the Dominions as in the United Kingdom, perhaps even more. Nor was it an issue as between the United Kingdom and the Dominions. It was an issue that must be thrashed out within each member of the Commonwealth itself. They had been told that the exercise of the right of neutrality was in effect an act of secession, but this was to argue from an outmoded conception of sovereignty. It had been suggested that common action in war was a *sine qua non* of the Commonwealth. He could conceive a situation arising in which a Dominion might be involved in a war without involving other parts—for instance, a conflict between Japan and the United States in which Canada might be involved. In such a case he did not think that Canadians

would feel that there was any obligation on the other nations of the Commonwealth to become involved.

The sixth Canadian speaker, on the other hand, emphasized the distinction between the struggle for self-government in internal affairs and the struggle for complete responsible government. History showed that the primary responsibility for the decision on the issues of war and peace rested upon the Power which was the strongest in any particular combination, and he believed that, if the Commonwealth were to achieve any kind of unity, this would still apply. This, he thought, should be borne in mind in discussing the Canadian right to neutrality, since, whether they had that right or not, it would not change very much the place where the primary decisions would be taken.

Six members from the United Kingdom took part in the discussion. None of them took the view that the United Kingdom Government either should, or would, contest the right of a Dominion to proclaim its neutrality, if it should decide to do so. One of them laid emphasis on the dynamic quality of the Commonwealth, as evidenced by the developments of the last ten or fifteen years, and by the evolution of thought, especially in Conservative circles. Another, whilst suggesting that 'the line of evolution to be followed by the British Commonwealth of Nations does not lie along the path of pursuing theories to their logical conclusions', agreed that the Dominions were entitled to exercise 'the full responsibility of nationhood' as claimed by the second Canadian speaker. He considered, however, that, for practical purposes, the course pursued by Australia was more likely to lead to that goal than the course pursued by Canada. It must be remembered, he argued, that each Dominion has full control over its own foreign policy, which is separate from the foreign policy of the United Kingdom. A Dominion may indeed find itself plunged into war by the foreign policy of the United Kingdom over which it has no control and for which it cannot bear any share of responsibility. But this is no different from the case of the

United Kingdom which might find itself plunged into war through the foreign policy of France. The United Kingdom meets this situation by close consultation with France: similarly Australia consults with the United Kingdom.

A third speaker stated that, as far as the Labour movement in Great Britain was concerned, it would welcome any development in the direction of greater freedom and a more independent status for the Dominions, and said that, if any further legislation should be required, he felt sure that the British Government would pass it.

Three of the speakers, however, expressed certain misgivings as to the practical consequences of the declaration of the right of Dominion neutrality. One of them said that he believed that no Dominion, in the present state of the world at any rate, could make such a declaration, because in doing so it would expose itself to the gravest possible dangers. Another declared that, if foreign Powers were notified by Great Britain that the Dominions were free to determine their own attitude in time of war, it would be natural for foreign Powers to ask Great Britain if she remained responsible for their safety. The concept of neutrality, he added, would, of course, disappear eventually in any improved world order. Another went farther and said that such an initiative by Great Britain, which would turn the Commonwealth into an alliance, or something less, would be regarded by the people of the Dominions as a betrayal. He asked whether such a suggestion had been put on the agenda of the Imperial Conference, to which a Canadian member immediately replied that the questioner must be well aware that this had never been done so far as that Dominion was concerned, because of the delicate internal situation.

A member from South Africa declared that the action which the opening speaker foreshadowed would be taken by the Dominions, as the next step had already been taken by South Africa under the Status Act and the Seals Act.

Another, from the same Dominion, said that the present position was unsatisfactory because it maintained a state of irritation between the peoples of the Dominions and the United Kingdom, the former feeling that rights were, in some way, being withheld from them. To his suggestion that the position should be cleared up by a specific declaration on the part of the United Kingdom Government that there was no withholding of rights on its side, several United Kingdom speakers replied by pointing out that there was no question of the withholding of rights, since in recent generations no rights claimed by the Dominions had been withheld. The opening speaker intervened to point out that if a Dominion wished not to be involved in belligerency by a declaration of war by or against Great Britain, that Dominion must itself notify the United States, Germany, Japan, and the other Powers. It was not for Great Britain to make that notification. She would merely say that she acquiesced in it.

Another aspect of the question was touched upon by a United Kingdom member who met the opening speaker's dilemma by challenging the premises of his argument which, he declared, were based on the Austinian theory of sovereignty, in which states were treated as abstract entities, all self-contained and conforming to a single pattern. In history, unlike the legal theory, there was never a choice between two logical extremes. The states of to-day were not self-contained and sovereign in the old sense of the term, but units in an interdependent world. Thus Great Britain, which, on the opening speaker's theory, had independence, whilst the Dominions had not, was tied to France in the same way as Ireland was tied to Great Britain.

Another line of comment on the opening speaker's statement was that he had failed to put his finger on the point where the real failure of responsibility lay. This lay, so an Australian member argued, in the absence of a sustained and responsible body of public opinion on foreign affairs. If the issues involved in Czechoslovakia were not understood in the Dominions, this was not the fault of Great

Britain, or of the existing system of co-operation, but of the peoples of the Dominions themselves. If there were a real desire for responsibility, the ways and means for building up an informed public opinion would quickly be found. It was a mistake to assume that consultation between Governments necessarily created a responsible electorate.

The dilemma put forward by the opening speaker roused several speakers to attempt to discover a middle course between federation and Dominion independence. Thus, one member from Australia defined the problem as that of finding a new form of political association, a sort of 'lesser unity', some looser bond which would serve the purposes of the British Commonwealth in the present-day world. Another, also from Australia, saw much value in the Commonwealth as a consultative association, even if the idea of unity in war-time had to be abandoned, if only for the time being.

Side by side with this discussion on the broad general issue, there were comments by several speakers on the legal and constitutional aspects. Another theme running through the debate was the diversification of Commonwealth membership—a diversification corresponding to various situations, interests, and attitudes. Thus, a New Zealand spokesman stated that New Zealand was satisfied with the present system of consultation, in spite of the opening speaker's criticism of it, since she did not feel herself powerful enough to contemplate the assumption of a greater measure of responsibility. This evoked a reply from a Canadian speaker, who said that he saw no objection to a system under which there would be different grades of Dominions or, to speak more precisely, overlapping circles of co-operation between members inside the Commonwealth and between individual Commonwealth members and the outside world. The real danger to the Commonwealth consisted in asking those who wished to assume full responsibility to conform to the rate of progress of the less advanced. Ultimately, as he believed, these diversities would be merged in an improved

League of Nations system. In the same connexion, an Australian member argued that relations between Great Britain and the Dominions had been happiest under the flexible system which had existed before 1926. This had made it possible to adjust the working of co-operation to the particular needs of each Dominion. He considered that the origin of the present troubles lay in the Balfour Resolutions of 1926, which had introduced an element of standardization foreign to the spirit of British institutions. In this connexion, a New Zealand member summarized the position by distinguishing between three ways in which Commonwealth co-operation might be extended or developed: firstly, by the admission of new like-minded members; secondly, by political or trade agreements, such as had been referred to by a previous speaker; and, thirdly, along lines which made a special appeal to New Zealand, by co-operation in the field of social policy, with special reference to standards of living and conceptions of social justice.

Finally, reference must be made to a group of speakers who considered that the opening speaker had confined his reasoning too much to the plane of political mechanics, and had ignored the social and human problems which underlay strictly political issues. Such tension as existed in the Commonwealth, it was argued by an Australian member, was not due to the withholding of constitutional rights, but was in the domain of human values. Somewhat similar was the comment of a New Zealand speaker, who considered that the social problems, both of the Dominions and of the Crown Colonies, not to speak of Great Britain, were more urgent and more dangerous for the future of the Commonwealth than the constitutional problems raised by the opening speaker. In this he was supported by an Australian member, who, arguing from experience of the International Federation of Trade Unions, declared categorically that every diversity was possible except a diversity of policy. He looked forward to the holding of a Commonwealth Labour Conference. The present system would work if there were a common

policy between Commonwealth members. Speaking for himself, he believed that the search for a common policy would turn out to be unsuccessful, but he was convinced that this was the only possible method of approach to the problem of Commonwealth unity.

In replying on the debate, the opening speaker dealt with the points made by a number of the speakers. In particular, he rejected the concept of personal union, since the essence of union under the Crown was that it covered a common citizenship. (It may be mentioned here, in passing, that, in the course of the debate, a somewhat similar criticism was passed by an Indian member on other suggested bases of Commonwealth unity such as the concept of a common race, or of Anglo-Saxondom, or of Great Britain as the Mother Country of all Commonwealth members.) The opening speaker said that he had been asked what he meant by world order:

I mean a world government [he replied] and I am absolutely certain that it is coming. I mean a real government. I know that it is a divine, far-off event; but we shall see it, but not now; we shall behold it, but not nigh. My dream is that there are things that we can do now to lead to it and that the British Commonwealth may be the means to that end.

(b) THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN RELATION TO ASIA

The second session of the Commission was opened by an Indian member. He argued that the preceding discussion had made it clear as between the self-governing members of the Commonwealth, neither common race nor common religion nor common culture was a sufficiently powerful unifying force to overcome divergencies caused by geography or material interests. How much more difficult must the problem of unity be in relation to India, where both culture and religion were not unifying, but diversifying factors. Nevertheless, it was necessary to attempt to formulate some method for surmounting these differences; for it would provide a key for the

solution of similar problems outside the Empire. The position of India was a very important one, both in the Commonwealth and outside it, as a link between the West and the East, but he did not propose to deal with Indian aspirations. That subject had already been dealt with. He then went on to speak of the position of inferiority tacitly assigned to the Asiatic peoples in such organizations as the League of Nations, and referred in particular to the resentment caused in the East by the Briand scheme for European union, which was regarded in Asia as a means for uniting Europe against the rest of the world. Japan, indeed, owing to her military achievements, could no longer be patronized, but even the Japanese were looked down upon on grounds of race in the United States and the British Commonwealth. Turkey had, at terrific cost, acquired a somewhat similar position in western Asia, but such respect as was felt for her was not extended to Iran, Afghanistan, Arabia, and the rest of the Moslem world.

He felt that India, whose forces had helped in the war in Mesopotamia, had been guilty of a crime towards the Arabs. Its effect had been to destroy the unity of Arabia, which was split up into territories under some of the Great Powers or into small principalities under their influence. This was responsible for the existence of the Jewish problem in Palestine which, as a small state, was afraid that an unlimited influx of Jews might radically alter the political complexion of the Government. British policy in Palestine was, on this ground, strongly objected to in India.

If this deep-lying inequality was to be redressed and the relations between East and West placed on a healthy footing, they must find something transcending race and creed which would provide a moral purpose for Western activities in the East. This was not a matter of Commonwealth welfare alone, but of the welfare, and indeed the peace, of the whole world.

The discussion was opened by a United Kingdom member, who reminded the Conference that Jesus Christ

was an Oriental and had taught that all human beings were brethren and that men should consider not material, but spiritual interests, and should promote the interests of others, not their own. People in the British Commonwealth were slowly moving towards that conception, and the speaker urged that India should recognize and help forward this transition. These remarks provided a keynote for the discussion, which revolved mainly round the two related topics of the redressing of the existing inequalities and the surmounting of obstacles created by material interests.

In the first connexion, reference was made by a woman member of the Conference to the exasperation caused by attitudes of patronage and condescension. This was one of the most potent causes of the suspicion which so often made co-operation difficult or even impossible. Another speaker, a New Zealand member, addressing himself to the problem of the migration of Indians to that country, said that there was a large body of opinion in Australia and New Zealand which greatly regretted that the exclusion of Indians from the Dominions on economic grounds was regarded as a slur and declared himself in favour of a quota system. Another speaker, also from New Zealand, referred to the Government of India Act, 1935, as a great constitutional experiment which was being watched with sympathy and interest by the Dominions.

A United Kingdom member raised the question of methods of education and pointed out how difficult it was to find an adjustment which would satisfy the intense demand for Western knowledge without, at the same time, bringing in influences which sapped the culture and traditions of non-Western peoples. If this were true of China and India, it applied with very much greater force to the primitive peoples of Africa. Another United Kingdom speaker referred to the 60 million people who were treated as outcasts in India and to the efforts made by men such as Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Kunzru to improve their lot as children of a common Father. Another United Kingdom member pointed out that the

non-white peoples, particularly those who had inherited an ancient civilization, such as that of India and China, were the real 'unsatisfied peoples', since the moral and material inequality from which they had suffered, and were still suffering, since Western science had given the European peoples a preponderance of power, constituted a problem of a scope and character that could not be compared with the grievances felt by this or that European people.

As regards the issue between material and other interests in Asia, stress was laid by two United Kingdom speakers on the change that had taken place in the character of British policy towards China, which was now inspired by the desire of assisting the Chinese people to develop self-governing institutions. If real self-government were established in China, said one of them, British interests would look after themselves, while the other drew attention to the policy of co-operation with China embodied in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922. In this connexion another speaker, an Australian, doubted whether Great Britain was strong enough to continue to bear the burden of her previous responsibilities in Asia and remarked that, during the period of transition, whilst self-governing institutions were being established and developed, the flow of investment of European capital was not likely to increase, especially in areas where existing investments were being destroyed. Another Australian member commented on this by referring to the need for economic co-operation with the Far Eastern peoples, for whom foodstuffs and raw materials were essential, and drew attention to the driving force of empty bellies, especially in the presence of a vast undeveloped country south of the Line. A further Australian comment on the same topic was the suggestion that the area between south-eastern Asia and Australia, which was the least developed and the most potentially valuable region in the world for colonial enterprise, outside Central Africa, should be treated on the principles laid down in the Berlin Act of 1885, and a régime of economic equality

and non-militarization established there. How else, he asked, could Japanese claims for participation in the development of this region be peaceably satisfied?

Referring to the opening speaker's remarks on the Arab countries, a United Kingdom speaker remarked on the tendency in the East to imitate the worst features of exclusive nationalism as it had been developed in the West. He did not think there was any justification for suggesting that the British Government had a policy of dividing the Arabs and referred to recent British policy in 'Iraq and Egypt. He hoped that Palestine would continue to be what it had always been in the past, a place for the intermingling of peoples.

In his reply, the opening speaker, referring to the remark of a New Zealand member regarding the Government of India Act, said that it exemplified the spirit of condescension which he had mentioned in his opening observations. India was not an uncivilized country, which was being educated and taught to manage its affairs by the British. On the question of mandates, which had been raised in the discussion, he said that, except possibly for the 'A' Mandates, they were regarded in India as a veiled form of annexation. The history of the 'C' Mandates, in particular, seemed to him to justify this view.

(c) THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN RELATION TO THE UNITED STATES

The discussion of the future relations between the peoples of the Commonwealth and the United States was introduced by a Canadian speaker. He said that friendship in the United States for the British people was very real, but that there were a number of obstacles which prevented it from being translated into terms of international collaboration. Amongst these, he mentioned their traditional attitude towards 'entangling alliances'; the suspicion of Britain and France in certain parts of the country, based largely on ignorance and unfortunately kept alive by an anti-American bias in certain British

circles, the War Debts controversy, and differences arising out of some recent incidents in British foreign policy, notably in regard to Mr. Stimson's action during the Manchurian crisis and President Roosevelt's action during the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. He made two practical proposals: the renewal of the Arbitration Treaty on an all-in basis between Great Britain and the United States, which had been allowed to expire, and collaboration between Great Britain and the United States in an effort to remove from the body of international law inconsistencies which tended to bring it into popular disrepute.

The subsequent discussion covered a considerably wider range. Several speakers dwelt on the fact that, in the issue between liberty and dictatorship, the United States was automatically ranged by the side of the Commonwealth; in particular the Nazi philosophy of racialism would spell disintegration when applied to America. Others dwelt on the difficulty experienced by members of the Commonwealth in explaining England to Americans and urged that England could no longer afford to be indifferent to misrepresentation and calumny. Others urged that the fault lay in the character of recent British foreign policy and that Americans could not be expected to be more friendly to the British Government than its own Opposition. A Canadian speaker remarked that, in the present state of the world, isolation was a very natural policy for a rich and largely self-contained country such as the United States; fresh overtures would now be regarded as attempts to secure another ally in a future Great War. To this a United Kingdom member replied that the root of the difficulty of co-operation with the United States was their withdrawal from co-operation with Europe through the League in 1920, and that this difficulty would not be overcome until Americans felt that their vital interests were involved in the establishment of a liberal world order. When this happened—and it was beginning to happen—they would become interested in the maintenance of the British Commonwealth

and of the League of Nations. Another United Kingdom speaker remarked that, although the United States was now the greatest Power in the world, her people were, as a whole, not yet world-minded; the small state outlook still persisted. Our present troubles would remain until this process of education in social responsibility was completed.

The same speaker referred to two other anti-international influences emanating from the United States. One was the racial attitude crystallized in the South and reinforced by influences emanating from the Pacific Coast. This would be a complicating factor if ever the British Commonwealth and the United States should co-operate in a system of world order, and rendered it of supreme importance for the world that India should retain her place and increase her stature in the Commonwealth, so that there might be no suspicion that the whites were aligned against the non-whites. The second was the influence of the moving picture industry which had originated, and was still mainly centred, in the United States and was an important element in the foreign trade of that country. It was a misfortune for the world that this new invention had not, from the first, been under public control, and particularly that it had been exploited so as to cater to vulgar tastes, and to disseminate a distorted picture of American life and conditions. This criticism was contested by two subsequent speakers; one of them stated that recent American films were displaying a more friendly attitude towards Great Britain, whilst another remarked that the criticism might equally be addressed to the British film industry. Another point referred to in the discussion was the importance of the Irish element in the United States in its attitude for or against the Commonwealth. Mention was also made of the difficulty of co-operation with the United States in external affairs owing to the dual control over foreign policy.

Finally, there was some discussion on the subject of Canadian participation in the Pan-American Union. The

opening speaker had declared that, to those who urged the United States to come out of its isolation, the American answer would be: 'Come into the Pan-American Union'. This raised a question taken up by one United Kingdom speaker, whether it was open to Commonwealth members to have affiliations with other international groupings. The opening speaker pointed out in reply that, whatever might be the answer to this question in the abstract, Canadian participation in the Pan-American Union might raise a very specific question arising from the fact that the Pan-American system shows signs of hardening around a common policy of neutrality. Another Canadian speaker stated that there would be serious opposition to Canada's participation in the Union from three different quarters: those who considered it incompatible with the British connexion; those who favoured the League of Nations; and those who feared that French-Canadian Catholicism would be stifled by American influence. On this last point, however, it was remarked by another Canadian speaker that there was a school of thought which favoured the establishment of a closer connexion between French-Canadian and Latin-American Catholicism.

(d) THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN RELATION
TO WORLD ORDER

In the last session of the Commission, the discussion turned on an issue already raised, but not fully examined at the previous meetings: the relation of the Commonwealth to a system of world order and the nature of such a system. The opening speaker, an Irish member, put before the Conference his concept in the following terms:

The British Commonwealth is expanding and the British Empire is diminishing. I believe the purpose behind both Empire and Commonwealth to be this: as soon as certain peoples at present in the Empire either as colonies, protectorates, or not fully self-governing entities, such as India, become fully ripe for self-government, complete autonomy will and must be granted to them. In other words, they will leave the Empire and enter the Commonwealth as free nations. Rhodesia attended the Ottawa Conference

and it is unlikely that her admission to the Commonwealth will be long delayed. India and Burma must, in the not remote future, be admitted to full membership of the Commonwealth. There is no middle course between such admission and secession. The philosophic—I am not ashamed to say, divine—purpose behind this league of free peoples is that, without distinction of race, colour or creed, there shall be accorded complete democratic institutions when they are ready to receive them. I know that, in a world of imperfections, these distinctions are still unhappily observed. We have had ample evidence of them from members of the Indian delegation during the past fortnight. I do not say that they are immediately remediable, but what I do say is that on a long-term basis they can, and must, ultimately be remedied. The question arises as to whether, since the high moral purpose of respect for human freedom which informs the British Commonwealth is shared by other democratic nations outside the Commonwealth, they should be admitted, if they so will, to the Commonwealth, and, if so, on what terms. My personal view, for what it is worth, is that the time for that is not yet, though I certainly would wish to see the states of the Commonwealth working in harmony with nations imbued with similar ideals, in the interests of world order and appeasement in a reformed League of Nations. The peoples capable of self-government, but now under trusteeship in the Empire, will grow to maturity, leave the Empire and come into the Commonwealth. We may not have to await that consummation before the advent of a larger federation, which will in turn, or so we hope, develop into that unity of government for all mankind which is the dream of the opening speaker.

I hope I have made my concept clear. It is of an expanding Commonwealth. The duty lies upon Great Britain of bringing her dependencies, colonies, and protectorates to a point at which self-governing institutions may fitly be conferred on them; and, when they have reached that point, autonomy will follow and they will join the Commonwealth. When that process has been completed, or even earlier, the Commonwealth may be replaced by a larger federation of free peoples.

Meantime, in the period which must elapse before the Commonwealth has fulfilled its function and is ready to give place to that larger federation, we must expect diversities amongst its member states. Human nature is not of one pattern and it is not to be supposed that human institutions will be of one pattern either. There is ample room in this Commonwealth for many varieties of

democracy. All we can safely predicate is that, being what we are, and our fathers before us having been what they were, it is in the highest degree improbable that systems of government of which the philosophic basis is the subordination of the individual to the State, will have any attraction for us or for our children.

This large vista of the future opened out a discussion in which the abstract and the concrete, long-distance and short-distance considerations, were rather indiscriminately intermingled, ranging as it did from the 'far-off divine event' of a world commonwealth to the declaration, published in the papers of that morning, of the Australian Government's support of the policy of Great Britain in the European crisis.

To turn first to the nearer distance, a United Kingdom representative drew attention to the fact that the Commonwealth at that moment provided the spectacle of a world order actually in being—an embodiment of Right against Might—drawing its inspiration, not from 'enlightened self-interest', but from deeper and purer springs. An Australian member remarked that the two issues on which the Conference seemed to be in agreement were the maintenance of a strong United Kingdom and the establishment of a world order, but expressed doubt whether the United Kingdom could continue to carry all the responsibilities laid upon her. Might it not be that, as in the case of Holland two hundred years ago, Britain's dominance on the seas might be drawing to a close? The same point was made by a Canadian speaker who declared that Great Britain, which had been *the* Great Power in Europe, was now only a Great Power, and was for the first time fearing for her security. To this, a South African member retorted that, as he read history, concern for her security had been a dominant motive in British foreign policy ever since the time of Queen Elizabeth, and had been the basis of the policy of the balance of power.

There was some discussion on the actual moral content of the Commonwealth at the present time. A United Kingdom member raised the question as to whether the

caste structure of South African society was compatible with the principles for which the Commonwealth was supposed to stand. A South African delegate pointed out that the dangers of developing into a caste society on racial lines was not confined to the Union of South Africa, but was found in all African countries in which the population was not racially homogeneous, but consisted of a permanent population of white settlers ruling over non-European majorities. This applied, e.g. to Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, which were expected to evolve, sooner or later, to the full status of membership in the Commonwealth. If, as the Balfour Memorandum declared, 'freedom is the life blood of the Commonwealth', he felt that, by this moral test of Commonwealth membership, South Africa had no right to membership, so far as the present position of the non-European population in its social and political structure was concerned. The same speaker, taking up another speaker's phrase, 'sense of international duty', pleaded also for a higher 'sense of inter-racial duty', at the same time asking the Conference to bear in mind that the tragedy of the African situation consisted precisely in conflicting concepts of 'inter-racial duty'.

The question of the character of the economic system in the dependent Empire was also raised and regret expressed that this issue, involving the contrast between 'Lugardian' and other methods, had not been followed up. A Canadian speaker drew attention to an element valuable both for the Commonwealth and the world in the activity of French-Canadian missionaries working under British protection. An Australian speaker recurred to the problem of racial exclusiveness and expressed the belief that it could be solved along horizontal lines through friendly negotiations between Australian and Indian Labour organizations. Another Australian member stressed the same point, adding that horizontal relationships of this kind were entering more and more into the region of practical politics, as was evidenced by the fact that the Australian Labour movement had

recently sent £10,000 to assist their fellow-workers in Spain. Whereas the older school tended to act under the spur of emotion, the newer outlook was more consciously political.

A woman member of the Conference, referring to the opening speaker's concluding remarks, asked whether one practical outcome of the Conference might not be that the Institutes in the various countries would turn their attention to the education of their own people on these questions. What she had in mind was some better means of explaining our own views to the rest of the world and of being enabled to understand the views of others. Something of this kind—education in the finer sense of the word—was needed to help the nations to emerge from the welter of confusion in which they found themselves at present. This suggestion was warmly taken up in the ensuing discussion.

On the question of Commonwealth organization, two specific points were raised. One member, referring to the remarks of the opening speaker, suggested that the expansion of the Commonwealth was more likely to take place through a gradual process of fusion with other like-minded communities than by the definite admission of non-members. Already it had closer links with certain European countries in defence matters than with the Dominions. Another speaker, an Australian, whilst accepting the reasoning which postulated the merging of the Commonwealth into a world state, found great difficulty in envisaging immediate practical steps in that direction. It had been suggested that a first step might be a federal union between the United Kingdom and Australia or New Zealand or both. But experience seemed to him to suggest that federation was unworkable where one unit was overwhelmingly predominant. He thought federation could only take place on a wider basis, and agreed that this was at present not practicable.

On the larger question of world order, the Conference had to meet the challenge of a South African delegate who declared that the term was too often used as a

soporific, in order to avoid the trouble of exact political thinking. Nevertheless, there seemed a large measure of agreement in the Conference with a New Zealand delegate who said that the Commonwealth did not contain within itself all the elements which were required for its survival, and that world order—a conception drawn from outside the Commonwealth—supplied the need. The discussion of this conception revealed two trends of thought in the Conference. One was that of the opening speaker at the first session of the Commission, for whom the notions of world order and world government were inseparable. The object of human existence was to develop the sense of duty in each man to all others. To accomplish this, the political system must be one that exercised that sense of duty. A national Commonwealth did this, but mainly in respect of fellow nationals only. An international sense of duty, which would make international law a reality, could only be exercised and developed in an international Commonwealth. The fragmentation of human society into national sovereignties meant international anarchy.

The other trend was represented by a United Kingdom speaker who envisaged a world order of a far looser kind, a co-operative rather than a federal system. Like one of the speakers in the discussion at the first session of the Commission, he refused to accept the opening speaker's dilemma, because it was stated in terms of political organization, whereas the real problem was on a deeper level. That problem, as he saw it, was not one of political machinery, but of the possibilities of community life. Science and economic enterprise had made the present-day world interdependent. Nevertheless, man in his essential nature remained unchanged; for acquired characteristics, due to the influence of environment, were not transmitted. Man remained a small-scale animal. Life in a small community was, and always would be, more natural to him than life in the vast community to which the opening speaker aspired.

The problem, therefore, as he saw it, was not between

federalism on the one hand and anarchy on the other. It was the problem of discovering a right adjustment between order and liberty, between the large-scale organization on which we depended for the comforts, and indeed the necessities of civilization, and the freedom which men felt in a more natural environment. Much of the emphasis of the Conference, he said, had been laid on the enlargement of the freedom of individual members of the Commonwealth, and this was not surprising; for free institutions worked best in small areas where the psychological conditions were congenial. Was there, he asked, a middle course between this local independence and world government? He believed there was, and he saw it in a system of world order as contrasted with a system of world government. What would be required of a citizen under such a system would be, not the complete transference of his loyalty to a world state, but just enough public spirit to perform a duty corresponding to that of a special constable. It was a mistake, he argued, to associate ideals with the mechanics of politics: they belonged to another realm. What the world needed was not a logically complete system, but *just enough* unity to provide the conditions of a good life for ordinary men and women. There were several other expressions of opinion varying between these two views, but recognizing that the essential problem was, as one Australian speaker put it, 'to develop a sense of society' in the Commonwealth and in the world as a whole. This review of the Commission's work may perhaps appropriately conclude with the observation that it is only in a real society that such frank discussions can take place and such sharp contradictions be brought to light, and that if this can be said of the Sydney Conference there is no reason, in the nature of the problem, why it should not be said of the Commonwealth as a whole.

PART V

A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE
DISCUSSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE

PART V

A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE

REPORT BY H. V. HODSON,
CONFERENCE RECORDER

This Survey was written after the Conference had closed, in accordance with decisions of the Editorial Committee and the Steering Committee, and it was not, therefore, adopted by the Conference as were the Commission Recorders' reports. The substance of it, however, was delivered to the Conference at one of its final sessions in the form of a report by the Conference Recorder, which was accepted by the Conference.

(I) INTRODUCTION

THE Conference was held under the shadow of the gravest international crisis since 1914. Some of those present felt that this was an advantage in that the discussions were thereby dyed with a realism which the most airy-minded could not avoid. Others felt it to be a disadvantage that, while the assembled delegates could do nothing to affect the urgent situation, its very urgency and its emotional content were bound to distort their vision of what they came to the Conference to discuss, and perhaps to help to determine—the long-term future of the British Commonwealth. As one delegate put it, the purpose of the Conference was to assess what opinion would be to-morrow, not to count noses to-day. Clearly there is substance in both those views. Realism helps, anxiety hinders, rational discussion. At least it is certain that the discussions would have been very different had they taken place in an atmosphere of international calm with an unbroken vista of the future.

It is equally certain that the trend of the discussions on some issues—for instance, the foreign policy of the United Kingdom or the possibility of co-operating in defence of collective security or of the democratic group

of nations—would have been very different had the Conference not been meeting at that particular moment. In the words of a United Kingdom delegate, a Conservative and a supporter of Mr. Chamberlain, 'we have been passing through the fires of experience of a new world order'. He continued:

When you look at the attitude of the democracies of the world you will see that we are standing for those principles about which we have been talking. We are trying to prevent the prevalence of might over right; we are trying to protect minorities and the victims of aggression. . . . Throughout the world everybody is standing shoulder to shoulder during this great crisis we are passing through. . . . If we come through victorious about this I think we have great hopes for the future. Here is a world order already in existence, which stands up for right, not in terms of enlightened self-interest, but for the benefit of the world at large.

Attention has been drawn in the Introduction to the international background of the Conference deliberations. It met in the period between Sir John Simon's speech of August 27 and Mr. Chamberlain's return from Berchtesgaden, a period in which the rising threat of war seemed to be matched by the growing solidarity of the democratic and peaceful nations.

In this moment of extreme crisis for the nations of the Commonwealth and, it seemed, of mounting common purpose among them, some of the differences between them or between sections of their national opinions fell into the shade. It was, however, one of the prime purposes of the Conference to illumine these differences and to face them frankly, since if they are not taken into account in building up co-operation, its foundations may be unable to support the superstructure. The summary of the preparatory papers has referred to some of these differences; others have been brought out by the Recorder of Commission I in his report. A notable feature of the closing stages of the Conference was the frequency with which delegates from different delegations returned to the problem of increasing mutual understanding among the ordinary people of the nations of the Commonwealth,

and between them and the people of other countries, particularly the United States of America. There were tributes to the value of the Institutes of International Affairs themselves in this respect, and a reference to the work of the British Council. But there appeared to be a general feeling that something more far-reaching and penetrating was needed than had yet been attempted, to explain ourselves to each other in the Commonwealth, to spread understanding of our own problems among the peoples of other countries, and to learn to understand their problems in return. An Indian delegate reminded the Conference that understanding and liberty go hand in hand: knowledge, he said, meant freedom of thought, and freedom of thought meant freedom of action.

(2) THE COMMON PURPOSE

Perhaps the boldest impression that the Conference left on the mind of one observer—and his opinion was shared by others—was made by the assertion, frequently repeated and never challenged, that the Commonwealth cannot find an adequate inspiration for its own life from within itself alone. Whether in the economic or in the political field, there did not appear to be any wish to make of the Commonwealth an inward-looking or exclusive group, or to believe that it could retain its coherence and strength by advancing its own welfare or security at the expense of the rest of the world.

There was no challenge to the position of the Crown as a unifying factor in the Commonwealth. But an Irish delegate reminded us that loyalty to the Crown was not, and could not be, universally felt among the peoples of the Commonwealth. Even if it were, some one quoted Edith Cavell's famous words: 'Patriotism is not enough'. The same Irish delegate continued that what mattered was loyalty to the Commonwealth connexion and acceptance of the Crown as its living symbol. But, of course, the phrase 'loyalty to the Commonwealth connexion' neither explains the connexion nor tells us why it should continue to be an object of loyalty.

Another Irish delegate argued that, now that Britain was a 'decent Power' and had 'given up oppressing Ireland', every member of the Commonwealth had a vital interest in keeping Britain strong. If, he added, she were to lose her position as a Great Power, we should be ground between the upper and nether millstones of fascism and communism. This opinion was echoed from many quarters, and special recognition was given to the importance of British sea power to all member countries of the Empire and Commonwealth. A Canadian delegate put the same idea in another way when he said that our common purpose was the maintenance of the Commonwealth in peace and war, and a colleague of his from the same political wing declared that Canada's frontiers in war would be wherever the Commonwealth was being attacked. Australia, said one delegate from that Dominion, has an interest in her own membership of the Commonwealth. But this approach, by itself, obviously leads in a circle. Keep Britain strong—for what purpose? Maintain the Commonwealth—for what purpose?

On the purely defensive plane, the Conference was reminded that the Commonwealth, without friends, was neither a satisfactory nor a sufficient defensive unit. One Dominion delegate inquired why, instead of seeking co-operation in defence from the Dominions, the United Kingdom did not turn rather to its potential allies in Europe, whose immediate national interests were more clearly and more intimately bound up with hers. The reply came that defence co-operation between the United Kingdom and France was in fact much closer, and more automatic in its implied commitments, than defence co-operation between the United Kingdom and some at least of the Dominions.

From a still wider point of view, the Conference was told more than once that one of the best instruments of defence is a good moral cause. The obstacle, said a Canadian delegate, to the effectiveness of Britain's greatness as a unifying factor in the Commonwealth is the absence of a great cause. He may have implied criticism

of current British policy, but a United Kingdom delegate retorted that the cause was much greater than the view of any particular government at any particular moment. The objective of the strength of the United Kingdom, remarked an Australian delegate, does not by itself settle what our foreign policy is to be. Nor, he continued, does it follow that, because that interest may be decisive in drawing the Dominions into any great war in which the United Kingdom is involved, the latter can pursue her own foreign policy in her own interests and merely ask the Dominions to acquiesce. There must be co-operation—and how, asked one of his colleagues, are we to obtain the goodwill that makes continuous co-operation possible? His own answer was that we would never find the rallying point of sentiment within ourselves.

The Commonwealth, said the same delegate on another occasion, is a spiritual entity, and the basis of co-operation must be on the same plane. Only a moral force could integrate our diversity. Is there behind our activities, asked an Indian delegate, a moral purpose that transcends race and creed? If, he declared, you adopt the welfare of the whole world as your objective, you will strengthen the Commonwealth and make for world peace. Why, asked a delegate from the United Kingdom, does that country itself hold together, without civil war? He found the answer in the common interest in upholding and expanding liberty. In a European crisis, similarly, the appeal to the British people had to be founded on the liberties of Europe or the public law of Europe. If, he went on, we can convince our associates that our policy is based on these principles, we shall have their co-operation.

Our common purpose, said an Australian member, does not necessarily lie in the maintenance of democratic institutions, which we have got already, but in such conceptions as peace and fair dealing, the brotherhood of mankind of all races and creeds—things that we have yet to achieve. This implies the idea of a dynamic Commonwealth the emergence of which again left a strong impression on many delegates' minds.

All those general objectives—democracy, the brotherhood of man, peace and fair dealing—are international and not purely Commonwealth concepts. What we want, said one member of the Conference, is to add to the sum total of human happiness. War, he added, destroys happiness. The whole Commonwealth, said a United Kingdom delegate, has a vital interest in the prevention of world war. He described British foreign policy as aimed at preventing three regional disturbances—in the Far East, in Spain, and in Central Europe—from turning into a world war. The doctrine of appeasement received support from India, one of whose spokesmen declared that if Britain thought in terms of world peace Mahatma Gandhi would bring all India behind him to her support. The paramount mission of the British nations, said a South African delegate, is to aid in establishing world peace.

A negative avoidance of war, however, is clearly not enough, either for a single country's foreign policy or for a link of Empire. Thus the Conference was soon brought to grips with the notion of a world order. So long, said a New Zealander, as we can honestly believe that United Kingdom policy is actively motivated by a desire for a world order on a democratic basis, we can fully and willingly co-operate. Dominion status, observed a Canadian delegate, was contemporary with a functioning collective system. What new concept of the Commonwealth, he asked, must we have, now that the League has broken down as an instrument of collective security? His concept was one of a group working together with other nations to establish a real world order.

(3) IDEALS AND IDEOLOGIES

One delegate accused his fellow members of the Conference—not perhaps without justification—of letting the phrase 'world order' become a mere intellectual and emotional soporific. The phrase itself conveys different things to different minds. We have common ground on

a world order, said a Canadian delegate, but no common basis for moving towards it. One brave spirit said that by a world order he meant world government, but the focus of most delegates' outlook was closer to the present, and what they sought was some interpretation that would indicate an immediate practical policy, whether national policy or common policy, for all the member nations.

On one special aspect of the world order there seemed to be an unresolved divergence of thought. There has been quoted above a phrase from a New Zealand delegate: 'a world order on a democratic basis'. The unresolved divergence of opinion occurred over the place of ideologies or social philosophies in the world order.

It was a Canadian Socialist who, in outlining to the Conference his view of the world order, said that, although his new League of Nations might have to start with only a few members, no country should be excluded from it on grounds of race or of political philosophy. It was a United Kingdom Socialist who, in submitting a project of a Commonwealth Economic Council for the purpose of extending the benefits of Ottawa over a wider field, expressly mentioned Germany as one of the countries that should be invited to share in the scheme on the same terms as others. But the Canadian Socialist himself, by such phrases as 'no more private agreements with the dictators', exposed his assumption that the dictatorships—or at least the fascist dictatorships—would be outside his world-order system. He was reminded by an Irishman that there is a danger in starting with a small group and then saying to those outside, 'take it or leave it'; that kind of policy 'used to be called encirclement'.

The divergence, nevertheless, was there. A New Zealand Socialist said that some people in the Dominions needed to link British policy with more than the pursuit of a world order, and a fellow Socialist from Australia likewise told the Conference that only if Great Britain stood for democracy against fascism would the Australian workers want to co-operate with her in foreign policy and defence. The retort to this was a rhetorical question

from a United Kingdom Conservative: should we then make enemies of dictatorship countries which are now our friends, such as Portugal, Yugoslavia, Turkey?

The Recorder of the Conference expressed his view, formed after listening to the discussions, that neither anti-fascism nor anti-dictatorship—two very different things—could find a significant place among the permanent and unifying objectives of foreign and defence policy in the Commonwealth. One reason, in his opinion, was the evidence given to the Conference that such ideas could not reconcile special groups like the French-Canadians, who felt a religious affinity with Italy, or the Afrikaans-speaking section of South Africa, many of whom had strong sympathies with Germany; nor were they capable of bringing about that national unity which the Conference was told was an essential prelude to any Commonwealth unity.

He found another reason in the fact that, as the delegates were incidentally reminded, the existing grouping of world forces, with its counteraction in Commonwealth solidarity, might not endure for ever. An Indian delegate gave warning that, while India was strongly anti-Japanese over the invasion of China, should Anglo-American co-operation be directed to the lasting subordination of Japan, Indian opinion would flare up against the Western Powers. It was a reminder that race cleavages, which we of the Commonwealth have within our own borders, are likely to be more important to us in the long run than ideological cleavages, which divide us from a section of the foreign world; and that the relations between classes in our own democracies are a happily closed question by comparison with that of the relations between East and West, which in the future we shall have to solve inside the Commonwealth itself.

(4) THE COLONIAL PROBLEM

The ideological problem insinuated itself, of course, into the discussion of the colonial question—a question

at present dominated, for the Dominions, as a United Kingdom speaker pointed out, by the fact that so long as the British Navy remains paramount no direct attempt can be made by Germany to assert her demands by force except as an incident of a world war. A number of speakers declared that, while in the short run any rendition of Germany's former colonies was out of the question for strategic reasons, in the long run the problem of appeasement would have to be faced, and some at least were prepared to make a colonial offer to aid in its solution. Others replied, in brief, that you cannot appease fascists.

Perhaps closer to the Commonwealth spirit, as it revealed itself to one observer in the course of the Conference, were the protests against treating African colonies as make-weights in a European balance, and against importing European national rivalries into Africa, or rather exacerbating those already imported. Some put forward a plea for the transfer of all colonies to a mandates system, as a contribution to a new collective order and a beginning of a disarmed world. This did not go without question by those with experience of the working of the mandates system, and an Indian member inquired whether putting colonies under an international commission meant that coloured peoples were to be exploited by a number of Powers instead of only one. An Australian delegate, ruling out any extension of the mandates system, pleaded for international co-operation with other colonial Powers like the Netherlands, and for a new approach to the colonial problem, at least in certain areas, along the lines of the Berlin Act.

One of the outstanding features of the Act was the Open Door, which it applied to a large zone of Central Africa. The suggestion of the preparatory documents for the Conference, that the closing of the Open Door in the British dependent Empire was regarded as a grave mistake by many people generally in favour of Imperial preference, was borne out in the actual discussions. The policy was criticized on the grounds of the alleged breach

of the principle of trusteeship, of its injury to standards of life both in the colonies and in the countries that would benefit by a normal flow of trade, and of its political repercussions. One Australian delegate cited it as an instance of the way in which the pursuit of the United Kingdom's economic interests might injure the Dominions' strategic interests. A United Kingdom delegate, having been informed that the Commonwealth's great interest in the Far East was the raising of the standard of life both in China and Japan, complained of the departmentalization of policy between the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade. A Conservative from the United Kingdom suggested that it was a question of reciprocal trade relations; for the prosperity of the dependent colonies, as he said, depends on finding markets outside the Commonwealth.

(5) FREER TRADE AND HIGHER STANDARDS

The economic aspect of the postulated world order was discussed mainly in connexion with Commonwealth economic co-operation. Several delegates urged that the Commonwealth nations should co-operate more actively and enthusiastically with the International Labour Organization, and one expert in international affairs suggested that a constructive contribution to building a new world order might be made through an overhaul and strengthening of the economic machinery of the League of Nations. It seemed to be generally allowed, however, that the Commonwealth nations ought to make their own direct contribution to world economic appeasement, and that this was a matter of policy rather than machinery.

There was a difference of opinion over the best way of approaching the goal of freer trade and thus of higher standards of living. One school wanted to begin with complete free trade in a small number of products, the other to make for gradually freer trade over the whole range of imports and exports. The first may be called

the 'boot-lace school', from the article cited as an example of a possible object of immediate free trade, and the second the 'Ottawa school', from the fact that they wanted to start from the Ottawa Agreements on their path to freer international trade generally.

The boot-lace school said: Why bring Ottawa into the argument, since that implies an unmasked attack on vested interests on all fronts at once? In this criticism they were supported by those who argued that if Ottawa were wrong in making for an exclusive trade unit and injuring foreign countries, which reacted both politically and economically, then it was wrong to offer Ottawa—or part of it—to foreign countries, on terms. That was to imitate the state which committed an international crime and then said: 'I will cease from committing it if you pay my price.' The boot-lace school were also supported in the same criticism by those who asked if it were possible to build a permanent, progressive system on an emergency, defensive measure like the Ottawa Agreements.

The Ottawa school admitted the defensive character of the Ottawa Agreements. Indeed, no one was found to describe them otherwise, though there were several tributes to their practical value. It was generally acknowledged that economic conditions had changed radically since 1932. The Ottawa school, however, argued that here was a going concern from which we could make a start. We should develop Ottawa, said one delegate, not scrap it. Some of them said: Let the Commonwealth nations call a conference and invite other countries to share in the benefits of Ottawa, provided they renounce war and join a peace system. Others deprecated the attachment of political conditions to an economic plan which was right or wrong on its economic merits, and they pointed out that a preference is killed stone dead if it is shared by the chief un-preferred suppliers.

They suggested another way of liberalizing Ottawa, namely, by gradually reducing the margins of preference. One delegate argued that the right way to liberalize a

series of bilateral agreements was to make more of them. Another, himself a beneficiary of Ottawa, told the Conference that primary producers in the Dominions would be ready to accept some curtailment of their privileges in the United Kingdom market, either for the sake of a really worthwhile move towards general freer trade or for the sake of detaching friendly countries from the orbit of the fascist states, but not for anything less. A third delegate suggested a practical move which, in his view, would clear the path for reducing margins of preference and lowering barriers to trade on the basis of national interests and national policy: that was to replace promises of minimum margins of preference by promises of maximum preferential rates of duty.

Not every one, of course, thought that preferences should eventually disappear, though the Recorder of Commission II has set down an Indian delegate's opposition to the idea of preference on both international and national grounds. He has also recorded the view expressed that preferences and the most-favoured-nation principle were incompatible, and that one or other of them must go. A very different point of view was that of an Irish delegate who said: 'Surely, as a policy of defence, we are going to give preferences to those who are going to stand by us in war.' The general feeling seemed to be, however, that the objective of Commonwealth economic co-operation must be wider than the Commonwealth itself. Self-sufficiency was branded, without a dissenting voice, as a spurious ambition, whether for economic or for strategic reasons, whether for the whole Commonwealth or for any nation within it.

Many associated the wider objective with raising standards of living; but there appeared to be a confusion of thought—especially in the discussion of the terms that might be attached to any scheme of freer trade—as between those for whom the phrase called up the idea of defending vested labour interests in their own country and those for whom it called up the notion of trading on more liberal terms with countries whose existing standards

were low. An important intervention was that of an Australian delegate, who declared that unless there were economic co-operation with China and Japan, on the lines of freer trade, Australia, with her great resources, could not long continue unchallenged by the people of the Far East.

(6) A DYNAMIC COMMONWEALTH

The idea of finding an economic objective for the Commonwealth outside its own borders is closely linked with the concept of a dynamic destiny for the Commonwealth. The delegate who most fervently upheld this concept declared that the Commonwealth was under-capitalized and under-populated, and needed to attract initiative. Another delegate declared that Great Britain had an undeveloped colonial Empire and underfed colonial peoples. As the Recorder of Commission II has set down, in regard to the movement both of capital and of migrants, the discussions showed that the old, stimulative sources within the Commonwealth itself had come near to drying up. Could new sources be found and used within the Commonwealth itself (for instance, the potentialities of Indian migration), or could it turn to outside sources—American capital, or migrants from Central and Eastern Europe? These were problems that the discussions posed but could not solve, though perhaps one of the most fruitful and significant things in the whole Conference was the courageous way in which Australian delegates both of Left and Right acknowledged that a start must be made in Australia with a constructive answer to the Indian migration question.

The concept of a dynamic economic destiny was shown to be allied, in the minds of some who upheld it, with a libertarian philosophy, which brought vehement retorts from those whose philosophy expressed itself in terms like 'planning' or 'social control'. One delegate posed the troublesome dilemma: free trade brought us to 1931 and economic nationalism has brought us to 1938. And

another offered this paradox, that freedom of enterprise, by creating vested interests, destroys freedom of trade. Even in regard to monetary policy, a champion was not lacking for the view that external stability must rank before internal stability, and that the internal objective was appropriate only to autarchic communities. An Irish delegate warned his neighbours from New Zealand that internal rigidities in their country's economic structure must obstruct both the export of goods and the import of capital. On the whole, however, the idea of some measure of social control of those economic functions which affect Commonwealth relations was apparently accepted as proper, and the question for argument was whether the control could not itself be on a Commonwealth basis. More than one delegate remarked that once the Commonwealth basis was achieved, there was no reason why the control should not be international, and many reasons why it should. And the members of the Conference were brought back to their conceptions of a world order by the question: How can you get international control without international government?

(7) A WORLD ORDER

Several delegates, more especially from the Left political wing, urged that no world order could be built save on a better social order. A world order, said one, implies the rule of justice, internal as well as international, social as well as political. One delegate propounded the idea of a British Commonwealth policy for labour standards. A United Kingdom delegate, an employer, urged that trade unions be brought into the machinery both for Commonwealth co-operation and for world co-operation. A complaint was heard that the Conference had concentrated too much on vertical divisions and had given too little attention to horizontal divisions; in reply, the explanation was offered that the conditions of 1938 were those of extreme political insecurity coupled with relative economic prosperity.

Political insecurity was indeed the background and the main theme of the discussions. It is only in a world of peace, order, and security that progressive economic systems can evolve to the benefit of their constituents, and that the Dominions in particular can continue on their chosen paths of social regulation and economic development. Yet on the organization of security, as the reports of Commissions III and IV have shown, there were wide differences of opinion. The discussions on the future world order revealed no bridge between the respective supporters of what were described as the limited, mutual-protection league, and the universal, public-discussion league. On the one hand, there were those who thought that without force there was anarchy; that without confidence in collective security, peaceful change became a struggle for power. On the other hand, there were those who held that until disarmament had been achieved, there could not be a League based on automatic collective security; that a Power League could not be created without reducing every question to terms of strategy; that, as one delegate put it, 'we have relied too much on collective security through power, and too little on moral forces'. The League, in his view, ought to canalize the moral influences of the world. Some delegates were for starting on a new basis altogether; others agreed with the remark of an Australian delegate that Great Britain made a great mistake in throwing out the baby of the League with the dirty water of the errors in the Covenant.

These differences being present, even the pacific aspects of an international order did not expose complete unanimity. The project, referred to in the report of Commission III, for the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in disputes between Commonwealth members, which was put forward as a first step on the road to a world order, aroused keen controversy. When the proposal was enlarged to include the submission of political and economic issues, such as the White Australia policy—a suggestion that came from within the Australian delegation—then there

were at once objectors on the ground that this turned the Court into an international legislature.

There did not appear, however, to be any dissent from one proposition: that an eventual world order involved an encroachment on national sovereignty, and that this must be a slow and difficult business. Here was a highly important point in connexion with the future of the Commonwealth itself; for if the effort towards a world order is one of the unifying factors of the Commonwealth, and if complete national sovereignty is antipathetic to a world order, then complete national sovereignty cannot be more than a transitional phase of Commonwealth relations themselves. The essence of a true League, it was put to the Conference, is that no member has the right of neutrality. One speaker, himself a strong believer in the Dominions' right to neutrality, said plainly that a real League must mean a super-state. A delegate referred, in an expressive phrase, to a society of independent, interdependent states, among which, he said, association for mutual defence was quite possible. A similar phrase was indeed used of the British Commonwealth itself.

The question could not help being raised, how far co-operation in the Commonwealth was on the road to world co-operation? It was a Labour member of the United Kingdom delegation who urged that, in the struggle for liberty in the world, surely the nations there represented ought to develop the institution that did now stand for it—the British Commonwealth. An Australian said in almost exactly the same words: 'We all want peace, justice and freedom translated into practice, and we have at hand an instrument that will help us—the British Commonwealth'. Faced with the suspicion of British commitments expressed on behalf of the Dominions, which nevertheless were said to be ready to co-operate in re-establishing and strengthening the League of Nations, a Labour member of the United Kingdom delegation pertinently inquired whether the Government of his country had entered into any commitments wider or more stringent than those subscribed to by all

self-governing members of the Commonwealth in the Covenant of the League. Two New Zealand delegates made important interventions on this point. The balance of power, said one, was a fact, and efforts to restore a coercive League were foredoomed to failure. The problems that were important in rebuilding the League—for instance, the relations between East and West, and problems of economic co-operation—all existed in the Commonwealth, and the nations of the Commonwealth should address themselves to them. Within the Commonwealth structure, said his fellow delegate from New Zealand, we could experiment with machinery for arbitration and peaceful settlement; we might point the way to the reconstruction of the League by our own experience. What could not be done with the Commonwealth, he added, was unlikely to be feasible with the League.

Several delegates felt the problem of a world order to be intimately bound up with that of strengthening the friendly relations which all agreed to be necessary between the nations of the British Commonwealth and the United States. A Canadian spoke of the paradox that while participation in collective security was impossible for the United States, her collaboration was more easily achieved, and her suspicion of British policy less acute when the latter was directed to upholding the principle of collective security and a world order. One of those who would identify the steps towards a world order with a leaguering of the democratic states against the dictatorships remarked that the United States and the Commonwealth had a great common interest in the fact that the Nazi philosophy was death to them both. A delegate with very different political ideas pointed out that American suspicion towards Great Britain and France was nothing to American aversion towards the dictatorship states.

While some delegates drew attention to the growing participation of the United States in international organization and action, a Canadian member of the Conference

argued that the breakdown of the political side of the League had made American participation in a revived League less likely, and that the way back was through a co-operative league linking up different regional leagues of a similar character—including, no doubt, the Pan-American Union. A world order, as a United Kingdom delegate pointed out, 'will not wash out our diversities', and perhaps regional co-operation may be the means of finding unity in diversity on the world plane. 'I'm not interested in world unity', said the same delegate, 'I want just enough unity to provide the good life.' This same idea was presumably in the mind of the delegate who claimed—a lonely voice—that a world order was a false objective, and that the present regional grouping of Powers was much more natural than any attempt at universality.

The Conference unfortunately did not find time to develop the theme of the relations between the Commonwealth and regional associations, which was broached by a United Kingdom member's question to the Canadians present: What obstacle they saw to Canada's joining the Pan-American Union, and thus forming a link between the British Commonwealth and the American republics? Particular objections were suggested to this course, but the importance of the general theme was indicated by the remark of an Indian delegate that his country would one day form part of a pan-Asiatic league, and that at last, 'with the dawn of reason', it would be possible to integrate the different regional leagues.

(8) UNITED KINGDOM SOLIDARITY

Since these wide differences of opinion exist even over the general interpretation of long-term objectives, it is no wonder that differences arise between Commonwealth members—as they arose between delegates at the Sydney Conference—over the particular application of those objectives to passing circumstances. The Conference saw some animated debate over the content of

British foreign policy. That policy, as formulated by Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax at the time of the Conference, was described by one member of the United Kingdom delegation in these words: to prevent the outbreak of world war in the hope and belief that if peace could be maintained long enough the dictatorships would break down from within. Another sympathizer with the policy declared that the real difference between the Left and Right views of foreign policy was that the one concentrated on what was ideally desirable, the other on what was physically practicable. It was noticeable, however, that the stronger the criticism from Dominion delegates became, the more it had the appearance of closing the ranks of the United Kingdom delegation. To some extent, no doubt, this solidarity was a reflection of the unity of British purpose that was being displayed in Europe in the actual arena of international affairs while the Conference was in progress, and it is fair to assume, in the light of contemporary expressions by party leaders in the United Kingdom, that it would have been seriously weakened had the Conference been protracted for another week—that is to say, after the promulgation of the Anglo-French plan for the partition of Czechoslovakia. One United Kingdom delegate, an opponent of his Government's policy as it was then understood, did claim at the Conference that policy was influenced by a limited circle in 'Mayfair' in a pro-fascist direction; though he was answered by another who said that he himself lived in Mayfair, but felt that the days of his influence were past.

Speakers from the United Kingdom with widely different political viewpoints insisted that in the long run British policy was the policy of the British people, not of a party or governing clique. Perhaps the most notable tribute to fundamental solidarity of purpose in Great Britain was the remark of a United Kingdom delegate, a representative of the capitalist interest, in a closing debate, that he had not previously intervened because he had completely agreed with everything his

trade union colleagues on the delegation had said. The great desire in Great Britain, said a Labour spokesman, was to avoid violent fluctuation in foreign policy. The discussions indicated that the stronger British policy grew, the greater became national unity. But policy cannot be strong without strong backing, and again it was a Labour delegate who said that the British people wanted to feel secure first, before they began to reconstruct a world order. They were too near to Europe to play with legalism, he remarked on another occasion. Even though Labour supporters disagreed with the Government's policy, said another member of that party from the United Kingdom, they believed that Britain stood for a world order and peace, and did not stand for her own material interest. The British people were not prepared, he continued, to defend democracy alone, and he invited the co-operation of the Dominions in rebuilding the League. Any break-up of the Commonwealth, declared his Labour colleague, would lead to a world scramble; let us build upon that.

(9) THE PROBLEM OF CO-OPERATION

The problem of co-operation in foreign policy and defence between the member nations of the British Commonwealth was, of course, the central theme of the Conference discussions. They disclosed a general obstacle to co-operation residing in unresolved issues of status. Reference is made later to the question of the Dominions' status in the matter of peace and war. The Commission Recorders' reports have noted three other points in connexion with status; namely, the temporary relegation of Newfoundland to a position in which she has no right to conduct her own external policy; the claim of the Irish delegation that until the partition of their country was ended her co-operation in the Commonwealth could not be wholehearted; and the anomalous situation of India, which is a full member of the Imperial Conference, but even under the new federal constitution

will not control her own foreign policy or defence. Quite apart from its direct practical implications in regard to Commonwealth co-operation, the continuance of this inferior status obviously dominated the minds of the Indian delegation as they looked upon problems of foreign policy, defence, and economic relations. They made it clear, for instance, that from their point of view the problem of Indian migration to the Dominions was essentially one of status. The example of Ireland, as displayed at the Conference, certainly lent the emphasis of practical experience to the Indian claim that India's co-operation would be assured if she were given the right to decide her own form of government and to manage her own affairs; for of all the Dominion delegations present it would be hard to pick upon one that showed a more co-operative spirit and found itself more closely in tune with Great Britain's attitude in international affairs than the Irish delegation. (It must be noted, however, that the delegation did not contain any representative of Mr. de Valera's party.) With the exception of these internal questions of status, and of problems of inter-racial relations, the Commonwealth, as it manifested itself through the work of the Conference, might well be described as a satisfied group of satisfied Powers.

Other obstacles to full co-operation on foreign policy and defence may be seen in the light of the contrast—constantly reappearing throughout the discussions—between the approaches to the subject that had recently been made by Mr. R. Menzies, Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, and the almost completely opposite point of view adopted by Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister. Mr. Menzies had pressed for closer consultation as a prelude to a common policy, for one voice instead of six voices. The official Canadian view, on the other hand, had been to eschew consultation in order to avoid implied commitments, and certainly to avoid anything like a continuous common policy for the Commonwealth. The real question in

foreign policy, insisted one Australian delegate, was whether Australian interest or Commonwealth interest was to prevail; he was answered from within his own delegation, to the effect that, for Australia, Commonwealth interests were Australian interests expressed through the Commonwealth. This difference between sections of Australian thought not unfairly reflected the contrast between the attitudes of Mr. Menzies and Mr. Mackenzie King. The two views naturally involve different ideas about machinery for information, consultation, and common action in the Commonwealth; and much of the clash of opinion displayed by the Conference over the advisability of extending to other Dominions the Australian and New Zealand system of liaison officers with the Foreign Office seems to have been due to misunderstanding of the far-reaching differences of national viewpoint on the underlying issue.

The problem of common policy in the Commonwealth seems, in the light of the Conference's deliberations, to have two main aspects: the difficulty of finding a common policy, and the desire or lack of desire to seek one. On the first, the minor point, the Recorder of Commission III has noted some special instances of the difficulty in agreeing. While British policy in the Far East had been criticized by Canadians, New Zealanders, and others for its failure to uphold collective security, the Conference was told that the Australian Government opposed sanctions in the Manchurian episode, nor were there absent spokesmen for the view that Australia's interest was served by Japan's preoccupation with China. Over Spain, the delegates were told on the one hand that any policy but non-intervention would have been disastrous for Australia, on the other that non-intervention seemed inexplicable in Canada both to imperialists and to internationalists; while in Ireland it appeared that some were for Burgos and some for Barcelona, in the name of the same high principles, the principles that were said to animate and inspire the British Commonwealth itself—freedom and decent government.

What is foreign policy? asked one expert. His answer was that ultimate and immediate objectives of policy were to be distinguished; that the ultimate objective of British policy was the establishment of world order and the retention of a fraction of world order on the world's oceans, an objective on which all nations in the Commonwealth were agreed; that the immediate objective of a nation's policy was to protect its own nationals, and that this must be its own affair. Of course, he added, the methods of pursuing the immediate objective must not be such as to place obstacles in the way of achieving the ultimate objective; but this was where differences of opinion occurred. If this is a just description, then each member nation of the Commonwealth, in so far as it has a foreign policy at all, adopts the short-term objectives of its policy in the light of its own national interests. This does not necessarily inhibit co-operation with its fellow members; as one delegate said, recognition of national interests will best promote common interests. If we could find national unity, said another, we could begin to build Empire unity. Some member nations of the Commonwealth, it appeared from the discussions, conceive it to be a national interest that the Commonwealth itself should continue and be strong; this, of course, is automatically a common interest. But, in the phrase of an Australian delegate, there are degrees of interest in common objectives, and therefore degrees of Commonwealth unity. A Canadian delegate spoke of three possible bases of co-operation—national security, sentiment, and the desire to establish a world order—but these, he continued, were not equally present throughout the Commonwealth. There was a difference of degree in our respective security needs. We must leave room, said a South African, for unity in diversity and solidarity in flexibility.

The United Kingdom was shown not to be different from the Dominions in having to base her foreign policy on her own national interests. She must, as an Irish delegate reminded the Conference, keep her hand always

on the pulse of Dominion feeling, and this indeed she does. But, in the words of a United Kingdom delegate who could speak with some authority, she cannot share responsibility on day-to-day decisions, and from day to day there can be no common policy. Each Dominion conducts its own foreign policy in that sense, he added; but the interest of the Dominions is to see that the day-to-day conduct of British foreign policy is such as to appeal to their public opinions, since in the last resort they will be drawn into 'British wars'.

The last statement, of course, was challenged in some quarters, together with the conclusion that closer consultation was advisable in the interests of the Dominions as well as those of the United Kingdom. A Canadian claimed that the closer liaison which was proposed was useful only in keeping contact between countries that were already agreed on a common basis of policy. He was answered by the argument that it was not responsible but irresponsible to refuse consultation. The same phrase appeared when a South African delegate declared that the nations of the Commonwealth had shirked the responsibility of advising each other. One delegate, pursuing the logic of equal status, urged that the machinery of information and consultation should be extended as between the different Dominions. In practice, however, the problem clearly lies between the Dominions and the United Kingdom, and is as much a problem for her as it is for them. An Australian claimed that the United Kingdom would be better off if she dropped the Dominions, on the ground that the existence of the Commonwealth made her timid and undecided. She should keep in touch with the Dominions, he held, in the same way as she kept in touch with the United States. The suggestion would perhaps have been more convincing if the United Kingdom's relations with the United States in other ways were no looser than her relations with the Dominions.

In the phrases of an Australian delegate: the Commonwealth does exist; the bases for co-operation do exist;

the different nations of the Commonwealth do exist and are nations in a real sense; co-operation must be in the interest of each and the interest of all. He pointed out that existing co-operation was increasingly based on bilateral or group interest, and on an assumption of separate action. Another member of the same delegation urged that, following the example of the Hanseatic League, the nations of the Commonwealth ought to seek the maximum of freedom for each unit coupled with the maximum of co-operation in each circumstance requiring it. Even the assertion of complete independence, he continued, did not bar co-operation. More than one voice maintained that, in regard to any region, that part of the Commonwealth which had a primary interest there should have the dominant voice in policy, as compared with those parts which had only secondary interests. This took on shape in the light of an Australian complaint, expressed at the Conference, that British policy in the Pacific area seemed sometimes to be governed by a consideration of United Kingdom interests, rather than the interests of the people who had to live there. A delegate called upon the Dominions to classify their interests regionally as a prelude to co-ordination of foreign policy.

(10) DIVERSITY AND UNIFORMITY

That phrase, 'co-ordination of foreign policy', suggests a constructive way of rationalizing the drift of the Conference discussions on Commonwealth co-operation. It seemed plain from those discussions that each of the nations represented would have its own foreign policy, governed by its own view of its national interests, including interests in the preservation of the Commonwealth and the establishment of a world order. Now the Commonwealth will presumably hold together in its international relations if those national policies are kept on the same broad lines; and, with regard to some member nations, that will come about, it appears, through co-ordination of separate policies rather than through

consultation on a common policy. One such member nation is plainly Canada, of whom the Conference was informed that her primary interests were in North America, and that only through her Commonwealth membership did she have any vital interests in the three danger zones of the day—the Far East, the Mediterranean, and Central Europe. Another member nation clearly in the same group is the Union of South Africa. Typical of a different group is Australia, whose Government does seek a common policy with the United Kingdom, and realizes that for the most part the pursuit of a common policy means assenting to United Kingdom policy. The Australian and British people, said one of the former, must stand together. It was an Australian delegate—a Socialist—who remarked that every diversity was possible except diversity of policy, and that the problem of co-operation could be solved only in terms of working out an agreed policy. The events of the moment offered a practical example, which could escape no one, of the contrast between the two groups of Dominions; for one morning's news, while the Conference was sitting, included reports of statements by the Prime Ministers of Australia and of Canada on the critical international position then existing, in which the former was able to express Australia's full support of the United Kingdom Government, while the latter could only be indefinite and non-committal.

There are, it appears, two main causes for the appearance of that division of the Dominions over co-operation in foreign policy. The first is the disparity in size and power between the Dominions and the United Kingdom. The question whether they are to be entangled over her affairs is far more realistic, so it seemed from the discussions at the Conference, than the question whether she is to be entangled over theirs, though the latter question was insistently asked. A United Kingdom delegate asserted that questions of defending the Dominions over their own differences with foreign countries did not arise so long as British naval power was paramount. This

disparity of interest and power, and therefore of responsibility, gave force to the query of a South African Nationalist, whether co-operation really meant co-operation or only acquiescence. The position of satellites is not one that nations which have newly gained their nationhood are likely to wish to assume. It is a question, said another South African delegate, of throwing on the Dominions that measure of responsibility which they are able to bear; and small Powers, he added, cannot take complete responsibility in international affairs. An Australian delegate, who likewise recognized that the United Kingdom must carry a responsibility greater than that of the Dominions, at least in day-to-day policy, declared that the present problem was to create an informed public opinion in the Dominions. The real issue, he said, was not whether the Australian Prime Minister could talk on the telephone to London, but whether he had an informed public opinion behind him.

To inform public opinion, and to let public opinion inform Governments, was the purpose for which a number of delegates advocated the creation of a Commonwealth Council—or rather, to draw a parallel with Geneva institutions which more exactly represents what was in these delegates' minds, a Commonwealth Assembly. It was notable that the project secured support from a number of speakers, especially from Canada, so long as it was aimed at 'educating and clarifying public opinion, and not at encroaching on the function of Governments'; but as soon as delegates from the United Kingdom or Australia or elsewhere began to envisage executive or even advisory duties for the council, the support from those quarters fell away. The concept, said one Canadian member, was based on thinking of the centre and not of the different countries composing the Commonwealth. In some Dominions, he added, it would accentuate the existing divisions of opinion.

The second cause of difficulty is the state of international insecurity in which the nations of the Commonwealth are obliged to live. The discussions at the

Conference did not for long keep away from the issue of war and of defence preparations. That was inevitable in view of the surrounding circumstances. Urged as the delegates were—and rightly urged—that the purpose of foreign policy and defence in the British Commonwealth nations was not to involve them in wars or to win wars but to prevent war, they could not escape the conclusion that the dominant issue in external policy was the issue of peace and war. That has surely been at the bottom of the difficulties over Commonwealth co-operation in foreign policy. Clearly it is not fear of the peaceful and evolutionary consequences of a given line of policy that deters a Dominion from committing itself, but fear of being entangled in its possible warlike consequences. How can you tell, asked a South African delegate, what the state of public opinion will be in any future war crisis? It is no accident that the nations of the Commonwealth which find themselves unable to go beyond co-ordination of policy are those which are most secure.

‘Co-operation without liability’ was a phrase that constantly recurred in the Conference discussions, and was obviously inspired by this keeping of half an eye on the eventual possibility of war. Some Dominion delegates, however, expressed their doubt whether any form of consultation was possible without liability.

The natural inhibition against co-operation which may prejudice the issue of peace and war is, of course, most keenly felt in the realm of defence itself, since, as one delegate put it, strategy is all too likely to become policy. That is why so great importance attaches to the suggestions put forward by a defence expert from the United Kingdom for what may be called decentralized defence co-operation, and especially to his dictum that no nation can furnish defence to a common cause except as a by-product of its own security problem. As another delegate reminded us, the question, as between home defence and more extended defence, is not a moral one, but one of how you get your best money’s worth.

The significance of the suggestions lies in the fact

that, as their author declared, defence can be discussed only in terms of unreserved co-operation; partial or qualified co-operation is out of the question. But, he added, the form of co-operation must be decided by each Dominion for itself, in the light of the conditions set by the United Kingdom's own defence position. The suggestions were an attempt to solve this problem in a practical way. They were based on the assumption that the sending of large-scale reinforcements to some distant theatre of action would no longer be feasible in time to affect the critical issue of a world war. The idea of an expeditionary force from the Dominions could not be altogether discarded, but it must remain in the background. The business of each Dominion was to enlarge the area of its own security and make a whole region the field of its study. The author of the suggestions was careful to enter three caveats: firstly, that it was not imagined that any Dominion would be able to assume entire responsibility for any region; secondly, that local defence preparations and the extension of regional security were possible only under the shelter of command of the seas by the British Navy; and thirdly, that the plan was forward-looking, and had no immediate bearing on the defence provisions of the several countries.

The Recorder of Commission III has analysed the details of the suggestions and the discussion on them. Attention may be drawn here only to the references by Indian and South African delegates to the importance of the Red Sea zone to their countries, not as a line of route, but as a point at which British strategy was able to restrain foreign naval power from irrupting into the world's oceans and therefore menacing their own local security. A further important point that emerged was the capacity of the several Dominions to manufacture munitions for their own security regions, or even to supply a surplus to others. The great merit of the proposal, in the words of a Canadian delegate, was its flexibility; in those of an Australian delegate, that it could evolve naturally over a period of time; in those of its author,

from the United Kingdom, that it would increase the prestige as well as the security of the Dominions, and thus throw on them a real responsibility for their own defence. In that way there would come into being a real Commonwealth instead of an up-to-date colonial empire.

(II) THE PROBLEM OF RESPONSIBILITY

That question of responsibility constantly recurred in the debates, and with reason. Responsibility is the basis of freedom. The question whether the Dominions were responsible agents in the connected issues of foreign policy and defence was shown in the discussions to have two facets, the physical and the constitutional. The physical question, to which attention has already been drawn, is simply whether a Dominion is not bound to follow willy-nilly the path of so much more powerful an associate than herself as is the United Kingdom. We may be free, said an Australian delegate, but we are not equal. Perhaps the most important comment on this physical question of responsibility was that made by a United Kingdom delegate. 'Who does control the issue of peace and war?' he asked. 'May we not be plunged into war by the policy of France?' He went on to say that the means adopted to avert that danger was close co-operation and consultation with the French Government.

There are some countries of the Commonwealth, more fortunate than others, which for reasons of geography are not physically compelled to share the fate of the United Kingdom if war is forced on her. It is to such countries that there can be applied the phrases of a South African delegate, that no one could make a nation fight unless it wanted to, that a nation will fight only if it sees its own interests at stake, that to maintain friendship and co-operation with the United Kingdom a Dominion will make a great many sacrifices, but not of its freedom to decide its own fate. It is to such a Dominion that there applies the constitutional question, has it the right, as a

member of the Commonwealth, to declare itself neutral?

The Recorder of Commission IV has set down at some length the discussion that took place on the neutrality issue, and no fresh summary need be attempted here. But it may be well to recall the fact that speakers, both from the United Kingdom and from the Dominions, asserted that the problem of extending political or constitutional rights in the Commonwealth was one for the people of the Dominions themselves to face. It is also worth recalling the way in which a New Zealand delegate linked the issue with the evidence disclosed by the Conference that 'the Commonwealth does not contain within itself all the factors capable of uniting it'. Only if it were held together, he said, merely by internal factors would the right of neutrality mean secession. One of the forward-looking contributors to our debates, as the Recorder of Commission IV has set on record, placed before us this dilemma: that if the people of the Dominions were to have true responsibility, the choice lay between federation and the public declaration to foreign Powers of a right to be neutral in a war involving other parts of the Commonwealth—a course which in his view implied severance from the Commonwealth and from the common citizenship. This gave rise to a vitally significant debate on Dominion rights and the future of the Commonwealth, which is fully reported in the record of the Commission.

Some speakers, however, did not accept the dilemma as inevitable. They claimed that a middle course could be found, or even that it already has been implemented in practice, since several Dominions, without being read out of the Commonwealth, publicly claimed the right of neutrality, and one had purported to deny the common citizenship. Certainly the example of Ireland obliges us either to embrace a 'new orthodoxy' about British Commonwealth relations—the phrase of a delegate to the Conference—or, retaining old notions of the nature of the Commonwealth, to become unorthodox.

A political institution, said an Australian delegate,

could be set up only if the group were conscious of its unity, and regarded that unity as a paramount purpose; and these conditions, he argued, were not fulfilled for institutions of closer union in the Commonwealth. A member of the same delegation likewise denied that the nations of the Commonwealth could achieve a sufficient sense of belonging together to establish a real community. But the first-mentioned Australian added that a lesser unity could be organized and made effective. Nor was a consultative Commonwealth, which some people regarded as the practical third term between federation and dissolution, held to be a mere second-best. It was capable, said another Australian delegate, of co-operation for mutual security, even if based on difference; of the mitigation of nationalism in the organization of mutual trade; of the pooling of administrative and technical experience; of training citizens in a wider loyalty; of the renunciation of war among its members.

(12) THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE FUTURE

The answer to the final question on the Conference Agenda, whether there emerged from its discussions any new conception of the Commonwealth, must in the nature of things remain a personal one. The Recorder of Commission IV has set down the various thoughts that were contributed to the pool of prophecy and practical political ideas. What follows is a distillation from that pool, but one inevitably flavoured with the personal opinions of the writer.

One delegate, with unanswerable realism, said that the future of the Commonwealth was going to depend on the outcome of the next European war. Few others, however, and not even he himself, were willing to speculate on what that outcome would be if European war did break out. Although the Conference was held under the shadow of threatening war in Europe, its discussions of the future of the Commonwealth were based on the only assumption on which it was profitable to proceed, that

existing trends would either be allowed a period without war in which to work themselves out, or else would prove more potent than even those incalculable new forces which might be set up by a general war.

The discussions at the Conference inspired in one observer's mind a vision of a future Commonwealth not static but dynamic—to borrow the phrase of an Irish delegate: dynamic within itself through the gradual working out of the principle of self-government, which will steadily increase the number of its own elect; and gaining dynamic force from without by finding its inspiration in ideals that are broader than itself and can be brought to fruition only on a world scale—individual and group freedom based on responsibility, peace as the condition of freedom, the brotherhood of all races, colours and creeds. With its progress on this path new problems will arise. The multiplication of sovereign states within its circle, as countries not yet ripe for self-government attain to full nationhood, and those already self-governing assume fresh responsibilities, will give rise to new conundrums in constitutional relations, and increase the existing difficulties of constructing uniform and universal machinery for co-operation in foreign policy and defence. Above all, the rise of non-white nations to self-government, allied to the natural course of world events, will drive racial and inter-continental questions more and more to the front of Commonwealth problems. New attitudes of mind will become necessary—a discarding, no doubt, of the tacit assumption, of which an Indian delegate complained, that the British nations have a divine purpose to fulfil and have more to contribute than other nations to the fund of practical wisdom about race relations; a discarding, too—in the phrase of a United Kingdom delegate—of condescension, and of the attitude of mind on both sides that always suspects something sinister in the other.

The multiplication of states within the Commonwealth itself suggests the question whether it might not increase in the future by enrolling new members from

outside. The delegates did not tackle in detail the practical problems involved in such a course, believing, no doubt, with an Irish member, that the British nations must go farther on their own road before inviting others into their circle. Moreover, many people saw the possible future absorption of foreign countries in a process of assimilation rather than incorporation. The Commonwealth is a miniature world, containing peoples of every colour and from all continents. As it works out its own destiny, the world of which it is a part will be struggling with the same problems on a larger scale. In a phrase used by a member of the Conference at a public gathering after the Conference itself had concluded; the Commonwealth should be an example to the world of what it would wish the world to be. Is it too much to imagine that gradually the Commonwealth and those parts of the world which have progressed as far, or farther, in the art of self-government will become assimilated? The Commonwealth order, we may surmise, is only a path to a world order. The Conference discussions suggested that this gradual assimilation might happen in the economic as well as the political sphere. Whether the Commonwealth would then continue, or pass away as having fulfilled its usefulness, would be for some British Commonwealth Relations Conference of the future to discuss.

Within the Commonwealth itself, does it not emerge that there will be wide differences both in the degree and in the character of co-operation? Nothing in the discussions at the Sydney Conference suggested that uniformity was possible, even if it were desirable. The logic of events, said one delegate, is towards the individual responsibility of separate nations. The trend towards autonomy, said another, arises from the search for freedom. Diversity in co-operation is indicated because, in the words of a United Kingdom delegate, political arrangements, like economic arrangements, must be based on common sense, and not on sentiment. In defence, where realistic views must always be taken, the nations of the Commonwealth already practice greatly varying degrees and kinds

of peace-time co-operation, and the discussions suggested that this was likely to continue and to become intensified. And as the Commonwealth is a microcosm of the world, it seems likely that progress towards a world order will follow similar lines, with no rigid and universal machinery for securing co-operation either in mutual defence or in peaceful settlement. In the march towards a world order, the British Commonwealth, if it survives, will certainly be in the van; for the discussions showed at least one thing plainly—that the Commonwealth cannot prolong its life as an end in itself, but only as a means to a still greater end. How to express that end is perhaps only a question of words, not of fundamental faith. Some members of the Sydney Conference called it a 'world order', some the 'good life'; some spoke of constructive world citizenship or the brotherhood of man; still another used words which might serve as a motto both for the Commonwealth and for the world order of which he and his companions dreamed: 'to develop in each individual a sense of duty to his fellow men'.

PART VI

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE
STEERING COMMITTEE ON THE
WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

PART VI

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE
STEERING COMMITTEE ON THE
WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

I. TERMS OF REFERENCE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE.

The Steering Committee was set up as the result of a decision of the Conference at its first Administrative Meeting, by which a Committee was appointed consisting of the following persons:

Hon. Sir Thomas Bavin, K.C.M.G. (*Chairman*).
Mr. E. J. Tarr, K.C. (*Vice-Chairman*).
Mr. David Maughan, K.C.
Hon. F. W. Eggleston.
Major P. V. G. van der Byl, M.C., M.P.
Mr. H. V. Hodson (*Conference Recorder*).
Dr. Hirday Nath Kunzru.
The Marquess of Lothian, C.H.
Mr. Donal O'Sullivan.
Hon. W. Downie Stewart.
Mr. Ivison S. Macadam, C.B.E., M.V.O. } *Secretaries.*
Mr. Jack Shepherd }

The powers of the Committee were laid down in the Report of the Committee on Arrangements and Agenda which met in London in June 1937 as follows:

The Conference Steering Committee shall be responsible for the conduct of the Conference and shall have full authority to deal with all matters in connexion with the conduct of the Conference.

The Committee met eleven times during the Conference.

2. OFFICERS OF THE CONFERENCE

The following were elected by the Conference as its officers:

Chairman: Sir Thomas Bavin, K.C.M.G.

Vice-Chairman: Mr. David Maughan, K.C.

Hon. Treasurer: Mr. F. H. Way.

Conference Recorder: Mr. H. V. Hodson.

Conference Secretariat: Ivison S. Macadam

(*Conference Secretary*)

Jack Shepherd

(*Australian Organizing Secretary*).

3. MEMBERSHIP OF THE CONFERENCE (*see also Note below*)

Seven Groups attended the Conference as follows:

Australia	Delegates	31
	Secretaries	9
Canada	Delegates	15
	Secretaries	4
India	Delegates	4
Ireland	Delegates	5
New Zealand	Delegates	14
South Africa	Delegates	6
United Kingdom	Delegates	15
	Secretaries	2
Conference	Recorder	1
	Treasurer	1
	Members of the Secretariat	20
Total		127
Summary:	Delegates	90
	Group Secretaries	15
	Recorder, Treasurer and Secretariat	22
Total		127

NOTE: At the first Administrative Meeting of the Conference, held in Sydney on September 3rd, 1938, it was decided that no observers be admitted to the Conference discussions.

4. PLACE OF MEETING

The Formal Opening Meeting of the Conference at which the Prime Minister, The Right Hon. J. A. Lyons, C.H., and the Premier of New South Wales, The Hon.

B. S. B. Stevens, were present, was held in the Great Hall of the University of Sydney on Saturday, September 3rd, 1938. The first Administrative Meeting was held that afternoon in the Senate Room at the University, and the Formal Closing Session, at which His Excellency, the Governor of New South Wales, was present, was held in the Assembly Hall of the Presbyterian Church of Australia, on Saturday, September 17th, 1938, in Sydney.

All the other sessions of the Conference took place at the Lapstone Hotel, Glenbrook, New South Wales, between September 4th and September 16th, 1938.

5. SESSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE

The Report of the Conference Organizing Committee was presented at the first Administrative Meeting of the Conference which had met in Sydney from August 29th to September 2nd. By the adoption of this Report, the Conference endorsed the proposals submitted by the Organizing Committee for the general organization of the work of the Conference.

The Conference decided that the Agenda did not lend itself to treatment by sectional Committees, and that the discussions should be carried out by a series of Commissions of the whole Conference. Four such Commissions met as follows:

COMMISSION I: *A Consideration of the Interests of the Individual Nations of the Commonwealth*

Commission Recorder: Professor K. H. Bailey

The Commission held four sessions to discuss the following subjects:

Monday, September 5th, Morning Session	. Australia.
	Ireland.
Afternoon Session	. Canada.
	New Zealand.
Tuesday, September 6th, Morning Session	. India.
	South Africa.
Afternoon Session	. United Kingdom.

COMMISSION IV: *The Future of the Commonwealth as a Co-operative Organization*

Commission Recorder: Professor Sir Alfred Zimmern

The Commission met three times to discuss the following subjects:

- Wednesday, September 14th, Morning Session . World Order.
 Afternoon Session Future of the
 Commonwealth
 in relation to (a)
 Asia, (b) U.S.A.
- Thursday, September 15th, Morning Session . Future of the
 British Common-
 wealth.

In addition four meetings were held to consider and adopt the reports of the Commissions as follows:

- Friday, September 9th, Evening Session . Reports of Com-
 missions I and II.
- Thursday, September 15th, Evening Session . Report of Com-
 mission III.
- Friday, September 16th, Afternoon Session . Report of Com-
 mission IV.

A plenary Session was held on the evening of September 4th to hear the Chairman's Opening Address and to receive the Conference Recorder's Analysis of the Preparatory Papers.

Another Plenary Session was held on Friday afternoon, September 16th, to receive the general report of the Conference Recorder.

The following members of the Conference presided over one or more sessions of a Commission:

Sir Thomas Bavin	Hon. G. R. Hofmeyr
Professor D. B. Copland	Mr. David Maughan, K.C.
Hon. F. W. Eggleston	Professor R. C. Mills
Hon. W. Downie Stewart	Professor F. R. Scott
Mr. E. C. Dyason	Mr. E. J. Tarr, K.C.
Miss Grace Hadow	Professor Sir Alfred Zimmern

In the early afternoon of Wednesday, September 14th, six small Committees met to consider a number of points which had arisen during the discussions of Commission III. It was the purpose of these Committees to assist in the work of the Commissions by suggesting the lines that further discussion might usefully follow.

Evening Meetings. Three meetings, which were open to the public and the Press, were held at the Lapstone Hotel.

The speakers and subjects of these meetings were as follows:

Tuesday, September 6th:

The Refugee Problem. Speaker: Professor Norman Bentwich.
Chairman: Mr. David Maughan, K.C.

Thursday, September 8th:

Czechoslovakia. Speaker: Capt. Victor Cazalet, M.C., M.P.
Chairman: Mr. Donal O'Sullivan.

Monday, September 12th:

The Race Problem in South Africa. Speaker: Professor R. F. A. Hoernle.
Chairman: The Rev. Canon W. J. Edwards.

6. RECORDERS' REPORTS

The substance of the discussions of the Commissions are set out in the four reports of the Commission Recorders, and the Conference Recorder has prepared a general report on the work of the Conference as a whole. These five reports form the principal record of the proceedings of the Conference.

7. THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

The Editorial Committee appointed by the Conference met twice during the Conference to plan the volume of Proceedings, and arrangements were made for the Committee to meet again in Sydney during the week following the close of the Conference.

The Steering Committee approved the general plan of the volume which will be published by the Oxford University Press, and gave power to the Conference

Recorder, who will be the Editor, and the Editorial Committee to make any further decisions that may be necessary after the Conference.

8. PRESS AND BROADCASTING

The Press Committee, appointed at the Administrative Meeting, met daily during the Conference. With the co-operation of the Press and the Broadcasting authorities, steps were taken to disseminate both in Australia and in the other countries of the Commonwealth the results of the Conference discussions.

Before the Conference a number of delegates granted Press interviews, and each day during the Conference meetings were arranged by the Press Committee with representatives of the Press who were invited to be present at the Opening and Closing Sessions of the Conference and at the Evening Discussion Meetings.

The Recorders' Reports were issued to the Press immediately they had been adopted by the Conference.

Three broadcast talks on the work of the Conference were transmitted to stations throughout the British Commonwealth on the short-wave system. A series of seven talks by delegates were broadcast over the Australian Broadcasting Commission's network from the Conference, and a number of others were given over B class (Commercial) Stations in Sydney.

9. MEETINGS ON INSTITUTES OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

During the Conference three meetings were held to discuss the formation of Institutes and Branches in those parts of the Commonwealth where they do not exist, and to consider co-operation between the Institutes of the Commonwealth. It is hoped that as a result of these discussions plans may be formulated for the establishment of an Irish Institute of International Affairs, and that there may be a development in the activities of all the Institutes and particularly those of South Africa and India.

10. PLANS FOR A THIRD BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
RELATIONS CONFERENCE

The Committee has considered the desirability of holding a third British Commonwealth Relations Conference some time in the future and submits for formal endorsement the following proposal:

That the Conference express its conviction that it would be desirable to hold a third British Commonwealth Relations Conference, the decision as to the date and place of the Conference to be left to a Committee consisting of the Chairman of the Council of the Royal Institute and the Chairmen of the Governing Bodies of the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African and Indian Institutes, and an Irish Institute when founded; the initiative as to the convening of such a Committee to be taken by Chatham House. The Committee suggest that the procedure of setting up a Committee consisting of one representative of each Institute to make the preliminary plans and draft the Agenda, which proved to be satisfactory in regard to the present Conference, could with advantage be followed in preparing for the next.

11. VOTES OF THANKS

The Committee will submit to the Conference at its Formal Closing Session resolutions expressing the Conference's gratitude to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, the Hosts of the Conference, to the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, to the Government of New South Wales, to the many people who by their co-operation have made it possible to hold this meeting in Australia and to those who have so generously offered hospitality to its members.

(Signed) T. R. BAVIN
Chairman.

LAPSTONE HOTEL,
GLENBROOK, N.S.W.
September 17th, 1938.

PART VII
THE CLOSING SESSION

PART VII

THE CLOSING SESSION

THE closing session of the Conference was held in the Assembly Hall, 44 Margaret Street, Sydney, on Saturday, September 17th, 1938. Sir Thomas Bavin, Chairman of the Conference, presided. His Excellency the Governor of New South Wales, Lord Wakehurst, was present and, having been welcomed by the Chairman, addressed the Conference.

The work of the Conference, said Lord Wakehurst, and the continuing work of the Institutes of International Affairs in the member countries, were of inestimable value in providing the necessary foundations for the proper understanding of subjects concerning which passion and prejudice all too often distorted wise judgement. What Governments could do was closely determined by public opinion, and, though Governments could and should seek to guide public opinion, the force and direction of policy was in the main determined by the people themselves. The very frankness of the discussions at the Conference, and the freedom with which differences of points of view could be discussed, were evidence of a fundamental unity of thought and spirit; for only when people were really of a common mind could they afford to face realities and indulge in the plainest of speaking.

The adoption of the Report of the Steering Committee of the Conference was moved by Mr. E. J. Tarr (Canada) and seconded by the Hon. W. Downie Stewart (New Zealand).¹

In moving the adoption of the Report, Mr. Tarr noted the real vitality which had characterized the Conference

¹ The text of the Report of the Steering Committee is printed in the previous section of this volume, on pp. 283-90.

debates. The discussions had been frank, and varying schools of thought had not always been able to find common ground; but the search for the maximum of mutually advantageous co-operation in various fields of activity had been constructive and encouraging, even though at times sobering, in its results. Most of the members of the Conference would leave Sydney realizing more clearly than ever before that the effective progress of co-operation within the Commonwealth involved in most of its phases a broadening of the circle and the inclusion of other nations. They had come more and more to the conviction that co-operation within the Commonwealth must draw its inspiration from ideals and objectives greater than the Commonwealth itself.

The Hon. W. Downie Stewart, in seconding the motion, said that the contrast between Canada and New Zealand illustrated the great differences of constitutional, economic, and racial problems that existed within the Commonwealth. Members of the Conference would agree that it required a great deal of patient understanding to appreciate each other's points of view. But such an experience could not but teach the difficult lessons of toleration, and toleration was one of the world's great needs. The wealth of information prepared for the guidance of the Conference would be of tremendous value for years to come. The problem to which the Conference had really been devoting itself was the age-old problem of how to unite men without crushing them. It had been the problem of Egypt and of ancient Rome. More than once in history had men been united, but at the cost of the subjection of body and of soul, and a consequent stagnation of life. The task so sincerely attempted by the great Roman Empire had, he believed, first been measurably accomplished by the British Commonwealth, and as one from New Zealand he was proud to live within the orbit and prestige of that great fellowship of nations.

The motion being carried, the Chairman called upon

Mr. Ernest Bevin (United Kingdom) to move a vote of thanks to all who had co-operated in the arduous tasks of preparing for the Conference, of welcoming and entertaining its members, and of carrying the Conference through to a successful conclusion. Mr. Bevin, in commending this vote to the Conference, expressed particular thanks to the Australian Institute of International Affairs as the Conference's host, to the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia and of New South Wales, to the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Rhodes Trustees, and to those who had generously offered hospitality to members of the Conference or had placed services at its disposal.

The Conference, said Mr. Bevin, had met on the very edge of the abyss of war. It had been said that the seeds of every war were sown in the settlement of the previous war. If the present crisis resulted in a careful stocktaking of attitudes and policies, its fears and despair would not have been in vain. The world must come to a recognition of the fact that the size of a nation did not determine its value in the world. He believed that some way must be found for the political and economic integration of Europe, without destroying cultural and national individuality.

Turning to the work of the Conference, Mr. Bevin felt that there had been a tendency to emphasize points of divergence and overlook points of agreement. The British Commonwealth of Nations stood for the maintenance of free institutions, and for the development of self-government and the highest possible degree of responsibility in self-government. It stood for co-operation and peaceful settlement of disputes between its members. The Commonwealth could be an example and a nucleus of a wider and a newer world order. In the dependent Empire, whatever may have been the original motives of acquisition, policy must continue along the road of cultural and political development toward full self-government, and the application of the principle of trusteeship in its fullest sense, in the interests of the

native peoples and of the whole of humanity. Finally, if it appeared that by any policy we were preventing economic appeasement or justice, we should be prepared to face the costs of change courageously and justly.

Mr. Donal O'Sullivan (Ireland), in seconding the vote of thanks, said that in a confederation of free peoples the interests of the parts might be divergent, but he believed that the Conference had shown that they were not opposed. There was room for many forms of association within the Commonwealth. Ireland now had her full freedom. Only one contentious problem remained, the reintegration of her national territory, and he was confident that that could be settled by mutual consent, and in a shorter period of time than many people supposed. Ireland might play a great part in the Commonwealth. Ireland possessed the greatest spiritual empire in Christendom; her children were to be found in large numbers in every Dominion. Ireland was a mother-country and a satisfied Power, and she could use her influence for peace and reconciliation not only within the Empire, but in other lands as well.

Sir Thomas Bavin, in closing the Conference, said that it had gone far in promoting mutual understanding of each other's problems. The record of the Conference would provide a fund of information and of opinion upon which those who had to deal with these questions, as practical problems, would be glad to draw. Whatever difference of views might exist on constitutional relationships, the Conference had immensely strengthened the imponderable and intangible bonds, and in so doing had provided still stronger foundations for further collaboration, not only in the interests of the British Commonwealth of Nations, but in the service of humanity as a whole.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

THE AGENDA¹

NOTE ON THE GENERAL APPROACH

DURING the period when the Dominions were developing into autonomous states it was natural to think of them as a group and the central problem of the Commonwealth as that of adjusting the constitutional relations of the Dominions with Great Britain. It was also natural to discuss that problem in terms of the formal and historic unity of the Commonwealth, with the result that possibly undue emphasis came to be laid on the centrifugal character of recent developments. The problem now is to attain the maximum of mutually advantageous co-operation among a number of autonomous and equal nations. In this phase the Dominions can no longer be assumed to form a group with common problems. The problems of the several nations of the Commonwealth are in many ways distinct, and upon the respective interests of those nations will largely depend the nature and degree of co-operation desirable between them. A careful consideration of these interests is therefore felt to be the most constructive and realistic approach to the examination of the possibilities of co-operation.

The Conference will thus be concerned to take due account of the differences as well as the similarities in interests and outlook among the member countries, with the general aim of seeking the maximum of co-operation consistent with individual interests and of ascertaining how far, if at all, such interests should be subordinated to the furtherance of co-operation.

Such an approach to the question of Commonwealth Relations assumes that constitutional matters will not appear separately on the Agenda, but that they may arise and become relevant under any

¹ The terms of the Agenda were drawn up by the Committee on Arrangements and Agenda in June 1937. They were considered by the Conference Organizing Committee, which added a Note to Part IIA, and in that form they were adopted at the first plenary session as the Agenda for the Conference.

item, if in the view of any member of the Conference, the constitutional or legal position does not at present conform to the kind and degree of co-operation desirable.

PART I

A CONSIDERATION OF THE INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL NATIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

(Considered by Commission I)

In pursuance of this line of approach, each member Institute (or branch or group where no Institute exists) should prepare a paper setting out the national interests of the Commonwealth country in which it is situated. Each such paper, which should be distributed not later than April 1st, 1938, should cover the following ground:

Interests arising out of geographical and strategic position.

Racial composition and national unity.

Basic economic influences:

- (a) Natural resources, character of economic development hitherto;
- (b) Demographic factors: net reproduction rates, age-distribution, migration movements and trends, absorptive capacity;
- (c) Relation of the State to economic life: complications through federal constitutions;
- (d) Standards of living and social policies: attitude towards I.L.O. conventions;
- (e) External debtor or creditor position.

External associations or affiliations, based on race, culture, or economic or political interest, attention being drawn to those not shared by other members of the Commonwealth.

The extent to which the Commonwealth relationship conforms to or diverges from what would be the associations or affiliations of the member country if the Commonwealth were not a fact.

Colonial interests, including responsibility for mandates, and their repercussions upon relations with foreign countries and with other self-governing countries of the Commonwealth.

An assessment of any advantages of the existing Commonwealth association in security, prestige, economic welfare, culture and otherwise.

An assessment of any disadvantages of the existing Commonwealth association as an embarrassment in the conduct of

foreign policy, as a restriction on co-operation with non-British nations, as a cause of economic and financial costs and restrictions—and otherwise.

The effect of Commonwealth membership upon economic, political and defence policies.

Present foreign policy objectives, including attitude towards the League of Nations and the problem of neutrality.

Present defence policy and defence requirements.

Present objectives of economic policy.

Any other matters which may be deemed helpful, in order to put before the Conference a realistic survey of the internal and external factors—geographical, historical, racial, economic—determining the interests and sentiments of the member country and therefore influencing its external policies.

Care should be taken to give an objective survey of different opinions within the member country on the various matters dealt with, rather than to attempt any compromise statement. Recognized exponents of different views should be requested to write brief addenda if the principal paper is thought not adequately to present their points of view.

It is proposed that in the first working sessions of the Conference each Commonwealth member group will, through its Chairman or other person chosen for the purpose, present a brief verbal statement summarizing, or based upon, the written paper. Such statement will be followed by discussion, mainly in the form of question and answer, with the purpose of further elucidating the peculiar interests and problems of the member country under review. It will, of course, be open for Conference members, if occasion requires, to question any of the special or peculiar interests described.

PART II

A. EXTERNAL POLICIES IN THEIR ECONOMIC ASPECT

(Considered by Commission II)

NOTE: Although a certain amount of specialized knowledge among the different delegations will be essential for the proper treatment of the economic problem, it is not contemplated that it will be studied in its technical aspects. The emphasis will be throughout on its character as a vital element in the whole complex of international relations. The economic problem clearly has a two-way connexion with the political problem in world affairs: economic policies have a profound effect upon the risk of war, by

increasing or relieving international tension, both directly and by way of those internal troubles from which escape may be sought in external diversions; and conversely the possibility of war may suggest precautionary changes in economic policy.

1. *Review of National Outlooks and Policies*

A general debate upon the economic aspects of the national preparatory papers.

Points to be brought out in discussion:

- (a) The motives for maintaining, increasing, diminishing or altering present Commonwealth co-operation in economic affairs (including migration, currency, capital movements, etc.); economic motives; strategic motives; political motives, including the desire to contribute to world appeasement; motives of sentiment.
- (b) The existing trends of national policy, whether towards greater national or imperial self-sufficiency or towards closer economic relations with other member countries of the Commonwealth or with foreign countries.

2. *Future Economic Development in the Countries of the Commonwealth*

- (a) General trade policies: specialization; the redistribution of primary and secondary industry; the effect of different standards of labour upon economic policy.
- (b) Population policies; the economic policies necessary to implement them.
- (c) Monetary and other forms of economic co-operation.
- (d) The manner in which Commonwealth co-operation in economic affairs may help in improving general international relations: possible modification in any of the following respects or otherwise:

The type of preferential pledges given (minimum preferential duties or maximum margins of preference).

Form of protection: tariffs, quotas, subsidies, import boards, &c.

Height of preferences or of preferential tariffs.

Most-favoured-nation policy.

Bilateral or multilateral forms of preferential agreement.

Possible extension of preferences to other Powers on a reciprocal basis.

- (e) Economic policies in respect of Crown Colonies, protectorates and mandated territories, and their relation to the general international problem.

NOTE: *The Conference Organizing Committee proposes that this part of the Agenda be dealt with in the following way: In the light of the important Note above, and of the examination of national interests under Part I (Commission I), the main questions before the Conference will be:*

- (a) *Do the interests of the several members of the Commonwealth in economic matters point towards a more exclusive or less exclusive policy than in the past, in relation to their fellow members?*
- (b) *Do the interests of the Commonwealth nations regarded as a group point towards a more exclusive or less exclusive policy than in the past in the relations of the group to the rest of the world?*

It is proposed to consider these questions together under each of three heads, viz.:

- (i) *Trade.*
- (ii) *Migration.*
- (iii) *Currency and Finance.*

B. EXTERNAL POLICIES IN THEIR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ASPECTS (*Considered by Commission III*)

1. *Review of National Outlooks and Policies*

A general debate upon these aspects of the national preparatory papers. Points to be brought out in discussion:

- (a) Similarities and divergences of interests and outlooks in respect of different areas or issues; Europe, the Mediterranean, Africa, the Far East, the Pacific basin, the United States, the League of Nations, &c.
- (b) The bases of co-operation: common ideals and interests, general and particular.
- (c) The obstacles to co-operation: differences of interest, internal divisions.

2. *The Character of Co-operation in Foreign Policy and Defence*

To what extent should Commonwealth co-operation be uniform and comprehensive, to what extent based on group or bilateral understandings within the Commonwealth?

The following will be among the chief considerations relevant:

- (a) The value of a united Commonwealth front.
- (b) The necessity for tangible common interest as the basis of co-operation or common action; differing degrees of

common interest among different groups of Commonwealth members.

- (c) The extent to which co-operation, especially in defence, is already based on group or bilateral interest.

3. *The Practical Content of Future Co-operation or Agreement*

- (a) Possibilities of co-operation or agreed external policy (to be studied by sub-committees or as the Conference may determine) in regard to special regions or special topics. The following are suggested:

Europe.

The Mediterranean-Red Sea route and Africa.

The Far East and the Pacific.

The United States.

The League of Nations.

Mandates and the Colonial Question.

- (b) Any necessary changes in legal position, constitutional convention or administrative practice suggested by the discussions under (a).

PART III

THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AS A CO-OPERATIVE
ORGANIZATION

(Considered by Commission IV)

Does there emerge from the discussions any fresh conception of the Commonwealth arising from a reassessment of the historical and constitutional factors in the light of the present interests and national composition of the individual countries forming the Commonwealth?

APPENDIX II

LIST OF STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CONFERENCE, 1938

NOTE: *Studies marked with an asterisk are available to the public. Inquiries for them should be made to the Secretaries of the respective Institutes of International Affairs, the addresses of which are given below.*

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1.

**The British Empire.*

A Report by a Chatham House Study Group. Oxford University Press. Second Edition, June 1938. (Price 15s.)

The Essential Interests of the United Kingdom.

United Kingdom Conference Paper No. 1. In four mimeographed volumes. Prepared under the direction of a Chatham House Editorial Committee. (To be published by the Oxford University Press in the late spring of 1939.)

A Memorandum bringing up to date the Handbook on Consultation and Co-operation in the British Commonwealth, compiled by G. E. H. Palmer for the First Unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference at Toronto in 1933.

United Kingdom Conference Paper No. 2. Mimeographed.

Indian Defence Problems.

United Kingdom Conference Paper No. 3. Mimeographed.

The Royal Institute also circulated to the groups taking part in the Conference copies of the following paper bearing on the Conference Agenda:

**Germany's Claim to Colonies.*

Chatham House Information Department Paper No. 23. May 1938. Price 2s. (postage 2d.). New edition, ready in January 1939. Price 1s. (postage 2d.).

*CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS*

86 Queen's Park, Toronto, Ontario.

**Canada To-day*, by F. R. Scott. Oxford University Press: Toronto, June 1938; London, October 1938. Price \$1.25 or 6s.

Also the following mimeographed supplementary papers:

**Series A*. Price \$1 or 4s. (postage 6d.).

Contents:

No. 1. Population Policies: The Economic Policies necessary Implement Them, by D. A. MacGibbon.

No. 2. A French-Canadian View of Canada's Foreign Policy, by Jean Bruchési.

No. 3. Canada and the Americas, by F. H. Soward.

No. 4. Which Way Canada? by R. G. Trotter.

No. 5. New Trends in Canadian Defence Policy, by C. P. Stacey.

No. 6. A Review of Economic and Financial Conditions in Canada (April 1938), by J. F. Parkinson.

No. 7. Canadian Tariff Policy, by W. A. Mackintosh and K. W. Taylor.

**Series B*. Price 25 cents or 1s. (postage 3d.).

Contents:

No. 1. Provinces and Dominion, by J. B. McGeachy.

No. 2. Relations between English and French-Canadians, by a Representative French-Canadian Business Man.

**Series C*. Price 50 cents or 2s. (postage 3d.).

Contents:

No. 1. Statistics of Canadian Trade, by K. W. Taylor.

No. 2. Debate in House of Commons on Canadian External Policy, July 1st, 1938.

No. 3. Memoranda on Canadian Defence.

**Series D*. Price 5 cents (postage 1d.).

Contents:

Debates in House of Commons on Canadian External Policy, May 24th, 1938. Published by the King's Printer, Ottawa, from whom copies can also be obtained direct.

**Series E*. Price 35 cents or 1s. 6d. (postage 3d.).

Contents:

No. 1. Political Parties in Canada and External Affairs. Anonymous.

No. 2. The Propaganda Media in Canada, by G. V. Ferguson.

No. 3. The United States and the Commonwealth, by George Luxton.

**Canadian Neutrality—The Constitutional Power*, by J. B. Coyne, K.C. A mimeographed volume of 101 pp. Price 75 cents or 3s. (postage 6d.).

The Canadian Institute also circulated a limited number of copies of the following publication bearing on the Conference Agenda:

**Canada Looks Abroad*, by R. A. MacKay and E. B. Rogers. Oxford University Press: Toronto and London, 1938. Price \$3 or 15s. (postage 6d.).

AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A.P.A. Building, 53 Martin Place, Sydney, N.S.W.

**Australia's National Interests and National Policy*, by H. L. Harris. Melbourne: The University Press; London: Oxford University Press. Price 5s. (postage 4d.).

Also the following supplementary mimeographed papers. Price 2s. each (postage 3d.), or 10s. (postage 1s.) for the five series.

*Series A.

Contents:

No. 1. The Population-carrying Capacity of Australia, by J. Andrews.

No. 2. The Future of the Australian Population, by A. Smithies.

No. 3. Migration, by R. B. Madgwick.

No. 4. Tropical Settlement in Australia, by J. B. Brigden and W. Wynne Williams.

No. 5. Printed Supplement to Paper No. 4 above, containing maps.

*Series B.

Contents:

No. 1. The Development of Australian Industry, by H. Burton.

No. 2. The Australian Tariff, by W. S. Kelly.

No. 3. Australia's Foreign Trade Treaties, by C. A. S. Hawker.

No. 4. Monetary Policy in Australia, by D. B. Copland.

**Series C.*

Contents:

- No. 1. The Financial Nexus between England and Australia, by G. L. Wood.
- No. 2. Imperial Communications and Transport, by E. O. Milne.
- No. 3. The Strategic Position of the British Empire, by F. W. Eggleston.
- No. 4. The Cultural Co-operation in the British Commonwealth, by W. S. Sheldon.

**Series D.*

Contents:

- No. 1. Political Parties in Australia, by G. V. Portus.
- No. 2. Australian Foreign Policy—Formation and Expression of Australian Opinion, by E. A. Ferguson, T. P. Fry, J. G. Holmes and A. Murray Smith.
- No. 3. The Defence of Australia, by P. F. Irvine.
- No. 4. What the League of Nations Means to Australia, by F. Aarons.

**Series E.*

Contents:

- No. 1. Australia's Interests in the Pacific Basin, by a Canberra Study Group.
- No. 2. Australia's Relations to other Pacific Countries, by A. C. V. Melbourne.
- No. 3. The Australian Native Dependencies in the Pacific, by Marjorie G. Jacobs.

*NEW ZEALAND INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS*

P.O. Box 36, Wellington, New Zealand.

**Contemporary New Zealand.* A Survey of Domestic and Foreign Policy. Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs; London: Oxford University Press, 1938. Price 10s. 6d., plus postage.

**Western Samoa: Mandate or German Colony?* A supplementary printed paper. Published by the New Zealand Institute, April 1937. Price 6d. (postage 1d.).

IRISH GROUP

*A mimeographed volume containing the following papers was prepared for the Conference in Ireland and is obtainable through

the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1. Price 2s. 6d. (postage 6d.).

Preface, by Donal O'Sullivan.

The Origin and Growth of Modern Irish Nationalism, by Michael Tierney.

Ireland in Relation to the Commonwealth, by T. W. T. Dillon.

Economic Policy and Population in Eire, by James Meenan.

Irish Defence Problems. Anonymous.

CONFERENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

A selected Bibliography was prepared for the Conference by Margaret Cleeve at Chatham House and issued in October 1937 (*Reference No. B.C.R.C.3*).

Mimeographed Addenda to the Bibliography were produced in March and July 1938 (*Reference No. B.C.R.C.5*).

Copies of the Bibliography and Addenda are obtainable through the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1. Price 1s. (postage 2d.).

APPENDIX III

ANNOTATED LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE

**An asterisk is placed against the names of those who attended the first British Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Toronto in 1933.*

AUSTRALIA.

*BAILEY, PROFESSOR KENNETH HAMILTON, M.A., B.C.L. (Oxon.), LL.M. Professor of Public Law, and Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne; Adviser to Australian Delegation, Imperial Conference, 1937; Member of Australian Delegation, League of Nations Assembly, 1937; author of articles on constitutional and international law.

BAVIN, HON. SIR THOMAS (RAINSFORD), K.C.M.G., K.C., LL.B. (Chairman of the Conference). Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales; Professor of Law, University of Tasmania, 1900; Private Secretary to the first Prime Minister of Australia, 1901-4; M.L.A., New South Wales Parliament, 1917-32; Attorney-General, 1922-5; Leader of Opposition, 1930-32; Premier of New South Wales, 1927-30; President, Australian Institute of International Affairs since 1935; author of *Observations on Federal System of Government* (1907); *Collected Speeches*, 1927-30. Sydney.

BOOTH, MRS. DORIS REGINA, O.B.E. Gold-mining interests; formerly nurse at Brisbane General Hospital; author of *Mountains, Gold and Cannibals* (1929). Wau, New Guinea.

BOYER, RICHARD JAMES FILDES, M.A. Grazier; President, Warrego Graziers' Association since 1934; Member, Executive United Graziers' Association of Queensland and Grazier Federal Council of Australia; Member, Federal Executive, League of Nations Union. Brisbane.

*CHARTERIS, PROFESSOR ARCHIBALD, M.A., LL.B. Solicitor; Challis Professor of International Law, University of Sydney; Lecturer, Public and Private International Law, Glasgow University, 1904-19.

COLLINGS, JOSEPH SILVER. Senator for Queensland since 1931 and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate of the Australian

Commonwealth; Member, Federated Clerks Union of Australia; Organizer of Queensland Branch, Australian Labour Party, 1917-31; Member, Queensland Legislative Council at time of its abolition in 1921. Brisbane.

COPLAND, PROFESSOR DOUGLAS BERRY, C.M.G., M.A., D.Sc., Litt. D. Professor of Commerce and Dean of the Faculty of Commerce, Melbourne; Editor-in-Chief of the *Economic Record*; Marshall Memorial Lecturer, Cambridge University, 1933; Member of Committee of Experts in 1931 advising Loan Council on Premiers' Plan; author of *Credit and Currency Control*, *Australia in the World Crisis*, *W.E. Hearn: First Australian Economist*, *The Australian Economy*; Editor: *Economic Survey of Australia*; (with Professor E. O. G. Shann) *Books of Documents on Crisis in Australian Finance* (1929-31), *Battle of the Plans* (1931), *The Australian Price Structure* (1932); (with C. V. Janes) *Cross Currents of Australian Finance* (1935); *Australian Trade Policy* (1937), *Australian Marketing Policy* (1937).

CURREY, CHARLES HERBERT, M.A., LL.D. Senior Lecturer in History in Teachers' College, and Lecturer in Legal History in the University of Sydney; author of *British Colonial Policy, 1783-1916*, *Studies in the Legal History of New South Wales*, *The Teaching of History and Civics*, *British History*, Part I, Part II (with Professor S. H. Roberts).

DUNCAN, DR. WALTER GEORGE KEITH, M.A., Ph.D. Director of Tutorial Classes, University of Sydney; Director of Studies, Australian Institute of Political Science, Sydney, since 1933.

DYASON, EDWARD CLARENCE, B.Sc., B.M.E. Stockbroker; President, Chamber of Mines, Victoria, 1919-22; President, Gold Producers' Association of Australia, 1919-25; President, Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand, 1930-2; Member, sundry unofficial Committees on economic matters set up by Commonwealth Government; Chairman, Bureau of Social and International Affairs, Melbourne, 1930-2, and since 1934; joint author of *The Australian Tariff*.

EDWARDS, REV. WILLIAM JOHN, B.A. (Sidney), Dip. Ed. (Cantab.). Headmaster of Canberra Grammar School; Canon of St. Saviour's Cathedral, Goulburn, 1935; President, Canberra Branch, and Vice-President, Commonwealth Council, Australian Institute of International Affairs.

EGGLESTON, THE HON. FREDERIC WILLIAM (Chairman of the Delegation). Chairman, Commonwealth Grants Commission

since 1933; on staff Australian Delegation, Paris Peace Conference, 1919; M.L.A. for St. Kilda (Vic.), 1920-7; Minister of Water Supply and Minister of Railways, 1924-6; Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, 1924-7; Chairman, Victorian Branch, and Vice-President, Commonwealth Council, Australian Institute of International Affairs; author of *Life of George Swinburne* (with Dr. E. H. Sugden) (1931), *State Socialism in Victoria* (1932); Editor of *The Australian Mandate for New Guinea*. Melbourne.

FITZHARDINGE, LAURENCE FREDERIC, M.A., B.Litt. Historical Research Officer (Australian section) Commonwealth National Library, Canberra; part-time lecturer in Ancient History, Canberra University College.

FRY, THOMAS PENBERTHY, M.A., B.C.L. Barrister; Lecturer in the Law School, Queensland University; President, Queensland Branch, and Vice-President, Commonwealth Council, Australian Institute of International Affairs; Hon. Australian Secretary of the Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law. Brisbane.

HAWKER, (the late) THE HON. CHARLES ALLAN SEYMOUR, M.A., M.P. (United Australian Party). Grazier; Member of Commonwealth Board of Trade, 1927; Elected Federal Parliament 1929 for Division of Wakefield, South Australia; Minister for Commerce, 1932; Member of Council of St. Mark's College, Adelaide University; author of *Problems of the Wheat Growers*, 1934 (pamphlet); *An Australian Looks at Russian Farms* (pamphlet).

HENTZE, MISS MARGOT, M.A., Ph.D. (Econ.). Lecturer in Modern European History at the University of Sydney. Fraser Research Scholar, 1934; holder Woolley Travelling Scholarship, 1935-7. For last three years engaged on study (in Italy) of the history of parliamentary government in Italy. Author of *Australia and the Far East* (in collaboration—section on immigration), articles in periodicals.

HOLMAN, MISS MARY ALICE (MAY), J.P., M.L.A. (Labour, Forrest, W.A.). Alternate Delegate for Australia at League of Nations Assembly, Geneva, 1930; Member, International Labour Office Committee on Women's Work; President, Labour Women's Interstate Executive of Australia; Secretary, Western Australian Labour Women's Central Executive. Bassendean, W.A.

- HOLMES, JOHN GORDON. Leader writer; has travelled in Europe and the Far East. Brisbane.
- HYTTEN, TORLEIV, M.A. Economic Adviser to the Bank of New South Wales; Professor of Economics, University of Tasmania, 1929-35; Financial adviser to the Government of Tasmania, 1930-35; Australian delegate to 16th Assembly of League of Nations, 1935. Sydney.
- MAUGHAN, DAVID, B.C.L. (Oxon.), LL.B. (Sydney), M.A. (Oxon. and Sydney). K.C. (Vice-Chairman of the Conference); Chairman, New South Wales Branch, Australian Institute of International Affairs; Acting Justice, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 1924 and 1936-7; appeared before Privy Council in litigation relating to the abolition and reform of the Upper House, 1932 and 1934. Sydney.
- MILLS, PROFESSOR RICHARD CHARLES, O.B.E., LL.M., D.Sc. Professor of Economics, University of Sydney; Chairman of the Professorial Board, University of Sydney; author of *Colonization of Australia, 1829-1842* (1915).
- NICHOLAS, HON. MR. JUSTICE HAROLD SPRENT, M.A. (Oxon.). Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales since 1935; formerly leader-writer *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Daily Telegraph*; Editor *Australian Quarterly*; Commonwealth Counsel, Royal Commission on Constitution of Commonwealth; Member of Legislative Council, New South Wales; author of *Trustee Acts of New South Wales* (1926); *Australia, Economic and Political* (in part). Sydney.
- PACKER, GERALD. Accountant and Company Director. Melbourne.
- PHILLIPS, PHILIP DAVID. M.A., LL.B. Barrister; Lecturer International Relations and Private International Law in Melbourne University; Vice-President, L.N.U.; Chairman, Victorian Transport Regulation Board, 1934-7; Research Secretary, Australian Institute of International Affairs.
- PORTUS, GARNET VERE, M.A., B.Litt. Professor of Political Science and History, University of Adelaide; author of *Caritas Anglicana* (1911); *Marx and Modern Thought* (1921); *The American Background* (1928); *Criticism of Christianity* (1931); *Australia Since 1806* (1932); *Australia: An Economic Interpretation* (1933); *Force, Compulsory and Secular* (1937).
- ROBERTS, PROFESSOR STEPHEN HENRY, M.A. (Melb.), D.Sc. Econ. (Lond.), Litt.D. (Melb.). Challis Professor of History, Sydney University since 1929; author of *History of Australian*

Land Settlement (1923); *Population Problems of the Pacific* (1925), *French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925* (1928), *The Squatting Age in Australia* (1932), *The House that Hitler Built* (1937).

ROSS, LLOYD ROBERT MAXWELL, M.A., LL.B., D.Litt. State Secretary, Australian Railways' Union; Tutor-Organizer, Workers' Educational Association, Otago University, 1925-33; Assistant Director, Tutorial Classes, Sydney University, 1934-5; author of *Tickets Without Goods* (1932), *From the Martyrs to the Masses* (1936), *William Lane and the Australian Labour Movement* (1937). Sydney.

*SCOTT, PROFESSOR ERNEST. Professor of History, Melbourne University, 1914-37; Adviser for, and part author of, the Australian volume of the *Cambridge History of the British Empire*; author of *Terre Napoleon*, *The Life of La Perouse*, *The Life of Flinders*, *A Short History of Australia*, *Men and Thought in Modern History*, *History and Historical Problems*, *The Goldfields Diary of Lord Robert Cecil*, *History of the University of Melbourne*, *Australia During the War*.

SMITH, ELSDEN JAMES OLIVER, B.A. Private Secretary to Leader of Opposition, Commonwealth Senate; Queensland State Public Service, 1929-37; Compiled and edited *The Workers' Compensation Reports, Queensland* (1936). Brisbane.

WHITLAM, HENRY FREDERICK EARNEST, LL.B. (Melb.). Commonwealth Crown Solicitor. Canberra.

WOOD, DR. GORDON LESLIE, M.A., D.Litt. (Tas.). Associate Professor of Commerce at the University of Melbourne; author of *Tasmanian Environment*, *The Pacific Basin, Borrowing and Business in Australia*.

SECRETARIAT

ANDREWS, DR. JOHN, B.A. (Sydney) Ph.D. (Cantab.). Lecturer in Geography, University of Sydney; President, Geographical Society of New South Wales.

BLAND, FRANCIS ARMAND, M.A., LL.B. Professor of Public Administration, Sydney University; Barrister, Supreme Court, 1912; Visiting Professor of Government, Washington Square College, New York University, U.S.A., 1929-30; Secretary, Member and Chairman, Local Government Committee, N.S.W., 1907-38; Member and Chairman, Board of Examiners, N.S.W. Public Service Board, 1918-38; Local Government Commissioner, N.S.W., 1929; Tutorial Class Lecturer, University of Oxford, 1916-17; author of *Shadows and*

Realities of Government (1923), *City Government by Commission* (1928), *Budget Control* (1931), *Planning the Modern State* (1934); Editor, *Australian Highway* (1918-34); Editor, *Public Administration* (1936-8).

BUESST, TRISTAN NOEL MARCHAND, M.A. (Oxon.), LL.B. (Melb.). Barrister; Director Buesst and Bills Bros. Pty. Ltd. and other companies; Member of Property Rights and Interests Commission, Berlin, 1921-22; Honorary Treasurer of Australian Institute of International Affairs since 1933. Melbourne.

CONRAD, MRS. A. H., B.A. (Melb.). Chairman of the Ladies' Committee and a member of the Executive of the Queensland Branch, Australian Institute of International Affairs. Brisbane.

FORSYTH, WILLIAM DOUGLAS (Secretary of Group). Research Fellow, Melbourne University; Assistant Editor, *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*; author of *Governor Arthur's Convict System, Van Diemen's Land, 1824-36* (1935).

IRVINE, PHILIP FRANCIS, B.A., LL.B. (Sydney). Solicitor of Supreme Court, New South Wales. Sydney.

RICHARDSON, JOHN FFOULKES, B.A. Clerk, Department of Commerce; Lecturer (part-time) on British History, Canberra University College, 1938.

SHANN, FRANK, JR. Senior History Master, Canberra Grammar School.

SMITH, ALBERT MURRAY, M.A. Research Officer of the Bureau of Industry, Queensland; Member of Executive and Research Secretary, Queensland Branch, Australian Institute of International Affairs. Brisbane.

*WINDEYER, WILLIAM JOHN VICTOR, B.A., LL.B. Barrister; Lecturer in Equity, University of Sydney; author of *The Law of Wages and Lotteries in Australia* (1929), *Ten Lectures on Legal History* (1938).

CANADA

BLAKE, (the late) EDWARD HUME. Barrister; Assistant to Chairman of the Royal Commission on Railways in Canada, 1932-3; joint publisher, *Weekly Sun*, 1933-4; author of occasional articles on economics, history and architecture.

*BRADY, PROFESSOR ALEXANDER, M.A., Ph.D. Professor of Political Science and Economics, University of Toronto; author of *William Huskisson and Liberal Reform* (1938), *Canada* (Modern World series) (1932).

BRITNELL, PROFESSOR GEORGE EDWIN, M.A., Ph.D. Professor

of Political Science, University of Saskatchewan; Economic Adviser to Government of Saskatchewan, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 1937, and Member of Economic Research Staff; author of *The Canadian Economy and Its Problems* (with Innis, Plumptre, and others) (1934); *A Submission by the Government of Saskatchewan to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations* (Canada 1937) (with Cronkite); *The Wheat Economy: A Study of the Economic and Social Development of Saskatchewan* (in press). Saskatoon.

BRITTAI, PROFESSOR WILLIAM HAROLD, M.S.A., Ph.D., F.R.S.C. Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture in McGill University, and Vice-Principal of Macdonald College; Provincial Entomologist for British Columbia, 1912-13; Provincial Entomologist for Nova Scotia and Professor of Entomology, Nova Scotia Agricultural College, 1913-26; author of technical papers on entomological subjects. Montreal.

*BURCHELL, CHARLES J., K.C., M.A., LL.B. Barrister; Director of Dominion Steel and Iron Co., and of Halifax Shipyards Ltd.; Lecturer on Shipping and Admiralty Law at Dalhousie Law School, Halifax, Nova Scotia; Delegate for Canada and legal adviser for Canadian Government at Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation, 1929.

*CORBETT, PROFESSOR PERCY ELWOOD, M.C., M.A. Professor of Roman Law and Lecturer in International Law at McGill University; Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford, 1922-4; Member of the Secretariat, League of Nations and I.L.O., 1920-4; Dean of the Faculty of Law, McGill University, 1928-36; author of *Erasmus' Institutio Principio* (1921), *Canada and World Politics* (with H. A. Smith) (1928), *The Roman Law of Marriage* (1930), *The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes* (1937). Montreal.

GRIESBACH, MAJOR-GENERAL SENATOR WILLIAM ANTROBUS, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., K.C. Member (Conservative) of Canadian Senate since 1921; Member, House of Commons, 1917-21. Edmonton.

HARRINGTON, COLONEL GORDON SIDNEY, K.C., LL.D. Mayor, Glace Bay, N.S., 1913; Deputy-Minister of Overseas Military Forces, 1918; Minister of Public Works and Mines, Nova Scotia, 1925-33, Premier 1930-3; Chairman, Canadian Social Insurance Commission, 1935-6. Halifax.

- *MACKENZIE, PROFESSOR NORMAN ARCHIBALD MACRAE, M.M. with bar, LL.M., Professor of International Law in the University of Toronto; former Legal Adviser to International Labour Office; Chairman, Research Committee, Canadian Institute of International Affairs; author of *The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries* (1937), *Canada and the Law of Nations* (1938).
- MCLEAN, JAMES STANLEY. President, Canada Packers Limited; Vice-President, Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Director, Canadian Bank of Commerce, Toronto.
- QUENNEVILLE, CHARLES, B.A., Ph.L. Secretary, Catholic School Board, Windsor, Ontario; author of *Essentials of Economics* (1935), *Separate School Statistics* (1938).
- SCOTT, PROFESSOR FRANCIS REGINALD, B.A., B.Litt. (Oxon.), B.C.L.; Professor of Civil Law, McGill University; author of *Social Planning for Canada* (with others) (1935), *Canada To-day* (1938). Montreal.
- SOWARD, PROFESSOR FREDERIC HUBERT, B.A. (Toronto), B.Litt. (Oxon.), (Secretary of Group). Professor of History, University of British Columbia; Chairman, Vancouver Branch, Canadian Institute of International Affairs; author of *Moulders of National Destinies* (1938); Co-editor, *Civilization in Europe and the World* (1936); *Canada and the League of Nations* (1932).
- *TARR, EDGAR J., K.C., LL.D. (Chairman of Group). Barrister; President Monarch Life Assurance Company; President, Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Winnipeg.
- *TAYLOR, PROFESSOR KENNETH WIFFIN, M.A. Professor of Political Economy, McMaster University; Special Adviser, Canadian Delegation Imperial Economic Conference, Ottawa, 1932; Economic Adviser, Royal Commission on Anthracite Coal, 1936-7; Economic Adviser to Government of Ontario, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 1937-8; author with H. Michell and C. A. Curtis of *Statistical Contributions to Canadian Economic History* (1930); with H. Marshall and F. Southard of *Canadian-American Industry—A Study in International Investment* (1936). Hamilton.

SECRETARIAT

GORDON, DUNCAN.	MCLEAN, MISS MARY, M.A.
MCCARTHY, JOHN L. C.	MCLEAN, WILLIAM, B.Sc.

INDIA

ALI, SYED AMJAD, O.B.E., M.L.A., B.A. (Secretary of Group). Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Premier, Punjab; Secretary to the Muslim Delegation to the 2nd and 3rd Round Table Conferences; Secretary of the British India Delegation to the Joint Select Committee, London, 1933; Honorary Private Secretary to the Aga Khan in India in 1934-6; Resident Secretary of the Unionist Party, 1936-7. Lahore.

GHIASUDDIN, MOHAMMAD. Member of the Indian Legislative Assembly. Lahore.

KUNZRU, THE HON. PANDIT HIRDAY NATH, LL.D. (Hon.), B.A., B.Sc. (Chairman of the Group). Member of the Council of State; President of the Servants of India Society since January 1936; presided over the East Africa Indian National Congress, 1929; Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1927-30; Delegate to East Africa Indian National Congress in London, 1929 and 1930; President of the National Liberal Federation of India, 1934; author of *Public Services in India*. Allahabad.

NAG, DR. KALIDAS, M.A. (Calcutta), D. Litt. (Paris). Principal, Mahinda College, Ceylon, 1919-20; represented India, Third International Congress of Education, Geneva, 1922; temporary collaborator (11th Assembly), League of Nations, Geneva; inaugurated the Indian Department as first Visiting Professor, University of Hawaii; Founder-Secretary, Greater India Society, 1926-30; Hon. Trustee of the Pan-Pacific Union, Honolulu, 1937; author of *Les Théories Diplomatiques de l'Inde ancienne et l'Arthasastra*; translations into French of Rabindranath Tagore's *Balaka*, *Cygne*; *Art and Archaeology Abroad*; Editor, *India and the World* (1930-2); *Monuments and Museums of the Far East*. Calcutta.

IRELAND

DILLON, JAMES MATHEW, T.D. Barrister; Deputy Chairman, United Ireland Party; Member (Fine Gael) of Dail Eireann for County Donegal, 1932-7 and for County Monaghan since 1937; Farmer and Merchant. Roscommon.

DOCKRELL, HENRY MORGAN, T.D. Chairman of Messrs. Thomas Dockrell, Sons & Co., Dublin; Director of the Celtic Insurance Co. and of Sherwin-Williams (Ireland) Ltd.; Trustee of the Dublin Savings Bank; Member (Fine Gael)

of Dail Eireann for County Dublin since 1932; past President of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce.

MEENAN, JAMES, M.A. (Secretary of Group). Barrister; Lecturer in National Economics in University College, Dublin; author of various papers on population questions and Irish economic policy.

O'FARRELL, John Thomas. Irish Secretary of the Railway Clerks' Association; Chairman of Film Censorship Board and Labour Advocate before Irish Railways Wages Board; Chairman of Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, 1927; Member of Irish Free State Senate, 1922-36; Free State representative at various Inter-parliamentary Union Conferences, 1924-30. Dublin.

O'SULLIVAN, DONAL JOSEPH (Chairman of Group). Barrister; Clerk of the Senate, 1925-36; Honorary Secretary of the Irish Branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association; a Vice-President of the Irish Society for the Study of International Affairs; member of the Royal Irish Academy and of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland; editor of *Journal of the Irish Folk Song Society*; *The Bunting Collection of Irish Folk Music and Songs*, vols. i-v. Dublin.

NEW ZEALAND

AIREY, WILLIS THOMAS GOODWIN, M.A. (N.Z.), B.A. (Oxon.). Lecturer in History, Auckland University College since 1929; author of *Onward? A Study of the League of Nations and the Principles of International Co-operation* (1929), *Short History of New Zealand* (with J. B. Condcliffe) (1938), *Britain and World Affairs, 1783-1936* (1938). Auckland.

BORRIE, WILFRED DAVID, M.A. (Assistant-Secretary to Group). Ross Research Fellow in the University of Otago; author of *A History of Immigration to New Zealand since 1854* (in preparation). Dunedin.

ELDER, DR. JOHN RAWSON, C.M.G., M.A., D.Litt. Professor of History, University of Otago; author of *The Royal Fishery Companies of the Seventeenth Century*, *The Highland History of 1678*, *Spanish Influences in Scottish History*, *The Letters and Journals of Samuel Marsden*, *Marsden's Lieutenants*. Dunedin.

FREE, ALAN WALTER. LL.B. Barrister and Solicitor; Member, Wellington Institute for Educational Research; Board of New Zealand Co-operative Alliance; Wellington New Education Fellowship Provisional Committee; regular contributor to *To-morrow* (1935-8). Wellington.

HAY, ERNST PETERSON. Barrister and Solicitor. Wellington.

LAWN, GEORGE. Lecturer in Economics at Canterbury College since 1927; member of the Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Wellington.

MCARTHUR, HARRY DE COURCY. General Manager, The Provident Life Assurance Company Ltd. Dunedin.

MILNER, FRANK, C.M.G., M.A. Headmaster, Waitaki Boys' High School since 1906; Overseas Member, English Headmasters' Conference; first President, New Zealand Teachers' Federation. Oamaru.

MORRISON, STEWART RUTHERFORD, M.A. School-teacher; author of *History of Native Administration in Western Samoa*. Dunedin.

POWLES, GUY RICHARDSON (Secretary of Group). Barrister; Honorary Secretary, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs; Chairman, Editorial Committee, *Contemporary New Zealand*. Wellington.

*STEWART, THE HON. WILLIAM DOWNIE, LL.B. (Chairman of Group). Mayor of Dunedin, 1913; M.P. for Dunedin West, 1914-35; Minister of Customs and Finance, and Attorney-General at various times, 1921-33; Acting Prime Minister, 1926; author of *State Socialism in New Zealand* (with J. E. Le Rossignol), *Life and Times of Sir Francis Bell* (1937), Introduction to Siegfried's *Democracy in New Zealand*; editor, *The Journal of George Hepburn*. Dunedin.

SUTCH, WILLIAM BALL, M.A., B.Com., Ph.D. Secretary to Minister of Finance; Member of New Zealand Delegation, Imperial Conference, 1937; substitute delegate for New Zealand at meeting of League Council and Assembly at Geneva, May 1937; author of *Price Fixing in New Zealand* (1932), *Recent Economic Changes in New Zealand* (1936). Wellington.

WILLIAMS, DAVID OWEN. Director, Bank of New Zealand; late Lecturer in Economics, Victoria University College and Massey Agricultural College; part author and editor, *Agricultural Organization in New Zealand*. Wellington.

WOOD, PROFESSOR FREDERICK LLOYD WHITFIELD. Professor of History, Victoria University College, Wellington; temporary collaborator on Secretariat, League of Nations, September 1937; Chairman, Wellington Branch, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs; author of *Constitutional Development of Australia*, *Concise History of Australia*.

SOUTH AFRICA

VAN DER BYL, MAJOR PIET V.G., M.C., M.A. (Cantab.), M.P. (Bredasdorp, United Party), (Chairman of Group). Farmer; wool and wheat interests; Chairman (local board) United Dominions Corp.; Director of South African Mutual Life Assurance Society, *Die Suiderstem*, &c.; President, Western Province Agricultural Society; on staff of General Botha, 1914 Campaign; G.H.Q., General Smuts' G.E.A. Campaign; A.D.C. to Earl Haig, 1921. Caledon.

FRANKEL, PROFESSOR S. HERBERT, M.A. (Rand.), Ph.D. (Lond.). Professor and Head of the Department of Economics and Economic History, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; co-Editor, *South African Journal of Economics*; *The Forum* (South African National Weekly); author of *Co-operation and Competition in the Marketing of Maize* (1928), *The Railway Policy of South Africa* (1928); co-author of *Coming of Age, Studies in South African Citizenship and Politics* (1930), *Capital Investment in Africa* (African Research Survey, Royal Institute of International Affairs) (1938).

*GEYER, ALBERTUS LOURENS, M.A. (Stellenbosch), Ph.D. (Berlin). Editor of *Die Burger* since 1924; Chairman of the Archives Commission of the Union of South Africa; author of *Das Wirtschaftliche System der Niederlaendischen ostindischen Kompagnie am Kap der Guten Hoffnung, 1785-95* (1923), *Die Stellenbosse Gemeente tot, 1806* (1924). Capetown.

HOERNLE, PROFESSOR R. F. A., M.A., B.Sc. (Oxon.). Professor of Philosophy, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; Chairman, South African Institute of Race Relations; Lecturer in Moral Philosophy, St. Andrews University, 1905-7; Assistant Professor, Harvard University, 1914-20; author of *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics* (1920), *Matter, Mind, Life and God* (1923), *Idealism as a Philosophical Doctrine* (1925), *Idealism as a Philosophy* (1927).

HOFMEYR, HON. GYSBERT REITZ, C.M.G. Administrator of the Territory of South-West Africa, 1920-6; Union Government's representative in respect of South-West Africa, Permanent Mandates Commission; Member, South African Delegation, 5th Assembly of the League of Nations; Member of Angola-South-West Africa Commission, 1926; author of *The First Sketch of a Practical Plan for Union of South Africa* (1907); edited for publication the *Minutes of the South African National Convention, An Undivided White South Africa* (1916). Capetown.

- *STALLARD, COLONEL CHARLES FRAMPTON, K.C., D.S.O., M.C.
Leader of the Dominion Party; former M.P. for Roodepoort;
Member, Provincial Council, Transvaal, 1910. Johannesburg.

UNITED KINGDOM

- BENTWICH, PROFESSOR NORMAN, O.B.E., M.C., M.A.,
D.Litt. (Hon.) (Pennsylvania). Professor of International
Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Legal
Secretary, 1920-2, and Attorney-General, 1922-31, in
Palestine; Assistant to League of Nations High Commissioner
for German Refugees, 1933-6; author of *The Practice of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council* (1912), *The
Mandate System* (1930), *England in Palestine* (1932), *The
Religious Foundations of Internationalism* (1933), *Palestine*
(Modern World Series) (1934), *The Jews* (1934).
- BEVIN, ERNEST. Founder and General Secretary, Transport
and General Workers' Union; Director of the *Daily Herald*;
Past Adviser to the International Labour Conferences at
Geneva; Member the General Council of the Trades Union
of Congress since 1925. London.
- BURNETT-STUART, GENERAL SIR JOHN (THEODOSIUS), G.C.B.,
K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O. General Officer Commanding
Madras District, 1920-2; Director of Military Operations
and Intelligence, War Office, 1922-6; General Officer
Commanding 3rd Division, 1926-30; General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief British Troops in Egypt and Palestine,
1931-4; General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern
Command, 1934-8; retired 1938; A.D.C. General to the
King, 1935-8. Stuartfield, Scotland.
- CAZALET, CAPTAIN VICTOR ALEXANDER, M.C., M.P. (Con-
servative). Private Secretary to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister,
1922-3; Parliamentary Private Secretary to the President
of the Board of Trade, 1924-5. London.
- CURTIS, LIONEL, M.A. (Oxon.), D.Litt. (Melb.), Fellow of All
Souls' College, Oxford. Member, Council of the Royal Institute
of International Affairs; Town Clerk of Johannesburg, 1901;
Assistant Colonial Secretary to the Transvaal, 1903; Member
Transvaal Legislative Council, 1907; Beit Lecturer, Colonial
History, Oxford, 1912; Secretary to Irish Conference, 1921;
Adviser on Irish Affairs, Colonial Office, 1921-4; author
of *The Commonwealth of Nations* (1916), *Dyarchy* (1921),
The Capital Question of China (1932), *The Commonwealth
of God* (1938).

FRASER, PROFESSOR ALLAN MACPHERSON, M.A. (Edinburgh). Professor of History and Economics, Memorial University College, St. John's, Newfoundland; Hon. Secretary, Newfoundland Branch, Royal Institute of International Affairs; author of 'Government by Commission in Newfoundland, 1934-6—A Survey', in *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, February 1937.

HADOW, MISS GRACE, M.A. Principal, Society of Oxford Home-Students; Vice-Chairman of the National Federation of Women's Institutes; Member, General Advisory Council, B.B.C.; Executive Committee, National Council of Social Service; Hebdomadal Council, Oxford University; author of *Chaucer and His Times*, Litzmann's *Life of Clara Schumann* (translation); with W. H. Hadow, *The Oxford Treasury of English Literature*.

HANCOCK, PROFESSOR WILLIAM KEITH, M.A. Professor of History at the University of Birmingham; formerly Professor of History, University of Adelaide; author of *Ricasoli* (1926), *Australia* (1930), *Problems of Nationality, 1918-36* (*Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. i) (1937).

KELLY, ADMIRAL SIR (WILLIAM ARCHIBALD) HOWARD, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O. Admiralty Representative on League of Nations, 1927-9; Commander-in-Chief, China Station, 1931-3; retired 1936. London.

LOTHIAN, THE MARQUESS OF; PHILIP HENRY KERR, C.H., M.A. (Chairman of Group). Secretary, Rhodes Trust; Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1916-21; Under-Secretary of State for India, 1931-2; Member, India Round Table Conference, &c., 1930-3.

MINTER, SIR FREDERICK ALBERT, K.C.V.O., J.P. Chairman of F. G. Minter Ltd.; Member of Special Committee for Public Relations, Building Industries National Council; past President Builders' Benevolent Institution, &c. London.

PRATT, SIR JOHN THOMAS, K.B.E., C.M.G. Lately Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs to the Foreign Office; Consul-General, Tsinan, Nanking, and Shanghai, 1919-24; Acting Counsellor, Diplomatic Service, 1929-38; retired April 1938. London.

WALKER, JAMES, M.P. (Labour), J.P. Political Secretary, British Iron, Steel and Kindred Trades Association; Chairman, Scottish T.U.C.; Member, Scottish Advisory Board on Education, 1921-9; Member, National Executive of British Labour Party. London.

WYNDHAM, THE HON. HUGH ARCHIBALD. Assistant Private Secretary to Lord Milner in South Africa, 1901; Member of the Union House of Assembly, 1910-20; author of *Native Education* (1933), *The Atlantic and Slavery* (1935), *The Atlantic and Emancipation* (1937) in the series *Problems of Imperial Trusteeship*. London.

*ZIMMERN, PROFESSOR SIR ALFRED. Montague Burton Professor of International Relations, Oxford; and at University of Wales, 1919-21; Professor of Political Science, Cornell University, U.S.A., 1922-3; Deputy-Director, League of Nations Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1925-30; Founded Geneva School of International Studies, 1924; author of *The Greek Commonwealth* (1911), *Nationality and Government* (1918), *Europe in Convalescence* (1922), *The Third British Empire* (1926), *The Prospects of Democracy* (1929), *The League of Nations and The Rule of Law* (1936).

SECRETARIAT

HARVEY, MISS HEATHER JOAN (Secretary of Group). Secretary of Study Groups Department, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

BOSANQUET, DAVID GRAHAM, B.A. (Cantab.) (Assistant Secretary of Group).

CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

CORBETT, MISS LESLEY (Private Secretary to Mr. Ivison S. Macadam). Portland, Oregon, U.S.A.

DUNCAN, MISS ADA CONSTANCE, M.A. (Melb.). Secretary, Victorian Branch of League of Nations Union; former Secretary of the Japanese Y.W.C.A. in Tokyo and Kyoto. Melbourne.

FRY, MRS. ORMA HOWARD (Conference Librarian). Councillor of the Queensland Free Library Movement. Brisbane.

GRAY, FRANCIS ANTHONY (Conference Minutes Secretary).

GRAY, WILLIAM MAXWELL (Accommodation Officer). Secretary, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Victorian Branch. Melbourne.

HADLEY, GUY DESMOND (Assistant Conference Secretary). Assistant to the Secretary, and Secretary to the Imperial Committee, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

HILL, ALEC J. Sydney.

- *HODSON, H. V., M.A. (Oxon.), (Conference Recorder). Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford, 1928-35; on staff of Economic Advisory Council, 1930-1; author of *Economics of a Changing World* (1933); *Slump and Recovery*, 1929-37 (1938). London.
- *MACADAM, IVISON S., C.B.E., M.V.O. (Conference Secretary). Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs since 1929; Secretary of the First British Commonwealth Relations Conference, Toronto, 1933. London.
- MARTIN, ROBERT ORMSBY, B.A. Hon. Secretary, Commonwealth Council, Australian Institute of International Affairs. Sydney.
- MARTIN, S. G. O. (Conference Entertainment and Transportation Officer). Barrister; Hon. Secretary New South Wales Branch, Australian Institute of International Affairs; joint editor of *New South Wales Statutes (Incorporated and Annotated)*, 1824-1937.
- MASSEY, LIONEL VINCENT (Secretary, Press Committee). London.
- MAUGHAN, MRS. DAVID (Official Hostess). President Guild of Empire, 1930-8; Executive of the National Council of Women and of the Queen's Jubilee Fund. Sydney.
- SCOTT, MISS MARY ELIZABETH. Oxford.
- SHEPHERD, MRS. BETTIE. Sydney.
- SHEPHERD, JACK, M.A. (Australian Organizing Secretary). Retiring Hon. Secretary, Commonwealth Council, Australian Institute of International Affairs; Assistant Lecturer in History, University of Sydney, 1935-8; University Tutorial Lecturer in International Affairs, 1937-8. Sydney.
- THOMSON, MISS ESTHER, B.Sc. Sydney.
- WAY, FRANCIS HARMSWORTH (Conference Treasurer). Chartered Accountant; Hon. Treasurer, Australian Institute of International Affairs, New South Wales Branch. Sydney.
- WEIGALL, MISS MARGARET, B.A. Sydney.

INDEX

- Abyssinia: League of Nations problem, 25; New Zealand and Italian conquest, 95.
- Afghanistan, British relations with, 36.
- Africa, British interests in, 37.
- African Colonies: make-weights in European balance, 253.
- Afrikaans-speaking S. Africans: sympathies with Germany, 252.
- Agenda Committee, constitution of, 6.
- Agriculture, British, 21.
- Air bases: in Far East, 38; potentialities of Pacific islands, 91.
- Air defence, British, 44.
- Air Force: instrument of British intervention, 208.
- Air routes, New Zealand, 89.
- Air warfare, advantages of, 208.
- Ali, Amjad, xi.
- Americas, The: British interests in, 40-1.
- Anglo-American Relations: proposals for improvement, 234.
- Anglo-American trade pact: Australian view, 68.
- Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 29-30.
- Anglo-Irish Agreement, 100; strategic aspects of, 44, 102.
- Anglo-Italian Agreement, 35-6.
- Anti-fascism: American, 261; factor in Commonwealth unity, 252.
- Arab countries, British interests in, 36-7.
- Argentina: British economic interests, 41.
- Arrangements and Agenda Committee, *see* Agenda Committee.
- Asia: British responsibilities in, 232; future of British Commonwealth in, 229-33.
- Asiatic peoples: assumed inferiority of, 230; grievances of, 232.
- Atlantic Ocean: importance to Great Britain, 43.
- Austrian theory of sovereignty, 226.
- Australia: air force, 79; Anglo-American trade pact, 68; anti-British minority, 64; army, 79; attitude to Great Britain, 72-4; attitude to Japan, 76; British market, 67; capital requirements, 182; Commonwealth Grants Commission, 64; defence policy and expenditure, 78-81; defence problem, 138; economic development, 64-6; Empire markets, 67; factors in external policy, 72; Far Eastern policy, 190-1; foreign markets, 68; foreign policy, 77-8; 139-40; geographical factors, 75-7; immigration policy, 71; Indian immigration, 215; Labour Party policy, 140; League of Nations policy, 74-5; 'liaison officer' in London, 204; Loan Council, 64; migration, question of, 141-2; national unity, 63-4; navy, 79; need for economic co-operation with China and Japan, 257; New Guinea mandate, 141; Ottawa Agreement, 67, 140; place in British Commonwealth, 137; population capacity, 69-70; protectionism, 66-9; racial homogeneity, 64; refugees, admission of, 142; relations with U.S.A., 75; representative on Editorial Committee, xi; special day of prayer, 116; tariff policy, 66-9; White Australia policy, 64-5.
- Australian Institute of International Affairs, studies prepared by, 307-8.
- Australian Labour movement: money gift to Spain, 239-40.
- Austria: attitude of European powers, 30-1.
- Bailey, Professor K. H., xi.
- Balfour Declaration, 123, 126.
- Bavin, Sir Thomas: closing of Conference, 296; inaugural address to Conference, 121-32; welcomes Conference delegates, 116-17.
- Belgium: guarantees of neutrality, 29.

- Bentwich, Professor Norman: speaker on Refugee Problem, 288.
- Berlin Act: application to colonial problem, 253.
- Bermuda: strategic value, 41.
- Bevin, Ernest: moves vote of thanks, 295-6.
- Board of Trade and Foreign Office, departmentalization of policy between, 254.
- 'Boot-lace school', 255.
- British Columbia, Indians in, 150; 214.
- British Commonwealth: admission of new members, 277-8; Canadian attitude, 62-3; class differences, 108; common causes, 125-6, 132; contrasting groups among, 270; current economic trends, 171; defence objectives, 167-8; differences among, 106-8; disparity of interests and power, 270; diversity of inter-relationships, 202; dynamic destiny of, 257-8; economic co-operation, 167-71; economic differences, 108; economic objectives, 169; European commitments, 109-10; expansion of, 237; financial position, 181-4; free trade *v.* protection, 176; future economic problems, 174-6; future of, 276-9; future of in relation to Asia, 229-33; future of in relation to World Order, 236-42; future relations with U.S.A., 233-6; ideological objectives, 169; individual interests, 135-66; means to an end, not an end in itself, 279; methods of co-operation, 184-8; need for common policy, 131; nucleus of system of world government, 221; path to world order, 278; philosophic purpose of, 237; probable lines of expansion, 240; promotion of world peace, 260; purpose of, ix; regional classification of interests, 269; regular assembly meetings suggested, 206; religious differences, 107; right of neutrality, 222-5; social and human problems, 228.
- British Commonwealth Relations Conference (1938): channels of influence, 3-5; compared with Toronto Conference, 127; confidential nature of, xii; documentation of, 15; effect of Czech-German crisis on deliberations, 10-11; evening meetings, 288; first public session, 115; inaugural address, 121-32; influence of international crisis upon, 245-6; meeting places, 284-5; members, annotated list of, 310-20; messages to and from H.M. the King, 120-1; officers and members of, 284; origins of, 5; plan of Report, xii; plans for third Conference, 290; plenary sessions, 287; press criticism of, xii; Recorder of, xi; selection of delegates, 9-10; standing of, viii; task of, 122; value of, vii; venue and date, xi.
- British Empire: diminishing as Commonwealth expands, 237. *See also* British Commonwealth.
- British Isles, strategic unity of, 44. *See also* United Kingdom.
- British Navy: effect on colonial problem, 253; Halifax and Esquimalt harbours, 61; value to Canada, 58-9.
- British North America Act, Privy Council interpretation of, 63.
- British policy, need for Dominions support of, 204.
- Broadcasts, 4, 289.
- Brussels Conference, 40.
- Burma: admission to Commonwealth, 237.
- Cameroons: suggested cession to Germany, 193.
- Canada: Air Force, 61; attitude to Fascism, 55-6; attitude towards British Empire, 62-3; attitude towards Japanese expansion, 147; British Columbian Indians, 150; defence policy, 56-62; 147-8; defensive independence of Great Britain, 46; economic interests and policies, 48-50; foreign policy, 47, 51-4, 148-9; fundamental factors in position

- of, 146-7; increase of French-Canadians, 50; League of Nations, 54-5; linguistic division, 47; military preparations, 53; militia strength, 60-2; navy, 60; neutrality question, 148-9; non-socialistic policy, 49-50; Ottawa Agreements, attitude towards, 149-50; Pan-American Union, 57, 235-6, 262; population problems, 49; primary interests in N. America, 270; problems peculiar to, 200-1; rearmament, 60; relations with Newfoundland, 161; relations with U.S.A., 57-8; representative on Editorial Committee, xi; tariff policy, 48; unity of, 47, value of British Navy, 58-9; view of British foreign policy, 53-4; view of Far Eastern problems, 189-90; views on secession, 51-2.
- Canada To-day*, 47.
- Canadian Institute of International Affairs, studies prepared by, 306-7.
- Cazalet, Capt. Victor: speaker on Czechoslovakia, 288.
- Catholic Church: factor in Irish relations with British Commonwealth, 103.
- Central Africa, Open Door in, 253.
- Chatham House: initiative in convening Conference, 6; studies prepared by, 305.
- China: Australian economic co-operation with, 257; British investments in, 38; British policy towards, 39, 232; British trade with, 38.
- Collective security: Australian attitude, 74-5; Canadian view, 55; divided Commonwealth view, 106-7; moral forces as means to, 259; New Zealand view, 93-5; United States attitude, 261.
- Colonial Empire: capital requirements, 183.
- Colonial problem: aspects of, 252-4; British Labour policy, 193; South African views on, 192-3. *See also* German Colonies; Mandates.
- Commission I: agenda, 300-1; matters discussed, 136-7; report of, 135-66; sessions of, 285; subject-matter of, 8; task of, 135.
- Commission II: agenda, 301-3; sessions of, 286; subject-matter of, 8; task of, 167.
- Commission III: agenda, 303-4; sessions of, 286; subject-matter of, 9; task of, 189.
- Commission IV: agenda, 304; sessions of, 287; subject-matter of, 9; task of, 218.
- Common policy, obstacles to, 266.
- Commonwealth Assembly, project of, 271.
- Commonwealth Co-operation: bases and character of, 195-213, 267; in foreign policy and defence, 264-9; meaning and technique of, 204-7; moral basis of, 249; ways of development, 228.
- Commonwealth Economic Council, suggested formation of, 187, 251.
- Commonwealth Grants Commission, Australian, 64.
- Commonwealth Investment Board, suggested, 184.
- Commonwealth Labour Conference, hopes for, 228.
- Condescension, British attitude of, discarding of, 277.
- Consultation, inter-Dominion, value of, 206.
- Consultative Commonwealth, conception of, 276.
- Cook Islands: strategic importance to New Zealand, 91.
- 'Co-operation without liability', 205, 272.
- Crown, The, Commonwealth loyalty to, 247.
- Cyprus: defensive development, 34.
- Czech-German crisis: effect on Conference's deliberations, 10-11, 245-6.
- Czechoslovakia: British interests with, 30; Captain Victor Cazalet, speaker on, 288.
- Czechoslovakian question, Dominions ignorance concerning, 222.
- Defence: Australian, 78-81, 138; British policy, 42-6; Canadian,

- 56-62, 147-8; Dominion influence, proposed extensions of, 208-9; Indian organization, 156; Ireland's position, 144; New Zealand, 95-7, 151; objectives of Commonwealth economic co-operation, 167-8; proposed change in Indian organization, 156; South African, 160.
- Defence co-operation, Commonwealth scope of, 273.
- Delegates to Conference, selection of, 9-10.
- Democratic nations: admissibility to Commonwealth of Nations, 237.
- De Valera party: not represented on Irish delegation, 265.
- Dictatorship states: American aversion towards, 261; Commonwealth relations with, 252.
- Divine purpose of British nations, discarding of tacit assumption of, 277.
- Dominion independence and Imperial Federation, middle course between, 227.
- Dominions: contrasting groups of, 270; control of issues of peace and war, 219; defensive independence, 46; different grades of, 227; participation in European war, 196-8; still colonies in matter of peace or war, 222; withholding of rights of, 226. *See also* British Commonwealth.
- Dominions interests, regional classification of, 269.
- Dutch East Indies: relations with British Commonwealth, 209.
- East and West, relations between, 252.
- Economic co-operation, Commonwealth opportunities of, 254.
- Economic interests, British, 18-23.
- Editorial Committee: original membership, xi; purpose of, 288.
- Education: effects of Western methods in Asia and Africa, 231.
- Edwards, Canon W. J., 288.
- Egypt, British policy towards, 34.
- Eire: *see* Ireland.
- 'Enlightened self-interest', 198; basis for Commonwealth co-operation, 203.
- Esquimaux Harbour: use by British fleet, 61.
- Europe, principles of British relations with, 27.
- Europe, United States of, 163; Asiatic resentment of scheme, 230.
- European problem: Dominions' attitude, 109-10.
- European war: Dominions' participation in, 196-8; speculations as to probable effect, 276.
- Evening meetings of Conference, 288.
- Expeditionary force, British abandonment of idea of, 272-4.
- Far East: Australian interests and policy, 75-6; 190-1; British interests and policy, 38-40; 190; Canadian attitude, 189-90; Commonwealth policies towards, 189-91; Indian view of British policy, 189; New Zealand attitude, 90-1, 190-1.
- Fascism: antipathy towards, 251; Canadian attitude, 55-6; Irish attitude, 103.
- Federation, impracticability of, 240. *See also* Imperial Federation.
- Financial policy, British, 20-1.
- Foreign Office and Board of Trade, departmentalization of policy between, 254.
- Foreign policy: Australian, 72-4, 77-8, 139-40; British, 17-18; 23-7, 162-4, 199, 263-4; Canadian, 47, 51-4, 148-9; continuity of, in Great Britain, 207; 'co-ordination of', 269; definitions of British, 199; Dominions' responsibility, 128-9; Indian, 154; Newfoundland, 161; New Zealand, 92-3; 151-2; obstacles to full Commonwealth co-operation, 265; official theory relating to British Commonwealth, 219; South African, 160; ultimate and immediate objectives distinguished, 267.
- Fortified bases, overseas, 43.

- France, British bonds with, 225, 226, 248.
- Frankel, Professor S. H., xi.
- Free Trade, Commonwealth approach to, 254.
- French-Canadians: attitude towards Commonwealth, 52; increase of, 50; influence on foreign policy, 51; nationalist movement, 50; religious affinity with Italy, 252.
- General Approach, Agenda Committee's 'Note' on, 6, 299-300.
- German Colonies: Australian view, 77; South African attitude, 192-3. *See also* Mandates.
- German-Czech crisis: effect on Conference's deliberations, 10-11, 245-6.
- Germany: British 'questionnaire', 30; British reaction to rearmament, 29; results of withdrawal from League, 28; sympathy of Afrikaans-speakers, 252; wool agreement with South Africa, 158.
- Gold, price of: effect on South African industry, 157-8.
- Gray, Anthony, xi.
- Great Britain: *see* United Kingdom.
- Hague, Permanent Court of International Justice: arbitration in Commonwealth disputes, 210-11.
- Haifa pipe-line, 36.
- Halifax Harbour: use by British fleet, 61.
- Hanseatic League: example to British Commonwealth, 269.
- Hoare-Laval plan, 25.
- Hodson, H. V., xi.
- Hoernle, Professor R. F. A.: speaker on Race Problem in South Africa, 288.
- Home defence, United Kingdom, 44.
- Hong Kong, Britain's position in, 38.
- Honolulu: race-fusion research, 217.
- Ideological war, concept of, 26.
- Ideologies: place in world order, 251.
- Imperial Defence, 207-9; British view, 42.
- Imperial Federation: middle course between this and Dominion independence, 227; rejection of, 221.
- Imperial interests, diversity of, 202-3.
- India: absence of preparatory documents, 15; admission to Commonwealth, 237; anomalous situation of, 264; Constitution problem, 156-7; defence organization, proposed changes, 156; defence position, 45-6; 191-2; dissatisfaction with new Constitution, 154; diversifying factors, 229; emigration to Dominions, question of, 153; financial requirements and policy, 182-3; foreign policy, 154; importance of Red Sea zone, 273; migration to Dominions, 154-6; need for complete equality of status, 153-4; opinion of Japanese invasion of China, 252; position as link between West and East, 230; reactions to British foreign policy, 200; representative on Editorial Committee, xi; support for world peace, 249; White Australia policy, 65.
- Indian Migration, problem of, 213-17.
- Indian Ocean: a 'British lake', 43; importance as preserve of British power, 110.
- Indians: in British Columbia, 150; position as migrants, 179-80.
- Information, dissemination of, 206.
- Institute of Pacific Relations, meetings of, 5.
- Institutes of International Affairs, meetings on, 289.
- International Affairs: outlook of Great and Small Powers compared, 104-6.
- International crisis: effect on Conference, 10-11, 245-6.
- International Labour Organization: medium of Commonwealth economic co-operation, 254; ratification of conventions by United Kingdom, 22.

- Ireland: Catholic influence, 103; Commonwealth relations, 97, 98-9; defence problems, 144; Dominion status, 97, 98-9; economic relations with British Commonwealth, 99-101; emigration problems, 101, 145; external relations, 97; great spiritual empire, 145; impossibility of neutrality, 101-2; nationalism, 97-8; nationalism *v.* tariff interests, 146; observer at Agenda Committee meetings, 6; Ottawa Agreements, view of, 144; partition, 97-8, 145-6; population, 101; position in Commonwealth, 142-3; representative on Editorial Committee, xi; reunion question, 97-8, 145-6; status of, 264; strategic connexion with Great Britain, 101-2; trade markets, 144.
- Irish delegation: de Valera party not represented, 265.
- Irish Free State: *see* Ireland.
- Irish Group, studies prepared by, 308-9.
- Irish interests: incomplete statement of, 7.
- Isolationism: Australian, 140; Canadian view, 149.
- Italy: relations with United Kingdom, 35; religious affinity of French-Canadians with, 252.
- Japan: Australian attitude towards, 76, 257; British trade with, 38; New Zealand attitude, 91; southward ambitions, 40.
- Japanese expansion, Canadian view of, 147.
- Kenya: Indian migration to, 180; membership of Commonwealth, 239.
- King, His Majesty the: messages from and to Conference, 120-21.
- King, Rt. Hon. Mackenzie: view of foreign policy, 265.
- Kunzru, Pandit H. N.: speech at opening session of Conference, 119-20.
- Kyoto: meeting of Institute of Pacific Relations, 5.
- Lapstone, vii, 285.
- Latin America: Britain's economic interest, 41.
- League of Nations: Abyssinian problem, 25; Australian attitude, 74-5; Canadian attitude, 54-5; Commonwealth view of, 106, 127; condition of American support, 212; destruction of original purpose, 24; effect of a German withdrawal, 28; Manchurian and Abyssinian problems, 24-5; New Zealand policy, 93-5; plea for strengthening of, 211-13; problems of reconstruction, 260-61.
- 'Liaison officer', usefulness of, 204-5.
- Liberty: adjustment to World Order, 242.
- Loan Council, Australian, 64.
- Lothian, the Marquess of: speech at opening session of Conference, 117-18.
- Low Countries, independence of, 29.
- 'Lugardian' methods, 239.
- Lyons, Rt. Hon. J. A.: address at first session of Conference, 115-16.
- Macadam, Iverson S., xi.
- Maffey Report, 35.
- Malta, strategic value of, 34.
- Manchuria: League of Nations problem, 24.
- Mandates: extension of system, 253; Indian view of, 233; New Guinea, Australian policy towards, 141. *See also* German Colonies.
- Maughan, David, 288.
- Mayfair, pro-fascist circle in, 263.
- Mediterranean: British interests and strategy in, 31-5; importance to Imperial defence, 43; possibility of Britain's abandonment of, 194; strategic importance to Great Britain, 195.
- Meenan, James, xi.
- Members of Conference, annotated list of, 310-25.
- Menzies, Hon. R.: view of foreign policy, 265.

- Middle East, British interests in, 36, 193-4.
- Migration: Australian position, 69-72, 141-2, 177; British problems, 23, 164-5, 177; Canadian position, 177-8; decline of British, 23; discrimination against India, 217; from outside the Commonwealth, 180-1; Indian problems, 154-6, 179-80, 217; Irish problems, 145, 177; miscegenation factor, 216-17; New Zealand position, 88-9; 152, 178; prospects within the Commonwealth, 177-80.
- Minorities, unassimilated: effect of, 181.
- Miscegenation: factor in migration policy, 216-17.
- Montreux Convention: Italian adherence, 35.
- Most-favoured-nation clause, discussion of, 185.
- Moving Picture Industry: influence on U.S.A. world-relations, 235.
- Munitions, Dominions' capacity to manufacture, 273.
- Mutual-protection league, limited, 259.
- National sovereignty: antipathetic to world order, 260.
- Naval policy, British, 42.
- Nazi propaganda in South Africa, 192.
- Near East, British interests in, 36-7, 193-4.
- Neutrality: Canadian attitude, 148-9; Commonwealth rights of, 222-5, 274-5.
- Neutrality Act, 41.
- Newfoundland: continuance of Commission Government, 160; external trade, 160-1; foreign policy, 161; relations with Canada, 161; status, 160, 264; strategic value, 41.
- New Guinea Mandate: Australian opinion on return to Germany, 77, 141.
- New Hebrides: case for entire Australian administration, 76.
- 'New Orthodoxy' about Commonwealth relations, 275.
- New Zealand: air bases in Pacific, 91; air force, 96; air routes, 89; army, 96; Australian exports, 67; British market, 85; British sentiment, 81-2; capital requirements, 182; changed attitude towards Commonwealth and world affairs, 150-1; Commonwealth connexion, disadvantages of, 84; Constitutional dependence on Great Britain, 82-4; Cook Islands, importance of, 91; defence policy, 96-7, 151; democratic sympathies, 95; economic policy, 87-8; Far Eastern interests, 190-1; foreign policy, 92-3, 151-2; Government debt in England, 88; immigration, 88-9, 152; Indian immigration, 215, 231; Italian conquest of Abyssinia, 93; League of Nations policy, 93-5; navy, 96; Pacific policy, 91; political interest in India, 192; population, 89; proposed trade agreement with United Kingdom, 88; public services, 86-7; relations with U.S.A., 92; representative on Editorial Committee, xi; shipping, 89-90; Sino-Japanese War, 93; Spanish civil war, 93; strategic position, 90-2; tariff policy, 86; trade, 84-5; Western Samoa, future of, 152-3.
- New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, studies prepared by, 308.
- Non-white races: effects of rise to self-government, 277.
- Nyon Conference, 33.
- Oil interests, British, 36.
- Ontario: protectionist policy, 48.
- Open Door: in British Colonial Empire, 253.
- O'Sullivan, Donal, 10; chairman of evening meeting, 288; seconder of vote of thanks, 296.
- Ottawa Agreements: Anglo-European relations embarrassed by, 187; Australian view, 67, 140; 'boot-lace school' criticisms, 255; British view of, 165; Canadian attitude, 149-50, 168; criti-

- cisms of, 171-6; effect in United Kingdom, 22; Irish view, 144; 'liberalizing' of, 210, 255; New Zealand view, 85-6, 169.
- 'Ottawa School', 255.
- Oversea investments, British, 19.
- Pacific Islands, race-fusion research, 217.
- Pacific Ocean, Australian interests in, 77.
- Pacific Relations, Institute of, 5.
- Palestine: British interests in, 37; Indian objections to British policy, 230; origin of trouble, 37; partition proposal, 37, 194.
- Panama Canal: importance to British Empire, 41.
- Pan-American Union: Canadian attitude, 57, 235-6, 262; step to U.S. participation in revived League of Nations, 262.
- Pan-Asiatic league, 262.
- Pax Britannica*, 24.
- Peace, British desire for, 23-4.
- Peace and war, issues of: British and Dominion control of, 220; effect on Commonwealth foreign policy, 272.
- Permanent Court of International Justice: jurisdiction in Commonwealth disputes, 259.
- Plenary sessions, 287.
- Political insecurity: effect on concept of world order, 259.
- Population: Canadian problems, 49; decline of British increase, 23.
- Prairie Provinces of Canada: free trade policy, 48.
- Preferential tariff system, discussion of, 185-6; possible modifications of, 174-6.
- Preparatory documents, value of, 15.
- Presidents of Commissions, 287.
- Press, interviews with, 289.
- Press Committee, meetings of, 289.
- Press criticism of Conference, xii.
- Protectorates, South African: transfer to Union, 158-9.
- Public-discussion league, universal, 259.
- Public opinion, informed: need for, 271.
- Quebec: protectionist policy, 48.
- Quota boards, instrument of Commonwealth co-operation, 186-7.
- Race-cleavages: significance to Commonwealth, 252.
- Race intermixture: factor in migration policy, 216-17.
- Racial exclusiveness, problem of, 239.
- Racial problems: in U.S.A., 235.
- Rearmament: British, 26; Canadian, 60. *See also* Defence.
- Recorder of Conference, xi.
- Red Sea zone: importance to India and South Africa, 273.
- Refugee Problem, Professor Norman Bentwich's speech on, 288.
- Refugees: Australian admittance of, 142; chances of absorption in Commonwealth, 181.
- Responsibility: Dominions' measure of, 271; problem of, 274-6.
- Rhodesia: admission to Commonwealth, 236-7.
- Rome-Berlin Axis, construction of, 26.
- Rowell, Hon. Newton W., 6.
- Royal Institute of International Affairs: initiative in convening Conference, 6; studies prepared by, 305.
- Russia: *see* U.S.S.R.
- Samoa, Western: future of, 91, 152-3.
- Samuel, Viscount, 6.
- Sanctions: application against Italy, 25.
- Saudi Arabia, British relations with, 36-7.
- Scandinavia: relations with United Kingdom, 31.
- Scott, Professor F. R.: *Canada To-day*, 47.
- Secession: Canadian views, 51-2; relation to right to neutrality, 275.
- Self-sufficiency: a spurious ambition, 256.
- Sessions of the Conference, 285-8.
- Shanghai, Britain's position in, 38.
- Shipping interests, British, 20.
- Singapore Base: Australian view, 79; importance of, 43-4.

- Sino-Japanese War: New Zealand view, 93.
- Socialism, Canadian opposition to, 49-50.
- Social Philosophies: place in world order, 251.
- South Africa, Union of: absence of preparatory documents, 15; attitude towards Germany, 192-3; capital requirements, 182; caste structure of society, 239; defence and foreign policy, 160; delegation, constitution of, 10; divided attitudes towards Commonwealth relations, 165-6; future of South-West Africa, 159; importance of Red Sea Zone, 273; Indian immigration, 154-5, 159-60, 214; natives, policy towards, 157; Nazi propaganda, 192; Protectorates, transfer of, 158-9; race problem, 288; representative on Editorial Committee, xi; Status and Seals Acts, 165-6, 225; strategic position, 157, 192; Table Bay harbour, 157; War Debt paid, 158; wool agreement with Germany, 158.
- Southern Rhodesia: membership of Commonwealth, 239.
- South-West Africa, future of, 159.
- Soviet Union: *see* U.S.S.R.
- Spanish War: Australian opinion, 195; British policy, 33; Canadian doubts about British policy, 195; Irish views on, 194; New Zealand attitude, 93.
- Status, issues of: obstacle to Commonwealth co-operation, 264.
- Status and Seals Acts, 165-6; relation to South African neutrality, 225.
- Statute of Westminster, meaning of, 123.
- Steering Committee: adoption of Report, 294; membership and terms of reference, 283.
- Stevens, Hon. B. S. B.: welcomes Conference delegates, 116.
- Stewart, Hon. W. Downie: adoption of Steering Committee Report, 294.
- 'Stresa Front', 29.
- Suez Canal: convention of 1888, 35; importance to United Kingdom, 32.
- Sydney, vii., 285.
- Sydney Conference: *see* British Commonwealth Relations Conference.
- Table Bay: new harbour, 157.
- Tanganyika: danger of German air force in, 192; European settlement in, 180.
- Tariff boards as instrument of Commonwealth co-operation, 186.
- Tariff policy: British, 18-19; Canadian, 48.
- Tarr, E. J.: adoption of Steering Committee Report, 293-4.
- Taylor, Professor K. W.: xi, xiii.
- Thanks, vote of, 295-6.
- Togoland: suggested cession to Germany, 193.
- Toronto Conference: xii; compared with Sydney Conference, 127; Professor Toynbee's description of, 3; origins of, 5.
- Totalitarianism: unacceptability to Commonwealth nations, 238.
- Toynbee, Professor A. J.: description of Toronto Conference, 3.
- Trade policy: continuity in Great Britain, 207; Imperial community of, 130.
- Trade Unions, Irish: differences with employers regarding united Ireland, 146.
- Uniformity, impossibility of, 278.
- United Kingdom: Abyssinian problem, 25; agriculture, 21; air defence, 44; Australian attitude, 72-4; Australian exports, 67; bases of Commonwealth co-operation with, 199; Commonwealth interest in her strength, 248; Commonwealth trade, 165; control of high seas, 162; defence of Austrian independence, 30; defence policy, 42-6; delegation, constitution of, 10; economic interests, 18-23; effect of Ottawa Agreements, 22; emigration problems, 164-5; European interests, 27-31; Far Eastern

- policy, 190; financial policy, 20-1; foreign and empire trade, 16; foreign policy, 17-18, 23-7, 162-4, 199, 263-4; Hoare-Laval plan, 25; home defence, 44; immigration figures, 23; interests in Far East, 38-40; interests in Near East, 36-7; interests in the Americas, 40-1; Irish relations with, 97, 99; Irish reunion question, 145-6; liabilities in wartime, 196-8; Mediterranean interests, 31-5; national interests, 16-47; naval policy, 42; New Zealand exports to, 85; Ottawa Agreements, attitude towards, 165; oversea investments, 19; policy towards Spanish War, 33; political differences, 161; population increase, 23; position as a Great Power, 238; proposed trade agreement with New Zealand, 88; 'questionnaire' to Germany, 30; ratification of I.L.O. conventions, 22; rearmament, 26; relations with Egypt, 34; relations with Italy, 35; relations with Scandinavia, 31; relations with U.S.A., 40-1; relations with U.S.S.R., 31; representative on Editorial Committee, xi; responsibilities in Asia, 232; responsibility for Commonwealth defence, 164, 220; results of Ottawa commitments, 187-8; shipping interests, 20; solidarity of, 262-4; status as World Power, 16-18; strength of regular Army, 44-5; tariff policy, 18-19; tie with France, 225, 226; trade figures, 16; trade treaties, 22; transfer of South African Protectorates to Union, 158-9.
- 'United Kingdom, The Essential Interests of' (United Kingdom Paper No.1), 17.
- United States of America: attitude to collective security, 261; Australian relations with, 75; British relations with, 40-1; Commonwealth desire for close relations with, 109; Far Eastern policy, 39; future relations with British Commonwealth, 233-6; need for friendly relations with, 261; New Zealand's relations with, 92; relations with Canada, 57-8; 'small state' outlook of, 235; suggested financial co-operation in Commonwealth development, 183; support for League of Nations, 212.
- United States of Europe: 163; Asiatic resentment of scheme, 230.
- U.S.S.R.: relations with United Kingdom, 31.
- Van der Byl, Major P. G. V. (South Africa): speech at opening session of Conference, 118-19.
- Versailles peace system: reasons for failure, 28.
- Wakehurst, Lord: address to Conference, 293.
- War, British attitude towards, 23; Commonwealth participation in, 195-8.
- Washington Conference, effect of, 39.
- West Indies: strategic importance, 41.
- White Australia policy, 64-5, 142; Indian immigration, 215-16.
- Wood, Professor F. L. W., xi.
- World Order: background to Commonwealth co-operation, 211; diverse conceptions of, 240-2; effects of political insecurity, 259; false objective, 262; goal of nations, 250; meaning of, 229; nature of, 236; problem of, 218-29.
- Yosemite: meeting of Institute of Pacific Relations, 6.
- Zimmern, Professor Sir Alfred, xi.

Date Due

Nov 28 1956

JN 284 C73 1938
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS CONFERENCE
2ND 1938 SYDNEY AUSTRALIA
THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND
39751230 HSS



000015551484

JN 284 C73 1938
Commonwealth Relations Conference
(2nd : 1938 : Sydney, Australia)
The British commonwealth and
39751230 HSS

A24114